

RESEARCH ON THE MEANS TO IMPROVE HUMAN MOBILITY CHANNELS

RESEARCH PAPER 1

Understanding the Labour Markets of Key EU Destination Countries

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ABSTRACT: The focus of the first research paper is on labour market structures and skill demand in key European Union member states (Germany, Italy and the United Kingdom) to which Egyptian youth migrate. The paper will: 1) inventory key indicators of labour market structure, including elements such as share of work in the formal sector, labour market participation and (un)employment, and skill needs per sector; 2) assess existing and potential skill gaps in particular sectors of the labour market, including through review of skill production, activation, and matching of skilled workers in the labour market, and; 3) reflect on how decent work for Egyptian youth in Germany, Italy, and the UK may be facilitated given existing mobility patterns. The paper is informed by desk review of policy documents and assessments related to the labour market and skill mismatches, data sets on employment, and data on the employment and skill level of migrant workers.

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Executive Summary

The objective of this research paper is to provide a labour market profile of key European destination countries into which Egyptian youth migrate. As part of this profile, this research paper provides stylised information on the structure of the labour markets of Italy, Germany and the United Kingdom. The paper also reviews the skills demanded within those labour markets before exploring the employment and skills trends among Egyptian migrants residing in the OECD region. A combination of desk review of previous literature and descriptive analysis of secondary data on employment, skills and migration has been used to construct this profile. The research paper is intended to assist in the future design of policies and programmes that support regular migration opportunities into decent employment for Egyptian youth to key EU destination countries. The research paper is therefore intended for different stakeholders, including policymakers in national governments, programme managers of intergovernmental organisations, and staff of other relevant organisations (e.g., technical development cooperation agencies) that support labour migration programming.

This summary describes the main findings related to labour market dynamics in Germany, Italy and the United Kingdom. It also highlights findings related to the inclusion of Egyptian migrants in OECD labour markets before reflecting on the potential challenges or opportunities Egyptian migrant youth may face in the labour markets of the selected EU destination countries.

LABOUR MARKET DYNAMICS IN GERMANY, ITALY AND THE UNITED KINGDOM

The labour markets of Germany, Italy and the United Kingdom – important countries of destination for Egyptian migrants in the EU – are distinct and may accommodate Egyptian migrant youth in different ways. Elements such as labour market participation, the scale of informal employment, and the skills demanded in different sectors are important to understand in the anticipation of how migrant workers can access decent employment in these countries.

Labour market participation

Patterns of labour market participation, employment and unemployment differ across these focus countries for native- and non-native populations. The overall labour market participation rate was highest in 2018 for native-born persons in Germany (at 80%) and lowest among native-born persons in Italy (at 64.8%). Across the study countries, differences in participation rates between native-born and foreign-born populations were relatively minor, with the exception of Italy where a greater share of foreign-born (70.6%) compared to native-born persons (64.8%) were participating in the labour market (OECD, 2019).

While overall participation rates between migrant and non-migrant populations did not differ so greatly in general, unemployment was slightly different in each country according to nationality. In both the United Kingdom and Germany, approximately 75% or more of the native-born, working-age population was employed in 2018. In both countries a higher share of native-born persons were employed compared to foreign-born persons, with the native-migrant employment gap greatest in Germany (with 77.5% of the native-born population and 69.5% of the foreign-born population considered employed in 2018). Across the countries, unemployment rates were highest in Italy, where 13.7% of the foreign-born and 10.3% of the native-born population were out of work but searching for employment (OECD, 2019). The differences in labour market participation and employment/unemployment rates suggest that access to employment may be more limited in Italy for all populations, and in Germany migrants may have a more difficult time in securing employment.

Youth labour market inclusion

Across the focus countries, the labour market participation of youth differed from that of the general adult population. In 2018, just over one-quarter of the youth population in Italy participated in the labour force, compared to 50.3% in Germany and 57.1% in the United Kingdom. In general youth unemployment was higher than unemployment among the general working-age population in all countries. The unemployment gap was especially high in Italy, with youth unemployment triple that of unemployment among the general working-age population, at 32.2% compared to 10.6%. Differences in unemployment rates between youth and other age cohorts were also visible in Germany and the UK but were less stark. Compared to a general unemployment rate of 3.4% in Germany and 4.0% in the UK, youth unemployment was 6.2% and 11.3% in these countries, respectively (International Labour Organisation, 2019).

The quality of employment may differ for youth than for the general working-age population, with levels of informal employment a preliminary indicator of employment quality given its linkage to social protection, which can cushion workers against shocks such as job loss or injury. In Europe, a greater share of youth compared to adults are in informal employment, with an average of 25.8% of youth employment considered informal across developed European and Central Asian countries (compared to 14.8% among adults aged 25+). Unfortunately, data is not reported on labour informality among youth in specific countries, yet it may be anticipated that youth are more exposed to informal employment in some countries and sectors than others. The share of informal employment in total employment in 2016 was estimated at 10.2% for Germany, 19% in Italy, and 13.6% in the United Kingdom. In all three study countries, a greater share of agricultural employment in 2016 was considered informal compared to other sectors at 20% in Germany, 35.5% in the UK, and 40.8% in Italy (International Labour Organisation, 2018). Given the concentration of both young people and migrant workers in the agricultural sector across the EU (Schuh et al., 2019), migrant youth may be more exposed to informal employment than other population groups.

Skill needs and gaps

Youth represent an important resource for labour markets across the globe, but they are becoming a scarce resource in countries facing demographic shifts – including in Germany, Italy and the United Kingdom. Demographic transitions coupled with changing labour market structures may imply that some countries in the European Union will face shortages in the availability of workers with needed skill profiles.

A recent assessment of the scale and type of labour shortages in key sectors across the European Union suggested that labour shortages across skill levels were acute across several countries and sectors. Across the EU, demand for low- and medium-skilled household-based personal care workers, restaurant staff and cleaning personnel exceeded supply in 2015, suggesting the production of such categories of workers is not sufficient for the needs of the labour market (European Migration Network, 2015). Germany and the United Kingdom expressed the highest skill shortages in the EU-15, whereas Italy demonstrated the lowest levels of skills shortages (Vandeplass & Thum-Thysen, 2019).

As a complement to analyses of *current* labour market and skills gaps, forecasts provide a sense of which occupations and sectors will produce the greatest number of job openings in the future. Between 2016-2030, around 66.3 million job openings are expected to arise across the study countries, with the largest number appearing in the German labour market. The majority of job openings (100% in Germany, 90% in Italy and 87% in the UK) will not be for newly-created jobs but rather for replacement of current workers, for example due to retirement. The anticipated demand for workers of different skill levels is expected to vary across the study countries. While more than half of job openings generated between 2016 and 2030 in all three countries will be in medium-skilled occupations, the United Kingdom will have significant need for high-skilled workers, with 46% of job openings in this skill category. In both Germany and Italy, important shares of job openings (12% in Germany and 14% in Italy) will be for low-skilled occupations. Across all three countries, significant numbers of jobs will become available for workers in business and administration functions, with this category of occupation constituting the highest-demand occupation in Germany and Italy and the third-highest-demand occupation in the UK. Job openings will also arise in low-skilled occupations, however, including for personal service workers (which will be the second-highest-demanded occupation in Germany), cleaners and helpers (which will be the second-highest-demanded occupation in Italy), and labourers in mining, construction, manufacturing, and transport (which will be the second-most-demanded occupation category in the UK) (CEDEFOP, 2019b). The growth of specific sectors in the labour markets of Germany, Italy, and the United Kingdom are likely to outpace the domestic supply of workers. The anticipated labour gap in all three countries may be filled by migrant workers, yet it is important to recognise the role of skills and occupational competencies in ensuring the match of migrants to decent employment opportunities. It is therefore important to understand the existing skills profiles among Egyptian migrants, including those who are already working abroad.

Inclusion of Egyptian migrants in the OECD

Employment and skill patterns among contemporary Egyptian labour migrants may be helpful in anticipating how well Egyptian youth may be included in the select EU labour markets. While data on employment of migrant workers by nationality, skill level, and age are missing for Germany, Italy and the United Kingdom, some data is available on these trends for the wider OECD region.

Data on employment of Egyptians in the OECD from the 2015/2016 census rounds suggests that there is likely complementarity between the existing job profiles of Egyptian migrants and the types of occupations for which the greatest number of jobs will be produced. In general, Egyptian migrants are well dispersed across different skill and occupational categories. The largest share of Egyptian migrants with known occupations in 2015/2016 were in medium-skilled occupations (43% of all workers), 35% were in low-skilled occupations, and 22% were in high-skilled occupations. The most prevalent occupations of Egyptians in the OECD were professional functions (24% of all known occupations), service and sales jobs (17% of all known occupations), and elementary occupations, a category that includes functions such as unskilled agricultural work, cleaning or domestic work, and mining and construction labour (15% of all known occupations) (OECD, Database on Immigrants in OECD Countries 2015/2016, 2016). These occupations echo the occupations that Germany, Italy and the United Kingdom will be at greatest need for until 2030, which emphasises that Egyptian youth may be in an advantageous position in terms of the match between their skill/competency profiles and the skills/competencies that will be demanded in prime destination countries.

Conclusions

Egyptian youth migrating to countries such as Germany, Italy, and the United Kingdom may bring with them skills and competencies that are demanded on local labour markets. The profile of the focus European labour markets and employment trends among Egyptians across the OECD suggest that there may be some challenges in supporting the inclusion of Egyptian youth in European labour markets, however.

Ideally young workers would be able to access decent employment in the formal sector. An important component of decent employment is that workers are able to make use of and further refine their skills and competencies. The further development of skills and competencies requires that the skills of workers are appropriately matched to the skills needed in specific jobs. Skill matching seems to be a challenge across the three focus countries, with Italy standing out as a particular concern given high rates of employee-job skill mismatches and the overqualification of highly-skilled workers. Supporting the appropriate development of demanded skills among migrant workers in Egypt, and then facilitating the correct matching of those skills to at-need occupations abroad, could require the development of specific bilateral migration policies or programmes. The role of education, specifically vocational education and training, in producing needed skills in Egypt, Germany, Italy, and the UK are

addressed at more length in research paper 2 in this series. Research paper 3 then explores existing bilateral migration programmes and policies between Egypt and the selected EU destination countries, with some discussion of the skills dimensions of existing agreements.

For Egyptian youth to be best matched with quality labour opportunities in EU countries, more nuanced information and analyses would be needed to guide the design of appropriately-specified policy support systems. The following forms of data would be helpful in further nuancing understanding of Egyptian migrant youth and their roles in select labour markets: 1) data on labour market participation, occupations, skill levels, and qualification mismatches of Egyptian youth in specific destination countries; 2) data on formal and informal employment that is disaggregated by sector, place of birth, and age cohort, and; 3) qualitative, contextual information on the challenges Egyptian youth face in accessing and retaining quality employment in specific destination countries.

I. Introduction

Employment and labour are key elements of both individual- and society-level development, and they have both intrinsic and instrumental value. The instrumental value of work is well-reflected in conventional thinking on poverty and vulnerability. Employment is seen as a key way for individuals to become and remain financially independent. Instruments such as contributory social insurances (e.g., pension schemes, unemployment benefits) aim to reduce the risk of income loss over an individual's life cycle. Work also has its wider instrumental value by supporting state expenditures (through taxes), supporting consumption (by enabling expenditure on essential and non-essential goods), and supporting economic growth. There are a range of non-monetary benefits that relate more readily to the intrinsic value of employment. Employment and the underlying skills and competencies that support employment can encourage individual physical and mental health, increase autonomy and sense of control, and can encourage social engagement and the development of social networks (Heckman & Corbin, 2016). In short, employment can encourage social inclusion – the resources for and opportunities individuals and groups have to participate equitably in society.

The nature of the work undertaken and (institutional) contexts in which it occurs can shape whether or not the potential benefits of work materialise. For many migrant workers, access to decent work may be limited given the conditions of the labour markets in which they work. Decent work, a concept promoted by the International Labour Organisation (ILO), entails that a worker has access to productive employment¹, a safe working environment, access to appropriate wages, and security in employment. Decent work, while defined on the individual worker level, can be measured on the macro level by indicators such as shares of informality and unemployment², minimum wages and the gender wage gap, social security coverage, and compliance with labour standards (Burchell, Sehnbruch, Piasna & Agloni, 2014). Recent global assessments have signalled that migrant workers are overrepresented in work that is considered vulnerable or precarious. Such work may be characterised by a concentration of workers in low-skilled work (irrespective of the education or training of the worker), high rates of informal labour, poor compensation for work, and flexible and insecure employment terms.

1. Productive employment entails that a worker is paid a sufficient wage and does not fall below the poverty line, but it can importantly also include that a worker has the opportunity to learn on the job and further hone his/her skills and competencies.

2. Unemployment was previously one of the main indicators for decent work. Prior to the 1970s, decent work was largely measured through indicators that could quantify or proxy living conditions. Unemployment was considered an important indicator, as for someone to have “decent” living conditions, they should earn a wage, which can only occur if they are employed.

Migrants may be at greater risk of falling into vulnerable or precarious labour for different reasons. One potential reason is because of labour market deregulation, which may result in lowered employment standards and increased possibilities for casual labour arrangements – particularly in specific segments of the labour market. National regulatory frameworks or legislation are often also not as sensitive to the specific challenges and needs of mobile populations, which can make it unclear for both migrant workers and employers what their entitlements and obligations are related to, for example, social protection provisions, insurance and residence/work permits (Mallett, 2018). These factors may shape access to decent work for all migrant workers but may impose particularly acute challenges for irregular migrants.

While migrants in general may be at particular risk of being in precarious or vulnerable employment, mobile youth in particular may face even greater challenges in securing decent work. In many labour markets, regulations and labour market practises may be inherently age-discriminatory. For example, minimum wage thresholds may be set by age of the workers, resulting in more young workers being relegated to lower-paid employment (for discussion of age-based wage thresholds, see Bessant, 2016). Due to low wages and the higher rates of informal employment among young workers, youth may have more limited access to mandatory contribution schemes and the social protection entitlements that accompany those contributions. Youth may therefore be less protected by formal institutions and policies should they face economic shocks like job loss or on-the-job injuries. An additional challenge for young workers is that they may lack formal certifications, including diplomas, which would grant them access to jobs requiring the practise and improvement of more complex skill sets. This challenge is particularly acute for migrant workers, whose certifications may not be recognised in a new labour market or whose informal learning cannot be validated and certified.

Given concerns around ensuring decent work for migrant workers and mobile youth in particular, the current ***Research on the Means to Improve Human Mobility Channels*** investigates how Egyptian youth at risk of migrating irregularly to the European Union (EU) can be better protected, including through the promotion of regular, high-quality labour channels. To support this objective, specific aspects of the (irregular) migration of Egyptian youth to the EU will be examined. As the first research paper within this project, this paper explores the structure of key European labour markets into which Egyptian youth migrate and the skills that are increasingly demanded in these labour markets. The paper focuses on three EU countries: Italy, Germany, and the United Kingdom. These countries are top destinations for Egyptian migrants yet represent distinct labour market contexts.

The research paper is structured as follows. Section I, this introduction, is followed by a description of the methodology used to inform this paper (Section II). Section III highlights key findings related to labour market dynamics in Italy, Germany and the United Kingdom. This section details how characteristics such as shares of informal employment, un- and under-employment, and the distribution of skills vary across sectors in these labour markets. It also explores existing and projected skill and labour gaps in these economies, and it addresses how migrant workers fit within these particular labour market structures. Following this assessment, Section IV discusses the implications of these findings for Egyptian migrants in the EU. The paper concludes in Section V with a summary of the key findings, discussion of limitations and future needed research, and recommendations of how future policy and programming can support decent work among (irregular) Egyptian migrant workers.

II. Methodology

In order to meet the overall objectives of the study *Research on the Means to Improve Human Mobility Channels*, the objective of this research paper is to provide a labour market profile of key European destination countries into which Egyptian youth migrate. As part of this profile, this research paper provides stylised information on the structure of the labour markets of Italy, Germany, and the United Kingdom. The paper also reviews the skills demanded within those labour markets. The occupations and skill match of Egyptian migrants working in the OECD are also briefly reviewed. The profile produced in this report may be used to inform the design of policies and programmes that support regular migration opportunities into decent employment for Egyptian youth to key EU destination countries. The research paper is therefore intended for different stakeholders, including policymakers in national governments, programme managers of intergovernmental organisations, and staff of other relevant organisations (e.g., technical development cooperation agencies) that support labour migration programming.

This research paper used a mixed-methodological approach relying on a combination of desk review and descriptive analysis of statistical data. The methodological approach required that decisions needed to be made about the scope of the research and appropriate methods to meet the identified objective. First, specific case study countries that would be the focus of analysis were selected. Given the diverse migration patterns of Egyptians across the globe, preliminary research was conducted on stocks and flows of Egyptian migrants. Data from a combination of sources was used to construct profiles of Egyptian migrants abroad, which revealed a significant presence of irregular Egyptian migrant youth (the target population of the overall research) in the European Union. Within the European Union, countries were ranked based on the size of the Egyptian migrant stock in the country. Then, specific countries were selected for analysis based on factors such as the overall size of the Egyptian migrant stock, the structure of the labour market, and the geographical orientation of the country. Based on this assessment, Germany, Italy and the United Kingdom were selected for analysis. Data from 2017 indicated that Italy hosted by far the largest Egyptian population in the EU followed by the United Kingdom; Germany had the fifth-largest Egyptian migrant stock in the EU (United Nations Department of Economic and Social Affairs, 2017).

The countries also represent a range of economic profiles and geographical orientations, with Germany representing a relatively inflexible economy within Northern continental Europe, Italy representing a more flexible and informal economy in the Mediterranean, and the United Kingdom representing a diverse, semi-flexible economy in Northern Europe.

Second, literature on the selected focus countries and the inclusion of Egyptian migrant youth in those economies were selected. Literature review was conducted between September and November 2019 from a combination of academic and grey literature sources. Databases such as those represented in the Web of Science, EconLit, and EBSCOhost were used to identify relevant academic literature, which helped to identify research on Egyptian migrant youth in the select study countries from different disciplines. Specific search terms were used related to Egyptian migrants in the EU, Egyptian migrants in the case study countries more generally, and to Egyptian migrant youth more specifically. These specific search terms resulted in a limited number of relevant, high-quality resources. Much of the identified literature was excluded from this report given its age; 2010 was used as a cut-off year, as the migration context in the EU and in the given study countries had shifted significantly in the past ten years. The insights from such studies may therefore no longer reflect the reality of Egyptian migrants in the focus countries. Literature was also excluded based on concerns related to the credibility of the research design. Much of the identified literature reflected findings from studies conducted among specific populations (e.g., Egyptian migrant youth in detention) who were selected for study given acute, pre-existing vulnerabilities. Other studies relied on very small samples collected in specific local contexts, raising concerns about the external validity of findings. Given the limited availability of high-quality academic literature, grey literature—literature produced and published by institutions such as international organisations and governments—was included in this review and in fact constituted the majority of included references. The grey literature was largely identified through resources such as Google Scholar and searches of databases linked to credible institutions such as the European Training Foundation, the European Centre for the Development of Vocational Training (CEDEFOP), the International Labour Organisation (ILO), and the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD).

Third, data was selected and analysed related to migration patterns from Egypt to the OECD/EU region; labour market participation trends of migrants in general and Egyptian migrants specifically in the OECD/EU region, and; the skill level of migrants and related indicators of qualification matches between employees and occupations. Limited data were available on these phenomena and data were therefore selected for analysis based on availability of comparable indicators across countries, the availability of reasonably contemporary data, and the level of disaggregation available, with data preferred that at least discerned country/region of origin of migrants.

As a result, basic descriptive analyses were conducted on the following datasets:

- *The Database on Immigrants in OECD and non-OECD countries, update 2015/2016:* This database, compiled by the OECD in cooperation with the World Bank, allows calculation of emigration patterns by migrant skill level and occupation, aggregated for the entire OECD region.
- *The International Labour Organisation StatLine database:* This database contains indicators of labour market structure and labour market participation rates for native- and non-native born populations per country.
- *The United Nations Department of Economic and Social Affairs Database on International Migration Stock, 2017 revision:* This database provides bilateral migrant stock data, allowing for sex-disaggregated information on the size of the migrant stock originating from a particular country in a given country of destination.

Additional statistical indicators were pulled from publications from reputable institutions such as the ILO and CEDEFOP related to specific topics such as informal labour and qualification matches between employees and occupations in selected countries.

The analysis was limited due to the quality and availability of the quantitative data. Data was not consistently broken down by country of origin, country of destination, skill level, sector of work or specific occupation and age. Consequently, much of the analysis requires further triangulation and validation with the use of other sources. Section V provides more in-depth discussion of the findings of these analyses and how they could be further improved with more specific data.

III. Labour market dynamics in Italy, Germany and the United Kingdom

The labour markets of Italy, Germany and the United Kingdom (UK) differ considerably from each other given the nature of each country's economy. To demonstrate how Egyptian youth as a particular group of migrant workers may function in these different contexts, this section will review key information related to the labour markets in each of the focus countries, with particular attention given to (un)employment and the distribution of skills throughout the labour market.

III.a LABOUR MARKET PARTICIPATION


Important indicators of decent work include rates of employment/unemployment and rates of formal/informal employment among the employed population. Within any given economy, there are three important indicators of labour market engagement: participation rate, employment, and unemployment. Participation rates reflect the total share of the working-age population (age 15-64) that is currently engaged in work or is searching for work. Participation rates essentially signal the size of the supply of labour available to work in any given labour market. Employment rates reflect only the share of the population that is currently in paid employment or self-employment. Unemployment rates indicate the share of the working-age population that is available to work and is actively searching for work but is not in paid employment (International Labour Organisation, 2016).

Patterns of labour market participation, employment and unemployment may differ for migrant compared to non-migrant populations, and these indicators would be expected to differ across countries. As can be seen in Figure 1 overleaf, labour market participation varied across Italy, Germany and the UK, with some differences between native- and foreign-born populations apparent across these countries. The overall labour market participation rate was highest in 2018 for native-born persons in Germany and lowest among native-born persons in Italy. Whereas nearly 80%

of the working-age, native-born population in Germany was either currently in employment or searching for employment in 2018, only 64.8% of the native working-age population in Italy fit within this category. This would indicate that a large share of native-born Italians of working age are inactive in the labour market. Across the study countries, differences in participation rates between native-born and foreign-born populations were relatively minor, with the exception of Italy where a greater share of foreign-born (70.6%) compared to native-born persons (64.8%) were participating in the labour market (OECD, 2019).

Differences in participation rates across countries and across persons of different national origins reflect different patterns of employment and unemployment. In both the United Kingdom and Germany, approximately three-quarters or more of the native-born, working-age population was employed at the time of observation. In both countries a higher share of native-born persons were employed compared to foreign-born persons, with the native-migrant employment gap greatest in Germany (with 77.5% of the native-born population and 69.5% of the foreign-born population considered employed in 2018). Unemployment rates were highest in Italy, where 13.7% of the foreign-born and 10.3% of the native-born population were out of work but searching for employment (OECD, 2019).

Figure 1: Labour Force Participation for Working Age Population (15-64), by Place of Birth (2018)



Source: Author's visualisation based on "Employment and unemployment rates by gender and place of birth" (OECD, 2019)

The smaller share of migrants compared to non-migrants in employment in Germany and the United Kingdom may suggest that it is more difficult for migrants to join the labour market, despite the desire to work. The situation in Italy provides a contradictory picture, as both employment and unemployment rates were higher among migrant populations compared to non-migrant populations. This trend would suggest that a greater share of the native Italian work force has simply withdrawn from the labour market altogether and is either not available for employment or is not searching for employment.

YOUTH LABOUR MARKET PARTICIPATION

The figures provided reflect the entire working-age population, but employment/unemployment rates typically differ by age. Unfortunately high-quality data is absent on labour market participation rates of migrant versus non-migrant populations by age cohort. There is some information on unemployment rates for the youth population in total, however. In all of the study countries, youth labour force participation rates were lower than those of the general working-age population, and unemployment rates were higher. In Italy, just over one-quarter of the youth population participated in the labour force, compared to 50.3% in Germany and 57.1% in the United Kingdom. Similar patterns across the countries emerge when evaluating unemployment rates. While the total unemployment rate for the working-age population was 10.6% in Italy in 2018, the youth unemployment rate was triple that at 32.2%. Differences in unemployment rates between youth and other age cohorts were also visible in Germany and the UK but were less stark. Compared to a general unemployment rate of 3.4% in Germany and 4.0% in the UK, youth unemployment was 6.2% and 11.3% in these countries, respectively.

Youth unemployment rates can be deceptive in the sense that they capture only those people who are not employed and actively looking for a job, which may not be as relevant for young people who are engaged in other productive activities such as education and not seeking employment. As a complementary indicator, then, it is also important to assess the share of youth who are not in employment, education or training (NEETs). The share of this population is lowest among youth in Germany, at 5.9%, and highest in Italy, where 19.2% of the youth population is outside of both education/training and the labour market (International Labour Organisation, 2019).

Table 1: *Labour Force Participation Among Youth (15-24), by Country of Residence (2018)*

	Germany	UK	Italy
Youth labour force participation rate (%)	50.3	57.1	26.1
Youth unemployment rate (%)	6.2	11.3	32.2
Share of youth not in employment, education or training (%)	5.9	10.5	19.2

Source: International Labour Organisation, 2019

The high rates of youth unemployment and large share of the youth population that is out of employment, education or training in Italy suggests that a significant group of young people may not be gaining the human and social capital that can help them overcome hazards in later life. One of the challenges associated with high rates of youth unemployment is high competition for work, which may encourage young people to take on work that fails to meet the decent work definition³.

INFORMAL EMPLOYMENT

Young people unable to find suitable formal work may instead work in informal jobs or in the informal sector. Such jobs may lack appropriate labour protection and have only limited access to the social protection provisions that cushion against shocks such as job loss or injury.


Across the three study countries, a significant share of total employment was considered informal⁴, with the rate of informality varying by sector. The share of informal employment in total employment in 2016 was estimated at 10.2% for Germany, 19% in Italy and 13.6% in the United Kingdom (International Labour Organisation, 2018). The majority of informal work occurred in the informal sector, meaning in enterprises that are not formally registered with the relevant authorities in the country of operation (Husmanns, n.d.).

Rates of informality differ by the sector of work. As indicated in Figure 2, informal employment represented a greater share of total employment in Italy compared to Germany and the UK generally regardless of sector. In all three study countries, a greater share of agricultural employment in 2016 was considered informal compared to other sectors. In Germany, nearly 20% of agricultural employment was considered informal; within total agricultural employment, 35.5% in the UK and 40.8% in Italy was considered informal. In Germany and Italy, informality constituted a greater proportion of total employment in the service sector than in the industrial sector, whereas the opposite was true of the UK.

3. As noted in the introduction, decent work entails that a worker has access to employment where s/he can advance skills and competencies, a safe working environment, access to appropriate wages, and security in employment.

4. Informality occurs when, by law or practise, the employment relationship is not covered by national labour legislation, including provisions related to income taxation and the entitlement to benefits such as sick leave, unemployment insurance, advance notice of dismissal, etc. Such a definition may encompass short-term or casual jobs, jobs that are not declared to relevant authorities by employers, and jobs in which hours of work or pay are below thresholds for determining entitlements such as contributory benefits (Husmanns, n.d.).


Figure 2: Share of Informal Employment in Total Employment by Sector and Country (2016)



Source: Author's visualisation based on International Labour Organisation (2018).

While a greater share of employment was informal within the agricultural sector compared to employment within the other sectors, the share of employment in agriculture among all workers in informal employment was lower in all three countries than in either the industry or service sectors. This trend reflects the general distribution of sectors in total employment. In all three study countries, the majority of employment is in the service sector. The sectoral composition of employment is similar for informal employment as for formal employment, although agriculture represents a more important share of informal than formal employment, suggesting that this sector is over-represented within informality (International Labour Organisation, 2018).

Figure 3: Share of Employment by Sector in Total Informal and Informal Employment by Country (2016)



Source: Author's visualisation based on International Labour Organisation (2018).

Across the world, youth and older persons are overrepresented in informal employment compared to the general adult population. In Europe, a greater share of youth compared to adults are in informal employment, with an average of 25.8% of youth employment considered informal across developed European and Central Asian countries (compared to 14.8% among adults aged 25+) (International Labour Organisation, 2018). Unfortunately, data is not reported on labour informality among youth in specific countries.

Assessing the availability of decent work or actual employment in decent jobs would benefit from further disaggregation by migration status and age cohort. Much of the available information on indicators such as informal work, for example, is not reported at a sufficient level of granularity. Information on informality by sector does not distinguish between native- and foreign-born workers, which may disguise differences in exposure to informal work based on national origin. Given the higher rates of informality among workers in the agricultural sector, and structural reliance on migrant labour within the agricultural sector across much of the EU (Schuh et al., 2019), migrant workers may be at particular risk of working in informal employment. Migrant youth may be at even greater risk given higher rates of informal work among young people, but more data is needed to confirm this inference.

Trends of labour market participation and decent employment, for both native and non-native workers, are heavily tied to skills and the utilisation of skills on the labour market. Economic growth and the creation of quality labour opportunities are tied to increasing performance by linking workers with specific skill profiles to jobs that demand specific skill sets. The following section therefore widens the focus to analysis of overall skill distribution and potentially-systematic mismatches between the supply and demand of skills in the labour markets of Germany, Italy and the United Kingdom.

III.b SKILL DISTRIBUTION AND POTENTIAL MISMATCHES IN SKILL SUPPLY/DEMAND

Across Germany, Italy and the United Kingdom, simultaneous changes in the demographic composition of the population and the sectors that demand additional workers have brought issues of skill supply/demand to the fore of policy discussions. Across the European Union in general, economic planning has shifted away from the primary and secondary economic sectors and towards expanding the third sector of the economy, services. The emphasis on expansion of the service sector has been accompanied by increasing emphasis on producing skilled workers, generally through tertiary education and formal vocational training institutions⁵. The strong emphasis on expanding the service sector, which may include occupations that are medium- and high-skilled, implies that the existing workforce may not have the needed level or composition of skills that is most urgently needed to create or sustain sectoral growth.

5. Skills are complex and difficult to directly observe and measure; the OECD identifies skills as “knowledge, attributes and capacities that can be learnt and that enable individuals to successfully and consistently perform an activity or task.” (Toner, 2011). As skill is context-specific, education is often used as a proxy of skill based on the notion that additional education and training will enable an individual to sufficiently perform and master a task. Throughout much of this working paper, skill is addressed through completed education as a proxy.

PRODUCTION, ACTIVATION AND MATCHING OF SKILLS

A number of tools have been developed to assess the extent to which key sectors within European economies are supplied with workers of desired skill profiles. The European Centre for the Development of Vocational Training (CEDEFOP), which is a European Union institution dedicated to supporting the development of technical and vocational education and training (TVET) policies, has developed one instrument to assess the efficiency of skills systems within the EU-28 region. The European Skills Index (ESI) was developed by CEDFOP to assess the performance of each country's skill system, which include how skills are developed, activated, and matched to labour market opportunities.

The results of the 2018 ESI indicate that Germany, Italy and the United Kingdom have differing levels of achievement in terms of the production, activation and matching of skills within their domestic labour markets. Development/production of skills relates to how individuals accumulate the knowledge or competencies needed to perform skilled work. This dimension of the ESI is assessed through the policies and institutions in place for basic education and training, and it is measured through indicators such as the number of VET students, attainment rates of upper secondary education, and student scores in reading, maths, and sciences. Skills activation, in contrast, relates to how learners transition to the workforce and participate in labour markets. It is measured through indicators such as rate of early leaving from training, share of recent graduates in employment, and the labour market participation rate of youth and adults. Finally, skills matching provides a sense of how accumulated skills are used and whether there is mismatch between skills workers have and the types of work performed. Skills matching is assessed through indicators such as long-term unemployment, the overqualification rate of the tertiary educated, and qualification mismatch (CEDEFOP, 2019a).

Table 2 provides an overview of each country's performance on the 2018 Index. Among the three focus countries, Germany had the best-calibrated skills system. With an overall ranking of 9 of 28, Germany's skill system provides significant support to the production of skills and their activation on the labour market, but it's performance in terms of skill matching is below the median. In contrast, Italy's overall ranking is 26 of 28 countries, which reflects poor skill development and matching, and exceptionally poor activation of skills, which is ranked the lowest of all EU countries. The United Kingdom's ranking lies in between that of Germany and Italy at an overall ESI ranking of 19/28. While it demonstrates stronger performance than Germany on activation of skill, it performs below Italy in supporting matching of skills on the labour market (CEDEFOP, 2019a).

Table 2: *European Skills Index Ranking for Germany, Italy and the United Kingdom by Domain, 2018*

Country	Overall ESI ranking (ESI score)	Skill development ranking	Skill activation ranking	Skill matching ranking
Germany	9/28 (62.1)	9/28	10/28	15/28
Italy	26/28 (24.6)	20/28	28/28	20/28
UK	19/28 (51.5)	15/24	8/24	24/28

Source: CEDEFOP (2019a)

These rankings reflect differences in each country's educational system and labour market⁶. Germany, for example, has a strong emphasis on preparing young people through upper- and post-secondary education. It does not as well support the accumulation of skills through vocational education and training, signalling an emphasis on abstract thinking and knowledge rather than on the development of trade-specific, application-focused skills. In contrast, a greater number of pupils followed vocational education or training in Italy than in Germany, and completion rates of upper secondary and tertiary education were much lower. Differences in educational trajectories carry over, in part, to trends of skill activation. In Italy, labour market participation among the general adult population (aged 25-64) is low, and recent graduates from education and training are largely unable to find sustainable employment within four years of graduation. The opposite is true in both Germany and the United Kingdom, where the majority of recent graduates are employed within four years of graduation. The United Kingdom stands apart for its strong representation of youth in the labour market, with the vast majority of young people aged 20-24 active in either full- or part-time employment (CEDEFOP, 2019a).

The performance of all three focus countries was limited related to skill matching, however. The United Kingdom indicated particularly acute challenges in ensuring that the skills produced were matched to appropriate employment. To understand the United Kingdom's poor performance in the skill matching domain, it is important to understand the indicators that measure this dimension: underemployment, skilled workers in low-wage work, and qualification mismatches. A relatively high share of workers in the United Kingdom are considered *underemployed*, meaning that there is a high share of workers in part-time employment who are available for and looking for more working hours than they can find employment for. The UK is also notable for the high share of higher-educated workers in low-wage employment. Low-wage employment is employment for which the wages are two-thirds or less of the national median gross hourly earnings. As it is assumed that higher education or qualification supports workers to perform

6. For more information on the role of vocational education and training in supporting the creation, activation, and matching of skills, refer to research paper 2, *Vocational education and training in Egypt and key EU destination countries*.

more complex or specific tasks that require rarer skill sets, and would therefore be more heavily-rewarded on the labour market, the concentration of skilled workers in low-wage work implies that there is a mismatch between skills and earnings. The qualification mismatch indicator essentially compares the worker's education with the most common level of education attained by workers in each industry. The UK's contrasting performance on skill activation and skill matching suggest that while a high proportion of youth are active on the labour market and become active quickly after graduation, the quality of employment may not be optimal, particularly for the higher-skilled. Italy and Germany also performed badly in the qualification mismatch indicator, however, which reflects wider trends of qualification mismatch on the wider EU level (CEDEFOP, 2019a).

It is important to understand the role of skills in the labour markets of potential countries of destination for Egyptian youth, as performance on skill production, activation and matching suggest potential challenges and opportunities for the inclusion of migrant youth in decent employment. For example, the performance of Germany, Italy and the United Kingdom on skill matching suggests that there may be an imbalance of the production/availability of specific types of skilled workers compared to the skills needed on the labour market. Educational systems tend to be difficult to recalibrate to labour market needs within short time windows. Time is needed to support analysis and redesign of educational curriculum, to seek and receive accreditation for educational programmes, and to see students move through education programmes. One potential solution to short-term mismatches between educational systems and labour market demands is migration, particularly if labour migration channels are created that respond directly to shortages of workers of particular skill profiles in specific industries or sectors. From this perspective, understanding the skills gaps in particular industries can support the promotion of migrant labour channels into sectors at most acute need of qualified labour.

SKILLS GAPS AND LABOUR SHORTAGES

A number of assessments have been conducted that explore the scale and type of labour shortages in key sectors across the European Union, including within the three focus countries. A 2015 synthesis report that reviewed contemporary assessments of EU labour shortages (European Migration Network, 2015) suggested that despite the focus on the promotion of highly-skilled workers in the EU, acute labour shortages were not only concentrated in highly-skilled occupations but also existed in medium- and low-skilled occupations. Across the EU, demand for low- and medium-skilled household-based personal care workers, restaurant staff and cleaning personnel exceeded supply, suggesting the production of such categories of workers is not sufficient for the needs of the labour market (European Migration Network, 2015). The gaps between the supply of and demand for workers in specific sectors has recently widened in some countries, including in Germany and the United Kingdom. These two

countries, along with Sweden, are the EU-15 countries with the highest skill shortages, whereas Italy – along with other Southern European countries Greece, Spain, and Portugal – demonstrates the lowest levels of skills shortages among the EU-15 countries. The greater skill shortages in Germany and the United Kingdom and the limited skill shortages in Italy reflect broader economic trends. Whereas both Germany and the UK have generally good labour market conditions that attract workers of varying skill profiles, the Italian labour market is characterised by low labour productivity and high unemployment, particularly among the higher educated (Vandeplas & Thum-Thysen, 2019).

As a complement to analyses of *current* labour market and skills gaps, CEDEFOP has also compiled skills forecasts for the three study countries. These forecasts provide a sense of which occupations and sectors will produce the greatest number of job openings in the future. The table overleaf provides key figures derived from the 2018 forecast series, which anticipates job openings from the period 2016-2030. According to these forecasts, a significant number of job openings will arise in the coming years, with the largest number appearing in the German labour market. The majority of job openings (100% in Germany, 90% in Italy, and 87% in the UK) will not be for newly-created jobs but rather for replacement of current workers, for example due to retirement. Trends of job openings therefore reflect demographic trends in each of the given labour markets.

The anticipated demand for workers of different skill levels will vary across the study countries. The largest share of job openings will likely require medium-skilled workers, with 49% of total job openings in Italy and the UK and 60% in Germany requiring medium-skilled workers. The United Kingdom will have the greatest demand for high-skilled workers, with 46% of job openings related to high-skilled occupations. Italy and Germany, in contrast, will have significant numbers of job openings for low-skilled workers, with 12% of job openings in Germany and 14% of job openings in Italy related to low-skilled occupations (CEDEFOP, 2019b).

Table 3: *European Skills Index Ranking for Germany, Italy and the United Kingdom by Domain, 2018*

	Total anticipated job openings 2016-2030	Share of anticipated total job openings by skill level			Highest-demand occupations
		Low Skilled	Medium Skilled	High Skilled	
Germany	27.04 million	12%	60%	28%	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Business & administration professionals (2.2 million) • Personal service workers (1.86 million) • Sales staff (1.44 million)
Italy	16.59 million	14%	49%	37%	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Business & administration professionals (1.7 million) • Cleaners & helpers (1.18 million) • Teaching professionals (1.16 million)
UK	22.73 million	5%	49%	46%	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Sales Staff (1.67 million) • Labourers in mining, construction, manufacturing & transport (1.67 million) • Business & administration professionals (1.5 million)

Source: CEDEFOP (2019b)

The types of occupations that will have the highest demand for workers reflect the demand for skills indicated for each country. Significant numbers of workers will be needed for business and administration functions in all three countries, with this category of occupation constituting the highest-demand occupation in Germany and Italy and the third-highest-demand occupation in the UK. Low-skilled workers will also be highly-demanded in all three countries, but for different occupations. In Germany personal service workers will be the second-highest-demanded occupation, whereas in Italy, cleaners and helpers will occupy this position. In the United Kingdom, labourers in mining, construction, manufacturing and transport will be the second-most-demanded occupation category (CEDEFOP, 2019b). While the CEDFOP projections do not report the size of the gap between local production of needed workers of various skill profiles and the number of workers demanded in different occupations, the high demand for workers in replacement occupations may not be fully filled by native

workers given the demographic structure in all three focus countries. All three countries have relatively large populations of older workers, whose imminent retirement will imply that a large number of jobs will become available to younger workers. As fertility has declined markedly in all three countries, the size of the working-age population will likely be insufficient to completely offset the number of persons in the older age cohorts leaving the labour market. From this perspective, migrant labour may become a more important source of demanded workers for all three countries—but not all types of labour will be equally demanded, and the match between the structure of migrant labour and the type of skills demanded may not be perfect.

IV. Mobility Trends Among (Young) Egyptians and Labour Market Inclusion


The findings related to the structure of select European labour markets and the position of migrant workers within them provide greater context for understanding the potential opportunities and challenges that Egyptian migrants specifically may face in these countries. This section reflects on the inclusion of Egyptian migrants in the labour market, and it provides an overview of available data on the trends that shape high-quality, decent employment among Egyptian migrant youth.

To better understand the (potential) roles of Egyptian youth in the three specified countries, this section starts with a review of the mobility trends of Egyptians into Europe and into the case study countries specifically. As specific research and data on the education and labour market statuses of Egyptian migrants in these countries is lacking, the section also reviews indicators of skilled mobility among Egyptians in the wider OECD area. This section will also review available information on the occupations and sectors in which Egyptian youth work, and it will briefly review how the (known) skill profiles of Egyptians intersect with the skill demands on European labour markets.

IV.a TRENDS OF EGYPTIAN (YOUTH) MOBILITY

While the majority of Egyptian migrants reside in Western Asia, the population of Egyptian migrants in Europe is significant, with clear destination hubs emerging across Europe's different subregions. Data provided by the United Nations Department of Economic and Social Affairs (2017) provides one of the most contemporary assessments of global migrant stocks by country of birth and country of residence. The data indicates that in 2017, over 3.4 million Egyptians resided outside of Egypt, over 80% of whom resided in Asia—with just three countries (Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates and Kuwait) home to 63% of all (registered) Egyptians abroad.


Figure 4: *Distribution of Egyptian Migrant Stock by World Region, 2017*



Source: Author's calculations and visualisation based on (United Nations Department of Economic and Social Affairs, 2017)

Beyond the large community of Egyptian migrants residing in Western Asia, an important population of Egyptians resided in Europe, in both countries within and outside of the European Union. The European region was estimated to host 294,659 Egyptian migrants in 2017, of which nearly half resided in Southern Europe and nearly one-third resided in Western Europe.

Figure 5: *Distribution of Egyptian Migrant Stock by European Region, 2017*



Source: Author's calculations and visualisation based on (United Nations Department of Economic and Social Affairs, 2017)

While the population of Egyptians in Europe was dispersed across the continent, specific countries were clear primary destinations. Just ten countries were home to over 95% of the total Egyptian population in Europe. As demonstrated in Table 4 below, the size of the Egyptian population in Europe differed widely by destination country. Italy hosted by far the largest Egyptian population in Europe (at 110,398 persons), which represented nearly 40% of the total Egyptian migrant stock in the region. In comparison, the second-largest Egyptian community – representing just over 13% of the Egyptian migrant stock in Europe – resided in the United Kingdom.

Table 4: *Distribution of Egyptian Migrant Stock by World Region, 2017*

Country	Absolute number	Relative share of all Egyptians in Europe (%)
Italy	110,398	37.5
United Kingdom	39,980	13.6
France	31,407	10.7
Greece	27,754	9.4
Germany	23,428	8.0
Austria	16,397	5.6
Netherlands	14,126	4.8
Switzerland	6,676	2.3
Sweden	6,328	2.1
Spain	4,167	1.4
Total top 10	280,661	95.2
Total Egyptians in Europe	294,659	100%
Source: Author's calculations based on (United Nations Department of Economic and Social Affairs, 2017)		

EGYPTIAN MIGRATION AND THE ROLE OF EMPLOYMENT

The distribution of the Egyptian migrant stock is likely to reflect different reasons for mobility and even different eras of mobility. While it is beyond the scope of this research paper to provide a history of global Egyptian mobility, employment has played a role in shaping Egyptian migration. Much of the Egyptian migration to the Western Asian region reflects migration for labour purposes across the skill spectrum. Large shares of Egyptians in countries such as Saudi Arabia perform skilled work in occupations related to business development such as finance, accounting, and marketing (De Bel-Air, Demography, Migration and Labour Market in Saudi Arabia, 2018). Emigration from Egypt to Europe, while smaller than flows from Egypt to Western Asia, has increased over the past two decades, with employment again constituting an important reason for movement. Despite the 2008 financial crisis in Europe, which translated into disproportionate job loss among immigrant workers compared to native workers, the stocks of Egyptian migrants in Europe has steadily grown. Research from 2013 indicated that even amid shrinking (formal) employment opportunities in Europe, emigration to Europe was still seen as a viable option for Egyptians, particularly given remaining challenges in the Egyptian labour market related to unemployment and overqualification (De Bel-Air, Migration Profile: Egypt 2016).

As overqualification and absence of (quality) employment within Egypt are factors that affect mobility choices, it is important to assess mobility from a skills perspective. There is limited high-quality, contemporary data that provides a sense of how education level, employment and migration specifically intersect for Egyptians – and particularly for youth – in the casestudy countries. Nevertheless, data collected in the 2015/2016 census period provides some preliminary information on education level and occupation among Egyptians residing in the OECD [OECD, Database on Immigrants in OECD Countries 2015/2016, 2016]. According to this data, 515,920 Egyptians resided in an OECD country in the reference period, including 41,297 youth aged 15-24. Within this population, nearly half (49.4%) were employed at the time of the survey.


Given the focus of this research paper on youth, it is important to disaggregate this data by age cohort and understand if there are differences in employment trends among young migrants. As indicated in Figure 6 overleaf, there are indeed some differences in employment trends by age, with a greater share (57.3%) of young migrants aged 15-24 considered *inactive*⁷ compared to migrants of prime working age (27.3%). The large share of inactive migrants among the oldest age cohort reflects primarily persons in retirement. Unemployment⁸ is also slightly higher among youth than among the 25-64 age cohort (at 9.1% compared to 7.8%). The higher shares of inactivity and unemployment among young Egyptian migrants may reflect different characteristics. While participation in education and training is an important reason for young people to be considered inactive in the labour market, it is unlikely that the large inactive population of young Egyptians in the OECD are all enrolled in education or training. Statistics from UNESCO

7. Inactive indicates that a person is neither employed nor unemployed; it can include persons in education or training, those engaged in family duties, or those who are no longer looking for employment.

8. Unemployment indicates that a person is not in paid employment or self-employment, is available for work, and is actively seeking work.

(2019) indicate that in 2016, around 31,480 Egyptian students were registered abroad, but a large number of those students were not in OECD countries and would therefore not be identified in the OECD data indicated here. Another potential explanation for high shares of inactive youth may be that they have simply withdrawn from searching for employment after long periods of being unemployed, or they may be less reliant on formal job-search channels like employment offices or services because of irregular migration status or given reliance on informal job search channels.


Figure 6: *Labour Force Status of Egyptian Migrants in the OECD by Age Cohort, 2015/2016*



Source: Author's calculations and visualisation based on DIOC-2015/2016 (OECD, 2016)

The position of young Egyptian migrants in the labour market may also be shaped by education level. In contrast to persons of prime working age who are likely to have already completed both mandatory education and some form of post-secondary schooling such as vocational education or university, young people may not have had the time to accrue the same level of skills. Keeping this caveat in mind, examining labour market status by education level may provide some useful indicators to contextualise the position of young Egyptians in the OECD. Figure 7 demonstrates the education level of Egyptian migrant youth in the OECD according to their labour force status. The relatively large share of highly-educated youth who are considered economically inactive is potentially surprising, particularly as a larger number of highly-educated migrants are inactive than in employment. This trend may suggest that the highly-educated are pursuing additional education – for example, master or PhD studies – or that their skills or competencies either do not match with the needs of the labour market or are not valued on the market due to challenges of diploma recognition. Another notable trend is that the largest share of the inactive population is considered low-educated, which may directly relate to age (if very large numbers of Egyptians are still enrolled in secondary school, for example) or may relate to withdrawal from the labour market.

Figure 7: Labour Force Status of Egyptian Migrant Youth (15-24) in the OECD by Education Level, 2015/2016



Source: Author's calculations and visualisation based on DIOC-2015/2016 (OECD, 2016)


IV.b SKILLED EMPLOYMENT OF MOBILE EGYPTIANS

The availability of decent work within an economy can also be understood through the types of occupations performed, the skill level of those occupations, and the (mis) match between the skill level of the worker and of the job. As above, there is limited contemporary data on the performance of Egyptians in the European labour markets under study. The DIOC 2015/2016 data on migrants in OECD countries (OECD, Database on Immigrants in OECD Countries 2015/2016, 2016) from the 2015/2016 census rounds can once again provide some indication of patterns of Egyptian employment in OECD countries, however. The data comes with some important caveats. The information on occupation and skill level is not disaggregated by age or residence, so it is not possible to identify the occupation and skill (mis)match for youth specifically or for migrants residing in the focus countries of Germany, Italy and the United Kingdom. There are also significant gaps in the data related to identification of occupation, as a large share of total occupation is indicated as “unknown”, often because the reporting country did not report type of occupation in line with the

International Standard Classification of Occupations (ISCO). As the United States uses a different classification system, much of the missing information on occupation type in the dataset reflects Egyptians working in the US.

The dataset contained information on over 260,000 currently-employed Egyptian migrants in the OECD and indicated that the largest single share of employed persons (38%) were in unknown occupations. Among the occupations that were identified by reporting countries, the most prevalent were professional functions (24% of all known occupations), service and sales jobs (17% of all known occupations), and elementary occupations, a category that includes functions such as unskilled agricultural work, cleaning or domestic work, and mining and construction labour (15% of all known occupations). The dispersion of occupations held by Egyptian migrants in the OECD suggests that occupations are concentrated at different ends of the skill spectrum, with an important share associated with high skill requirements and a smaller but still significant share associated with no- or low-skill requirements.

Figure 8: *Employment by Occupation* Among Egyptian Migrants in the OECD, 2015/2016*




Source: Author's calculations & visualisation based on DIOC-2015/2016 (OECD, 2016)

NOTES: *Unknown occupations are removed from the calculation; shares indicate share of work per occupation among all known occupations.

SKILL LEVELS OF EGYPTIANS IN THE OECD

Assessing occupations by skill level provides a varied picture of the type of work Egyptians perform abroad. The DIOC-2015/2016 classifies the skill level of each occupation according to the ISCO framework, dividing occupations into four levels. Skill level 1 indicates functions requiring only basic skills, with performed tasks typically involving simple, repetitive physical actions (e.g., lifting and carrying materials by hand, sorting and displaying products by type). Skill level 2 encompasses functions in which more complex tasks requiring specialised tools are performed, which typically require more advanced numeracy and literacy skills (e.g., maintenance of electrical equipment, ordering and storage of information). Skill level 3 indicates occupations in which specialised knowledge related to the content of complex tasks, technical elements of task performance, and knowledge of procedures is required; functions within this skill level could include, for example, coordinating and supervising other workers or ensuring compliance with health and safety regulations. Skill level 4 then indicates tasks with greatest complexity, requiring problem-solving, decision-making and creativity within a specific field requiring both content and theoretical knowledge (e.g., diagnosis and treatment of disease, training/teaching others) (International Labour Organisation, 2012). Based on this classification, the known occupations held by Egyptians in the OECD region were organised into skills level 1-3, with none of the known occupations falling into skill category four. The figure below demonstrates the division of occupations into the three given skills levels, which for ease of understanding have been classified as low, medium or high-skilled (with level 4, indicating “advanced” skills, absent from this overview).

Figure 9: *Skill Level of Occupations* of Egyptian Migrants in the OECD, 2015/2016*



Source: Author's calculations and visualisation based on DIOC-2015/2016 (OECD, 2016)


NOTES: *Unknown occupations are removed from the calculation; shares indicate share of work per occupation among all known occupations.

More than one-third of the work performed by Egyptians in the OECD could be classified as low-skilled, meaning that the work performed required minimal knowledge of content, processes or tools. The greatest share of known occupations could be classified as medium-skilled, with workers required to have more advanced knowledge of language, mathematics and tools needed to complete a job. Over one-fifth of known occupations held by Egyptians abroad could be classified as high-skilled, which would require more advanced knowledge of content, processes and tools and could potentially entail management or guidance functions (OECD, Database on Immigrants in OECD Countries 2015/2016, 2016). The overview does not provide a complete picture, as the skill level of functions could only be provided for occupations that were fully classified within the ISCO-08 framework, but the data nevertheless provides some indication of the types of functions Egyptians perform abroad.

SKILL MATCHING AMONG EGYPTIAN MIGRANTS WORKING IN THE OECD

The match between the skill level of the employee and the required skill level of the occupation can provide an important indication of productive employment. Within the DIOC 2015/2016 dataset, the education level of workers per occupation is reported. Figure 10 overleaf demonstrates the distribution of educational profiles of Egyptians workers in the top-five known occupations: professional functions, service and sales workers, elementary functions, craft and related trades, and management functions. As would be expected given the skilled nature of several of these occupations, a large share of Egyptian workers in the top-5 occupations were considered highly-educated, meaning that they had completed some form of tertiary education (bachelor, master, or PhD). The occupations with the highest share of highly-educated workers were professional functions (e.g., functions where employees increase stock of knowledge in a field, apply concepts and theories from scientific or artistic fields, teach on concepts or theories) and management functions, where highly-educated persons represented 92.7% and 69% of the workforce, respectively. Medium-educated persons, those individuals who had completed upper secondary school and/or vocational education, constituted an important share of the workforce in services and sales functions, elementary occupations (e.g., labour in mining or construction, household work), and craft and related trades. The largest shares of persons with low education – indicating completion of pre-primary, primary or lower-secondary education – were found in elementary occupations and craft and related trades, where 39.2% and 32.6% of the workforce, respectively, were considered low-skilled (author's calculations based on OECD, Database on Immigrants in OECD Countries 2015/2016, 2016).

Figure 10: Education Level* of Egyptian Migrants in Top-5 Occupations in the OECD, 2015/2016



Source: Author's calculations and visualisation based on DIOC-2015/2016 (OECD, 2016)

NOTES: *Persons with unknown education levels, representing a minimal share of all observations, are removed from the calculation; shares indicate share of education per occupation among all known education levels.

The distribution of education levels of employees in these occupations highlights some potential mismatches between the required skill level of the occupation and the education level of the employee. Significant shares of employees in elementary occupations, services and sales, and craft and related trades may be considered overqualified. Elementary occupations are considered low-skilled, indicating that someone with medium- or high-education attainment may have excessive skills for the required functions. Services and sales, and craft and related trades occupations are considered medium-skilled, indicating the persons with high levels of education would have more than sufficient skills for the needed functions.

The DIOC 2015/2016 includes an indicator of whether or not an employee is overqualified for a given occupation, which is determined by the education level of the individual and required skill level of the occupation. Within the dataset overqualification is measured only for persons with high levels of education. Across all occupations, 65.7% of highly-educated Egyptians working in the OECD were considered sufficiently qualified for their functions, and the remaining 34.3% were considered overqualified (author's calculations based on OECD, Database on Immigrants in OECD Countries 2015/2016, 2016). The high level of overqualification signals that the skills and competencies within the highly-educated Egyptian population may not be used as effectively as possible, and the workers in occupations for which they are overqualified may not be given sufficient opportunity to further develop and refine the competencies they have gained through education.

V. Conclusions

Youth represent an important resource for labour markets across the globe, but they are becoming a scarce resource in countries facing demographic shifts – which includes countries like Germany, Italy and the United Kingdom. Demographic transitions coupled with changing labour market structures may imply that some countries in the European Union will face shortages in the availability of workers with needed skill profiles. The demand for specifically-skilled workers is unlikely to be fully met by the domestic production of skilled workers. Such shifts may create opportunities for Egyptian youth of various skill levels to be included in the labour market in countries that already host significant Egyptian populations. There are some initial signals, however, that Egyptians residing in the OECD may not be able to access decent employment, and migrant youth may be at particular risk of being excluded from the kind of high-quality employment that would support both the instrumental and intrinsic value of work over the life course. To that end, it is important to critically assess how Egyptian migrant youth can be best incorporated into the formal labour markets of key destination countries such as Germany, Italy and the United Kingdom.

Based on current labour market gaps and forecasts related to future job openings, it seems likely that Germany, Italy and the United Kingdom will be in need of workers across the skill spectrum for specific types of occupations. The CEDEFOP (2019b) skills forecasts for all three countries suggests that more than half of job openings generated between 2016 and 2030 will be in medium-skilled occupations. The United Kingdom will have significant need for high-skilled workers, with 46% of job openings in this skill category. In both Germany and Italy, important shares of job openings (12% in Germany and 14% in Italy) will be for low-skilled occupations. Across all three countries, significant numbers of jobs will become available for workers in business and administration functions, with this category of occupation constituting the highest-demand occupation in Germany and Italy and the third-highest-demand occupation in the UK. Job openings will also arise in low-skilled occupations, however, including for personal service workers (which will be the second-highest-demanded occupation in Germany), cleaners and helpers (which will be the second-highest-demanded occupation in Italy), and labourers in mining, construction, manufacturing, and transport (which will be the second-most-demanded occupation category in the UK) (CEDEFOP, 2019b).

Data on employment of Egyptians in the OECD from the 2015/2016 census rounds suggests that there is likely complementarity between the existing job profiles of Egyptian migrants and the types of occupations for which the greatest number of jobs will be produced. While the information from the DIOC 2015/2016 data set does not distinguish between countries of residence, it does suggest that in general, Egyptian migrants are well dispersed across different skill and occupational categories. For example, the most prevalent occupations of Egyptians in the OECD were professional functions (24% of all known occupations), service and sales jobs (17% of all known occupations), and elementary occupations, a category that includes functions such as unskilled agricultural work, cleaning or domestic work, and mining and construction labour (15% of all known occupations) (OECD, Database on Immigrants in OECD Countries 2015/2016, 2016). These occupations echo the occupations that Germany, Italy and the United Kingdom will be at greatest need for until 2030, which emphasises that Egyptian youth may be in an advantageous position in terms of the match between their skill/competency profiles and the skills/competencies that will be demanded in prime destination countries.

For Egyptian youth to be best matched with quality labour opportunities in countries such as Germany, Italy and the United Kingdom, more nuanced information and analyses would be needed to guide the design of appropriately-specified policy support systems. The production, activation, and matching of skills implies strong coordination among education, labour market, and social protection policies. The coherence and complementarity of policies across sectors such as education, labour, and social protection are challenging even within domestic policy contexts. Ensuring the cross-sectoral complementarity of policies across countries is even more complex. As such, it would be beneficial to address existing data gaps related to Egyptian migrant youth and their employment in the focus countries, as such data could support the development of skill-sensitive, bilateral labour migration agreements or programmes between Egypt and Germany, Italy and the UK.

The analysis of the labour markets in Germany, Italy and the United Kingdom – and the potential inclusion of migrant workers more generally and Egyptian migrant youth more specifically within them – relied on imperfect data, and specific recommendations can be given regarding future data collection and analysis. The following forms of data would be helpful in further nuancing understanding of Egyptian migrant youth and their roles in select labour markets:

1. ***Data on labour market participation, occupations, skill levels, and qualification mismatches of Egyptian youth in specific destination countries:*** Data on the labour market performance of Egyptian migrant workers in key destination countries is limited. The data used in this report have a number of important limitations that challenge the validity of findings related specifically to Egyptian youth in Germany, Italy and the United Kingdom. A first limitation relates to the age of the data set, as it was compiled from national censuses conducted in the 2015/2016 census round and is therefore outdated by 4-5 years. A second limitation relates to the availability of indicators. While age-disaggregated data were available for general labour market participation indicators (e.g., employment, unemployment, education level of (un)employed persons), age-disaggregated data were not available on the specific occupations Egyptians held. Age-disaggregated data was also not available

related to qualification mismatches, and in fact mismatch data was only available for the highly-educated population, which may disguise qualification mismatches at other employee skill levels. A third limitation was that the data was only available for the total OECD region, and the employment behaviours of Egyptians are likely to vary across specific countries. It is therefore important that more nuanced data that distinguishes the occupation and skill level of young Egyptian migrant workers is made available across countries. While now some scattered data related to the labour market inclusion of Egyptian youth in specific countries does exist, it is of questionable quality, and indicators are not comparable across countries because of the types of information collected.

2. *Data on formal and informal employment that is disaggregated by sector, place of birth and age cohort:* Decent work is comprised not only of access to employment opportunities but also to quality employment that provides appropriate remuneration and security, which are unlikely to be guaranteed in informal employment. Informal employment is employment conducted outside of regulatory frameworks. Monitoring of wages, social security entitlements, protection from unfair or sudden dismissal, and other such elements of secure work may be compromised in informal work due to lack of monitoring. It is unclear in how far young Egyptian migrant workers are exposed to either informal employment or employment in informal sectors given the absence of data on the place of birth and age cohort of workers in informal employment. Having age- and nationality-disaggregated data on formal and informal employment by sector would provide valuable insight into the potential hazards young Egyptian migrants may face in countries such as Germany, Italy and the UK. Such information could help in the design of labour migration schemes or policies that direct young migrants away from informal work.
3. *Qualitative, contextual information on the challenges Egyptian youth face in accessing and retaining quality employment in specific destination countries:* Reliable and valid research on the labour market inclusion of Egyptian migrant youth in Germany, Italy and the United Kingdom is extremely scarce. While the quantitative data evaluated provide some preliminary sign-posting regarding the employment of Egyptian youth in specific labour markets, more qualitative information generated from rigorous research designs on the lived experiences of young Egyptian migrants was missing. It is unclear what kinds of barriers or challenges Egyptian youth may face in accessing quality employment in key destination countries. Some of the initial findings from the quantitative analysis – such as the relatively large share of highly-educated Egyptian youth who are considered economically inactive in the OECD, and the larger share of highly-educated Egyptian migrants that are economically inactive rather than in employment – require more information on the experiences of Egyptian youth and the factors that shape their labour market decisions and behaviours. Specific research on the mobility and labour market experiences of young Egyptians in key destination countries such as Germany, Italy, and the United Kingdom would provide much-needed, contextualised understanding of how and why Egyptian youth are included as they are in specific destination country labour markets.

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RESEARCH ON THE MEANS TO IMPROVE HUMAN MOBILITY CHANNELS

RESEARCH PAPER 2

Vocational Education and Training (VET) in Egypt and Key EU Destination Countries

Prepared by **Dr. Michaella Vanore** and **Dr. Katrin Marchand**



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ABSTRACT: The second research paper explores the Vocational Education and Training (VET) policies in place in both Egypt and key European destination countries. The paper reviews the structure and objectives of the VET system in Egypt and potential destination countries for Egyptian youth (Germany, Italy and the United Kingdom). It also assesses the alignment between VET programmes and the labour markets into which graduates should enter, identifying supply-demand mismatches related to skills and knowledge. This assessment suggests that in all of the focus countries, VET programmes may not be sufficiently coordinated with the demands of specific local/regional labour markets to support smooth school-to-work transitions for graduates of VET programmes. Nevertheless, the structure of VET education in countries of destination may create opportunities for graduates of VET in Egypt to use their skills and competencies in EU labour markets.

Abbreviations and Acronyms

APEL	Accreditation of Prior Experiential Learning
BIBB	Bundesinstitut für Berufsbildung
BMBF	Bundesministerium für Bildung und Forschung
DfE	Department for Education
ETI	Education and Training Inspectorate
FE	Further Education
ILO	International Labour Organization
KMK	Kultusministerkonferenz
MIUR	Ministry of Education, University and Research
MLPS	Ministry of Labour and Social Policies
MoETE	Ministry of Education and Technical Education
NARIC	UK National Recognition Information Centre
Ofsted	Office for Standards in Education, Children's Services and Skills
QAA	Quality Assurance Agency
RPL	Recognition of Prior Learning
TVET	Technical and Vocational Education and Training
VET	Vocational Education and Training

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Executive Summary

This paper explores the relationship between vocational education and training (VET) systems and the skills portability of Egyptian youth, focusing on Egypt and on three potential migrant destination countries: Germany, Italy and the United Kingdom. Vocational education and training is distinguishable from other forms of education in that it 1) generally goes beyond mandatory or general education; 2) generally emphasises the development of practical skills, competencies, knowledge, understanding and attitudes related to specific occupations or jobs, and; 3) typically bridges the gap between theoretical knowledge and practical application in a specific job. How different countries supply VET varies, and VET systems may emphasise a combination of classroom-based learning and work-place learning (e.g., on-the-job training, apprenticeships) (International Centre for Technical and Vocational Education and Training, 2014). Vocational education and training systems may respond to the needs of the labour market, which entails not only preparing students for specific sectors and functions but also for the general skills and competencies that are portable across jobs.

The alignment between VET systems and labour markets can be challenging, especially in the context of international mobility of workers. Typically, VET systems are calibrated to *local* labour market needs, raising questions about how portable the education, training and credentials are of individuals trained in one country but who seek work in another. This paper explores how the design of VET systems in Egypt, Germany, Italy and the United Kingdom may support or challenge the skills mobility of Egyptian youth seeking to work in key destination countries of the European Union. It is the second paper in the project *Research on the Means to Improve Human Mobility Channels*. Based on review of previous literature, policy documents and descriptive statistics, the following key messages emerge about the studied VET systems and their ties to the potential labour market opportunities of Egyptian youth in select European destinations:

EGYPT

Egypt has the largest educational system in the MENA region, with approximately 20 million students enrolled in pre-tertiary education alone in 2018-2019 (European Training Foundation, 2019a). The youth population in Egypt is substantial, which creates demand and strain on existing educational structures. Due to lingering perceptions that the TVET system is of poor quality and low status, there are some indications that students try to be tracked into general secondary education and university rather than vocational education and training tracks. Nevertheless, the TVET sector remains an important component of the educational system.

One of the major challenges facing Egypt's TVET sector is the **lack of unified vision on the sector** and a consequent **absence of coherent governance**. Programmes offered within the TVET sector can be offered by different stakeholders and may be designed, implemented and monitored by different bodies. For example, in 2009/2010 around 68 institutions in Egypt offered post-secondary VET programmes, which offered 108 distinct technical programmes covering 22 training disciplines (Álvarez-Galván, 2015). Reform of the TVET sector has been an important policy priority, yet the movement towards coherent governance and standards frameworks within the sector remains challenging. In 2019 more than 20 ministries and institutions were involved in TVET, and there were some indications of competition among key ministries to take leadership of the sector. Important institutions such as the MoETE, the Ministry of Trade and Industry, and the Ministry of Manpower have all developed individual strategies or policies that relate to TVET (European Training Foundation, 2019a). The number of approaches to TVET have supported continued fragmentation of the sector that can undermine the quality of TVET programmes.

Concerns about quality of Egypt's TVET sector has been linked to **inflexibility of training curriculum** and a consequent **skills mismatch** between the skills emphasised in education/training and the demand for skills on the labour market. Currently different institutions offering TVET programmes may establish their own lists of skills to be developed in TVET programmes. Such lists may not be updated frequently enough to match the needs of the labour market, and individual programmes may not have the capacity to conduct their own labour market assessments. Outdated skills lists may lead to the training of students who lack both the soft and technical skills that will support their eventual employability (European Training Foundation, 2019a). The **mismatch between skills/education and employment** may be particularly significant in some sectors. A large share of employees have been found to be under-educated for the work they should perform in occupations related to skilled agriculture and fishery (37.6% of employees under-educated), plant and machine operation and assembly (29.6% of employees under-educated), and sales and services (26.6% of employees under-educated) (European Training Foundation, 2019c). The under-education of workers in occupations typically linked to vocational education suggests that the TVET sector is not training sufficient numbers of workers or is not targeting the right types of skills in existing programmes.

The TVET system in Egypt may also not fully support the transition of youth from school to work given the **absence of work-based learning opportunities**. Work-based learning allows students to directly practice and further improve the skills and capabilities they learn in the classroom. Different models of work-based learning are currently offered within Egypt's TVET sector. One well-known model (the formerly-called MKI scheme) links students of TVET programmes to apprenticeships with companies in the field of study. Another model, the 'factory in school', supports students to work on a production line within the school, directly producing goods that can be sold on the market. The various work-based learning opportunities in Egypt cover a very small share of students enrolled in TVET (International Labour Organisation, 2017; European Training Foundation, 2017). There are indications that students receive insufficient opportunities to practice what they learn, which also translate into lower exposure of students to potential employers. The weaknesses of the TVET sector

are generally all addressed in the **TVET Egypt programme**. The programme targets different elements of the TVET sector for reform. The TVET Egypt programme aims to support better institutional coherence and cooperation, a clearer national governance framework for TVET, and greater financial sustainability for the sector. It also focuses on expanding programming in specific priority sectors. These sectors include (among others) tourism, agriculture, food processing, building and construction, logistics, industrial engineering, and commerce and trade. As the TVET Egypt programme has a long-term vision for reform and no evaluations are yet available on the objectives it has met so far, it is unclear how effective the programme will be in supporting greater youth labour market activation.

GERMANY

The German economy is the largest in the EU, and the success of the economy is an educated and highly skilled workforce, for which the German VET system is a crucial component (European Centre for the Development of Vocational Training, 2020). On average, one in two graduates from secondary school goes on to follow a vocational path, and a majority do so in the form of an apprenticeship. The German vocational training and education system involves a range of actors, including the state, federal states (*Laender*), companies and social partners (European Centre for the Development of Vocational Training, 2017). For youth the system provides a relatively easy transition into the labour market and as a result low levels of youth unemployment (Hippach-Schneider & Huismann, 2018).

The German vocational education and training system is known for its apprenticeship-based system, also known as the **German dual training system**, which combines theory and training embedded within real work environments. The main legal framework guiding the system is the German Vocational Training Act of 1969, which was last amended in 2005. The Act stipulates that vocational training should build those skills, knowledge and qualifications that are needed to start working in a recognised training occupation. In addition, the Act governs further training later in career trajectories as well as retraining for other occupations. (Federal Ministry of Education and Research, 2005). The governance of the VET system in Germany is very coherent, with clear responsibilities delegated to state bodies (including at the federal state level), the private sector and social partners.

Training occupations are highly regulated in Germany and there are currently around 330 in the dual system alone. The dual system offers apprenticeships in every sector of the German economy (Hippach-Schneider & Huismann, 2018). As such, **there are no clear priority sectors for VET in Germany given the integration of VET system into the economy as a whole**. Despite the lack of clear priority sectors for which VET is relevant, partners in the design and implementation of the VET system frequently support revision of existing occupations and introduce new occupational standards when necessary, adapting the training system to the needs of the labour market on a rolling basis (Hippach-Schneider & Huismann, 2018).

Despite the strong link between the economy and training offerings, **matching of supply and demand for vocational training positions remains a challenge**, with the extent of mismatches varying across regions. Such mismatches may reflect misaligned timing between the start of training positions or education cycles, unequal supply and demand for specific training occupations, or mismatching expectations between the types of businesses offering training positions (e.g., SMEs, large companies) and the types of businesses desired of youth (Bundesministerium Für Bildung und Forschung, 2019). The VET system is also not fully successful in matching supply with the knowledge and ability demands of the labour market. An OECD (2017b) report indicates that **the supply of knowledge is mismatched to the demand in knowledge areas such as computers and electronics; clerical work; customer and personal service, and; engineering, mechanical, and technology tasks**, all of which experienced critical shortages. **Critical ability shortages were identified in areas such as verbal, reasoning and quantitative abilities**, all of which relate to the ability of workers to acquire and work with information to support decision making and problem solving. In contrast, there were surpluses of workers who offered physical abilities such as endurance and physical strength. The areas of critical shortage and critical surplus likely reflect the transition in the German economy away from manual tasks and toward automation-assisted tasks and services (OECD, 2017b).

ITALY

The VET system in Italy is large, with over 55% of all students enrolled in upper secondary education in 2016 participating in some form of VET (Eurostat, 2019). The VET system includes educational programmes at the upper secondary and post-secondary non-tertiary levels. Programmes may span three to five years. Whereas three-year VET programmes lead to a vocational qualification, four-year programmes lead to a technician professional diploma, and five-year programmes combine both VET curriculum with general education and lead to professional education diplomas (European Centre for the Development of Vocational Training, 2017b).

The VET system in Italy is offered through multilevel cooperation and coordination. Common rules and frameworks for the broader education and training system are set at the national level. Following national guidelines, the regions and autonomous provinces are responsible for implementing VET programmes, including some work-based learning schemes (European Centre for the Development of Vocational Training, 2017b). Despite the strong involvement of the regions and provinces in the design of education, **some parts of the VET system are not responsive to local employment contexts and do not necessarily reflect local needs in the curriculum**. The regions of Italy vary widely in socio-economic characteristics, labour opportunities and infrastructure, yet the areas of study offered in professional institutes (those offering 5-year, VET/general education professional education diplomas) were previously standardised. Previously professional institutes could only offer six areas of study, and the courses offered were not calibrated to the priorities of the region. The Italian government has begun reforming the structure so that professional institutes can offer more

study areas that are responsive to priority sectors of the region. In contrast, the regional VET programmes – the three- and four-year VET programmes at upper-secondary level – have always reflected the needs of the regions and local areas in their design (OECD, 2017a).

Some VET programmes in Italy combine classroom- and work-based learning, generally through apprenticeships, but **the Italian VET system is not considered dual track because the learning is primarily classroom-based**. In 2016 just over 30% of enterprises in Italy hired VET students in some form of work placement (Eurostat, 2019). Reform movements have been pursued to promote greater engagement between students and employers. For example, the “Good School” (*Buona Scuola*) reform introduced in 2015 enforced work-based learning in both general and vocational education, with students in technical and professional schools expected to fulfil 400 hours of work-based learning. Unlike the German dual-track VET system, the Good School reform does not *per se* entail apprenticeships but instead encourages students to have some form of work-based training, without prescribing the format that should be used (Pastore, 2019).

The priority areas for VET programmes vary by region. A 2014 assessment of the Italian TVET system (European Centre for the Development of Vocational Training, 2014) identified several focus areas for VET trainings, including in: trade and industry (e.g., clothing production, footwear production, chemical production, agro-food processing); skilled trades (e.g. woodworking, artwork, pleasure craft building and maintenance); professional services (e.g., motor vehicle repair, tourism and hospitality, catering, wellness, retail, commercial sales, hairdressing and cosmetology, waiting and bar services), and; agriculture. Despite the focus of regional VET programmes on meeting the demands of the local economy, the **supply of VET graduates does not fully match labour market demand**. The 2017 OECD Survey of Adult Skills indicated that 12% of Italian workers had higher skills than needed for their current functions, and 8% were under-skilled, meaning that they were not assessed as meeting minimum skill proficiency requirements to perform their current jobs satisfactorily. The skill mismatch varied widely by region, with greater shares of workers considered under-skilled in the South and greater shares of workers considered over-skilled in the North (Garda, 2017). Across the country certain work areas or knowledge domains also had critical or mild surpluses or shortages of employees. In 2017 the **supply of and demand for knowledge was mismatched in areas such as computers and electronics; clerical work, and; engineering, mechanical, and technology, all of which experienced critical shortages in knowledgeable staff**. The only area of critical *surplus* of workers was in the building and construction area, but there were milder surpluses in the supply of workers in areas such as transportation and food production. **In terms of abilities, critical shortages were identified in areas such as verbal abilities and quantitative abilities**, and surpluses were identified related to endurance and physical strength (OECD, 2017a).

THE UNITED KINGDOM

The UK's VET system is a key component of the country's economy and its origins date back to the 12th century. The system is continually adjusted to changes in the national economy and to keep up with developments in the global economy (Department for International Trade, 2018). The British Council (2017) states that the system aims to prepare people for the labour market by equipping them with skills. These skills are generally specific to an industry, trade and/or occupation and enable those with VET training to be fully active in the labour market (British Council, 2017). **Vocational education and training is offered at secondary and tertiary level in two forms: school-based programmes and apprenticeships.** The school-based programmes combine general academic studies with VET elements. The one- to four-year programmes may be either broad VET programmes or programmes for specific occupations, and they may take place in schools and a workplace. The apprenticeship system is growing as demand in different sectors of the labour market and competition for positions are increasing (Abusland, 2018). Apprenticeships generally are based on a work contract and include components of technical and occupation-specific qualifications as well as core, transferable skills like literacy, numeracy and ICT (British Council, 2017).

The **governance of the VET system is complex given the decision-making autonomy** granted by the UK Government to the Devolved Administrations in Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland. Each country has a different central body responsible for VET policies, and each country have their own inspection and review bodies. These bodies hold responsibility for inspecting schools and further education colleges as well as assessing the effectiveness of the outcomes for learners, the quality of teaching, learning and assessment, and of leadership and management. VET in the UK is provided in different kinds of institutions, including secondary schools, school sixth forms, sixth form colleges, FE colleges, higher education institutions, private providers and employers. This variety of providers make the control described above even more important. The VET qualifications are developed and awarded by independent awarding organisations that also issue the certificates. These organisations either offer a wide range of different qualifications, often general academic and vocational, or specialise on one specific area. This usually depends on the size of the organisation (European Centre for the Development of Vocational Training, 2017c).

Reviews and assessment lead to constant improvements in the VET system to ensure it matches the demands of the labour market. While improvements are important, they also come with the risk that employers are not aware of the value and relevance of different qualifications (Abusland, 2018; Wolf, 2011). **A recent reform has resulted in the introduction of T Levels**, new two-year courses starting in September 2020. The T Levels take the form of a dual system, meaning that they will provide a mixture of training in the classroom and at a workplace. Such programmes will be offered in a wide range of 25 areas, for example accountancy, digital business services, hair, beauty and aesthetics, health, management and administration, and science. The ratio of classroom learning is what makes the T Levels different from apprenticeships, where around 80% of training is provided on the job (Department for Education, 2019).

The UK does not have a large number of regulated occupations, and as such **the further development of the VET system is not based on priority sectors or occupations**. Programmes exist for a wide variety of occupations, and equally employers have demands for VET skills in all sectors of the economy (Abusland, 2018; Cerna, 2013). These demands are not consistently met, with 40% of workers considered not fully qualified for the occupation that they are engaged in. A forecasting estimation indicates that **underqualification will remain a significant challenge in the UK** and that the issue of an under-skilled labour force will increase by 2030 (Industrial Strategy Council, 2019). Certain work areas or knowledge domains show critical or mild surpluses or shortages of employees. The 2017 OECD evaluation indicates that **the supply of knowledge is critically mismatched to the demand in knowledge areas such as computers and electronics and clerical work**. There are milder shortages in a wide range of other sectors, including communications and media, telecommunication, and building and construction. Mild surpluses are observed in the supply of workers in areas such as sales and marketing, transportation, food production and mechanical work. In terms of abilities, **critical shortages were identified in areas such as verbal abilities, reasoning, and quantitative abilities**. These are skills that are necessary to be able to acquire and work with verbal or mathematical information to support decision making and problem solving. In contrast, more workers than demanded offered physical abilities such as endurance and physical strength (OECD, 2017b).

Conclusions and Recommendations

The focus countries differ in important ways in terms of how the VET system is structured and prepares students to transition into the labour market. One of the important differences in this regard relates to the role of work-based learning in each VET system. Germany stands apart for having a truly dual training (dual-track) system in which students in VET programmes are exposed to potential employers through apprenticeship schemes. The VET systems of Egypt and Italy provide insufficient opportunities for students to deepen their skills through work-based learning. While the recent reforms in the UK aim to increase work-based learning, it is unclear in how far the new reform will support youth transitions into the labour market.

Another important dimension of the VET systems in the focus countries relates to the types of skill sets generated in VET programmes and demanded on the labour market. A common thread across the focus countries is that there are a range of skills and competencies expected by employers that are not fully met by graduates. Verbal, quantitative, and reasoning abilities were generally assessed as being of critical shortage among workers in Germany, Italy and the United Kingdom. In contrast, physical skills – related to endurance, physical strength, and balance and coordination – were generally assessed as either being in surplus or in critical surplus in the three focus destination countries. The oversaturation of these skills in the labour market suggests that the jobs for which these skills are most relevant, such as

construction, may not accommodate the supply of workers. Across all three destination countries, there were two sectors or work areas that had critical knowledge shortages: computers and electronics, and clerical work. In Germany, additional areas of critical knowledge shortage were customer and personal services, and sales and marketing. In Italy, work related to engineering, mechanics and technology had experienced critical knowledge shortages (OECD, 2017b). The sectors experiencing critical skills shortages are generally those that require the skills noted above, such as verbal and quantitative skills.

The characteristics of the VET systems in the four focus countries, and the skill-/knowledge supply and demand mismatches within them, suggest opportunities for mobile Egyptians wishing to work in the EU. The acute need for knowledgeable professionals in specific work areas like clerical work, computers and electronics, and customer and personal service (in Germany) or engineering, mechanics and technology (in Italy) suggests potential employment opportunities for Egyptian youth trained in these areas. The work areas that have experienced acute knowledge shortages now are generally those that will continue to grow, even amid transitions to automisation. For Egyptian youth to make the transition from education or training (in Egypt) to employment (in Germany, Italy or the UK), attention should be paid to: 1) increasing quality of training for non-technical skills, including both basic skills (numeracy/literacy) and professional skills (e.g., verbal skills, quantitative skills); 2) expanding experiential or work-based learning opportunities; 3) better aligning VET curriculum with the needs of specific migrant destination countries, which may require greater correspondence between VET governance structures and bodies responsible for execution of labour migration policies; 4) understanding critical knowledge, skill, and ability shortages in key European destinations by sector, and; 5) evaluation of how existing certificate/diploma validation frameworks support the employment or further training of graduates of Egyptian VET programmes.

I. Introduction

For many countries, vocational education and training (VET) is an integral part of education, labour and economic development strategies. While the design and execution of VET systems and policies differ across countries, there are some common components that distinguish VET from other types of education and training aimed at increasing the human capital stocks of a population. First, VET is normally education or training that goes beyond mandatory or general education. Second, VET generally emphasises the development of practical skills, competencies, knowledge, understanding and attitudes related to specific occupations or jobs. As such, an important third component is that VET typically bridges the gap between theoretical knowledge and practical application in a specific job, which may entail that education may be delivered through a combination of formal education (e.g., as part of secondary/tertiary education) and workplace learning (e.g., on-the-job training, apprenticeships) (International Centre for Technical and Vocational Education and Training, 2014).

The objective of VET is generally to support individuals with the skills and competencies needed to be competitive in the labour market, which suggests that VET systems should be calibrated to the needs of the labour market. These needs relate not only to the specific sectors and occupations that are demanded at a particular moment in time but also relate to needed levels of expertise or competency – quality of workers. As education and training cycles typically require months or even years, there is also a need for VET systems to be forward-looking. In this sense, VET programmes should be aligned not only with current labour-market needs but also anticipated needs.

The alignment between VET systems and labour markets can be challenging, especially in the context of international mobility of workers. Typically, VET systems are calibrated to *local* labour market needs, raising questions about how portable the education, training and credentials are of individuals trained in one country but who seek work in another. This paper explores the relationship between VET systems and policies and the skills portability of Egyptian youth. As the second paper in the project *Research on the Means to Improve Human Mobility*

Channels, this paper focuses specifically on how the VET systems in Egypt, Germany, Italy and the United Kingdom may support or challenge the skills mobility of Egyptian youth seeking to work in key destination countries of the European Union. The paper seeks to answer the following question: Given the structure of national VET systems, what potential challenges or opportunities may Egyptian migrant youth with VET credentials face when trying to enter the labour market in major destination countries?

To answer this question, this paper explores the structures and design of the VET systems in Egypt and three European destination countries, the sectors that are prioritised in national VET strategies, and the way VET systems support the school-to-work transition. The paper also explores how credentials earned in foreign VET systems are recognised within specific policy frameworks. Following section one (this introduction), section two describes the methodology used to inform this paper. Section three presents an overview of the Egyptian VET system, while section four provides abbreviated country case studies of the VET systems of Germany, Italy and the United Kingdom. In all four cases, an overview of the structure and governance of the VET system, the size of the system, the sectors of focus and strategic objectives for the VET system, and the relationship between the VET systems and youth activation policies and interventions is provided. Section five concludes with reflections on challenges and opportunities mobile Egyptian youth with VET credentials may face when seeking employment in key European Union destination countries.

II. Methodology

This research paper has been informed by a review of existing grey and academic literature. Paper 1 defined the key countries of destination in the European Union (EU) that are the focus of analysis. The selected countries – Germany, Italy and the United Kingdom – are home to significant numbers of Egyptian migrants and represent diverse economic systems. In 2017 Italy hosted by far the largest Egyptian population in the EU, with 110,398 Egyptians (or 37.5% of the total Egyptian migrant stock in Europe) residing within it. The United Kingdom hosted the second-largest Egyptian migrant stock (at 39,980 people) whereas Germany was the 5th country in terms of the size of the Egyptian migrant population (at 23,428 people) (United Nations Department of Economic and Social Affairs, 2017). The countries also represent a range of economic profiles and geographical orientations, with Germany representing a relatively inflexible economy within Northern continental Europe, Italy representing a more flexible and informal economy in the Mediterranean, and the United Kingdom representing a diverse, semi-flexible economy.

Based on the selection of countries, literature was collected on each. The literature covered: 1) the structure, history and current objectives of the vocational education and training (VET) systems in each of the focus countries; 2) the skills and knowledge deficiencies observed in the local labour markets, and; 3) active labour market/youth labour market activation policies to support the transition from school to work. Given the descriptive nature of the paper, literature was generally collected from national authorities, international and intergovernmental organisations, and, when necessary, popular media such as newspapers. Where possible, academic texts from peer-reviewed journals on topics such as youth labour market activation policies were drawn into the analysis. The majority of resources taken into the review can be considered grey, non-academic literature.

Unfortunately nuanced secondary data on the labour market outcomes of VET graduates were not available for all of the study countries. Consequently, original analysis of statistical data was not possible for this review. Instead, publications making use of similar original data sources were used to ensure that the same sets of indicators could be used for assessing elements such as skill- and knowledge mismatches across countries. Credible bodies such as the European Centre for the Development of Vocational Training (CEDEFOP) and the European Training Foundation (ETF) were consulted for data and publications that would support comparison among the focus countries.

As the paper has made use of publications available in the public domain and primarily in English, some more contemporary trends or changes may not be well reflected in this review. In all of the focus countries, a number of reforms have recently been undertaken in both the wider educational system and in the VET sector specifically. The fast pace of these changes, and the ambiguity in what planned changes or reforms have actually been implemented, makes it challenging to capture the current state of the VET system. The absence of contemporary information has been particularly challenging in Egypt. The Egyptian VET system appears to be undergoing significant reforms. Given the multiplicity of institutions and stakeholders involved in the VET system and the development of different, parallel reform strategies, the literature was not able to sufficiently reflect the complexity of the sector. This review could be further nuanced through validation with stakeholders in the focus countries or consultations with key experts.

III. VET in Egypt

The vocational education and training (VET) system varies in its design and objectives across countries. The design and objectives of VET systems generally reflect the needs/constraints of local labour markets and country economic development trajectories and strategies. Egyptian youth who have participated in VET programmes in Egypt may migrate to key destination countries in the European Union such as Germany, Italy and the United Kingdom, all of which have unique VET systems. How well they can use the credentials and skills they gained through VET training may depend in part on how the VET systems function in each of the countries of destination. This section therefore provides abbreviated profiles of the VET systems in the four focus countries.

The technical and vocational education and training (TVET) system¹ in Egypt is complex and in transition, which makes analysis of how it prepares migrant youth for inclusion in foreign labour markets challenging. The Egyptian educational system is large and stands apart in the Middle East and North African (MENA) region for the large number of students it includes. Approximately 20 million students were enrolled in pre-tertiary education in Egypt in 2018-2019, and different parts of the educational system may struggle to accommodate the needs of the large young population seeking different forms of education (European Training Foundation, 2019a).

Finding accurate, contemporary statistics on the number of young people specifically in TVET programmes in Egypt is difficult. As of 2009/2010, around 68 institutions in Egypt offered post-secondary VET programmes, which collectively had 127, 400 enrolled students. These students were spread across 108 distinct technical programmes covering 22 training disciplines (Álvarez-Galván, 2015). Over time the absolute number of students enrolled in TVET programmes has remained relatively stable, yet the proportion of TVET students among all students enrolled in pre-tertiary education has decreased. In 2016, approximately 21.6% of all students enrolled in general secondary education were in TVET programmes, and 46% of all students enrolled in upper secondary education were in TVET programmes. The large share

1. In the literature, the Egyptian vocational education and training sector is generally described as including 'technical' education and training. In the European destination countries profiled, the sector was generally described without the addition of 'technical' education and training, which likely reflects the distinct separation made between vocational and technical education and training programmes in Europe. As such, the 'TVET' system is generally referred to in Egypt while the 'VET' system is referred to in European country contexts.

of students enrolled in some form of TVET reflects the overall structure of the Egyptian education system. The student tracking system in Egypt channels students into different forms of secondary education based on student performance in primary education. Whereas students with higher marks are recommended into general secondary education, lower-performing students are tracked into the TVET system (European Training Foundation, 2019a). As a consequence of these educational tracks, a larger portion of young people end up within the TVET system.

III.a STRATEGIC OBJECTIVES AND STRUCTURE OF TVET IN EGYPT

The technical and vocational education and training system in Egypt is embedded within large-scale government strategies and programmes for development. The 2014 Egyptian constitution recognises the need for high-quality TVET that accommodates international standards. The 2015 Sustainable Development Strategy-Egypt Vision 2030 further identifies TVET as an important mechanism to support inclusive, sustainable economic development. In part because of the central role of education and training in promoting national development, the whole educational system in Egypt has been subject to recent reform. In 2018, for example, the Ministry of Education and Technical Education (MoETE) introduced a strategy for reforming the educational system. This strategy included provisions that affect the TVET system, such as the introduction of new technological universities with both two- and four-year programmes that can be accessible to students who completed either general secondary education or technical secondary education (European Training Foundation, 2019a).

In line with the larger educational reforms, the TVET system in Egypt is also undergoing large-scale reform. The reforms aim to address perceived fragmentation in the TVET system, poor coordination between bodies responsible for its design and implementation, and concerns about the system's ability to produce relevant skills for the labour market (Álvarez-Galván, 2015). In recognising that fragmentation in the TVET system can undermine the quality of education, a 2014 presidential decree was issued to create the Executive Council for Technical and Vocational Education and Training. While the Council is not yet operational, its creation reflects a strong desire at central level to increase cooperation among bodies involved in TVET (European Training Foundation, 2019b). In 2016 a Ministry for Technical Education and Training was established to lead strategic policy development for the TVET sector, yet it was abolished several months after its creation (European Training Foundation, 2017). In 2018, President el-Sisi confirmed that a new quality assurance and accreditation agency specifically for TVET institutions will be created (European Training Foundation, 2019b), suggesting that while it may not be possible to have centralised leadership of the entire TVET sector, some centralisation of monitoring and evaluation may still occur.

In addition to reform steps initiated at the executive level, a number of line ministries have also proposed policies and strategies that would support TVET reform. The MoETE, for example, created a medium-term strategy for 2015-2018 that addressed quality improvement mechanisms for TVET. The Ministry of Trade and Industry also developed an institutional strategy that included a specific chapter on TVET. The recent update to the Egyptian labour law, which was developed by the Ministry of Manpower, also addressed means of better integrating TVET into the labour market (European Training Foundation, 2017). In 2019 the MoETE started developing a specific strategy for reform of technical education called Technical Education 2.0. This strategy aims to specifically improve the governance and management of secondary technical education. It focuses on five reform pillars: 1) quality assurance; 2) competence-based training; 3) teacher training; 4) centres of excellence, and; 5) visibility (European Training Foundation, 2019b).

The proliferation of policies and strategies reinforces the remaining institutional fragmentation in the TVET sector. Two initiatives have the potential to unite the institutions and stakeholders involved in the TVET system, but both have so far failed to incite wide-spread cooperation. The first initiative was MoETE's mid-term action plan for 2015-2020. This action plan was designed to support eventual standardisation of the entire TVET sector by proposing the TVET Act. As multiple stakeholders are involved in the design, delivery and monitoring of TVET programmes, the action plan did not receive wide-spread acceptance and cooperation. The second initiative was the 2015 Sustainable Development Strategy – Egypt Vision 2030. The Vision 2030 which includes a specific section on the TVET system, has formed the basis for a large-scale, EU-funded TVET initiative called the TVET Egypt (and previously TVET II) programme (see Box 1). The TVET Egypt programme offers a national strategy for TVET but does not wholly address challenges around institutional fragmentation and decentralisation of responsibility for different aspects of the TVET system. The MoETE is the most active body in the TVET Egypt programme, and while there are a wide range of other actors and institutions involved in the strategy, important bodies like the Ministry of Labour and Ministry of Manpower have retained their own strategic approaches to TVET (European Training Foundation, 2017).

BOX 1: TVET EGYPT PROGRAMME

The TVET Egypt programme is a joint initiative funded by the Egyptian government and the European Union (EU). The TVET Egypt programme extends from 2013-2023 and has so far gained financial commitment of €67 million from the Egyptian government and €50 million from the EU (European Training Foundation, 2019a).

The programme has been developed to respond to Egypt's rapidly-changing socio-economic characteristics and needs. Against a backdrop of high youth unemployment and concerns about sustained economic growth, the programme aims to increase national competitiveness, promote youth employment and promote social equity (European Training Foundation, 2019a).

The programme is fundamentally a reform. It has the potential to change the way the TVET system is organised and delivered given its focus on governance of the TVET sector, updates to the curricula of TVET programmes and reforms of school-to-work transition initiatives (European Training Foundation, 2019b).

The TVET Egypt programme focuses on different aspects of the TVET sector (European Training Foundation, 2017), including:

1. Data collection on the employability of TVET graduates;
2. The development of a unified labour market information system (LIMS), which could support curriculum updating, matching of students with on-the-job trainings and placement options, and eventually better matching of graduates with employers;
3. Development of career advising functions in TVET institutes;
4. Development of entrepreneurship education to promote TVET graduates to start their own businesses;
5. Development of national standards for competence based curriculum, which would see TVET curriculum updated according to private-sector needs, the development of qualification frameworks and establishment of assessment standards.

The programme has engaged a wider range of stakeholders involved in the TVET sector. These include not only the national government but also regional/local governments, the private sector, civil society and international/intergovernmental agencies. Important national agencies involved in the programme include the Ministry of Education and Technical Education, the Ministry of Trade and Industry, the Ministry of Tourism, the Ministry of Immigration and Egyptian Expatriates Affairs and the Ministry of Manpower and Migration (TVET Egypt, 2020).

Given the remaining diffusion of responsibilities, competencies and visions across the different institutions involved in the TVET sector, it is difficult to identify one set of objectives for the entire sector that is shared on country level. Nevertheless, the TVET Egypt programme provides guidance on a vision for the TVET system that aligns closely with the overall development strategy of the country. The objectives identified in the TVET Egypt programme are wide-reaching and relate to small-, medium- and long-term changes in the sector. In the long-term, the programme envisions the creation of laws, strategies, and policies that support coherent governance of the TVET system. Another objective is to identify and mobilise long-term funding sources to ensure sustainability in the sector. Building institutional capacity to ensure that stakeholders can efficiently support the sector and ensure quality education is another objective. The TVET Egypt programme would therefore aim to support better institutional coherence and cooperation, a clearer national governance framework for TVET, and greater financial sustainability for the sector (TVET Egypt, 2020).

III.b SECTORAL FOCUS OF VET IN EGYPT

The vocational education and training sector in Egypt provides support for students in a number of different sectors and industries. Given the diffusion of visions for TVET in Egypt, there is no universal list of priority sectors that TVET programmes focus on. As it represents the closest to a national TVET vision, the TVET Egypt programme can nevertheless provide some sense of priority training sectors. The TVET Egypt programme had placed particular emphasis on a small number of sectors, namely:

- Tourism
- Agriculture
- Food processing
- ICT
- Renewable energy
- Textiles and ready-made garments (RMGs)
- Building and construction
- Automotive
- Logistics
- Industrial engineering
- Commerce and trade.

The sectors of focus for the TVET Egypt programme and for the TVET system in general strongly reflect the national vision of TVET as part of larger economic development strategies. For example, the focus on tourism responds in part to recognition that tourism has been one of the most important contributors to Egypt's economic growth yet has been deeply affected by reduced tourism inflows in recent years. To address

the reduction of these flows the TVET Egypt programme proposes that the sector's revival will depend in part on the skill of hospitality workers, thus there is a strong link made between the training of hospitality workers and its long-term recovery (TVET Egypt, 2020).

Past assessments of Egypt's education system in general have suggested that there is a mismatch between supply of students and demand for workers with minimum skills levels. Limited literary and numeracy skills have been identified as a problem for young people entering the labour market. Primary school students appear to graduate with poor reading, writing and numerical skills that then carry over into secondary education, including TVET. Weak basic skills may translate into poor employment opportunities or dissatisfaction from employers on the skills of employees. A 2012 survey of employers who hired post-secondary VET graduates signalled that both basic (e.g., literacy, numeracy) and technical (e.g., occupation-specific) skills could be improved. Across all sectors, only 38% of employers indicated that post-secondary VET graduates had 'strong' basic skills; over half (58%) indicated that basic skills were of 'medium' mastery, and 4.3% indicated that graduate's basic skills were 'weak'. Technical skills were assessed better, with 51% of employers indicating that graduates had 'strong' technical skills, 45% indicating graduates had 'medium' skills, and 4.4% indicating that graduate had 'weak' technical skills (Álvarez-Galván, 2015). Such employer's assessments may signal that it is important to focus on building basic and soft skills in addition to technical skills to assure that graduates at all levels, including from VET programmes, meet the needs of the labour market. In addition to challenges in skill level of graduates, there also appear to be come challenges around mismatches in the supply and demand of skills in specific sectors.

Based on data from 2014, Dimova and Stephan (2016) identified a significant oversupply of students from social science specialisations and engineering. As a consequence of oversupply, students from these fields enter the labour market in a larger pool of potential applicants. The overcrowding of the potential-worker pool may lead to higher unemployment among recent graduates. Indeed, job-seekers with some form of working experience have higher likelihoods of being employed. This suggests that in overcrowded employment pools, job seekers who have had not only formal education, but some form of work experience will have a competitive edge (Dimova & Stephan, 2016).

Unfortunately, assessments of the (mis-)match between the supply of TVET graduates specifically and demand from specific sectors of employment are lacking. There are some indications that TVET graduates may be more in demand than university graduates, however. A 2015 review of skill mismatches in Egypt conducted by the International Labour Organisation (ILO) found that the labour market has experienced shortages in workers with technical and mid-level professional skills. Such skills are typically developed in TVET programmes, yet perceptions about the low quality and low status of the Egyptian TVET sector has resulted in more students moving toward the university system rather than TVET programmes. Data from 2012 indicate that youth unemployment rates were highest among youth seeking jobs as technicians and associate professionals (29.6% of all job-seekers unemployed) and those seeking

professional occupations (46.5% of job-seekers unemployed). In contrast, unemployment rates were much lower among youth seeking work in craft and related trades (3.1% unemployed) and skilled agricultural and fishery workers (0.5% unemployed) (International Labour Organisation, 2015). The low levels of unemployment in occupations that are typically trained in vocational education programmes suggests that there is a strong need in Egypt for graduates from VET programmes.

Other assessments confirm that education/skills and occupations are not always well matched. Data collected on workers aged 15-64 in 2016 indicated significant over- and under-education in specific sectors. A number of occupation categories linked to TVET demonstrated strong education mismatches. For example, while 11.7% of service workers and shop/market sales workers were found to be *over-educated*, a much larger share – 26.6% – were found to be *under-educated* for their work. The skills gaps were even more marked in skilled agriculture and fishery occupations (with 31.7% of workers over-educated and 37.6% under-educated) and among plant and machine operators and assemblers (with 6.5% of workers over-educated and 29.6% under-educated) (European Training Foundation, 2019c). The under education of workers in occupations that would usually require vocational training suggests that the Egyptian VET system is not completely calibrated to the needs of the labour market. Indeed, a number of structural challenges in the VET sector have been identified that can lead to poor take up of young people into the labour market. These challenges are summarised below.

III.c YOUTH LABOUR MARKET ACTIVATION AND THE EGYPTIAN VET SYSTEM

When examining the role of vocational education and training in supporting youth employment, it is important to understand what mechanisms support youth in the transition from education/training to work. The so-called school-to-work transition is often facilitated by programmes that either seek to generate job creation or to promote the movement of youth into first employment. One specific way of easing the school-to-work transition is through active labour market programmes (ALMP).

Youth-focused ALMPs often support young people's inclusion in the (formal) labour market through four mechanisms: 1) training and skills development, both in and outside of the formal educational system; 2) entrepreneurship promotion; 3) employment services, and; 4) subsidised employment. A 2017 assessment of ALMPs used in Egypt (Barsoum, 2017) suggests that each of these four intervention types are used in the country but with varying levels of success. While some of the ALMP interventions are connected to each other, they are generally used in isolation. For example, there is an extensive youth public employment scheme that recruits youth into the public sector, guaranteeing a minimum number of jobs per year for recent graduates. As the focus is on the public sector, there is limited connection between the supply of skills provided for in the educational system, including VET, with skills demanded in eventual job placements.

The TVET sector in Egypt has several features that limit its effectiveness in supporting youth in the school-to-work transitions. Key issues identified by the ILO (2017) include the disconnect between trained skills and demand on the labour market, poor targeting of programmes, quality of training and focus on classroom-based rather than experiential learning. The disconnect between trained and demanded skills within the traditional supply-driven design of Egypt's TVET sector is a particular issue highlighted by multiple evaluations. As Barsoum (2017) notes, VET programmes cover a pre-defined list of skills for training that vary according to the training centre. The skill lists may not be updated often enough to remain fully relevant for the demands of the labour market, leading to limited activation of youth (Barsoum, 2017). The skill mismatch between training programmes and employment includes both soft skills (e.g., communication skills, problem-solving skills, adaptability) and technical skills (e.g., occupation-related competencies), suggesting that students are not adequately prepared for work on multiple domains of competency (AlAzzawi & Hlasny, 2018). The TVET Egypt programme recognises the need to better align the curriculum of TVET programmes to the demand of employers. It follows a number of smaller-scale initiatives (e.g., Sectoral Enterprise Training Partnerships, the ITC-sponsored National Program for Training for Employment) that sought to offer demand-driven training. While such initiatives were valuable ways of promoting youth activation, they were generally industry subsidies and not appropriately targeted to vulnerable youth (International Labour Organisation, 2017).

Another feature of Egypt's TVET system that challenges youth activation is the focus on classroom-based rather than work-based learning. Work-based learning occurs when students learn concepts or skills, can apply them in a job setting, and reflect on that experience to inform further learning. In the TVET context, important forms of work-based learning are on-the-job trainings, internships, apprenticeships, in-school production centres and other exercises that allow students to practice what has been learned in a classroom setting.

Within the TVET sector in Egypt, some forms of work-based learning have been used in the past. Several have emerged from international cooperation projects. One well-known example is an apprenticeship scheme formerly called the Mubarak Kohl Initiative (MKI) for Vocational Education Training and Employment Promotion. The MKI was first introduced in 1994 with assistance from the German technical cooperation agency GIZ but later became a self-sustaining model under MoETE. The MKI supported around 30,000 apprentices to be placed with companies in 2017 (International Labour Organisation, 2017). Other work-based learning schemes are the product of national innovations. The so-called 'factory in school' scheme is one. The factory in school scheme involves students directly working on a production line, with the goods produced later sold on the market. The production line may be run in the school with the assistance of a teacher, or it may be run through a partnership with a company, where the company installs the production line in the school and directly employs some students (European Training Foundation, 2017).

While the existing work-based learning models allow students to practice their skills, the number of students who can make use of these programmes is relatively small. In 2016 the MoETE estimated that around 2% of all secondary students were enrolled in programmes with explicit work-based learning components (European Training Foundation, 2017). The small number of students in work-based learning may reflect the limited capacity of companies to facilitate such placements. Small- or medium-sized companies, which are the majority of all businesses, often do not have the resources to train workers on the job. It may also be risky for companies to invest in work-based learning if trained employees quit after receiving training (International Labour Organisation, 2017). As a consequence of limited work-based learning, students may not be able to adequately practice and train the skills needed by employers. There are also fewer opportunities for students to come into contact with potential employers until they are actively seeking work. In recognition of the importance of work-placed learning to increase the quality of students and their contact with employers, the Egyptian government has prioritised creating more work-based learning opportunities. Work-based learning is an explicit component of the TVET Egypt programme.

III.d SUMMARY OF TVET SYSTEM IN EGYPT

The technical and vocational education and training system in Egypt includes a large number of students and plays a potentially important role in supporting youth employment, but it can be further strengthened through ongoing reforms. The TVET sector in Egypt fits within a complex and diverse educational structure. A number of national development strategies and frameworks, including the 2015 Sustainable Development Strategy-Egypt Vision 2030, identify further strengthening of the whole educational system as priorities to ensure sustainable and inclusive economic growth. Egypt has the largest educational system in the MENA region, with approximately 20 million students enrolled in pre-tertiary education alone in 2018-2019 (European Training Foundation, 2019a). The youth population in Egypt is substantial, which creates demand and strain on existing educational structures. Due to lingering perceptions that the TVET system is of poor quality and low status, there are some indications that students try to be tracked into general secondary education and university rather than vocational education and training tracks. Nevertheless, the TVET sector remains an important component of the educational system and can play an important role in supporting better matching between the skills demanded on the labour market and the skills trained through formal education and training.

The high potential of TVET system in Egypt to support young people's transition into formal work can be improved by addressing some of the structural challenges identified in the TVET system. One of the major challenges facing Egypt's TVET sector is the **lack of unified vision on the sector** and a consequent **absence of coherent governance**. Programmes offered within the TVET sector can be offered by different

stakeholders and may be designed, implemented and monitored by different bodies. For example, in 2009/2010 around 68 institutions in Egypt offered post-secondary VET programmes, which offered 108 distinct technical programmes covering 22 training disciplines (Álvarez-Galván, 2015). Reform of the TVET sector has been an important policy priority, yet the movement towards coherent governance and standards frameworks within the sector remains challenging. In 2019 more than 20 ministries and institutions were involved in TVET, and there were some indications of competition among key ministries to take leadership of the sector. Important institutions such as the MoETE, the Ministry of Trade and Industry, and the Ministry of Manpower have all developed individual strategies or policies that relate to TVET (European Training Foundation, 2019a). The number of approaches to TVET have supported continued fragmentation of the sector that can undermine the quality of TVET programmes. The absence of strong quality-assurance mechanisms can limit both the quality of programming and the transferability of skills acquired within the Egyptian TVET sector.

The quality of existing TVET programmes is a further challenge that can undermine the employment of youth. Concerns about quality of Egypt's TVET sector has been linked to **inflexibility of training curriculum** and a consequent **skills mismatch** between the skills emphasised in education/training and the demand for skills on the labour market. Across the TVET sector there has previously been a lack of appropriate assessment of labour-market needs to inform curriculum development and updating. The TVET Egypt programme, a large TVET reform initiative funded by the government of Egypt and the European Union, seeks to better incorporate labour market assessments into curriculum planning. Currently different institutions offering TVET programmes may establish their own lists of skills to be developed in TVET programmes. Such lists may not be updated frequently enough to match the needs of the labour market, and individual programmes may not have the capacity to conduct their own labour market assessments. Outdated skills lists may lead to the training of students who lack both the soft and technical skills that will support their eventual employability (European Training Foundation, 2019a). The **mismatch between skills/education and employment** may be particularly significant in some sectors. A large share of employees have been found to be under-educated for the work they should perform in occupations related to skilled agriculture and fishery (37.6% of employees under-educated), plant and machine operation and assembly (29.6% of employees under-educated), and sales and services (26.6% of employees under-educated) (European Training Foundation, 2019c). The under-education of workers in occupations typically linked to vocational education suggests that the TVET sector is not training sufficient numbers of workers or is not targeting the right types of skills in existing programmes.

The TVET system in Egypt may also not fully support the transition of youth from school to work given the **absence of work-based learning opportunities**. Work-based learning allows students to directly practice and further improve the skills and capabilities

they learn in the classroom. Different models of work-based learning are currently offered within Egypt's TVET sector. One well-known model (the formerly-called MKI scheme) links students of TVET programmes to apprenticeships with companies in the field of study. Another model, the 'factory in school', supports students to work on a production line within the school, directly producing goods that can be sold on the market. The various work-based learning opportunities in Egypt cover a very small share of students enrolled in TVET (International Labour Organisation, 2017; European Training Foundation, 2017). There are indications that students receive insufficient opportunities to practice what they learn. The limited ties to industry to support work-based learning opportunities may result in students having insufficient mastery of the soft and hard skills needed to become and remain employed in their sector of training. The shortage of work-based learning placements may also translate into lower exposure of students to potential employers.

The weaknesses of the TVET sector are generally all addressed in the **TVET Egypt programme**. The programme targets different elements of the TVET sector for reform. The TVET Egypt programme aims to support better institutional coherence and cooperation, a clearer national governance framework for TVET, and greater financial sustainability for the sector. It also focuses on expanding programming in specific priority sectors. These sectors include (among others) tourism, agriculture, food processing, building and construction, logistics, industrial engineering, and commerce and trade. As the TVET Egypt programme has a long-term vision for reform and no evaluations are yet available on the objectives it has met so far, it is unclear how effective the programme will be in supporting greater youth labour market activation.

IV. VET in Germany, Italy and the United Kingdom

Across the European Union, vocational education and training (VET) is considered to cover a wide range of programmes offered in different settings. Such programmes may be part of secondary, post-secondary or tertiary education levels. Vocational education and training may take place in formal structures or through informal learning, including through active labour market measures. Programmes for VET may also rely on classroom-based learning, work-based learning or a combination of both².

IV.a GERMANY

The German economy is the largest in the EU. The automotive sector and manufacturing more generally are the basis of the economy, and several German companies are among the leading manufacturers worldwide. Furthermore, wholesale and retail trade as well as health and social care are key sectors of the German economy. The basis of the success of the economy is an educated and highly skilled workforce, for which the German VET system is a crucial component (European Centre for the Development of Vocational Training, 2020).

The German vocational education and training system is known for its apprenticeship-based system, also known as the German dual training system, and for the way it combines theory and training and embeds this in a work environment. The main legal framework guiding the system is the German Vocational Training Act of 1969, which was last amended in 2005. Through this Act the German State declares that non-school vocational education and training is a public task. Within the Act vocational training refers to “vocational training preparation, initial training, further training and retraining” (Federal Ministry of Education and Research, 2005). The Act further stipulates that vocational training should build those skills, knowledge and qualifications that are needed to start working in a recognised training occupation. In addition, the Act governs further training later in career trajectories as well as retraining for other occupations.

2. In some countries, a combined focus on classroom- and work-based learning is referred to as a *dual track* or *dual education* system. Within such systems, students apply the theory and concepts learned in a classroom to work conducted in an apprenticeship.

On average, one in two graduates from secondary school goes on to follow a vocational path and a majority do so in the form of an apprenticeship. The VET system is a cooperation between the government, companies and social partner, which jointly set standards and regulations that result in a system recognised worldwide. For youth the system provides a relatively easy transition into the labour market and as a result low levels of youth unemployment (Hippach-Schneider & Huismann, 2018).

Within the German educational system (visualised in Figure 1), VET programmes and programmes combining VET and general education are offered at several educational levels: upper secondary, post-secondary and tertiary. The basic full VET programmes are at the upper secondary level, and students first enter these VET programmes after completing lower secondary education at the age of 15 or 16. At this level, several forms of VET are offered. Firstly, there are apprenticeship programmes, which usually last between two and three and a half years. These are the core of the German vocational education and training system and are also referred to as the dual system. The system combines two places of training: work-based learning and vocational schools. In general, the majority (about 70%) of the learning takes place in the workplace. Besides the apprenticeships, there are also school-based programmes at different levels, which last between one and three years and lead to different kinds of qualifications. There are full-time vocational schools, which offer education for non-academic occupations, for example, in the health care sector. In addition, there are general education programmes that have a vocational orientation at the upper-secondary level. In addition, there are transition programmes, which provide basic training upon completion of a lower secondary programme before then moving into either an apprenticeship or a school-based programme (European Centre for the Development of Vocational Training, 2017a; Hippach-Schneider & Huismann, 2018).


As can be seen in Figure 1, there are several pathways from general education into VET and from upper-secondary VET to higher education. Post-secondary level programmes exist to enable the transition into tertiary education for holders of general intermediate secondary school leavers as it enables them to obtain a qualification to enter higher education. The specialised programmes at the post-secondary level build on knowledge and skills built through general education and initial VET and deepen specific occupational knowledge. Programmes last for one to three years and graduates then have qualifications needed to enter the universities of applied sciences (European Centre for the Development of Vocational Training, 2017a; Hippach-Schneider & Huismann, 2018).

Given the structure of the German education system, there are several opportunities for upward movement within and beyond VET tracks. Possibilities for lateral movements also exist at several points in the system, although to a limited extent. What is important to note is that students who initially enter any of the upper-secondary VET programmes still have the opportunity to obtain a tertiary level education by moving into higher-level VET and VET/general education programmes and then from these upper-level VET/general education programmes into university (see Figure 1).

These channels for possibilities to move through the system are important to note as they are also relevant for non-national youth who may enter the VET system at different levels depending on their previous education and training. As will be discussed in Section IV.A.iii, Germany has increased its efforts to recognise professional and technical skills of migrants. This means that migrants may not need to enter the VET system if their aim is to work and their previous training is recognised. It also means, however, that migrants entering the VET system are generally able to increase their education independent of where they are first placed in the system. In this context, it is important to mention that the German government has opened channels for regular labour migration for the purpose of training and further training for foreign, third-country nationals. More information on this is provided in Section IV.A.ii below in the context of skills matching.

Since 2005, the BMBF produces an Annual Report on Vocational Education and Training³. In the report a summary of trends in the last year are provided, including an overview of the training balance of the past year. The latest report for 2018 shows that in that year 494,539 individuals started vocational training in the dual system, which is 1.7 per cent more than the year prior. In addition, 178,718 people started a school-based VET programme (Bundesministerium für Bildung und Forschung, 2019). Looking at the share of students in Germany that is enrolled in VET reveals some further interesting trends and reveals the importance of VET in the country. In 2016, below 5% were enrolled in VET at the lower secondary level, but then almost 46% of all students enrolled in upper secondary education were in some form of VET. At the post-secondary non-tertiary level this share then increases to 92%. Males outnumbered females in VET enrolment at the lower level and also when it comes to graduates, with just about 40% of graduates from post-secondary VET programmes female. At the post-secondary non-tertiary level, females outnumber males both in terms of enrolment and graduation. The dominance of work-based learning in VET in Germany is shown by the fact that in 2016 almost 65% of enterprises in Germany hired VET students in some form of placement (Eurostat, 2019).

3. See <https://www.bmbf.de/de/berufsbildungsbericht-2740.html>

Figure 1: VET in Germany's education and training system

NB: This is a simplified chart, based on the unified approach used for the spotlights on VET in all EU-28 countries plus Iceland and Norway. ISCED-P 2011. EQF levels have not yet been defined for all qualifications

Source: European Centre for the Development of Vocational Training, 2017a, p.3

IV.a.(i) Management and strategic objectives of VET in Germany

The German vocational training and education system involves a range of actors, including the State, federal states (*Laender*), companies and social partners (European Centre for the Development of Vocational Training, 2017). At the governmental level, the Federal Ministry of Education and Research (Bundesministerium für Bildung und Forschung; BMBF) is mainly responsible for the vocational training system; in particular when it comes to VET policy. The Ministry also holds a coordinating and steering role for issuing federally-regulated vocational training regulations together with the respective Ministry responsible for the specific sector (Federal Ministry of Education and Research, 2012).

Another key actor governing the vocational training system in the German context is the Federal Institute for Vocational Education and Training (Bundesinstitut für Berufsbildung; BIBB), which works closely with and advises the BMBF and VET providers. It is a centre of excellence for vocational research and for the progressive development of vocational education and training in Germany. The main mandate is therefore to identify challenges for the VET system and to drive change both in the national but also international training systems. They focus on practice-oriented solutions for all stages of the VET system, including initial and continuing training (Federal Ministry of Education and Research, 2012; European Centre for the Development of Vocational Training, 2017).

The federal states (*Länder*), on the other hand, are responsible for the school-based components of the VET system. This is due to the stipulation in the Constitution that school education is regulated by the individual *Länder*. For this purpose, each of the states has a VET committee, made up of state representatives, employers and employee representatives. These advise the state governments on necessary actions regarding the vocational training in schools. In order to ensure coherence between the federal states, there is a standing committee at the national level, the Kultusministerkonferenz (KMK). The KMK develops recommendations to ensure unity and comparability, but those have to be passed and implemented at the state-level to become legally binding (Hippach-Schneider & Huismann, 2018).

Social partners also have an important function in the German dual system. This refers specifically to employers and trade unions. These actors are influential when it comes to the development of content and form of VET, in order to ensure that their interests, needs and requirements are considered. As such they are involved in the VET committees at the state level and representatives are also on the board of the BIBB (Hippach-Schneider & Huismann, 2018).

Finally, professional chambers and several federal and state authorities also play a crucial role for the VET system as so-called *Zuständige Stellen* (competent authorities). They ensure the suitability of training centres, monitor training in enterprises, provide advice to apprentices, trainers and enterprises, establish and maintain lists of training contracts and organise and implement the final exams. Each competent authority has

a VET committee, which has to be informed on VET-related issues and decides on the regulations for implementation. It consists of representatives of employers, trade unions and teachers (Hippach-Schneider & Huismann, 2018). The regionally organised chambers of industry and commerce, chambers of crafts and professional bodies for liberal professions are mandated as such competent authorities and assigned tasks accordingly. Mainly, they coordinate the training companies and organise the examinations of the different training trajectories. They also issue the proficiency certificates, which are recognised across Germany and internationally (Forschungsinstitut Betriebliche Bildung, 2020).

In the Annual Report on Vocational Education and Training policy priorities for VET are outlined. In general, these relate to making VET attractive for young people, developing and modernising the system further and utilising the potentials that exist to address skills shortages. Related is that one of the main points highlighted is that matching of training places and potential trainees needs to be made more efficient (Bundesministerium für Bildung und Forschung, 2019), a challenge which will be further discussed in the following section.

In the Annual Report of 2018, the integration of young foreigners and youth with a migration background was also specifically highlighted as a priority. This is based on the fact that evidence showed that these groups face more difficulties entering VET than young Germans do. More specifically, the statistics show that 27.6% of foreign nationals start training compared to 55.8% of Germans. In addition, foreign nationals are on average older by two years when they enter VET. Also striking is the fact that 31.4% of first generation young migrants are considered to be unskilled. For young people with a migration background this share is also 19.9%, while it is only 8.8% of German youth. Specific initiatives have been and continue to be developed to encourage more people with a migration background to enter into training (Federal Ministry of Education and Research, 2018).

IV.a.(ii) Sectoral focus and skills matching of VET in Germany

Training occupations are highly regulated in Germany and there are currently around 330 in the dual system alone. In addition, the federal states are responsible for further occupations and have passed their own regulations governing these. These occupations include, for example, teachers and other educators, engineers, architects and medical specialists (Federal Institute for Vocational Education and Training, 2020). Independent of who is responsible, the dual system offers apprenticeships in every sector of the German economy (Hippach-Schneider & Huismann, 2018). As such, there are no clear priority sectors for VET in the case of Germany due to the key role of the system for the economy as a whole. This is supported by the fact that the number of company-based training places offered increased period from 2009 to 2017 shows that training places increased over time in all sectors.

Namely these are:

- Trade and Industry
- Skilled Trades
- Professional Services
- Public Sector
- Agriculture (Federal Ministry of Education and Research, 2018).

While there are no clear priorities with regards to sectors for which VET is relevant, it is clear that the responsible actors engage frequently in revising existing occupations and introducing new occupational standards when necessary. In this sense, they adapt the system to the needs of the labour market as needed (Hippach-Schneider & Huismann, 2018).

Despite the lack of sectoral focus in the set-up of the VET system and the strong link between the economy and training offerings, data does show that the demand in several sectors is not met by youth going into VET and by VET graduates. Matching of supply and demand for vocational training positions has been a challenge for a number of years. A time series has been kept since 2009 when this was first highlighted as an issue. In 2018, 57,656 places could not be filled in September which is when apprenticeships usually start. This is the highest number in the time series. At the same time, there is a significant amount of young Germans who do not succeed in finding a position initially. As such, there is a mismatch between demand and supply. It has been identified that this issue has a regional component. In some regions of the country companies are not able to fill positions, while young people find a training position quite well, while in other regions companies fill their positions, but young people face challenges to start their training when they would like to. Both of these problems are caused by a mismatch of expectations of businesses and youth. These can, for example, be a mismatch between supply and demand for specific training occupations, but also the fact that youth might prefer training in a large business, while it is SMEs that offer training positions in the respective field (Bundesministerium für Bildung und Forschung, 2019).

Besides this mismatch of supply of and demand for apprenticeships, there is also other evidence that the VET system is not fully successful in matching the demands in the labour market. An OECD (2017b) report indicates that the supply of knowledge is mismatched to the demand in knowledge areas such as computers and electronics; clerical work; customer and personal service, and; engineering, mechanical, and technology, all of which experienced critical shortages in knowledgeable staff. The only areas with a *surplus* of knowledge were transportation, food production and mechanical, while there is no area with a critical surplus (OECD, 2017b). The knowledge areas highlighted in the table overleaf are readily connected to VET training and suggest areas in which the VET system may need to increase effectiveness.

Table 1: Knowledge mismatches in Germany per sector

Sector	Critical Shortage	Shortage	Surplus	Critical Surplus
Computers & electronics				
Communications & media				
Clerical				
Customer & personal service				
Engineering, mechanics & technology				
Sales & marketing				
Telecommunications				
Transportation				
Food production				
Building & construction				
Mechanical				

Source: Adapted from OECD (2017b) based on selection of VET-relevant sectors.

Mismatches in supply and demand of skills do not only occur when it comes to occupation-specific skills, but also in soft skills, basic skills and non-technical abilities. In its assessment of ability shortages and surpluses in Germany, the OECD (2017b) identified some ability areas where workers lacked the skills and abilities for which there is demand on the labour market. Critical shortages were identified in areas such as verbal, reasoning and quantitative abilities, all of which relate to the ability of workers to acquire and work with information to support decision making and problem solving. In contrast, more workers than demanded offered physical abilities such as endurance and physical strength. The areas of critical shortage and critical surplus suggest that there is demand for workers with the ability to integrate information into complex problem solving and not so much for workers with strong physical abilities. This likely reflects the transition in the German economy away from manual tasks and toward automation-assisted tasks and services (OECD, 2017b).

Table 2: Ability mismatches in Germany per ability

Sector	Critical Shortage	Shortage	Surplus	Critical Surplus
Verbal abilities				
Reasoning abilities				
Quantitative abilities				
Fine manipulative abilities				
Spatial abilities				
Reaction time & speed abilities				
Control movement abilities				
Endurance				
Physical strength				
Flexibility, balance, & coordination				

Source: Adapted from OECD (2017b) based on selection of abilities.

IV.a.(iii) Transferability and recognition of skills in Germany

At the end of an apprenticeship the responsible chambers hold final exams. The results of these exams serve as evidence that the training has been completed successfully. The certificates that graduates receive are fully recognised and trusted by employers. As such, transferability of skills for people trained in the formal system is easy and generally smooth. For people outside of the formal system, there is an option to take final exams as external candidates. Candidates need to show that they have been working in the respective occupation for at least one and a half times the time that the regulated training for this occupation takes. If the exam is passed, the same certificate is provided, also enabling these candidates to then have the certificate that enables easy movement on the labour market (Hippach-Schneider & Huisman, 2018).

For recognition of skills obtained abroad, Germany introduced a new Federal Recognition Act in 2012 (Gesetz über die Feststellung der Gleichwertigkeit von Berufsqualifikationen). This Act provides the legal framework for the recognition of professional and vocational qualifications obtained abroad. The introduction of the act was accompanied by the establishment of several services, such as a dedicated website and a telephone hotline, where interested parties can find all relevant information. Compared to earlier processes, the Act aims to simplify and standardise the procedures for recognition. It has also opened up ways to get skills recognised which was not possible before. The main aim of this change was to make Germany more attractive for skilled potential migrants in the face of labour market challenges related to demographic changes and existing skill mismatches (please see Research Paper 1 for more information on this) (Bundesministeriums für Bildung und Forschung, n.d.).

The implementation of the Act is regularly monitored and is reported on in annual reports. The latest report shows that from 2012 until 2018 140,700 applications for recognition have been made for the occupations governed by the federal law. The occupations that saw the most requests were healthcare professionals, including care workers, doctors, physiotherapists, pharmacists and dentists (Bundesministeriums für Bildung und Forschung, 2019).

In 2018, 20.4% of 29,202 individual applicants were filed from abroad. The available data also shows that since the reform in 2012 until 2018, 2,424 requests for skill recognition were made by people that received their training in Egypt (Bundesministeriums für Bildung und Forschung, 2019). This is likely also the result of the fact that Egypt is one of the countries that is part of the *ProRecognition* project, which is funded by the BMBF and implemented by the DIHK Service GmbH. The purpose of the project is to provide information and consultation on recognition to potential labour migrants in countries of origin.⁴ This service is provided through the German-Arab Chamber of Industry and Commerce in Cairo (Bundesministeriums für Bildung und Forschung, 2020; German-Arab Chamber of Industry and Commerce, n.d.).

IV.a.(iv) Youth labour market activation and the German VET system

The fact that the VET system and especially its dual component are well known and recognised in Germany is an incentive in itself for youth to transition from general education into the labour market in cases where they do not want to pursue tertiary education. The fact that doing an apprenticeship provides a good starting point for career development is accepted within the German society and supported by data. Statistics show that 94% of apprentices find a job immediately or within three months after completing their training. Yet, general and higher education are also becoming more attractive and demographic changes are changing the labour market. This poses challenges to the VET system and to making it attractive for those going into initial training out of secondary education (Hippach-Schneider & Huismann, 2018).

One of the strong points for activating youth to enter VET is the fact that in the dual apprenticeship system the learners receive a wage. This is a strong motivator for youth as it provides them a level of financial independence. Those enrolled in school-based VET programmes can apply for student grants or loans. In addition, the German government provides several support measures for initial VET learners under the Social Code of the country (Hippach-Schneider & Huismann, 2018). Youth that is engaged in VET and does not receive sufficient remuneration to meet basic needs, such as housing, food and transportation, is eligible for vocational training assistance (Berufsausbildungsbeihilfe). This is provided through the Federal Employment Agency in the form of a monthly subsidy (Bundesagentur für Arbeit, n.d.).

4. The service is represented online at <http://www.prorecognition-egypt.com/en/home/>

It is important to note that this service is also available to non-national youth at the discretion of the responsible Employment Agency (Bundesagentur für Arbeit, n.d.). Here it is important to mention that coming to Germany to start vocational training is an option that exists. Interested individuals need to apply for a visa. In order to qualify for this, they need to already have secured an apprenticeship with a German company. In addition, the Federal Employment Agency needs to confirm that there is no German or other prioritised national (EU, Iceland, Liechtenstein, Norway and Switzerland) is available to fill this specific position. This does not apply for graduates of German schools abroad. Visa applicants also need to show that they can financially support themselves during their stay in Germany. Additional requirements, such as proof of language sufficiency may also be requested (Die Bundesregierung, n.d.).

Turning back to the situation in Germany and labour market activation of youth, the Federal Employment Agency also offers prevocational training. This targets youth who have completed compulsory education, but not started VET. Specific programmes are offered for disadvantaged youth. Measures for the engagement of this group include financial support and socio-pedagogic assistance. Training is offered to give youth with limited prospects the chance to acquire skills and slowly build qualifications towards a recognised occupation (Hippach-Schneider & Huismann, 2018).

Another option for unemployed people is to turn to self-employment and open their own business. The Federal Employment Agency provides several support services for people interested in this step. They provide advice regarding options for self-employment and the associated risks and opportunities.

Under certain conditions individuals may also receive financial support for starting a business. The main conditions are that it is the main economic activity and that the person still has the right to unemployment benefits for 150 days after starting the business. In addition, a chamber or similar institution needs to certify that the business model and the personal preconditions promise success of the business. In order to support new entrepreneurs, the chambers also offer trainings for those interested in this step (Bundesagentur für Arbeit, 2020).

IV.b ITALY


The VET system in Italy is large and includes educational programmes at varying education levels. Within the Italian education system, the term ‘vocational education and training’ is generally used to refer only to select programmes that are offered by regions and autonomous provinces. Nevertheless, many types of programmes that would be classified as VET in a wider European context do exist (European Centre for the Development of Vocational Training, 2014).

Within the Italian educational system (visualised in Figure 2), VET programmes are offered at two educational levels: upper secondary and post-secondary non-tertiary. Students are tracked into VET programmes at the upper-secondary level after completing lower secondary education at the age of 14. At the upper-secondary level, two forms of VET programmes are offered. The first form of programme, regional TVET programmes, focuses exclusively on VET and is offered for either three or four years. Whereas three-year VET programmes lead to a vocational qualification, four-year programmes lead to a technician professional diploma. The second form of VET programme is a five-year programme offered at technical schools. The five-year programmes combine both VET curriculum with general education and lead to professional education diplomas (European Centre for the Development of Vocational Training, 2017b).

The further education and training pathways for VET students differs depending on the level of training received. Students in the three- and four-year programmes may move horizontally into a five-year mixed VET/general education programme, where the number of years they have already completed in the three- or four-year programme count toward attainment of the five-year programme certificate. Students who have completed four-year programmes may also choose to move vertically, upward into a one-year VET programme at post-secondary level that culminates in a high technical specialisation certificate. Students who completed a five-year VET/general education programme may move vertically into both general education tracks (tertiary level bachelor programmes) or VET tracks. The post-secondary VET tracks available for graduates of five-year upper-secondary programmes include one-year programmes or two- or three-year higher technical programmes. The completion of a higher technical programme results in a high-level technical diploma (European Centre for the Development of Vocational Training, 2017b).

Given the structure of the Italian education system, both lateral and upward movement within and beyond VET tracks is possible. Students who are tracked into the lowest level of VET programmes at upper-secondary level (i.e., those moved into three-year VET programmes) could in principle still have later access to tertiary education by moving laterally into higher-level VET and VET/general education programmes and then from these upper-level VET/general education programmes into university. The three- and four-year VET programmes are built in a “modular” manner, with students exposed to modules that focus on basic, cross-cutting and occupational/technical skills. The modularisation supports the recognition of credits from one programme to another. The “permeability” across educational tracks ends at the upper-secondary level, however. Once at the post-secondary level, students cannot make the transition from VET education to general education.

Figure 2: VET in Italy's education and training system



Source: European Centre for the Development of Vocational Training, 2017b, p.3

The track system is important to understand given its implications for non-national youth who wish to enter the educational system at a later moment. Someone with a VET diploma or certificate may not have access to upper-levels of VET if their credentials are assessed as being at the lowest post-secondary level (i.e., at the level of a three-year programme). The VET system in Italy is offered through multilevel cooperation and coordination. At the national level, the Ministry of Education, University and Research (MIUR) and the Ministry of Labour and Social Policies (MLPS) are responsible for establishing common rules and frameworks for the broader education and training system. Following national guidelines, the regions and autonomous provinces are responsible for implementing VET programmes, including some work-based learning schemes (European Centre for the Development of Vocational Training, 2017b). In principle all VET programmes at post-secondary level may be offered with apprenticeships, but the Italian VET system is not considered dual track because the learning is primarily classroom-based.

Large shares of students in Italy are tracked into some form of VET programme. In 2016, over 55% of all students enrolled in upper secondary education were in some form of VET, indicating that the remaining 45% of students were enrolled in general upper secondary education. As VET programmes are the only form of education or training offered at the post-secondary non-tertiary level, 100% of students enrolled in this level were in VET programmes. Males outnumbered females both in VET enrolment and graduation, with less than 40% of graduates from post-secondary VET programmes female. As mentioned above, some VET programmes in Italy combine classroom- and work-based learning. Typically work-based learning is executed through apprenticeships. In 2016 just over 30% of enterprises in Italy hired VET students in some form placement (Eurostat, 2019).

IV.b.(i) Management and strategic objectives of VET in Italy

The Italian VET system involves representation of a wide range of stakeholders with different responsibilities and competencies. The governance of the VET system may affect how quality is assured within VET programmes, how programmes are calibrated to local labour market needs, and how validation frameworks are established. As mentioned earlier, the Ministry of Education, University and Research (MIUR) establishes frameworks for VET at post-secondary level. Programmes at upper secondary level fall under the mandate of the Ministry of Labour and Social Policies (MLPS). The role of the MIUR and MLPS is to define the general roles and principles of educational programmes, but the actual design and implementation is shared with other stakeholders. The regions and autonomous provinces of the country have legislative power over VET and are responsible for the planning, organisation and offering of VET programmes. The regions and provinces generally also supervise apprenticeship-like schemes with industry. In addition to government at different administrative levels, other stakeholders – called social partners – have an important role in VET. Social partners, including representatives of the private sector, help promote work-based learning, may advise on VET policy, and assist in the design and organisation of active labour market policies (European Centre for the Development of Vocational Training, 2014; 2017).

The different types of VET programmes at upper secondary and post-secondary level are associated with different kinds of institutions. Whereas the three- and four-year VET programmes at upper-secondary level are regional programmes, other VET programmes are offered through technical institutes and professional institutes. Each of these pathways within the VET system may be organised slightly differently yet may have some overlap in terms of the competencies and sectors they train.

Despite the strong involvement of the regions and provinces in the design of education, some parts of the VET system are not responsive to local employment contexts and do not necessarily reflect local needs in the curriculum. The regions of Italy vary widely in socio-economic characteristics, labour opportunities and infrastructure. Despite marked differences in local labour needs, the areas of study offered in professional institutes were previously standardised. Previously professional institutes could only offer six areas of study, and the courses offered were not calibrated to the priorities of the region. The Italian government has begun reforming the structure so that professional institutes can offer more study areas that are responsive to priority sectors of the region. In contrast, the regional VET programmes – the three- and four-year VET programmes at upper-secondary level – have always reflected the needs of the regions and local areas in their design (OECD, 2017a).

Regardless of how a VET programme is offered (e.g., at regional level, in professional institutes), there are strong reform movements to promote greater engagement between students and employers. The “Good School” (*Buona Scuola*) reform introduced in 2015 enforced work-based learning in both general and vocational education. The reform requires students in technical and professional schools to fulfil 400 hours of work-based learning, which may occur in a private or public organisation. The reform would not entail that the VET system becomes fully dual track in the same way that the German VET system is. Rather than encouraging apprenticeships, the Good School reform encourages students to have some form of work-based training, without prescribing the format that should be used (Pastore, 2019).

IV.b.(ii) Sectoral focus and skills matching of VET in Italy

The different types of VET programmes offered in Italy at different geographical levels focus on different priority areas for training. A 2014 assessment of the Italian TVET system (European Centre for the Development of Vocational Training, 2014) identified several focus areas for VET trainings offered in different schemes. The following select economic sectors were offered within the three- and four-year VET programmes offered at upper-secondary level (the regional schemes):

- Trade and industry (e.g., clothing production, footwear production, chemical production, agro-food processing)
- Skilled trades (e.g. woodworking, artwork, pleasure craft building and maintenance)
- Professional services (e.g., motor vehicle repair, tourism and hospitality, catering, wellness, retail, commercial sales, hairdressing and cosmetology, waiting and bar services)
- Agriculture.

At the post-secondary level, some VET schemes focused on similar sectors. A list of 20 higher technical specialisations that should be targeted in one-year post-secondary VET trainings are defined at national level (through Decree 7.2.2013). Among these specialisations are those relating to agriculture, industry, manufacturing, tourism and public services. Longer post-secondary VET programmes (those lasting two years) generally focused on more technical fields. The technological areas focused on in two-year VET programmes included energy efficiency, sustainable mobility, new life technologies, and information and communication technologies (European Centre for the Development of Vocational Training, 2014). Over time the sectors and technological areas offered by the different VET programmes under different schemes will likely have shifted in line with changes in national development priorities and labour market reforms. Unfortunately, little information is available on the shift in priority areas over time.

Despite the focus of particularly regional VET programmes on meeting the demands of the local economy, there are nevertheless some indicators that supply of VET graduates does not fully match labour market demand. While not specific to VET graduates, recent assessments have suggested significant skill mismatches across Italy. The 2017 OCED Survey of Adult Skills indicated that 12% of Italian workers had higher skills than needed for their current functions, and 8% were under-skilled, meaning that they were not assessed as meeting minimum skill proficiency requirements to perform their current jobs satisfactorily. The skill mismatch varied widely by region, with greater shares of workers considered under-skilled in the South and greater shares of workers considered over-skilled in the North (Garda, 2017).

Across the country certain work areas or knowledge domains also had critical or mild surpluses or shortages of employees. A 2017 OECD evaluation indicated that the supply of knowledge is mismatched to the demand in knowledge areas such as computers and electronics; clerical work, and; engineering, mechanical and technology, all of which experienced critical shortages in knowledgeable staff. The only area of critical *surplus* of workers was in the building and construction area, but there were milder surpluses in the supply of workers in areas such as transportation and food production (OECD, 2017a). The knowledge areas highlighted in the table below are readily connected to VET training and suggest that the VET system may shift focus away from surplus sectors toward shortage sectors.

Table 3: *Knowledge mismatches in Italy per sector*

Sector	Critical Shortage	Shortage	Surplus	Critical Surplus
Computers & electronics				
Communications & media				
Clerical				
Customer & personal service				
Engineering, mechanics & technology				
Sales & marketing				
Telecommunications				
Transportation				
Food production				
Building & construction				
Mechanical				

Source: Adapted from OECD (2017a) based on selection of VET-relevant sectors.

Supply-demand mismatches relate not only to technical knowledge areas but can also relate to soft skills, basic skills and non-technical abilities. In its assessment of ability shortages and surpluses in Italy, the OECD (2017) identified some ability areas where workers lacked the skills and abilities at highest demand on the labour market. Critical shortages were identified in areas such as verbal abilities and quantitative abilities, both of which relate to the ability of workers to acquire and work with verbal or mathematical information to support decision making and problem solving. In contrast, more workers than demanded offered physical abilities such as endurance and physical strength. The areas of critical shortage and critical surplus suggest that workers better able to integrate information into complex problem solving would be at higher demand than workers with strong physical abilities. Such findings likely reflect the transition in the Italian labour market away from manual tasks and toward automation-assisted tasks (OECD, 2017a).

Table 4: *Ability mismatches in Italy per ability*

Sector	Critical Shortage	Shortage	Surplus	Critical Surplus
Verbal abilities				
Reasoning abilities				
Quantitative abilities				
Fine manipulative abilities				
Spatial abilities				
Reaction time & speed abilities				
Control movement abilities				
Endurance				
Physical strength				
Flexibility, balance & coordination				

Source: Adapted from OECD (2017a) based on selection of abilities.

Unfortunately information on the mismatch in knowledge and skills/abilities is not available for workers of different educational profiles. As such, it is difficult to discern whether the skill/knowledge areas at greatest demand are addressed by graduates of VET programmes or not. Nevertheless, the mismatches in specific skill and knowledge areas that VET programmes are likely to train suggests that graduates may not be as well placed to make the school-to-work transition.

IV.c UNITED KINGDOM

In the United Kingdom context, the governance of education, including VET, has been devolved by the UK Government to the Devolved Administrations in Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland. The systems in three of the four countries, England, Northern Ireland and Wales, share many similarities. Yet, reforms are increasing the number of differences between these three systems. The Scottish system has always worked differently and continues to do so (Abusland, 2018). As such, in some instances specific points about the individual systems will be pointed out throughout this section.

The UK's VET system is a key component of the country's economy and its origins date back to the 12th century. The system is continually adjusted to changes in the national economy and to keep up with developments in the global economy (Department for International Trade, 2018). The British Council (2017) states that the system aims to prepare people for the labour market by equipping them with skills. These skills are generally specific to an industry, trade and/or occupation and enable those with VET training to be fully active in the labour market (British Council, 2017).

Education or training is compulsory until the age of 18 in England and 16 in the other three countries, but the majority of youth continues in one of the trajectories for longer. While it is obligatory, learning costs are covered by government agencies and grants and loans are available for older learners (Abusland, 2018).


Within the overall education system in the UK, VET is delivered in two main forms at secondary and tertiary level (see figure 3): school-based programmes and apprenticeships. The school-based programmes combine general academic studies with VET elements. The latter may be either broad VET programmes or programmes for specific occupations and may take place in schools and a workplace. Duration of programmes varies by occupation and level of study but generally lasts between one and four years. Equally, whether programmes are offered full- or part-time and whether students attend training for blocks or single days, on weekdays or weekends varies by specific programme (Abusland, 2018).

On the other hand, the apprenticeship system is growing as demand in different sectors of the labour market and competition for positions are increasing (Abusland, 2018). Apprenticeships generally are based on a work contract and include components of technical and occupation-specific qualifications as well as core, transferable skills like literacy, numeracy and ICT (British Council, 2017). It is important to note that due to changes in the labour market, apprenticeships are increasingly also being offered at the tertiary level in the UK (Abusland, 2018).

Possibilities for transitioning from VET programmes to higher education exist in the UK context. Vocational qualifications at the upper-secondary level allow learners to access selected first-cycle university programmes. There is, however, no guarantee for such lateral pathways. As Figure 3 shows, the majority of possibilities for movement are upward once someone is in the VET system. Once in either an apprenticeship or a school-/college-based VET programme, it does not seem possible to move between the two forms until the highest level of VET. In addition, while lateral movement from general education into VET programmes is possible at the secondary level and when transitioning from secondary to tertiary education, options for movements in the other direction are limited. Specifically, only those that are in college-based higher VET may be able to transition to a Bachelor programme.

As in the other two case studies, it is important to understand these, in this case, more distinct tracks with regards to the implications for non-national youth wanting to enter the educational system at a later moment. In this case, the way that existing skills are recognised may determine the possibilities for furthering education and training in the UK. The recognition of skills will be further discussed in Section IV.C.iii on page 50.

As in the other two countries, a relatively large share of students is enrolled in a VET programme in the UK. At the lower secondary level, over 17% of students are already receiving vocational education. At the upper secondary level this share increases to almost 47%, while the remaining 53% are enrolled in general secondary education. The shares are slightly higher for females (47.6%) than for males (45.6%). Females also slightly outnumber males when it comes to graduation from upper secondary VET programmes with a share slightly higher than 50%. Furthermore, as mentioned above some VET programmes in the UK are school- or apprenticeship-based. This reflects in the fact that in 2016 only slightly more than 30% of enterprises in the UK hired VET students in some form placement (Eurostat, 2019).

Figure 3: VET in the United Kingdom's education and training system

Source: European Centre for the Development of Vocational Training, 2017c, p.3

IV.c.(i) Management and strategic objectives of VET in the United Kingdom

The institutional set-up of the VET system is quite complex due to the nature of government in the UK. For each of the four constituent countries there is a different body that is responsible for VET policies. Namely, these are the Department for Education (DfE) in England; the Department of Education and the Department for the Economy in Northern Ireland, the Welsh Government's Department for Education and Public Services and Department for Economy, Skills and Infrastructure in Wales and the Department of Learning and the Department of Lifelong Learning of the Scottish Government in Scotland.

Each of the countries also has their respective own inspection and review bodies. These bodies hold responsibility for inspecting schools and further education colleges as well as assessing the effectiveness of the outcomes for learners, the quality of teaching, learning and assessment, and of leadership and management. In England, this responsibility lies with the Office for Standards in Education, Children's Services and Skills (Ofsted). In the other countries these are tasks for Education Scotland in Scotland, Estyn in Wales, and the Education and Training Inspectorate (ETI) in Northern Ireland. In addition, the Quality Assurance Agency (QAA) conducts quality reviews of higher education provided at UK further education (FE) colleges. This is done through Higher Education Review, which combines peer review, student involvement, as well as analysis of core and thematic elements (Abusland, 2018).

VET in the UK is provided in different kinds of institutions, including secondary schools, school sixth forms, sixth form colleges, FE colleges, higher education institutions, private providers and employers. This variety of providers make the control described above even more important. The VET qualifications are developed and awarded by independent awarding organisations that also issue the certificates. These organisations either offer a wide range of different qualifications, often general academic and vocational, or specialise on one specific area. This usually depends on the size of the organisation (European Centre for the Development of Vocational Training, 2017c).

Reviews and assessment lead to constant improvements and the government has been actively driving the further development of the VET system to ensure it matches the demands of the labour market. While improvements are important, they also come with the risk that employers are not aware of the value and relevance of different qualifications. This has been found to be true in research in the Wolf report (Abusland, 2018; Wolf, 2011). Based on this and other reviews, one of the most recent reforms is the introduction of T Levels. These will be new two-year courses, that will be offered starting in September 2020. Students will be able to enter them upon completing secondary education. Employers and businesses were heavily involved in developing these programmes to ensure that contents meet their needs and that the students graduating will have smooth transitions into the labour market. The T Levels take the form of a dual system, meaning that they will provide a mixture of training in the classroom and at a workplace. The on-the-job experience should last at least 315 hours or 45 days and enable the trainees to get insights into working life. Such programmes

will be offered in a wide range of 25 areas, for example accountancy, digital business services, hair, beauty and aesthetics, health, management and administration, and science.⁵ The ratio of classroom learning is what makes the T Levels different from apprenticeships, where the majority of training, around 80%, is provided on the job (Department for Education, 2019).

IV.c.(ii) Sectoral focus and skills matching of VET in the United Kingdom

VET qualifications exist in a wide variety of sectors in the UK, though the UK does not have a large number of regulated occupations. As such a specific sectoral focus cannot be identified. Programmes exist for a wide variety of occupations and equally employers have demands for VET skills in all sectors of the economy (Abusland, 2018; Cerna, 2013). However, the introduction of the new T Levels may indicate that there is a newly introduced focus on specific sectors in the UK VET system. In order to ensure that the training received in these new programmes match demands in the labour market, employers, training providers, and the DfE have been working jointly to develop each T Level. T Level panels have been established, where groups of employers work together to define the skills and requirements for each course. This way of developing the programmes was chosen to ensure that once they graduate from their T Levels the students have the technical knowledge and skills required by employers in that industry. As the programmes are introduced later this year, the content will be further revised in cooperation with the students, trainers and employers (Department for Education, 2019).

While employment levels in the UK are high, research has found that these statistics hide the fact that there is a mismatch between the skills offered by workers and those in demand by employers. More specifically, 40% of workers are not fully qualified for the occupation that they are engaged in. And these kinds of mismatches exist in two-thirds of the knowledge areas defined by the OECD and almost all workplace skills. A forecasting estimation indicates that this will remain a significant challenge in the UK and that in particular the issue of under-skilled labour force will increase by 2030 (Industrial Strategy Council, 2019).

More specifically, country certain work areas or knowledge domains show critical or mild surpluses or shortages of employees. The 2017 OECD evaluation indicates that the supply of knowledge is critically mismatched to the demand in knowledge areas such as computers and electronics and clerical work. There are milder shortages in a wide range of other sectors, including communications and media, telecommunication and building and construction. Mild surpluses are observed in the supply of workers in areas such sales and marketing, transportation, food production and mechanical work (OECD, 2017b). The knowledge areas highlighted in the table below are readily connected to VET training and suggest that the VET system may need to focus especially on those sectors with critical shortages.

5. For a full list please consult <https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/introduction-of-t-levels/introduction-of-t-levels>

Table 5: Knowledge mismatches in the United Kingdom per sector

Sector	Critical Shortage	Shortage	Surplus	Critical Surplus
Computers & electronics				
Communications & media				
Clerical				
Customer & personal service				
Engineering, mechanics & technology				
Sales & marketing				
Telecommunications				
Transportation				
Food production				
Building & construction				
Mechanical				

Source: Adapted from OECD (2017b) based on selection of VET-relevant sectors.

As in the other two countries, the supply-demand mismatches relate not only to technical knowledge areas but also to soft skills, basic skills and non-technical abilities. In its assessment of ability shortages and surpluses, the OECD (2017b) identified some ability areas where workers in the UK lacked the skills and abilities at highest demand on the labour market. Critical shortages were identified in areas such as verbal, reasoning and quantitative abilities. These are skills that are necessary to be able to acquire and work with verbal or mathematical information to support decision making and problem solving. In contrast, more workers than demanded offered physical abilities such as endurance and physical strength. Overall, the situation is like that in both Germany and Italy in so far that the areas of critical shortage and critical surplus suggest that workers better able to integrate information into complex problem solving would be at higher demand than workers with strong physical abilities. Such findings likely reflect the transition in the labour market away from manual tasks and toward automation-assisted tasks (OECD, 2017b).

Table 6: *Ability mismatches in the United Kingdom per ability*

Sector	Critical Shortage	Shortage	Surplus	Critical Surplus
Verbal abilities				
Reasoning abilities				
Quantitative abilities				
Fine manipulative abilities				
Spatial abilities				
Reaction time & speed abilities				
Control movement abilities				
Endurance				
Physical strength				
Flexibility, balance & coordination				

Source: Adapted from OECD (2017b) based on selection of abilities.

IV.c.(iii) Transferability and recognition of skills in the United Kingdom

Since the 1980s, attempts have been made in the United Kingdom to advance the recognition of qualifications (formal, non-formal and informal) and the system has been developing gradually since then (Cerna, 2013). Yet, the possibilities for getting skills that were obtained outside of the formal system are somewhat limited. Especially when it comes to accessing further and higher education based on such non-formal learning, transfer opportunities are limited. The process in place for this is the Recognition of Prior Learning (RPL). In England RPLs policies exist at the discretion of the awarding organisations. Furthermore, the National Institute of Adult Continuing Education (now the Learning and Work Institute) developed RARPA (Recognising and Recording Progress and Achievement in non-accredited learning) in order to provide possibilities for the recognition and validation of learning that does not lead to a formal award. RARPA includes a multi-step process for the assessment of learners abilities and achievements on an individual basis. In addition, the Quality Assurance Agency has a service called Employer Based Training Accreditation. This links employers to higher education institutions, monitors that quality and standards are met in the work-based training, and in some cases even links it to national qualification standards. These processes promote the recognition of informal training and therefore assists transition to the formal system (Abusland, 2018).

In Scotland, the Scottish Credit and Qualifications Framework contains guidelines regarding RPL as does the Credit and Qualifications Framework of Wales. In Northern Ireland, the Department for the Economy in Northern Ireland allows and encourages individuals with no or little formal training to transition to higher education based on accredited prior experiential learning. The Northern Ireland University and College

Accreditation of Prior Experiential Learning (APEL) Guidelines allow people to access higher education – especially Foundation degrees – based on vocational and experiential learning (Abusland, 2018). Regarding the recognition of skills obtained abroad, the UK National Recognition Information Centre (NARIC) works with the UK immigration authority to facilitate this. They provide recognition of formal qualifications from abroad and match it to the most appropriate level within the UK education system. NARIC is a private company specialised in matching overseas qualifications to the UK qualification frameworks. Once this matching is done, a Statement of Comparability is issued which is recognised by employers in the UK. In order to maintain the quality of this system and to develop it further, the advisory board of NARIC is comprised of representatives of businesses, education and recognition agencies (Cerna, 2013).

IV.c.(iv) Youth labour market activation and the United Kingdom VET system

There is a long tradition of ALMPs in the UK, generally with a focus on moving people out of unemployment. An especially important phase in this regard is the transition from school to work as decisions made at this point may impact lifelong career trajectories. As stated by the Authority of the House of Lords (2016): “Making a good transition into work can overcome earlier disadvantage. Making a bad transition can mean a lifetime of poverty” (p. 15). As in many countries, evidence shows that in the UK people with privileged backgrounds are the ones that have easier transitions, but education can make a difference here and impact opportunities in the future (Authority of the House of Lords, 2016).

The government has tried to enable social mobility for those from disadvantaged backgrounds and in doing so has focused on both providing them access to universities as well as apprenticeships. A concern in this regard is that while work-based learning and apprenticeships were a clear option for youth not choosing to go to university, this has changed. This is due to the fact that higher education expanded in a way that it replaced many of the traditional VET trajectories. As a result, the jobs are now not available to people without a university degree anymore (Authority of the House of Lords, 2016).

When it comes to unemployment, the UK Government has been implementing the Work and Health Programme since 2017. The programme is run by service providers and gives these the freedom to develop their own strategies to support the unemployed in finding work. Youth, aged between 18 and 24, is generally referred to this programme after claiming unemployment benefits (Jobseeker’s Allowance) for nine months, while for older individuals this happens after 12 months (European Commission, 2019).

There is a special initiative targeting the group of unemployed 18 to 24 year olds called the Work Experience scheme. This is specifically for those young people in the UK that have no or little previous work experience. The scheme places individual youth into a suitable workplace for two to eight weeks. The participants then work between 25 and 30 hours a week. Participation is voluntary and can be ended at any time. Employers do have the option to expand the placement for up to four weeks if they are willing to hire them as an apprentice following that (Dar, 2015). As such, this kind of ALMP forms a way into formal VET training to youth that did not successfully transition from school to work previously.

V. Conclusions

The vocational education and training (VET) systems in Egypt, Germany, Italy and the United Kingdom differ from each other in important ways that may shape how VET-trained Egyptian youth make the move from education/training to work. This paper reviewed the structures and objectives of the different VET systems in the four focus countries. The review of how the VET systems differ demonstrated that in each of the focus countries, the VET system does not fully align with the needs of the labour market. Disconnects between education and the labour market may lead to sometimes delayed absorption of graduates into (formal) employment. The staggered movement of graduates into employment offers both opportunities and potential risks for Egyptian youth wishing to enter the target EU labour markets with the skills and credentials gained in the Egyptian VET system.

The focus countries differ in important ways in terms of how the VET system is structured and prepares students to transition into the labour market. One of the important differences in this regard relates to the role of work-based learning in each VET system. Germany stands apart for having a truly dual training (dual-track) system in which students in VET programmes are exposed to potential employers through apprenticeship schemes. The apprenticeship system used in Germany ensures that students in VET programmes meet potential employers long before they need to make the movement into the labour market. The dual training system also requires students to practise the combination of professional and technical skills that are demanded by employers. One of the weaknesses identified in the VET systems of Egypt and Italy is that they provide insufficient opportunities for students to deepen their skills through work-based learning. In contrast to classroom-based learning, which often emphasises learning of concepts and principles, work-based learning requires application of ideas and skills in real-time environments. Different forms of work-based learning are used in the focus countries, which range from more intensive and immersive methods such as apprenticeships to forms of work-based learning that are actually offered in school settings, such as the “factory in school” method used in Egypt. Whereas Germany has the most intensive system of work-based learning that is mainstreamed throughout VET programmes, the work-based experiences in the other focus countries are more limited. In both Italy and the United Kingdom, more intensive work-based learning is planned under ongoing educational reforms, but it is unclear in how far the envisioned forms of work-based learning will allow students to deepen their acquired skills. The use of work-based learning methods are important to help students consolidate the skills they’ve learned, including those that are less explicitly trained in VET programmes.

Another important dimension of the VET systems analysed relates to the types of skill sets generated in VET programmes and demanded in the labour market. A common thread across the focus countries is that there are a range of skills and competencies expected by employers. These skills and competencies are not only technical in nature and specific to the sector of work but relate to broader employability skills. The broader skills demanded include general skills, such as literacy and numeracy. They also include professional skills that relate to the ability to problem solve, which importantly includes verbal skills, quantitative skills and reasoning skills. In Germany, Italy and the United Kingdom, these professional skills were generally assessed as being of critical shortage among workers. The absence of workers with these professional skills suggests that education across different levels, including VET, may not provide adequate training for the non-technical skills required across job functions and sectors. In contrast, physical skills – related to endurance, physical strength, and balance and coordination – were generally assessed as either being in surplus or in critical surplus in the three focus destination countries. The oversaturation of these skills in the labour market suggests that the jobs for which these skills are most relevant, such as construction, may not be in as much demand as would accommodate the supply of workers.

Indeed, analyses of the extent of knowledge mismatch in specific sectors or areas of work suggest that the VET systems in each country may not be training the knowledge of most critical demand. In Germany, Italy and the United Kingdom, specific work areas were assessed as having critical shortage of knowledgeable personnel to perform jobs. Across all three destination countries, there were two sectors or work areas that had critical knowledge shortages: computers and electronics, and clerical work. In Germany, additional areas of critical knowledge shortage were customer and personal services, and sales and marketing. In Italy, work related to engineering, mechanics and technology had experienced critical knowledge shortages (OECD, 2017b). The sectors experiencing critical skills shortages are generally those that require the skills noted above, such as verbal and quantitative skills. The absence of sufficiently-knowledgeable workers in these areas suggest that different levels of education, VET included, may not be appropriately responsive to labour market shifts and demands.

Vocational education and training systems face several challenges in responding to labour market needs, and supporting supply-demand matching is even more complicated when considering training of students locally for deployment in another country. Within the analysed VET systems, the curricula of programmes were generally updated through different feedback cycles, including with industry representatives. Despite mechanisms for updating curriculum being in place, however, VET programmes may not be sufficiently flexible to meet evolving labour market needs. In Italy, for example, national VET programmes implemented in professional institutes were previously restricted to one of six programme areas, which were not always responsive to the needs of the regions in which the institutes were placed (OECD, 2017a). Indeed, in all of the destination countries there are some indications that VET programmes are not able to prepare workers for regional labour market demands. All of the focus countries have diversified economies and distinct regional differences in key sectors and occupations. The skill and knowledge mismatches vary across region, suggesting that sufficient support for the school-to-work transition entails understanding *which* specific labour market graduates are being trained for.

The characteristics of the VET systems in the four focus countries, and the skill-/knowledge supply and demand mismatches within them, suggest opportunities for mobile Egyptians wishing to work in the EU. The acute need for knowledgeable professionals in specific work areas like clerical work, computers and electronics, and customer and personal service (in Germany) or engineering, mechanics and technology (in Italy) suggests potential employment opportunities for Egyptian youth trained in these areas. The work areas that have experienced acute knowledge shortages now are generally those that will continue to grow, even amid transitions to automatisation.

For Egyptian youth to make the transition from education or training (in Egypt) to employment (in Germany, Italy or the UK), several important factors should be considered. A first important consideration relates to the quality of VET education that is delivered, particularly related to the non-technical skills that are implicitly or explicitly trained in VET programmes. Across both Egypt and the EU destination countries, critical shortages in basic skills (numeracy/literacy) and professional skills (e.g., verbal skills, quantitative skills) have been observed. These skills may need to be explicitly trained in classroom-based education and consolidated through some kind of work-based training. More experiential or work-based learning could help ensure that students have the chance to build both soft and technical skills demanded in specific areas of work, using the equipment and following the instructions and standards of particular industries. The generally low level of basic skills like literacy and numeracy across graduates of the Egyptian education system is particularly worrisome in this regard. Being able to read and understand industry-specific language – for example, safety instructions, or manuals for working with specific equipment – is an essential set of skills in most jobs. When reflecting on the work areas experiencing critical knowledge shortages in the focus destination countries, such as clerical work, skills related to language and numerical mastery seem key. For Egyptian migrant youth to capitalise on the knowledge and skills shortages in the EU, it is essential for the VET system in Egypt to support students to learn the technical and professional skills needed in specific sectors.

The VET system in Egypt trains students to work in a variety of occupations or professional areas, not all of which are relevant or demanded in the EU destination markets. The priorities of any national VET system are generally calibrated to local labour market needs. It is therefore unsurprising if the priority sectors for training highlighted in ambitious packages such as the TVET Egypt programme do not fully match with the priority sectors in the EU destination countries analysed. The VET system can be better aligned with the needs of specific migrant destination countries, but to do so, a different governance and policy framework would generally need to be in place. In other countries, bodies responsible for execution of labour migration policies and programmes generally play more central roles in supporting VET graduates to transition into foreign labour markets. In such cases, the VET system is a small but essential part of labour training and deployment schemes. In the Egyptian context, it is unclear how the VET system is incorporated into labour migration policies and programmes. Given the inclusion of the Ministry of Immigration and Egyptian Expatriates Affairs and the Ministry of Manpower and Migration in the TVET Egypt programme, there is presumably some embeddedness of VET programmes in labour migration schemes. Nevertheless, it would be important to understand in more depth how the labour migration framework in Egypt incorporates different elements of the VET sector.

Other factors should be taken into account when considering how Egyptian migrant youth with VET credentials received in Egypt may be included in the EU labour markets. One of the important potential determinants relates to validation of VET credentials and the “transferability” of skills and knowledge across countries. While there are some frameworks for supporting migrants trained abroad to transition into both the (higher) educational system and labour markets in both the United Kingdom and Germany, it remains unclear how transferable skills and certifications are in reality. In 2012 Germany introduced a new Federal Recognition Act (Gesetz über die Feststellung der Gleichwertigkeit von Berufsqualifikationen) to support the recognition of skills/qualifications gained abroad. The Act, which facilitates the evaluation and recognition of both vocational and professional qualifications, was established to standardise procedures for recognition. Between 2012 and 2018, 2,424 requests for skill recognition were made by people who received their training in Egypt (Bundesministeriums für Bildung und Forschung, 2019). Unfortunately the limited data available on recognition applications under the Act does not provide sufficient insight into the portability of credentials for applicants holding VET qualifications specifically. There have also not been evaluations of how well the Act supports recognition of skills from people trained abroad. To understand how well VET qualifications in Egypt enable young Egyptians to work in the German labour market, it would be helpful to understand how well the recognition framework functions for people trained in different sectors, in different types of VET institutions, and in VET programmes with different curricula.

Understanding the potential labour market opportunities for graduates of the Egyptian VET sector is also challenged by missing or incomplete data/literature on important elements of the German, Italian and UK labour markets. As mentioned throughout this paper, information on the school-to-work transition is not always explicit to the experiences of VET graduates. There is limited information available on skill matching per industry according to educational level or qualification. The information available on both skill and knowledge mismatch is generally not disaggregated by type of education, which makes it difficult to determine if graduates of VET are more or less able to make a successful school-to-work transition than graduates of other forms of education. There is a similar lack of information on the sectors for which VET graduates are best or least-well matched in terms of skill and knowledge. Having such information would help identify areas in which VET programmes are systematically sufficiently or insufficiently building required skills. As noted above, there is also very limited information available on how individuals who have received VET certifications abroad can use their credentials in specific labour markets. The frameworks for recognising foreign-earned qualifications in both the United Kingdom and Germany offer important supports for Egyptian VET graduates. Nevertheless, information is sparse on how VET qualifications gained elsewhere “translate” into employment opportunities in other countries. Recognition of qualifications is just one element that will determine how foreign-earned certifications are valued on the local labour market. Other factors, such as work-based learning opportunities and the professional skills they build, may lead qualifications in one VET system to be valued differently in other labour markets.

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RESEARCH PAPER 3

Mobility Support Schemes Between Egypt and the European Union

Prepared by **Dr. Michaella Vanore**



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ABSTRACT: The third and final research paper related to labour markets explores the cooperation frameworks between Egypt, the European Union and select European countries that shape mobility support schemes for migrant workers. Legal migration and mobility support schemes can be generally understood as policies, programmes or interventions that facilitate the movement of workers from one country to another. Such schemes are often created to support better managed migration flows. Despite increased cooperation between Egypt and the European Union on migration management, relatively few mobility support schemes enable Egyptian labour migrants to enter and work in member states. This paper therefore provides an overview of policy frameworks and specific schemes that do enable migration between Egypt and the EU for work purposes. The paper focuses on schemes across the skills spectrum. It reviews support schemes both for lower-skilled Egyptian labour migrants as well as for students and researchers who may be considered high-skilled (future) workers.

List of Acronyms

BLMA	Bilateral Labour Migration Agreement
ENP	European Neighbourhood Policy
ERMCE	Enhancing the Response to Migration Challenges in Egypt
EU	European Union
EUTF for Africa	European Union Trust Fund for stability and addressing root causes of irregular migration and displaced persons in Africa
IMIS	Integrated Migration Information System
JAES	Joint Africa-EU Strategy
JVAP	Joint Valletta Action Plan
MMD	Africa-EU Migration and Mobility Dialogue
RCPs	Regional Consultative Processes on Migration
TCNs	Third-Country Nationals
VET	Vocational Education and Training

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Executive Summary

Legal labour migration and mobility between Egypt and the European Union (EU) has become an increasingly important area of cooperation between the two bodies, yet the creation of labour migration schemes that support the migration and work for Egyptians of varying skill levels in EU countries has not yet been widely realised. Since the early 2000s, growing cooperation and collaboration between Egypt and the EU on migration has generally focused on curtailing irregular migration, identifying and addressing smuggling and trafficking in human beings, and supporting local development initiatives to address the “root causes” of migration (African Union & European Union, 2019). Legal labour migration and mobility have been important elements of the strategic partnership between Egypt, the EU at large, and specific EU member states. Yet despite the emphasis on this area of collaboration, few recent initiatives have emerged to facilitate the labour migration of Egyptians to EU member states.

This paper explores how frameworks for cooperation between Egypt, the EU and EU member states have and will shape mobility facilitation from Egypt to Europe. This paper is the third in a series of research papers within the project *Research on the Means to Improve Human Mobility Channels*. The wider project focuses on how Egyptian youth at risk of migrating irregularly to the EU can be better protected, including through the promotion of regular, high-quality labour channels. To support this objective, this paper examines migration cooperation frameworks and specific examples of past and planned policies, programmes, and interventions that aim to support the legal movement of Egyptians to the EU. The paper explores cooperation agreements and labour mobility support programmes that are included in frameworks on different levels: 1) between Africa and the EU; 2) between Egypt and the EU, and; 3) between Egypt and specific EU member states.

AFRICA-EU COOPERATION ON LABOUR MIGRATION

Cooperation between Africa and Europe, including on migration, has been defined through a number of instruments and frameworks. One particularly important framework is the **2007 Joint Africa-EU Strategy (JAES)**, a political vision and roadmap for future cooperation between Africa and the EU. The Joint Strategy provides a long-term framework for the Africa-EU relationship on joint challenges, of which migration is just one. The JAES contains four main objectives, two of which explicitly identify the need to deepen cooperation on migration management. Within this action area, the JAES notes that combating irregular migration, including through increasing cooperation on return and readmission, is a prime area for cooperation. Mutual efforts on border control and trafficking and human beings are also identified under this objective (Africa-EU Strategic Partnership, 2007). Under the JAES, different sets of priorities have been defined over time. The most-recent set of priorities were agreed in 2017 and collated in the so-called **Abidjan Declaration**, which identified migration and mobility as one of four joint priorities (African Union & European Union, 2017).

The expansion of Africa-EU cooperation on migration through the JAES has been accompanied by complementary initiatives that have opened up substantial funding and support for joint dialogues and projects related to migration. For example, instruments such as the **Africa-EU Migration and Mobility Dialogue (MMD)** have been used to increase African-EU cooperation on migration. The MMD framework contains three strategic dialogues: the Rabat Process, the Khartoum Process and the Continental Dialogue. It also includes a fund for flagship initiatives and technical assistance (the MMD Facility) and consolidated the Africa-EU Development platform to further enhance the role of the diaspora as development actors (African Union & European Union, 2019). The MMD was created to further foster partnerships on joint migration issues, and its creation of the two regional consultative processes on migration (RCPs) was a significant step to institutionalising regional cooperation on migration issues.

Following the MMD, other migration-specific agreements and frameworks have also been adopted between Africa and the EU that shape the policies and programmes governing labour mobility. One of the most important in this regard is the **Joint Valletta Action Plan (JVAP)**. The JVAP was agreed in November 2015 at the Valletta Summit on Migration and has become the regional framework within which migration policy should be constructed (Valletta Summit on Migration, 2015). The action plan identifies five action areas to support better migration governance between Africa and Europe relating to: 1) the development benefits of migration and addressing root causes of irregular migration and forced displacement; 2) legal migration and mobility; 3) protection and asylum; 4) prevention of and fight against irregular migration, migrant smuggling, and trafficking in human beings; 5) return, readmission and reintegration. The JVAP brought with it substantial financial contributions from the EU and its member states for initiatives related to one of the priority areas, although there is limited publicly-available data on the projects or initiatives that have been funded specifically for Egypt under JVAP financing.

The 2015 Valletta Summit also resulted in the establishment of the **EU Trust Fund for stability and addressing root causes of irregular migration and displaced persons in Africa** (hereafter: EUTF for Africa). The EUTF for Africa complements the Africa-EU partnership by supporting political dialogue between countries and pooling funding and expertise from different agencies. Over €4.7 billion of financing has been placed in the EUTF for Africa. As of January 2020, €807 million had been disbursed from the EUTF for Africa to countries in the North of Africa region, which includes Egypt (EU Trust Fund for Africa, 2020).

As of October 2019, 7 projects and €60 million in financing had been committed by the EUTF for Africa specifically to Egypt through one single initiative, “enhancing the response to migration challenges in Egypt” (ERMCE). The initiative encompasses seven projects that are implemented by EG NEAR in partnership with Egyptian authorities, international aid agencies (e.g., AICS, GIZ) and international NGOs (e.g., Plan International, the German Red Cross). None of the envisioned projects would directly support the creation of mobility schemes or labour migration channels to the EU, yet funding under the EUTF for Africa for cross-country initiatives, which involve multiple recipient countries, would directly focus on mobility support

schemes. One cross-country initiative is of particular importance: the project “**towards a holistic approach to labour migration governance and labour mobility in North Africa** (THAMM).” The project envisions a €15 million budget paid from the trust fund and an additional €5 million to be paid by the German Federal Ministry for Economic Cooperation and Development. As a regional flagship initiative, THAMM would represent a significant investment in supporting legal labour migration and mobility facilitation. The project envisioned should complement and enhance regional dialogues and wider cooperation frameworks between North Africa and the EU. It also seeks to pilot or expand mobility schemes from Egypt to interested EU member states. The project will first involve implementation of a mobility scheme with Germany, with Belgium expressing interest to implement a mobility scheme later.

The various frameworks and funds to support cooperation on migration between Africa and the EU have so far not focused extensively on legal labour migration and mobility. Labour migration schemes specifically for Egyptians to the EU have not yet emerged from wider cooperation between Africa and the EU. The EUTF for Africa may support the development of migration schemes in the future, particularly through the multi-country THAMM project, however.

Egypt-EU Mobility Cooperation

Cooperation between Egypt and the EU on labour migration fits within the wider context of Egypt-EU relations. The **2001 Association Agreement between the EU and Egypt** provides the general framework for cooperation between the two bodies on multiple policy issues. Cooperation between the EU and Egypt specifically on migration is defined within the context of the 2015 Joint Valletta Action Plan. Specific priorities for cooperation between Egypt and the EU have been further defined through the **European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP)** and through the partnership priorities for 2017–2020, which address migration as a challenge related to security and terrorism and as an issue to be managed for mutual benefit (European Union Association Council, 2017).

The possibilities for (legal) labour migration between Egypt and a member state of the EU is shaped not only by Africa-EU and Egypt-EU agreements but also by policy frameworks within the EU. The EU itself may adopt legislative acts that establish rules of entry and stay for third-country nationals (TCNs). These acts essentially provide guidance to member states on the conditions under which TCNs may be admitted, yet member states have the right to determine the number of TCNs who may be admitted (Alcidi, Laurentsyeve, & A., 2019). These directives, while not targeted explicitly at Egyptians, naturally also affect the entry and stay of Egyptian labour migrants.

The EU has elaborated several Directives since 2018 that establish rules of entry and stay for different groups of labour migrants. Among others, these include:

- **The EU Single Permit Directive (2011/98/EU):** The Directive merged residence and work permits for labour immigrants. It also sought to ensure equal treatment of TCNs related to labour rights, which could entail equal access to vocational education and training (VET), frameworks for diploma recognition and equal working conditions.
- **EU Seasonal Workers Directive (2014/36/EU):** This Directive establishes the conditions of entry and stay for seasonal workers and defines their rights within the EU. The Directive does not replace bilateral seasonal worker agreements between member states and third countries but instead operates as an additional admission scheme. The number of work permits issued is directly tied to economic conditions in the EU, with relatively small numbers of permits issued annually.
- **The EU Blue Card Directive (2009/05/EC):** Similar to the Seasonal Workers Directive, the Blue Card Directive establishes rules for the entry and stay of highly-skilled workers and their immediate family members. The Directive supports mobility of highly-skilled workers across EU member states, in doing so offering migrant workers and their accompanying family members much more extensive rights than assured to other categories of labour migrants. The Directive does not eliminate bilateral schemes to support highly-skilled migration but offers an admission channel on supranational level.
- **The Students and Researchers Directive ((EU) 2016/801):** This Directive was transposed into EU law in May of 2018 and essentially harmonised rules of entry and stay for different categories of migrants: students, researchers, trainees, pupils, au pairs and volunteers. While member states were allowed to place conditions on the different categories of migrants covered in the Directive, the Directive nevertheless established important common conditions. One of those conditions was the creation of a grace period for post-graduation employment searches, which could support the school-to-work transition for international students.

While these Directives aim to support mobility of different skill cohorts of migrant workers across the EU, it is unclear how impactful these schemes have been in supporting mobility from North Africa more generally and Egypt specifically. Legal migration of Egyptians into the EU has increasingly occurred within the family reunification channel, not labour migration channels. Between 2015 and 2017, the share of Egyptians entering the EU on family reunification grounds rose by 25%. The increase corresponds to a rapid decline in the number of work permits issued to Egyptian migrants in the EU. Whereas almost 17,000 work permits were issued to Egyptian nationals in 2010, the number had declined by three-quarters, to less than 4,000, in 2017 (Alcidi, Laurentsyeve, & A., 2019).

Schemes on EU level, such as the Seasonal Workers Directive, facilitate a limited amount of migration, largely because the number of permits issued is directly tied to economic conditions in the EU. In 2017 less than 7,000 seasonal worker permits were issued, over 90% of which were issued to nationals of Morocco. While the number of permits issued for seasonal work have declined markedly over recent years, the number of permits issued to researchers and highly-skilled migrants rose, from 1.8% of all work permits issued in 2008 to 23% of all permits issued in 2017. The Blue Card Directive to support highly-skilled worker mobility has been an important contributor, with 1,094 Egyptians issued with a Blue Card in its first five years of operation (Alcidi, Laurentsyeve, & A., 2019). While some EU-level schemes may indeed open legal movement channels for migrant labourers at different skill levels, the number of workers who can benefit from them appears small.

Labour Mobility between Egypt and Specific EU Member States

The limited emphasis on facilitating legal labour migration through EU cooperation is echoed in the small number of formal agreements Egypt has with EU member states on labour migration. Labour migration is often addressed in **bilateral labour migration agreements (BLMAs)**, which are agreements between two countries that regulate labour migration schemes. **Egypt currently has BLMAs with Bulgaria (1972), Greece (1981), and Italy (2005).** The BLMA concluded with Bulgaria in 1972 details the needed forms of cooperation between Egypt and Bulgaria to ensure adequate matching of demand and supply across countries. It also addresses the rights of Egyptian migrant workers and specifies that both states should aim to ensure equal standards of living for Egyptian labourers as for Bulgarian workers. The BLMA with Greece details the type of information exchange needed between Egyptian and Greek authorities, and it assures equal rights related to employment conditions for Egyptian migrant workers. The BLMA with Italy is the most recent (2005) and the most extensive in terms of implementation guidance. The Egypt-Italy BLMA is accompanied by both an MoU outlining cooperation between state parties and a protocol on implementation. The implementation protocol provides guidance on the requirements Egyptian migrants should meet to be eligible for recruitment into an Italian job posting. It further specifies how information on available jobs should be advertised. A management information system, called the Integrated Migration Information System (IMIS), is an important supporting initiative to the Egypt-Italy BLMA, which includes the provision of a technical system to support exchange and information sharing between Italian and Egyptian authorities. The 2005 Egypt-Italy agreement is notable for its strong emphasis on matching labour supply in Egypt with labour demand in Italy (ILO, 2017).

The BLMA between Egypt and Italy is just one of the agreements the two countries have made on labour facilitation. In addition to the 2005 Egypt-Italy BLMA, the two countries signed a **readmission agreement in 2006**. The readmission agreement was accompanied by a separate **agreement on legal admissions of set quotas** of Egyptian labour migrants to Italy. Under this agreement, annual quotas for Egyptian labourers were agreed based on the needs of different Italian regions. The Egypt-Italy agreement on migration cooperation has been

credited as a model for labour migration facilitation across the EU. The agreement has supported the implementation of several initiatives that have provided concrete structures to support the placement of Egyptian workers in Italian employment opportunities. One such initiative was the creation of the Integrated Migration Information System (IMIS) in 2001 and its extension (IMIS PLUS) in 2008 (Silka, 2011). A complementary initiative, the Information Dissemination on Migration (IDOM) project, followed the creation of the IMIS. Whereas the IMIS initiative focused on creating the technical infrastructure for managing labour supply/demand matching, the IDOM project focused on supporting matching of Egyptian labour supply (through the IMIS system) with Italian demand, developing human capital through financial support of selected Egyptian training institutions, and providing media and social awareness campaigns to inform prospective migrants of the dangers of irregular migration and the legal migration possibilities provided by the Egyptian government.

In addition to agreements or schemes that support mobility for general migrant labourers, many EU member states also have specific schemes to support the migration of students and researchers. Given growing emphasis on the attraction and retention of highly-skilled workers in specific sectors across many EU countries, the student and researcher migration channel may become an even more significant mechanism for labour mobility. As of 2015, ten EU countries had specific schemes available to support the mobility of students and researchers from Egypt, although there is limited available information on how many Egyptian students migrate to the supporting countries through these mechanisms.

Conclusions and Recommendations

Legal labour migration and mobility between Egypt and the European Union is a key area of cooperation between the two bodies, yet the creation of labour migration schemes for Egyptians of varying skill levels has not (yet) been widely realised. Since the early 2000s cooperation between Africa and the EU on migration issues has intensified. Within Africa-EU cooperation frameworks, growing emphasis on migration management has been accompanied by substantial financial contributions from the EU, including under the EU Trust Fund for Africa (EUTF). Increasing cooperation and financial contributions has not (yet) seemed to correspond to the expansion of labour migration schemes or opportunities, as none of the contributions made under the EUTF for Egypt so far have addressed the fund's objective related to mutually-beneficial legal migration and mobility (European Union, 2019). There are nevertheless signals that EU financing can contribute to labour migration support programmes on the regional level, with the EUTF for Africa-funded project "towards a holistic approach to labour migration governance and labour mobility in North Africa" aiming to create a pilot migration scheme for labour migrants to Germany and potentially to Belgium in the future. As the project is still in its early stages, there are no specific mechanisms or outcomes that can be evaluated. Nevertheless, the design of the programme does suggest the creation of a mobility support scheme that can provide holistic guidance to migrants and employers throughout the migration cycle.

Cooperation between the EU and Egypt specifically on labour migration is limited. On the EU level, there have been a number of policy changes over the last decade that may increase legal mobility channels for migrant workers, including those from Egypt. Important Directives in this regard include the Seasonal Workers Directive and Blue Card Directive, which aim to support mobility of different skill cohorts of migrant workers across the EU. It is unclear how impactful these schemes have been in supporting mobility from North Africa more generally and Egypt specifically, however.

The limited emphasis on facilitating legal labour migration through EU cooperation is echoed in the small number of formal agreements Egypt has with EU member states on labour migration. Bilateral labour migration agreements have been established with Bulgaria (1972), Greece (1981) and Italy (2005). The agreement with Italy and the subsequent development of labour migration programmes and support facilities does provide an instructive model for how labour mobility can be facilitated, however. In addition to agreements or schemes that support mobility for general migrant labourers, many EU member states also have specific schemes to support the migration of students and researchers. As of 2015, ten EU countries had specific schemes available to support the mobility of students and researchers from Egypt.

Given the increasing cooperation between the EU and Egypt on legal migration pathways, it is important to learn from the small number of interventions and agreements that support the mobility of workers from Egypt into the EU to inform future interventions. To that end, several recommendations are given for future research, namely to:

- *Assess how family reunification or formation policies condition labour market access for status holders:* Large numbers of Egyptian migrants residing in the EU have been given the right to enter and stay through family reunification or formation channels. Such migration channels may have different provisions that encourage or discourage recipients' access to the local labour market. Future research could assess and compare how family reunification/formation policies in key EU countries shape the labour market entry and mobility of Egyptian recipients.
- *Evaluate to what extent researcher and student mobility support schemes support the entry and retention of skilled Egyptians into EU labour markets:* In many countries, student exchange and researcher support schemes may be part of labour market strategies aimed to bridge skill gaps in local labour markets by encouraging the attraction, training and retention of foreign talent with rare or demanded skill profiles. Given the diversity of student and researcher schemes that support Egyptians wishing to study or train in the EU, future research could assess the post-graduation or post-training labour market outcomes of participants.
- *Inventory complementarities between labour mobility programmes or policies and education frameworks/strategies, specifically technical and vocational education and training:* Mobility support schemes are often focused on specific categories of potential migrant workers, who may be selected on the basis of specific skill or competency profiles. The extent to which Egyptian workers are able to meet the competency profiles requested by foreign employers may depend in part on the education or training opportunities available to them domestically, which may

require detailed evaluation of how foreign labour opportunities are mainstreamed into policy frameworks that guide the design of education programmes.

- *Conduct formal impact evaluations of labour migration interventions:* Evaluation of labour migration policy frameworks, agreements and projects are notably lacking. Neither process nor impact evaluations are readily available that provide substantial insight into how different schemes function (or do not). As Africa-EU and Egypt-EU cooperation intensifies and expands to include specific mobility support schemes, it would be valuable if lessons learned from past policy frameworks, agreements and schemes could be used to inform future programme design. To this end, future research in this area could focus on how specific elements of programme design – for example, mechanisms to support supply and demand matching between Egypt and Italy through management information systems – affected the overall efficacy of the scheme.

I. Introduction

Egypt has been a long-standing country of origin for migrant labour. Prior to the 1990s, countries like Iraq, Libya and those in the Gulf region hosted large numbers of Egyptian workers. With the Gulf War and the following political and economic instability in the region in the 1990s and continuing into the 2000s, however, countries in Europe became more attractive destinations for Egyptian migrant workers, despite the presence of relatively stricter visa regimes (al-Khashef & Martin, 2019). As labour markets developed in countries such as Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates, growing numbers of Egyptian workers – of varying skill profiles – also migrated to the Gulf Cooperation Council countries. The strong concentration of Egyptian migrant workers in countries in the Gulf region and North Africa has corresponded to a growth in bilateral labour migration agreements (BLMAs) with Arab countries. As of 2011 the Egyptian government had enacted 12 BLMAs with Arab countries, including important destinations such as Jordan, Libya and Qatar. In the context of its agreements with destination countries, the Ministry of Manpower and Migration cited the creation of 363,000 jobs for Egyptian migrant workers in 2009 alone (Silka, 2011). In contrast, few such agreements have been made with European countries despite growing numbers of both regular and irregular Egyptian migrant workers in Europe.

The limited numbers of formal bilateral agreements on labour migration with European countries reflects a general absence of mobility facilitation from Egypt to the European Union (EU). Since the early 2000s, cooperation between Egypt and the EU on migration has strongly increased. Growing cooperation and collaboration on migration has generally focused on curtailing irregular migration, identifying and addressing smuggling and trafficking in human beings, and supporting local development initiatives to address the “root causes” of migration (African Union & European Union, 2019). Legal labour migration and mobility have been important elements of the strategic partnership between Egypt, the EU at large, and specific EU member states. Yet despite the emphasis on this area of collaboration, few recent initiatives have emerged to facilitate the labour migration of Egyptians to EU member states.

This paper explores how frameworks for cooperation between Egypt, the EU and EU member states have and will shape mobility facilitation from Egypt to Europe. This paper is the third in a series of research papers within the project *Research on the Means to Improve Human*

Mobility Channels. The wider project focuses on how Egyptian youth at risk of migrating irregularly to the European Union (EU) can be better protected, including through the promotion of regular, high-quality labour channels. To support this objective, this paper will examine migration cooperation frameworks and specific examples of past and planned policies, programmes and interventions that aim to support the legal movement of Egyptians to the EU.

This paper is limited to policy mechanisms that specifically support labour migration. Employment and labour market insertion are addressed in different types of migration policies. Policies related to the admission and stay of family reunification/formation migrants and refugees, for example, may have elements related to labour market access. Their principle concern is not with the work possibilities for such migrants, however, but the provisions of rights and responsibilities related to other reasons for entry and stay. For this reason, this paper will not include policy mechanisms that promote migration for non-labour purposes, even if they have mechanisms that can support later employment of migrants. Instead this paper focuses specifically on schemes or mechanisms to support migration for labour purposes. This includes, most importantly, labour migration schemes. It also includes some student and researcher mobility schemes that are explicitly designed to facilitate international exchange and joint research work, which could entail stays in EU member states.

Following this introduction, section two describes the methodology used to inform this research paper. Section three then provides an abbreviated review of the policy frameworks in which mobility support schemes are currently offered or may be offered in the future. These frameworks are divided according to the level of cooperation. The first sub-section reviews cooperation agreements and frameworks between Africa and the EU. The following sub-section elaborates on Egypt-EU cooperation frameworks before narrowing down on agreements between Egypt and specific EU member states. While the section primarily concentrates on the frameworks and strategies for cooperation on legal labour migration and mobility, where possible the section also explores specific mobility support schemes between Egypt and a European destination country. The final section (four) reflects on lessons from past mobility support schemes and concludes with suggested ways forward.

II. Methodology

This paper is based on desk review of available literature. Both academic and non-academic (grey) literature was consulted to compile this review. An initial literature search was first conducted on a narrow set of search terms to map broad themes within the literature. This initial search revealed limited information on both past and current mobility initiatives between Egypt and countries in the European Union. As a consequence of the few sources found describing specific mobility facilitation schemes, projects or policies, the literature search was expanded to include broader frameworks or policies on migration cooperation that addressed labour facilitation.

To support identification of relevant literature, a more elaborated list of search terms were defined (see table 1 opposite). The search terms were defined to capture different dimensions of specific themes or topics covered in the paper. The search terms related to specific topics were then combined with terms related to the region or country of focus. For region, search terms included North Africa, Egypt, European Union and Europe. Given the thematic focus of research papers one and two on specific European destination countries for Egyptian migrants, search terms were also included for specific European countries, namely Germany, Italy and the United Kingdom. Different combinations of search terms were used. For example, to collect information on migration agreements between Egypt and EU countries, search strings could have included terms like “bilateral labour migration agreement EU” or “bilateral labour migration agreement Italy/Germany/United Kingdom”.

Table 1: *Search terms used in Literature Review*

Theme/topic	Search terms
Migration cooperation frameworks	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • (Human) migration, mobility AND • Strategic cooperation [frameworks/policies] • Strategic action plan • Strategic partnerships
Migration agreements	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Labour migration agreement • Bilateral labour migration agreement • Bilateral labour migration policies
Mobility support schemes	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Labour migration [programmes/schemes/possibilities] • Legal labour migration options • Labour migration facilitation • Mobility [programmes/schemes/possibilities] AND
By skill level or migrant type	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Low-skilled labour • Medium-skilled labour • High-skilled labour • Students • Researchers

Different academic and non-academic search engines and repositories (e.g., Google Scholar, Google, Research Gate) were used to find literature. As much of the relevant literature was not articles but policy papers, working papers, organisational reports, policies and strategies, the online repositories of specific institutions and organisations were searched. Important sources in this regard included the publications archives of the following: the **European Commission International Cooperation with Egypt**, the **European Trust Fund for Africa** project archive, the **Africa-EU Partnership** portal, the **Khartoum Process**, the **Rabat Process** and the portal of the **Joint Valletta Action Plan**. In addition to these credible regional sources, repositories of specific institutions (e.g., development cooperation organisations, ministries of foreign affairs and international cooperation) were also searched. Finally, newspaper articles and event announcements related to specific projects, events or activities were used to identify specific programmes or policies that required additional research.

The literature search faced several limitations. First, much of the literature available on mobility support schemes is very descriptive in nature. No impact or process evaluations seem to be available (in English) that describe the outcomes of mobility support programmes between Egypt and European destination countries. As a consequence, much of the information on policies or programmes that facilitate labour migration is superficial and framed in terms of potential future outcomes rather than observed outcomes. What little information was available on outcomes had limited analytical value and largely reported outputs (e.g., number of grant recipients) rather than programme-specific consequences.

Another limitation relates to the dates of information on policies and programmes. Some available information (for example, on mobility support schemes for students and researchers) was undated, which makes it difficult to determine if certain actions or programmes are contemporary and ongoing or only implemented in the past. A related issue is that a number of mobility facilitation initiatives have been introduced relatively recently. For some such recent initiatives, the best source of information was documents such as action fiches, which summarise the design and objectives of the intervention. These documents do not provide clear assessments of what *has been done* but instead just describe what *may be done* in an intervention.

A final limitation related to the absence of critical statements or appraisals on policy frameworks or specific mobility facilitation schemes. Literature on specific agreements or projects often identified when planned cooperation or projects did not continue or go through, but it is often silent on why. For example, a mobility partnership with Egypt has been sought by the European Union since around 2012, but there is very limited information on the specific aspects of the partnership negotiations and why they failed. Another example is the Abidjan Declaration. The declaration defines the most-recent set of priorities within the Africa-EU strategic partnership, and while it notes that Egypt has reserved its position on the declaration, there is no information available on what that reservation implies or why it arose. The absence of this information leaves much of the literature review superficial regarding the potential consequences of existing labour migration cooperation frameworks or policies.

Given these challenges, additional information and research is needed on legal labour migration and mobility frameworks, policies and programmes, particularly regarding impacts. As impact assessments on mobility facilitation schemes seem to be lacking for Egypt, one immediate recommendation would be to encourage implementers to routinely collect and analyse data through project implementation cycles. A further recommendation would be to collect primary data through interviews with policy/programme designers, implementers and monitoring and evaluation specialists. Such interviews could provide valuable insights as to how specific policies or schemes were decided, what factors influenced their design or negotiation, and what lessons could be pulled from them that can inform future interventions.

III. Frameworks and schemes to support labour migration and mobility facilitation

Labour mobility support schemes are policies, projects, initiatives and other mechanisms that can support the legal movement of people from one country to another for work purposes. Such schemes may be temporary in nature, restricted to specific groups of people based on strict eligibility criteria, and administered by different types of frameworks and agreements.

In the Egyptian context, there are relatively few mobility support schemes with the European Union (EU) or its individual member states. Agreements on labour migration in particular are part of a rapidly-changing policy landscape, however. Labour migration schemes from Egypt to countries in the EU fit within a larger regional policy context. Egypt is a member of the African Union, and as such its relationship with the European Union is influenced by wider Africa-EU relations. As an individual state, Egypt also has a particular relationship with the EU, which fits within both general cooperation and migration-specific frameworks. Labour migration possibilities are also shaped by agreements between Egypt and individual EU member states.

The multiple layers of cooperation – at Africa-EU, Egypt-EU and Egypt-EU member state levels – create distinct opportunities for cooperation on labour migration and other mobility support schemes. This section therefore separates out the frameworks and agreements that support labour migration from Egypt to the EU at these distinct levels. While the first section explains the general context of Africa-EU cooperation on migration, the second section provides more insight on specific agreements between Egypt and the EU on labour migration. The third section then explores specific mobility support schemes between Egypt and specific EU member states. While a distinct strand of policy, the fourth section will briefly touch upon mobility support schemes for researchers and scientific staff. An overview of schemes offered by EU member states will be provided, with some limited detail provided on schemes with more explicit mobility facilitation components.

III.1 THE AFRICA-EU MIGRATION COOPERATION CONTEXT

Cooperation between the African Union and European Union on migration and mobility has deepened over the past decades. Cooperation between Africa and Europe, including on migration, has been defined through a number of instruments and frameworks. One particularly important framework is the **2007 Joint Africa-EU Strategy (JAES)**, a political vision and roadmap for future cooperation between Africa and the EU. The Joint Strategy provides a long-term framework for the Africa-EU relationship on joint challenges, of which migration is just one. The long-term outcomes of the partnership are further specified and made implementable through the development of short-term action plans and multi-annual roadmaps (Africa-EU Strategic Partnership, 2007).

The JAES contains four main objectives. The first objective – reinforcing and elevating the Africa-EU political partnership – explicitly addresses migration and development as an area of mutual concern. The third objective – fostering effective multilateralism – also explicitly identifies cooperation on migration as a common challenge that Africa and the EU should jointly address. The first objective of the JAES provides a more extensive list of areas where cooperation on migration is most key. Chief among these areas is migration management. Within this action area, the JAES notes that combating irregular migration, including through increasing cooperation on return and readmission, is a prime area for cooperation. Mutual efforts on border control and trafficking and human beings are also identified under this objective (Africa-EU Strategic Partnership, 2007).

Under the JAES, different sets of priorities have been defined over time. The most-recent set of priorities for the African-EU strategic partnership were agreed at the 5th AU-EU Summit in 2017. The so-called **Abidjan Declaration** identified four joint priorities for cooperation: 1) investing in people; 2) strengthening resilience, peace, security and governance; 3) migration and mobility, and; 4) mobilising investments for African structural sustainable transformation. In contrast to previous documents that strongly emphasised the security dimensions of Africa-EU migration, the Abidjan Declaration notes that “we aim to promote a positive, and constructive and multidimensional approach to migration that takes place in a safe, orderly and regular manner.” (African Union & European Union, 2017; pp3). The priority area also makes reference to addressing the root causes of irregular migration and forced displacement, echoing early commitments on migration management (African Union & European Union, 2017). The use of the phrase “safe, orderly and regular”, a pivotal part of the Global Compact for Migration, nevertheless suggests growing recognition of creating regular pathways for migration in the future.

The expansion of Africa-EU cooperation on migration has been accompanied by complementary initiatives that have opened up substantial funding and support for joint dialogues and projects related to migration. For example, instruments such as the **Africa-EU Migration and Mobility Dialogue (MMD)** have been used to increase African-EU cooperation on migration. The MMD framework contains three strategic dialogues: the Rabat Process, the Khartoum Process and the Continental Dialogue. It also includes a fund for flagship initiatives and technical assistance (the MMD Facility) and consolidated

the Africa-EU Development platform to further enhance the role of the diaspora as development actors (African Union & European Union, 2019). The MMD was created to further foster partnerships on joint migration issues, and its creation of the two regional consultative processes on migration (RCPs) was a significant step to institutionalising regional cooperation on migration issues.

Following the MMD, other migration-specific agreements and frameworks have also been adopted between Africa and the EU that shape the policies and programmes governing labour mobility. Whereas the JAES and the Abidjan Declaration are broader frameworks for Africa-EU cooperation, more specific frameworks address migration management as a specific cooperation sector. One of the most important in this regard is the **Joint Valletta Action Plan (JVAP)**. The JVAP was agreed in November 2015 at an Africa-European Summit on Migration (the Valletta Summit on Migration) and has become the regional framework within which migration policy should be constructed (Valletta Summit on Migration, 2015).

The action plan identifies five domains (action areas) to support better migration governance between Africa and Europe. These relate to: 1) the development benefits of migration and addressing root causes of irregular migration and forced displacement; 2) legal migration and mobility; 3) protection and asylum; 4) prevention of and fight against irregular migration, migrant smuggling and trafficking in human beings; 5) return, readmission and reintegration. The JVAP brought with it substantial financial contributions from the EU and its member states for initiatives related to one of the priority areas. Within the JVAP, the second priority area – on *legal migration and mobility* – is particularly relevant to explore in this inventory of mobility schemes that support migration from Egypt to the EU.

The legal migration and mobility area of the JVAP contained several specific commitment areas. These importantly included *promoting regular channels for migration*, including by creating legal labour migration opportunities¹ and supporting the recognition of skills and portability of work-related benefits. Another commitment related to *promoting student, researcher and entrepreneur mobility* between Africa and Europe. This stream focused not only on promoting university exchange and qualification recognition but also addressed training programmes for African entrepreneurs in Europe-based enterprises. A further commitment area is on *supporting development and implementation of national and regional strategies* on migration and mobility. *Visa facilitation and readmission agreements* were identified as a final area for cooperation among Valletta partners in the legal migration and mobility action area (Valletta Summit on Migration, 2015). Within priority area 2, 45 policies and 39 projects had been funded by the last quarter of 2018 (ICMPD, 2018). Box 1 (opposite) addresses how JVAP funding has been used to address migration and mobility facilitation from Africa to Europe.

1. The JVAP included a list of initiatives that would be prioritised for implementation by the end of 2016. One of the initiatives listed was a pilot project to pool offers for legal migration from EU member states to a list of African partners. Information on its implementation to date is not available.

Box 1: The Joint Valletta Action Plan and its Role in Labour Mobility Facilitation

Projects and policies implemented as part of Joint Valletta Action Plan initiatives are monitored by focal points from the two regional consultative processes on migration (RCPs), the Rabat Process and the Khartoum Process. As of October 2018, the smallest amount of funding for initiatives in the JVAP framework had been released for the legal migration and mobility domain (domain 2). Over €112 million had been disbursed for initiatives in this JVAP domain from the start of the JVAP initiatives in 2016. In comparison domain 1 (development benefits of migration and addressing root causes) and domain 3 (protection and asylum) had received over €4.91 billion and €4.69 billion in funding, respectively.

The differences in funding dispersed across the JVAP action domains strongly reflects that nature of initiatives pursued in each area. Within domains 1 and 3 larger numbers of projects compared to policies were implemented. The opposite was true of domain 2, on legal migration and mobility, where 45 policies (compared to 39 projects) were created (ICMPD, 2018). Unfortunately the specific initiatives implemented under each domain of the JVAP are not published publicly. There is a monitoring database for initiatives, but at this time only Valletta partners are able to access it. As such, the policies or projects related to legal migration and mobility that have been implemented with JVAP funding for Egypt cannot be listed here.

The 2015 Valetta Summit also saw the establishment of the **EU Trust Fund for stability and addressing root causes of irregular migration and displaced persons in Africa** (hereafter: EUTF for Africa). The EUTF for Africa is intended to complement the Africa-EU partnership by supporting political dialogue between countries and pooling funding and expertise from different agencies. Over €4.7 billion of financing has been placed in the EUTF for Africa. As of January 2020, €807 million had been disbursed from the EUTF for Africa to countries in the North of Africa region, which includes Egypt. Improved migration management was considered the main priority area for the North of Africa region. Activities in this domain include improving migration governance frameworks, supporting labour migration and mobility, and supporting voluntary return and reintegration efforts, among others (EU Trust Fund for Africa, 2020).

Substantial funds have been made available to Egypt through the EUTF for Africa. As of October 2019, 7 projects and €60 million in financing had been committed by the EUTF for Africa specifically to Egypt. Additional projects and financing have been given to Egypt within regional or cross-country initiatives, which are described in more depth below. In contrast to other recipients of funding under the EUTF for Africa, the number of interventions supported exclusively for Egypt is relatively small. The €60 million financing offered through the EUTF for Africa is for a single initiative, “enhancing the response to migration challenges in Egypt” (ERMCE). The project encompasses

seven projects that are implemented by EG NEAR in partnership with Egyptian authorities, international aid agencies (e.g., AICS, GIZ), and international NGOs (e.g., Plan International, the German Red Cross). None of the envisioned projects would directly support the creation of mobility schemes or labour migration channels to the EU. Within the North Africa region, the EUTF for Africa strategy focuses on EUTF objective three (“improved migration management in countries of origin, transit and destination”). This wider objective is split into five *strategic objectives*, namely: 1) foster rights-based migration governance systems; 2) increase mutually-beneficial legal migration and mobility; 3) strengthen protection and resilience of those in need; 4) foster a more inclusive social and economic environment and stability, and; 5) mitigate vulnerabilities arising from irregular migration and combat irregular migration. The €60 million mobilised for Egypt would support projects in all strategic objectives *except* for strategic objective two on legal migration and mobility (European Union, 2019). Cross-country initiatives, which involve multiple recipient countries, have a slightly wider focus, with one specific initiative directly addressing legal migration and mobility. The seven projects funded in Egypt under the EUTF for Africa are summarised in the table below.

Table 2: *Summary of Projects Funded Through the EU Trust Fund for Africa in Egypt as of October 2019²*

EUTF Strategic Objective (# of projects funded under objective)	Project name	Envisioned actions in project
1. <i>Foster rights-based migration governance systems (1)</i>	Enhancing migration management through institutional support (also part of objective 5)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Raising public awareness • Developing policy and institutional frameworks to address irregular migration and trafficking in human beings • Implementing Law 82/2016 on combating illegal migration and smuggling of migrants • Mainstreaming migration in labour and social policies • Conducting mappings and studies on demographic, labour market and migration needs and trends

2. As of the end of 2019, the seven projects had been approved for financing, but no substantial implementation has occurred due to Egyptian authorities’ delay in meeting administrative steps (European Union, 2019).

EUTF Strategic Objective (# of projects funded under objective)	Project name	Envisioned actions in project
2. <i>Strengthen protection and resilience of those in need (2)</i>	Addressing root causes of irregular migration through employability and labour intensive works	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Financing of small-scale infrastructure works in selected governorates (e.g., rural roads, rehabilitation of water networks) • Financing local grassroots organisations to provide community services (e.g., early childhood education, solid waste collection) • Financing local stakeholders to provide training packages to youth to encourage skilling for wage employment or self employment
	Supporting communities – health for all	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Providing mobile health teams to provide services to most-vulnerable migrants, including refugees • Providing community-based health and first aid courses for community members
3. <i>Foster a more inclusive social and economic environment and stability</i>	Multi-educational programme for employment promotion in migration-affected areas	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Training for teachers/trainers on contemporary teaching methods and technical skills • Creation of Professional Training Centre • Providing short-term vocational courses, including internships and other work-based training for trainees at risk of migrating
	Tackling the root causes of irregular migration and supporting integrated communities in Upper Egypt (also part of objective 5)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Support for demand-driven employability skills trainings and job placement • Support for youth to start and sustain enterprises • Conducting awareness-raising campaigns about risks and alternatives to irregular migration

EUTF Strategic Objective (# of projects funded under objective)	Project name	Envisioned actions in project
	Capacity building through urban infrastructure development in migration-affected urban areas	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Support for skills trainings and on-the-job training in the construction sector for residence of urban informal settlements • Promotion of small and medium enterprises • Support for improvement of physical infrastructure in urban informal settlements • Education on dangers of irregular migration
	Addressing the economic drivers of irregular migration	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Creating clusters and value chains in high-growth, labour-intensive sectors • Encouraging women and youth to lead enterprises • Establishing knowledge and innovation incubators • Conducting campaigns discouraging irregular migration
4. <i>Mitigate vulnerabilities arising from irregular migration and combat irregular migration (2)</i>	Enhancing migration management through institutional support; Tackling the root causes of irregular migration and supporting integrated communities in Upper Egypt	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • See above

Source: Own compilation based on European Union (2019) and EU Emergency Trust Fund (2017)

The summary of projects planned for implementation in Egypt under the EUTF for Africa suggests relatively limited prioritisation of legal migration and mobility facilitation. Most of the funded projects address prevention of irregular migration and contained some element of educating or informing potential migrants and general members of the public about the risks of and alternatives to irregular migration. Notably absent are projects that address objective two of the EUTF for Africa, to increase mutually-beneficial legal migration and mobility.

In addition to the projects funded singularly for Egypt, the EUTF for Africa has also mobilised support for cross-country initiatives. One cross-country initiative is of particular importance: the project “**towards a holistic approach to labour migration governance and labour mobility in North Africa (THAMM)**” The project, the agreement for which was signed in November 2019 but is awaiting security clearance before implementation begins, would entail a €15 million budget paid from the trust fund and an additional €5 million to be paid by the German Federal Ministry for Economic Cooperation and Development. The project would be jointly implemented by the ILO, IOM and GIZ. When implemented, the regional flagship initiative would represent a significant investment in supporting legal labour migration and mobility facilitation.

Box 2: Towards a holistic approach to labour migration governance and labour mobility in North Africa (THAMM)

The project “towards a holistic approach to labour migration governance and labour mobility in North Africa” (THAMM) is envisioned as a flagship regional programme to support legal migration and mobility from North Africa. The project is envisioned as a complement and enhancer of regional dialogues and wider cooperation frameworks between North Africa and the EU. It also seeks to pilot or expand mobility schemes from Egypt to interested EU member states. The project will first involve implementation of a mobility scheme with *Germany*, with *Belgium*¹ expressing interest to implement a mobility scheme later.

The project directly addresses objective 2 of the EU Trust for Africa, namely to foster mutually-beneficial migration and mobility. The project would involve the range of activities needed to enable a mobility support scheme to operate, including:

- Capacity-building for partner countries in the area of migration governance;
- Improvement of mechanisms for skill and qualification assessment, certification, and validation;
- Strengthening capacity for provision of labour market analysis;
- Strengthening capacity for the provision of pre-departure orientation for prospective migrants, including job matching and career counselling;
- Creation of mobility schemes with relevant member states;
- Support for reintegration needs of returning migrant workers, and;
- Supporting dialogue and cooperation among stakeholders involved in legal migration and mobility.

Note:

1. *Belgium is currently implementing another programme (called PALIM) with Morocco that aims to support capacity building among Moroccan authorities and to create a mobility scheme with Morocco. The scheme may be scaled up under the EUTF for Africa project, with the scheme likely limited to migrants from Morocco.*

The various frameworks and funds to support cooperation on migration between Africa and the EU have so far not focused extensively on legal labour migration and mobility. Labour migration schemes specifically for Egyptians to the EU have not yet emerged from wider cooperation between Africa and the EU. The EUTF for Africa may support the development of migration schemes in the future, particularly through the multi-country project “towards a holistic approach to labour migration governance and labour mobility in North Africa”, however. Understanding the frameworks on Africa-EU level that shape cooperation on migration is helpful to understand, as it is the wider cooperation context that also shapes Egypt-EU relations specifically. The focus of Africa-EU cooperation frameworks on combating irregular migration is echoed in Egypt-EU cooperation frameworks, which are reviewed in the next section.

III.2 EGYPT-EU MIGRATION COOPERATION

The cooperation between Egypt and the EU on labour migration should be understood within the wider context of Egypt-EU relations. The **2001 Association Agreement between the EU and Egypt** provides the general framework for cooperation between the two bodies on multiple policy issues. Cooperation between the EU and Egypt specifically on migration is defined within the context of the 2015 Joint Valletta Action Plan. Specific priorities for cooperation between Egypt and the EU have been further defined through the **European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP)** and through the partnership priorities for 2017-2020³ (European Union Association Council, 2017).

One of the overarching partnership priorities identified for the 2017-2020 period relates to enhancing stability. Migration is addressed under this priority area and framed in two ways: 1) as a challenge related to security and terrorism and; 2) an issue to be managed for mutual benefit. Within the sub-priority area of security and terrorism, the priority area encourages cooperation between the EU and Egypt to prevent and combat migrant smuggling and human trafficking and to expand assistance to victims of trafficking. Within the sub-priority area of managing migration for mutual benefit, a number of action areas between the EU and Egypt are identified. These include strengthening of Egypt’s migration governance framework, which could entail legislative reforms and migration management strategies. Other priority areas include the EU support for Egypt’s efforts to prevent and address smuggling and trafficking in persons and irregular migration. A related element is the expansion of EU-Egypt cooperation on the voluntary return of irregular migrants. In line with the wider JVAP, the priority areas also include cooperation to address the “root causes” of migration, namely poverty, unemployment and underdevelopment. The priority cooperation document also makes ambiguous reference to the importance of *supporting mobility for skilled migrants*, who could assist in the further development of Egypt. No specific

3. In addition to the EU-Egypt Association Agreement, which reduces barriers to trade between the two partners, Egypt and the EU have also been negotiating a deep and comprehensive free trade agreement (DCFTA) since 2013. As of July 2019, discussions on the DCFTA had stalled given negotiations on trade in services (European Commission, 2019). As trade in services may entail movement for the providers of such services, such provisions can constitute an important mechanism to support labour mobility.

actions are identified in this area, however, as the document simply notes that “the EU and Egypt are committed to the full protection of the rights of migrants.” (European Union Association Council, 2017; pp8). The ambiguous support for legal labour migration channels again reflects the absence of support for labour migration in Africa-EU frameworks. For example, the MMD and its accompanying funding facility do not seem to have yet effectively supported envisioned legislative reforms (e.g., mobility facilitation schemes for Egyptians into the EU) or projects that were marked for implementation in Egypt (al-Khashef & Martin, 2019).

III.3 EGYPT-EU MEMBER STATE LABOUR MIGRATION FACILITATION

The possibilities for (legal) labour migration between Egypt and a member state of the EU is shaped not only by Africa-EU and Egypt-EU agreements but also by policy frameworks within the EU. While the latter part of this section specifically addresses agreements and policies between Egypt and EU member states that support labour mobility, it first describes how labour migration is regulated on EU level.

EU-Level Labour Migration Regulations

Mobility schemes between EU member states and origin countries are negotiated within specific EU-level frameworks. The EU itself may adopt legislative acts that establish rules of entry and stay for third-country nationals (TCNs). These acts essentially provide guidance to member states on the conditions under which TCNs may be admitted. Member states have the right to determine the number of TCNs who may be admitted (Alcidi, Laurentsyeve, & A., 2019).

The EU has elaborated several Directives since 2018 that establish rules of entry and stay for different groups of labour migrants. Among others, these include:

- **The EU Single Permit Directive (2011/98/EU):** The Directive merged residence and work permits for labour immigrants. It also sought to ensure equal treatment of TCNs related to labour rights, which could entail equal access to vocational education and training (VET), frameworks for diploma recognition and equal working conditions. While the Directive does support harmonisation in some elements of treatment of TCN workers, member states are nevertheless still able to set specific admission criteria and establish conditions of stay for TCN migrant workers. In addition to specific programmes or schemes established on member state level, there are also EU-wide schemes to facilitate migration of highly-skilled workers (see the Blue Card Directive overleaf) and for seasonal workers (see the Seasonal Workers Directive overleaf).
- **EU Seasonal Workers Directive (2014/36/EU):** This directive establishes the conditions of entry and stay for seasonal workers and defines their rights within the EU. The directive does not replace bilateral seasonal worker agreements between member states and third countries but instead operates as an additional admission scheme. The number of work permits issued is directly tied to economic conditions in the EU, with relatively small numbers of permits issued annually.

- **The EU Blue Card Directive (2009/05/EC):** Similar to the Seasonal Workers Directive, the Blue Card Directive establishes rules for the entry and stay of specific groups of workers – namely highly-skilled workers and their immediate family members. The Directive supports mobility of highly-skilled workers across EU member states, in doing so offering migrant workers and their accompanying family members much more extensive rights than assured to other categories of labour migrants. The Directive does not eliminate bilateral schemes to support highly-skilled migration but offers an admission channel on supranational level.
- **The Students and Researchers Directive ((EU)2016/801):** This Directive was transposed into EU law in May of 2018 and essentially harmonised rules of entry and stay for different categories of migrants: students, researchers, trainees, pupils, au pairs and volunteers. While member states were allowed to place conditions on the different categories of migrants covered in the Directive, the Directive nevertheless established important common conditions. One of those conditions was the creation of a grace period for post-graduation employment searches, which could support the school-to-work transition for international students.

In addition to specific Directives on EU level that address labour migration, the EU has also developed non-binding policy frameworks with specific partners to structure cooperation on migration. One of those frameworks – which has yet to be realised for Egypt – is the *Mobility Partnership*. Mobility Partnerships are essentially non-binding political declarations between interested member states, a third country, and the EU. The Partnerships focus on commitments related to irregular migration, legal/labour migration, international protection and migration and development. Visa facilitation agreements and readmission agreements are also addressed under Partnerships. Specific programmes that facilitate labour migration may be funded in the framework of a Mobility Partnership. For example, the Partnership with Morocco resulted in a special scheme to support Egyptian youth to train in the hotel industry in Germany. Despite attempts by the EU to encourage Egypt to negotiate a Mobility Partnership since 2011, there has not been significant progress toward a Mobility Partnership (Alcidi, Laurentsyeve, & A., 2019).

The EU Directives on labour migration and instruments like mobility partnerships can shape individual member state's approaches to labour migration. Nevertheless, labour migration policies are set on the national level of each individual member state. Member states typically calibrate their labour migration policies to real or anticipated needs for labour. Different countries use different mechanisms to determine: 1) the quantity of migrants that can/should be admitted; 2) the duration for which they can be admitted, and; 3) the profile of required workers. To determine the number of migrants who can be admitted, countries typically use information from companies/sectors on shortages in specific occupational categories and on the number of jobs left unfilled after implementing a labour market test. Quotas or ceilings on admission are typically set, which limits the number of people who can be admitted. Profiles of admitted workers are often derived from the needs of industry and are assessed according to applicant's education levels of occupational certifications. The European

model of labour migration, which is formalised through instruments like the EU Single Permit Directive (see page 27) strongly relies on admission on the basis of a “qualifying” job offer. A qualifying job offer is essentially a position that clearly specifies the conditions of an employment contract, including salary, duration and work function. While migrants are issued admission permission, it is in effect the job and not the individual that is approved. An individual should fulfill certain criteria (related to education or occupation) in order to fill an offered job position, but the job has to be approved first (Chaloff, 2016). It is within this structure the individual EU countries can offer structural job opportunities to TCNs. This context is important to keep in mind when considering individual agreements between countries related to labour migration, which is addressed in the next section.

Bilateral Labour Migration Agreements between Egypt and EU Countries

Different types of agreements may facilitate labour migration between any two given countries. Labour migration is often addressed in bilateral labour migration agreements (BLMAs), which are agreements between two countries that regulate labour migration schemes. Such agreements can take different forms. For example, they may be non-binding agreements that create a general framework for cooperation on labour migration called memoranda of understanding (MoU)⁴. There are also BLMAs that are legally-binding, specifying the rights and obligations of states and participants of BLMAs under the framework of international law. Other bilateral agreements that include different aspects of labour migration may be agreed between specific ministries or agencies in countries of destination and origin. Framework agreements between countries that specify wider elements of migration management—for example, covering topics such as return and readmission—may also include labour migration provisions. Different types of BLMAs may support labour mobility between two countries (ILO/IOM, 2019). These include:

- Temporary labour migration schemes (e.g., seasonal worker agreements, contract and project-based worker agreements, working holiday-maker agreements);
- Work-based learning labour schemes (e.g., trainee agreements, programmes for short-term training);
- Potentially longer-term labour schemes (e.g., cross-border worker agreements, sector-based schemes, skill-based schemes).

Egypt has concluded a number of bilateral agreements on labour migration with partners across different regions. The majority have been with countries in the Middle East, but a small number (three) have been concluded with EU countries. The BLMAs between Egypt and EU countries vary in detail and depth. The first, concluded with Bulgaria in 1972, details the needed forms of cooperation between Egypt and Bulgaria to ensure adequate matching of demand and supply across countries. It also addresses the rights of Egyptian migrant workers and specifies that both states should aim to ensure equal standards of living for Egyptian labourers as for Bulgarian workers. The

4. MoUs generally does not require or entail domestic ratification by a domestic legislature and do not entail binding obligations for the agreeing parties, including related to commitments from a public budget.

second BLMA was agreed between Egypt and Greece in 1981. Similar to the BLMA with Bulgaria, the agreement with Greece details the type of information exchange needed between Egyptian and Greek authorities, and it assures equal rights related to employment conditions for Egyptian migrant workers (ILO, 2017).

Table 3: *Summary of BLMAs between Egypt and select EU member states*

Partner Country	Name of Agreement	Brief Description
Bulgaria	Egypt-Bulgaria Agreement of 1972	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • 14 Articles • Focuses on ensuring equal standards of living for labour migrants • Emphasises the regulation of labour migration through information exchange between country authorities
Italy	Agreement of Cooperation in the Field of Labour Migration of 28 November 2005	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • 12 Articles • Emphasises the regulation of labour migration through information exchange between country authorities; emphasises matching of Italian labour demand with supply of workers from Egypt • Emphasises Egypt's responsibility to ensure that labour migrants don't constitute a threat to security or public order
	Protocol on the Implementation of the Agreement on Cooperation in the Field of Labour Migration of 12 May 2009 ⁵	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Specifies executive procedures of implementation for the Agreement • Emphasises requirements Egyptian migrants should meet to be employed in Italy • Emphasises consistent and transparent exchange of information between countries regarding the migrant labour supply in Egypt and labour demand in Italy • Identifies that migrant workers should enjoy the same rights and protections as Italian workers, including related to social security provisions

5. A Memorandum of Understanding between the Ministry of Employment of Italy and the Ministry of Manpower in Egypt on Cooperation in the Field of Labour Migration further specifies cooperation between Egyptian and Italian authorities on labour migration.

Partner Country	Name of Agreement	Brief Description
Italy (continued)		<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Requires authorities of Egypt and Italy to compile a list of available job opportunities and their requirements plus the potential supply of workers and their qualifications, which should be publicly shared
Greece	Agreement on Strengthening the Cooperation in Relation to Employment of 18 April 1981	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Emphasises the regulation of labour migration through information exchange between country authorities Focuses on employment rights

Source: Own compilation from ILO (2017)

The BLMA with Italy is the most recent (2005) but also the most extensive in terms of implementation guidance. The Egypt-Italy BLMA is accompanied by both an MoU outlining cooperation between state parties and a protocol on implementation. The implementation protocol provides guidance on the requirements Egyptian migrants should meet to be eligible for recruitment into an Italian job posting. It further specifies how information on available jobs should be advertised (ILO, 2017), which is related to another important element of Egyptian-Italian cooperation on labour migration – namely the technical infrastructure needed to support supply and demand matching. A management information system, called the Integrated Migration Information System (IMIS), is an important supporting initiative to the Egypt-Italy BLMA. The IMIS is detailed in more depth below.

The agreements between Egypt and Bulgaria, Greece and Italy as destination partners emphasises the rights and protections Egyptian labour migrants should be guaranteed under both national and international law. While the agreements refer specifically to upholding of migrants' rights under international law, they also explicitly refer to equal treatment of migrant workers in national frameworks. All three agreements note that Egyptian labour migrants should have the same rights and privileges as national workers, but specific elements of equality are covered more explicitly in certain agreements. The agreement with Bulgaria, for example, discusses equal standards of living, whereas the agreement with Greece refers more extensively to employment rights. The agreement with Italy addresses equal rights for social security provisions. While the agreements stand apart for their explicit references to the rights of migrants under international law, which could entail greater protection from exploitative practices, the agreements vary in explicit worker protection provisions (ILO, 2017). Table 4 overleaf provides information on specific provisions related to the protection of migrant worker's rights that are included in each of the BLMAs.

Table 4: Specific provisions for protection of migrant workers' rights under different BLMAs

	Equal treatment	Fair recruitment	Social dialogue	Wage guarantees ⁶	Specific contract provision	Training Provisions	Transfer of savings and remittances	Framework for skill and qualification recognition	Mechanism for complaint / dispute resolution
Bulgaria	Living standards	Entry visas and travel costs paid by hosts	None	None	Provides suggested contents of contract between migrants and employers	None	Detailed clauses on transfer of wages, savings and insurance entitlements	None	None
Greece	Employment rights	Entry visas and travel costs paid by hosts	None	None	None	None	Detailed clauses on transfer of wages, savings and insurance entitlements	None	None
Italy	Social Security	No cost for candidates during selection phase or for training courses	Encouragement of dialogue among states, employers, trade unions and other institutions related to selection and training of migrant workers	None	None	Pre-departure	Contains provisions on transfer of earnings and savings to Egypt	None	None

Source: Own compilation from ILO (2017)

6. Wage guarantees may relate to elements such as minimum wages, compensation for overtime work and payment schedules, among others

The 2005 Egypt-Italy agreement is notable for its strong emphasis on matching labour supply in Egypt with labour demand in Italy. The agreement tries to foster better linkages between migrant labour supply and demand through different mechanisms. One mechanism relates to encouraging social dialogue among stakeholders in both countries. The agreement encourages consultation among state representatives, private sector representative, trade unions and organisations involved in the recruitment and training of migrant workers. Ideally such dialogue would also entail discussion with civil society organisations, including those representing migrants themselves (ILO, 2017).

An important element of BLMAs relates to capacity development of migrant workers. The 2005 Egypt-Italy agreement allows for both technical/vocational and language training for migrant workers who are selected into eventual contracts. Within the agreement, training should be offered at no costs prior to departure for selected workers. Despite emphasis on skilling for the destination country labour market, none of the BLMAs between Egypt and Bulgaria, Greece and Italy contain provisions for recognition of skills and qualifications in the country of destination (ILO, 2017). The absence of skill or qualification recognition frameworks may reflect the potentially short-term nature of migrant worker deployments. The 2005 Egypt-Italy agreement, for example, relies on a specific list of job openings and the specific qualification requirements that accompany them. Workers are recruited for these specific positions. Once the contract for the position is expired, the worker should return to Egypt. Skill/qualification recognition is perhaps most meaningful for workers wishing to switch employers or find other employment. Given the emphasis on short-term, job-specific employment, it is perhaps unsurprising the recognition frameworks are not explicit elements of the BLMAs Egypt has with the partner countries in the EU.

Egypt-Italy Cooperation on Labour Migration

The BLMA between Egypt and Italy is just one of the agreements the two countries have made on labour facilitation. In addition to the 2005 Egypt-Italy BLMA, the two countries signed a readmission agreement in 2006. The readmission agreement was accompanied by a separate agreement on legal admissions of set quotas of Egyptian labour migrants to Italy. Under this agreement, annual quotas for Egyptian labourers were agreed based on the needs of different Italian regions. While the agreement did support the mobility of Egyptian workers, eligibility for movement under the agreement proved challenging. The initial quota of 7,000 set in 2007 was difficult to fulfil because applicants did not fulfill the conditions set by Italian authorities. As part of the readmission and labour quota agreements, the government of Egypt was also able to negotiate for the legalisation of around 5,000 irregular Egyptians residing in Italy in 2007 (Ghoneim, 2010). The readmission agreement between Egypt and Italy, while certainly supporting the strengthening of labour migration channels, primarily addresses the reduction of irregular migration.

The Egypt-Italy agreement on migration cooperation has been credited as a model for labour migration facilitation across the EU. The agreement has supported the implementation of several initiatives that have provided concrete structures to support

the placement of Egyptian workers in Italian employment opportunities. One such initiative was the creation of the Integrated Migration Information System (IMIS) in 2001 and its extension (IMIS PLUS) in 2008. The IMIS was funded by the Italian government and jointly implemented by the Egyptian Ministry of Manpower and Migration and IOM. The IMIS and IMIS PLUS initiatives aimed to support the Ministry of Manpower and Migration in Egypt in facilitating regular migration from Egypt. The main feature of the IMIS was a web-accessible database to match prospective labour migrants with employers (Silka, 2011).

A complementary initiative, the Information Dissemination on Migration (IDOM) project, followed the creation of the IMIS. The IDOM project was also financed by the Italian government (the Ministry of Foreign Affairs Cooperation for Development) and jointly implemented by the Ministry of Manpower and Migration and the IOM. Whereas the IMIS initiative focused on creating the technical infrastructure for managing labour supply/demand matching, the IDOM project focused more on disseminating information to different stakeholders involved in labour migration processes. The project had three pillars:

- **Supporting matching** of Egyptian labour supply (through the IMIS system) with Italian demand (moderated through the Italian Data Collection System Borsa Lavoro);
- **Developing human capital** through financial support of selected Egyptian training institutions, encouraging curriculum development in line with international standards, providing certified language course, and analysis of the legal and regulatory framework affecting labour migration;
- Providing **media and social awareness campaigns** to inform prospective migrants of the dangers of irregular migration and the legal migration possibilities provided by the Egyptian government.

The design of the IMIS and IDOM initiatives emphasise the ties between educational systems, skills recognition and pre-departure preparation as part of labour migration schemes. These elements are also echoed in past short-term labour migration schemes that have been offered between Egypt and Italy. While it does not seem that specific labour migration programmes or projects are running between Egypt and Italy, past schemes – such as the “education and training for Egyptian youth in Fayoum Governorate” (see box 3 opposite) – demonstrate how education, training and labour migration can be unified in a mobility scheme.

III.4 EU MOBILITY SUPPORT SCHEMES FOR STUDENTS AND RESEARCHERS

As mentioned in the introduction, labour migration can be (inadvertently) supported by policies that are not explicitly about labour mobility. Certainly migration channels such as family reunification and asylum may be used to support the legal movement of job seekers into the EU, for example. While it is beyond the scope of this review to discuss different types of mobility schemes across all types of migration channels, it is worthwhile to provide an abbreviated review of mobility schemes for students and researchers.

Students and researchers are unique cohorts or categories of migrants who may be of particular interest to EU labour markets. Recent reforms at both EU and member state level to facilitate the school-to-work transition for international students reflects a wider trend of converting educational migrants into high-skilled workers. Given both their relevance for EU labour markets and the possibilities for legal movement from student migration channels to labour channels, this section will briefly inventory some of the mobility schemes that support the movement of Egyptian students and researchers into the EU.

There are a number of international and bilateral programmes that support the mobility of Egyptian researchers into the EU and vice versa. A small number of schemes are offered by the EU and offer opportunities for institutional exchange through financing offered through the European Commission. One such scheme, the Marie Skłodowska-Curie actions – Horizon 2020, focuses on supporting researchers at all stages of their careers through grants. The grants can be used to foster collaboration across institutions, which could include short stays of researchers from Egypt into an institution in an EU member state (Delegation of the European Union to Egypt, 2015).

Box 3: Education and training for Egyptian youth in Fayoum Governorate

Cooperation between Egypt and Italy on labour migration has resulted in specific short-term interventions and programmes focusing on regular labour migration. One such programme was the “education and training for Egyptian youth in Fayoum Governorate”. The project was implemented between 2010 and 2013 and was funded by the Italian Ministry of Labour and Social Policies. The project was implemented by IOM in cooperation with Egyptian authorities and focused on increasing the availability and quality of vocational education and training (VET) for young people in high-migration communities. Focusing on the tourism sector specifically, the project worked with the Italian Tourism School E. Cornaro of Jesolo as an exchange partner with the Advanced Technical School for Hotel Management and Tourism Services in Fayoum. The project supported the following activities:

- Renovation of classrooms, laboratories and equipment;
- Transformation of the school’s pedagogical model and curriculum to be better aligned with international standards and the Italian model of education;
- Development of a webportal for the school;
- Training and further development of capacities of teaching staff;
- Implementation of a management and monitoring system for the school;
- Organisation of events and short training courses for the community, and;
- Information and media campaigns on the project.

As part of the project, training curricula were revised in line with Italian, European and international standards. The European qualification framework system was used to support the reform, which was intended to ensure portability of competencies and certificates earned during training. Revised curricula also encouraged practical experiences and work-based learning.

While the project's objectives were primarily to increase the quality of local VET, the project did explicitly support mobility for training purposes. High-achieving students in the programme were supported to attend a two-week training programme at the Italian partner institute. After the course's end, students were offered a four-week workplace training position in an Italian enterprise.

The short- and medium-run impacts of the project are unclear. Nevertheless, the intervention did contain several elements that could support the development of future mobility schemes. The project emphasised **skill development and portability** through the adoption of international quality frameworks, which could help enhance the value of the VET programme. **Partnerships** among government, educational institutions and enterprises were fostered, which helped expose young people to on-the-job competency development. Finally, the project extended **short-term international learning** possibilities to programme participants, which exposed students to ways of learning and working in other labour market contexts (International Organisation for Migration, 2012).

Another important EU-level scheme is the Erasmus+ scheme, a programme that focuses on both young learners and educators. The Erasmus+ scheme has run from 2014 to 2020 and focuses on different aspects of higher educational internationalisation. While it supports education policy reform in both the EU and partner countries, including Egypt, it also supports the internationalisation and modernisation of higher education institutions in partner countries through partnerships and cooperative projects. Erasmus+ also encourages both learner and staff mobility through something called *international credit mobility* (Delegation of the European Union to Egypt, 2015).

The international credit mobility supports the movement of students or staff between institutions in the EU and partner countries. For **students**, it supports exchanges of between three and 12 months, which are open to short-cycle, bachelor, master and doctoral candidates. Traineeships are also available for students between bachelor and PhD level for periods of two to 12 months. Mobility schemes for **teachers** are also provided through Erasmus+, with staff of both academic and non-academic organisations supported to teach at a higher-education institution abroad for between five days to two months. **Staff mobility for training** is also supported through Erasmus+. Teaching and non-teaching staff of higher-education institutions can train at both higher-education institutions or non-academic organisations in a partner country for periods of between 5 days and two months. The training could entail short training events, job observation or job shadowing. Erasmus+ supports students and staff mobility across disciplines and subjects. The programme provides grants to students and staff to cover their monthly expenditures and/or employment costs as well as travel costs. The scheme also provides support for hosting organisations, including logistical and administrative costs associated with selecting and facilitating the movement of candidates (e.g., language preparation, visa costs, insurance costs) (European Commission, 2017).

In addition to schemes at EU level, different member states have schemes to support student and researcher mobility to and from Egypt. The number and specificity of such schemes varies widely by member state. The table below summarises available mobility support schemes for students and researchers between Egypt and EU member states as of 2015. Annex 1 also contains additional information on the mobility schemes for students/researchers by member states.

Table 5: *Summary of mobility support schemes for Egyptian students and researchers to the EU*

Country	Number of types of schemes	Focus areas/support mechanisms ¹
Belgium	2	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Scholarships for post-graduate studies or research • Scholarships for French-language study
Finland	2	Scholarships for Egyptian researchers in Finnish institutions
France	6	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Scholarships for Egyptian students enrolled in Master's education in France • Grants for PhD students to conduct part of their research in a French institution • Grant for post-doctoral researchers to complete additional training in France • Support for further training of medical students and researchers in a French university hospital • Support for 5-day scientific visits to a laboratory in France for conferences of project planning • Support for post-doctoral and senior Egyptian researchers to work with public-sector research labs in Paris
Germany	12	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Support for scholars to spend extended time in German institutions to work on research projects • Scholarships for youth to study in German higher-education institutions and research institutes • Grants to support cooperation between Egyptian and German researchers working in the fields of renewable energy, material sciences, medical sciences, agriculture and industry • Scholarships for Egyptian doctoral candidates to follow doctoral programmes in German institutions for up to 42 months • Scholarships for short research stays of 3-6 months for Egyptian master, doctoral and post-doctoral researchers in German institutions

Country	Number of types of schemes	Focus areas/support mechanisms ¹
Germany (continued)		<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Support for staff exchanges for German and Egyptian institutions working on collaborative science and technology-focused projects • Support for joint master programmes and research partnerships between German and Egyptian institutions • Scholarships for Egyptian students to complete post-graduate courses on development at a German institute • Scholarships for “future leaders” to complete a masters degree in a German institution related to public policy and good governance • Stipends for alumni of German institutions who completed their education with a German state-sponsored scholarship to return to a German institution to complete research or a project • Support for scientists to engage in bilateral exchange programmes to explore areas of scientific collaboration and complete joint research programmes
Hungary	1	Scholarships for partial stays for undergraduate students and research stays at graduate and post-graduate level
Italy²	1	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Stipends to support the mobility of researchers engaged in joint research projects • Grants for joint research activities
Poland	1	Stipends for Egyptian students to complete research internships at a Polish institution
Romania	1	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Scholarships for students at bachelor, graduate and doctoral level to follow education in Romania • Support for exchange of professors and specialists between Romanian and Egyptian institutions
Sweden	3	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Scholarships for doctoral and post-doctoral education in Swedish institutions • Scholarships for African researchers who focus on social science topics in Africa • Support for exchange of teachers and students between Egyptian and Swedish institutions

Country	Number of types of schemes	Focus areas/support mechanisms ¹
United Kingdom	4	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Scholarships for “future leaders, decision-makers and opinion-formers” to complete a post-graduate study in a UK higher-education institution • Scholarship for high-performing students to complete specific courses at the University of Cambridge • Support for mobility of researchers between Egyptian and UK institutions to work on joint projects

NOTES:

1. Many of the programmes listed support bilateral exchanges between Egypt and the member state. As different focus areas or support mechanisms may be provided to nationals of the member state migrating to Egypt, this column only lists the focus areas and support mechanisms for Egyptians going to the member state.
2. Information updated to reflect scheme for 2019-2021; see Italian Ministry of Foreign Affairs and International Cooperation (2019).

The mobility schemes available through EU member states may be offered at different administrative levels (e.g., national, regional/community, city) and may be supported by different bodies. For example, some schemes are offered by the EU member state embassy in Egypt (e.g., grants for Egyptian PhD students are offered by the French embassy in Egypt). Others are offered by foundations, such as the Alexander von Humboldt Foundation in Germany, which supports scholars to stay in German institutions to work on collaborative research projects (Delegation of the European Union to Egypt, 2015).

The different mobility schemes offered by EU member states also differ by the type of mechanism used to support their respective target groups. By far the most common form of support were scholarships given to students to pursue or complete education in a member state higher-education institution. While some programmes also supported students to complete research projects in a member state institution, the majority focused on providing scholarships for education purposes. A few programmes encouraged mobility and exchange of staff between Egyptian and member state institutions, often in a bilateral or reciprocal way (Delegation of the European Union to Egypt, 2015). For example, the Newton-Mosharafa fund is a £50 million fund to support British-Egyptian collaborations on science, innovation and developed-focused research. It directly funds joint research projects involving British and Egyptian scientists and encourages the production of research that can have commercial or wider societal benefit. It strongly encourages the establishment of sustainable, international scientific networks. The fund offers financial and logistical support to British and Egyptian scientists to train at a partner institution and to take

part in short- and longer-term research mobility schemes. The fund is jointly funded by the UK Department for Business, Energy and Industrial Strategy and the Egyptian Ministry of Higher Education and Scientific Research. Given the role of both countries in shaping the fund, the fund supports research in thematic areas that have been identified as priorities by the Egyptian government, namely: sustainable water management, renewable energy, sustainable food production, archaeology and cultural heritage, and affordable and inclusive healthcare (Newton-Mosharafa Fund, 2020).

V. Conclusions

Legal labour migration and mobility between Egypt and the European Union is a key area of cooperation between the two bodies, yet the creation of labour migration schemes for Egyptians of varying skill levels has not (yet) been widely realised. Since the early 2000s cooperation between Africa and the EU on migration issues has intensified. Within Africa-EU cooperation frameworks growing emphasis on migration management has been accompanied by substantial financial contributions from the EU. The funding made available under different frameworks has enabled support for projects at both regional (North Africa) level and within Egypt itself. These contributions – such as the €60 million committed to projects to be implemented exclusively in Egypt under the EU Trust Fund for Africa (EUTF) – are generally for interventions that aim to improve migration governance and reduce irregular migration. Increasing cooperation and financial contributions has not (yet) seemed to correspond to the expansion of labour migration schemes or opportunities, and increasing (legal) labour migration channels to the EU does not seem to be a priority under this cooperation. None of the contributions made under the EUTF for Egypt so far have addressed EUTF objective 2, to increase mutually-beneficial legal migration and mobility (European Union, 2019). There are nevertheless signals that EU financing can contribute to labour migration support programmes on the regional level, however. Under the EUTF for Africa, a regional project (“towards a holistic approach to labour migration governance and labour mobility in North Africa”) is being funded that would create a pilot migration scheme for labour migrants to Germany and potentially to Belgium in the future. As the project is still in its early stages, there are no specific mechanisms or outcomes that can be evaluated. Nevertheless, the design of the programme does suggest the creation of a mobility support scheme that can provide holistic guidance to migrants and employers throughout the migration cycle.

The limited emphasis on facilitating legal labour migration through EU cooperation is echoed in the small number of formal agreements Egypt has with EU member states on labour migration. Bilateral labour migration agreements have been established with Bulgaria (1972), Greece (1981) and Italy (2005). The agreement with Italy and the subsequent development of labour migration programmes and support facilities does provide an instructive model for how labour mobility can be facilitated, however.

In addition to agreements or schemes that support mobility for general migrant labourers, many EU member states also have specific schemes to support the migration of students and researchers. Given growing emphasis on the attraction and retention of highly-skilled workers

in specific sectors across many EU countries, the student and researcher migration channel may become an even more significant mechanism for labour mobility. As of 2015, ten EU countries had specific schemes available to support the mobility of students and researchers from Egypt.

Mobility support schemes at the level of individual member states are also complemented by schemes on EU level. Over the past decade the EU has issued several directives, such as the Seasonal Workers Directive and Blue Card Directive, that aim to support mobility of different skill cohorts of migrant workers across the EU. It is unclear how impactful these schemes have been in supporting mobility from North Africa more generally and Egypt specifically, however.

In general the share of residence permits issued in the EU for labour purposes has been small. Between 2008 and 2017, less than one-fifth of all permits issued to nationals of Southern Mediterranean countries (including Egypt) by an EU member state were for work purposes. This share includes a variety of work channels for labour migrants across the skill spectrum. In contrast, family reunification was by far the largest legal mode of entry for migrants from the Southern Mediterranean region to the EU. Between 2008 and 2017, over half of all residence permits issued in the EU were for family reunification (Alcidi, Laurentsyeve, & A., 2019).

In line with general trends from the region, legal migration of Egyptians into the EU has increasingly occurred within the family reunification channel. Between 2015 and 2017, the share of Egyptians entering the EU on family reunification grounds rose by 25%. The increase may reflect a rapid decline in the number of work permits issued to Egyptian migrants in the EU. Whereas almost 17,000 work permits were issued to Egyptian nationals in 2010, the number had declined by three-quarters, to less than 4,000, in 2017 (Alcidi, Laurentsyeve, & A., 2019).

Schemes on EU level, such as the Seasonal Workers Directive, facilitate a limited amount of migration, largely because the number of permits issued is directly tied to economic conditions in the EU. In 2017 less than 7,000 seasonal worker permits were issued, over 90% of which were issued to nationals of Morocco. Movement from Egypt into the EU does seem to be supported by EU-level schemes. Between 2008 and 2017, around 32% of residence permits issued by member states to Egyptian nationals were for work purposes, and around 12% were for education purposes. While the number of permits issued for seasonal work have declined markedly over recent years, the number of permits issued to researchers and highly-skilled migrants rose, from 1.8% of all work permits issued in 2008 to 23% of all permits issued in 2017. The Blue Card Directive to support highly-skilled worker mobility has been an important contributor, with 1,094 Egyptians issued a Blue Card in its first five years of operation (Alcidi, Laurentsyeve, & A., 2019). While some EU-level schemes may indeed open legal movement channels for migrant labourers at different skill levels, the number of workers who can benefit from them appear small.

Given the increasing cooperation between the EU and Egypt on legal migration pathways, it is important to learn from the small number of interventions and agreements that support the mobility of workers from Egypt into the EU to inform future interventions. It is also important to understand how policies and programmes that facilitate mobility between Egypt and the EU but do not have explicit labour components nevertheless shape work opportunities for Egyptians abroad. To that end, several recommendations are given for future research, namely:

- *Assess how family reunification or formation policies condition labour market access for status holders:* Large numbers of Egyptian migrants residing in the EU have been given the right to enter and stay through family reunification or formation channels. Such migration channels may have different provisions that encourage or discourage recipients' access to the local labour market. Given the numerical importance of family reunification/formation channels for Egyptian migrants, it is important to understand how the inclusion or incorporation of status holders in select EU countries with large numbers of Egyptian migrants (e.g., Italy, Germany) is supported through these policies. Future research could therefore begin by assessing and comparing how family reunification/formation policies in key EU countries shape the labour market entry and mobility of Egyptian recipients. The desk-based policy review could be complemented by later statistical modelling of the factors that are associated with employment and labour market mobility among status holders, which can provide important insight into the individual characteristics that correspond to successful labour market integration in the EU.
- *Evaluate to what extent researcher and student mobility support schemes support the entry and retention of skilled Egyptians into EU labour markets:* In many countries, student exchange and researcher support schemes may be part of labour market strategies aimed to bridge skill gaps in local labour markets by encouraging the attraction, training and retention of foreign talent with rare or demanded skill profiles. Despite this implicit objective, researcher and student mobility schemes are often not evaluated as labour migration schemes. Given the diversity of student and researcher schemes that support Egyptians wishing to study or train in the EU, future research could assess the post-graduation or post-training labour market outcomes of participants. A first part of this research could entail understanding how student/researcher mobility schemes are embedded within the wider migration policy ecosystem in specific EU host countries, which could involve, for example, inventorying the countries that have specific migration categories or policy provisions to support graduates from local educational programmes to find employment. A second component of the research could focus on assessing the post-graduation/training employment outcomes of graduates.
- *Inventory complementarities between labour mobility programmes or policies and education frameworks/strategies, specifically technical and vocational education and training:* Mobility support schemes are often focused on specific categories of potential migrant workers, who may be selected on the basis of specific skill or competency profiles. The bilateral labour migration agreement between Italy and Egypt, for example, supports labour migration of a select number of workers based on lists of demanded employees. The extent to which Egyptian workers are able to

meet the competency profiles requested by foreign employers may depend in part on the education or training opportunities available to them domestically, which may require detailed evaluation of how foreign labour opportunities are mainstreamed into policy frameworks that guide the design of education programmes.

- *Conduct formal impact evaluations of labour migration interventions:* Evaluation of labour migration policy frameworks, agreements and projects are notably lacking. Neither process nor impact evaluations are readily available that provide substantial insight into how different schemes function (or do not). As Africa-EU and Egypt-EU cooperation intensifies and expands to include specific mobility support schemes, it would be valuable if lessons learned from past policy frameworks, agreements and schemes could be used to inform future programme design. To this end, future research in this area could focus on how specific elements of programme design – for example, mechanisms to support supply and demand matching between Egypt and Italy through management information systems – affected the overall efficacy of the scheme. Current information on impacts is largely limited to numbers of workers facilitated to move through a particular scheme. Independently these numbers may not be such useful indicators of policy or programme functioning. Complementary indicators should be collected that place those numbers in context and that can draw more robust connections between programme design features and achievement of particular policy goals.

Annex 1: Student and researcher mobility schemes between Egypt & the EU

Table 6: List of selected student and researcher mobility schemes between EU member states and Egypt

Country	Name of scheme or programme
Belgium	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Executive programme on cooperation in the fields of education, science and culture—Flemish community • Executive programme on cooperation in the fields of education, science and culture—French community
Finland	Finnish government's scholarship pool (supported by Finnish Centre for International Mobility)
France	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Tahtawi Scholarship • Grants for PhD students and post-doctoral researchers (supported by French Embassy in Egypt and the Science and Technology Development Fund) • Research in Paris (supported by the city of Paris)
Germany	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • German-Egyptian Research Fund (GERF) • German-Egyptian long-term scholarship programme (GERLS Fund) • German-Egyptian Mobility Programme for Scientific Exchange and Excellence Development (GESEED) • German-Arab Transformation Partnership • Public Policy and Good Governance programme (PPGG) • Re-invitation scholarship • Bilateral exchange of academics/Wissenschaftler Austausch Programme
Hungary	Hungary International Scholarship pool
Italy	Executive Programme of Scientific and Technological Cooperation between Italy and Egypt
Poland	Cultural and scientific activities agreement (2002)
Romania	Agreement on economic, scientific and technical cooperation (2007)
Sweden	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Guest scholarship programme for PhD and post-doctoral studies in Sweden • African Guest Researchers Scholarship Programme • Linneaus-Palme Exchange Programme
United Kingdom	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Chevening scholarship • BP Cambridge scholarship • Scotland Saltire Scholarships • The Newton-Mosharafa Programme

Source: Delegation of the European Union to Egypt (2015)

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NOTES



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RESEARCH ON THE MEANS TO IMPROVE HUMAN MOBILITY CHANNELS

RESEARCH PAPER 4

A Comparative Based Analysis of the Legislative Frameworks on Labour Mobility of Egypt and the EU

Prepared by **Emira Ajeti, MBA**



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ABSTRACT: The focus of the fourth research paper is on the comparative based analysis of the legislative frameworks of countries of origin and countries of destination (Egypt and the EU) and the degree to which they can contribute to facilitating labour mobility in key European Union member states (Germany and Italy) to which Egyptian youth migrate. The paper will:

1) extrapolate key legislative infrastructures and institutional apparatus both from the perspective of country of origin and destination by utilising a comparative based approach; 2) analyse legal frameworks, policy documents, investigate obstacles to legal migration, present findings as well as identify ways to improve migration management. Thus, the paper aims to serve as an interactive guiding document for Egyptian counterparts to design potential legislative innovation to contribute to more effective and safer migrant labour mobility channels. The paper is informed by an inter-disciplinary methodology which has determined direct review of primary source material, such as legislative documents, strategies, policies and action plans along with detailed assessments of relative secondary sources such as policy briefs, position papers, various data sets on migration, local and regional best practices on labour mobility channels and integration policies, and academic assessments of labour mobility legislation frameworks in the target markets of the research paper.

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Executive Summary

The purpose of this review is to present a comparative analysis of the legislative frameworks of countries of origin and countries of destination (Egypt and the EU) and the degree to which they can contribute to facilitating labour mobility in key European Union (EU) member states (Germany and Italy) to which Egyptian youth migrate.

This study, also denoted as Research paper 4: “A comparative based analysis of the legislative frameworks on labour mobility of Egypt and EU,” is part of a series of research papers based on the IOM Egypt commissioned research on the *Means to Improve Human Mobility Channels in Egypt*. The objective of this research is to examine the Egyptian youth, amongst other groups, who are most likely to migrate irregularly to the EU, and propose how to better protect them through the promotion of regular and high-quality labour channels.

Moreover, the paper contributes to the above overall objective, as it aims to guide Egyptian counterparts to design potential legislative innovation to contribute to more effective and safer migrant labour mobility channels. The analysis depicted in this paper examines EU labour migration policies and the impact of legal frameworks on migratory movements, investigates obstacles to legal migration and labour market integration of immigrants, as it presents findings both from the perspective of country of origin, Egypt, and country of destination, EU, with a particular emphasis on Germany and Italy, as well as identifies ways to improve migration management.

The paper engages an inter-disciplinary methodology involving a direct review of primary sources, such as legislative policies, strategies, action plans and other documents along with detailed assessments of relative secondary sources such as position papers, policy briefs, various data sets on migration, best practices on labour mobility channels and integration policies, as well as academic assessments of labour mobility legislation frameworks in the selected countries for the research.

The degree to which legislative frameworks of countries of origin and countries of destination (Egypt and the EU) can contribute to facilitating labour mobility in key EU member states (Germany and Italy), is highly dependent on immigrant labour market integration policies and their implementation. In fact, labour market integration of migrants is one of the major policy areas in most immigration countries, considering the significance that successful labour integration of immigrants has both on an individual and country level. Economic and social benefits, such as reducing skills mismatches, addressing unemployment and supporting growth at the EU level, are undoubtedly recognised by the *EU acquis*. These benefits derive from mobility for both member states and individuals, but barriers continue to exist, both in the *EU acquis* and in measures applied by member states. Some organisations have shared their concerns related to the limited EU interventions in reference to low-skilled migrants, creating a gap in national legislations, which consequently raises the number of irregular migrants as well as lowers working conditions.

Extensive research of independent institutions finds that European countries have been lagging behind in conducting vital impact evaluations of immigrant integration policies that would allow us to determine whether policies are cost effective for boosting outcomes. Furthermore, harmonisation of effective migration policies, as well as successful initiatives across host countries in the EU are crucial to ensure migrant fair treatment and protection of rights related to labour mobility. Nevertheless, various types of programmes that work best for immigrants and best use and develop immigrants' skills, are recommended for both selected countries for this research: Germany and Italy. They range from job search personalised assistance tied with intensive coaching, general introduction programmes and language trainings to provide migrants with country-specific skills, subsidised private jobs, and more.

In the future, the newly released *Pact on Migration and Asylum*, by the European Commission (EC) in September 2020 aims to strengthen trust between member states and to restore citizens' confidence in EU's capacity to manage migration, by building a long-term migration policy that can infer European values into applied management, as well as progress the partnership with third countries. A new comprehensive *Action Plan on integration and inclusion for 2021-2024* will also follow to promote migrants' intra-EU mobility, which will in return aid meeting labour and skills scarcities within key sectors of the EU economy. However, a very strong collaboration with non-EU countries is needed to result in a successful implementation of such an Action Plan on integration and inclusion, which is why it is crucial to launch a partnership of equals with the non-EU countries. On that note, in March 2020, the EU has outlined a long-anticipated new Africa strategy with the aim to break the power imbalances, and strengthen EU-Africa partnership in five key areas, including migration and mobility. While the partnership proposal remains to be adapted and discussed in detail in 2021, most independent development Institutes agree that there is a strong need to restore policy making agendas in the Africa-EU dialogue requiring a new approach, with more sensitivity and pragmatism, in order to both help build a future for the youngsters in Africa, and to improve EU response to migration.

To address its challenge of skilled workers' shortage, Germany in particular has taken a proactive role, and has passed a new act relating to the immigration of skilled workers in Germany in March, 2020. While the Act does not provide a completely new immigration system, it does revise and supplement existing regulations to allow non-EU citizens with German vocational training qualifications, or non-German comparable qualifications, to be considered as skilled workers, and to no longer undertake a 'priority check' to inspect whether there are any German or EU applicants available for the specific job. However, there has been a lot of criticism noting that this act still leaves room for improvement. On another note, more recently in July 2020 a contract of €2 million has also been signed for the establishment of the Egyptian-German Center for Jobs, Immigration and Reintegration.

The Research paper 4 is structured in the five following sections. The introduction (Section A), is followed by an elaboration of the methodology used to inform this paper (Section B). The next section (Section C) highlights key institutional apparatus and legislative infrastructure related to labour migration, both from the perspective of country of origin, Egypt, and

country of destination, EU, with a particular emphasis on Germany and Italy. EU labour migration policies and legislation impact on migratory movements, as well as the labour market integration of immigrants is elaborated in the next section (Section D), whereas the paper attempts to also give answers to whether the current EU-Egypt migration policies respond to EU needs for labour migration. In this section the paper also analyses two legislative infrastructures to evaluate the impact evaluations by utilising a comparative based approach, to elaborate if the current European migration policies respond to EU needs for labour migration, in the context of Egyptian migrants. Moreover, this analysis is enriched by best practices of impact evaluations on labour mobility channels and integration policy, and it provides recommendations (Section E) regarding policy contributions to facilitating effective and safer labour mobility, as well as integration programmes. Finally, the paper concludes with a summary of the key findings, discussion of limitations and future needed research (Section F).

A. Introduction

Legal frameworks and processes of labour migration contribute to the integration of countries into international labour market, by ensuring migrants' rights to comply with the labour international conventions. Formation of legal mechanisms for migrant protection has a deep and complex history, but with the proliferation of migration since the early 1990s, issues of global cooperation in this field require continuous updating of coherence and comprehensive information.

When various states employ migrants, their processes and procedures are informed by standardised practices informed by the UN, its specialised agencies, the International Organisation for Migration (IOM), the International Labour Organisation (ILO), regional organisations, as well as bilateral and multilateral agreements on the regulation of labour migration. In that context, there are various global and regional international legal acts that regulate rights of labour migrants, as well as conventions on migrant workers which cover abuses in the field of migration and ensure migrant workers with equal opportunities and treatment.

International, regional, and national provisions for the regulation of migration are already included in a number of legal and policy measures that are in place in Egypt, such as *1990 International Convention on the Protection of the Rights of All Migrant Workers and members of their Families* that came into force in 2003; the *1951 Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees* and its *1967 Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees*; the *1969 Convention Governing the Specific Aspects of Refugee Problems in Africa*; the *1965 Agreement of the Council of Arab Economic Unity*, and the *Arab Declaration of Principles on the Movement of Manpower* was adopted in 1984. Also, in 2016, Egyptian authorities adopted the *anti-human smuggling law*.

Nevertheless, the sensitivities, challenges and needs of mobile populations are often not cautiously considered in national legislative and regulatory frameworks on labour mobility, which can result in uncertainty and lack of clarity on both migrant workers' and employers' obligations and entitlements, such as in relation to social protection provisions, insurance, and residence/work permits (Mallett, 2018). Furthermore, due to market deregulation at times leading to lowered employment standards and potential informal labour arrangements, there is a greater risk for migrants, and especially irregular migrants, to fall into hazardous and otherwise vulnerable labour. The latter particularly applies to young workers who may lack

diplomas and formal certifications that would give them access to jobs, and/or migrant workers, whose certifications from country of origin may not be recognised in a host country new labour market.

Despite Egypt's missing comprehensive and endorsed policy document targeting specific labour demands abroad, a de facto policy exists, and it aims to encourage legal emigration. Moreover, the latter lowers the pressure on the domestic labour market and increases the economic rewards of remittances, by meeting the demand for immigrant labour in countries of destination and simultaneously combatting irregular migration. Nevertheless, the same also reduces the ability for the country of Egypt to react flexibly and maximise the returns of international migration, due to the government mostly having to resort to ad hoc migration management arrangements.

In such cases there is lack of various mobility management tools, like migrant pre-departure training and orientation or skills training, which infers that there is policy and planning deficiency on labour migration, rather than the lack of legal basis. The latter often results in de-skilling of migrants and limited skill transferability translating negatively to integration of migrants, and the actual implementation of labour market integration programmes of the host countries.

Nevertheless, in spite of delays in implementing mobility schemes for Egyptians travelling to the European Union (EU), migration continues to play an important role in shaping the EU-Egypt relations. Moreover, the latter has not slowed down bilateral level cooperation's aiming to regularise the stay and work of Egyptians abroad, as well as memorandums of understanding Egypt has signed with countries of destination, as is the case with Italy and Germany.

In line with the above, this paper will aim to review the key institutional apparatus and legislative infrastructure, as well as policies on labour mobility in both selected host countries, Italy and Germany from the perspective of the country of origin, Egypt. As such, the paper will explore both moderate similarities and noticeable contrasts on labour mobility by utilising a comparative based approach.

Having said that, this paper builds on Research Paper 1, *"Understanding the labour markets of key EU destination countries,"* which focused on Italy, Germany and the United Kingdom as case studies for the research. In Research Paper 4 the legislative frameworks on labour mobility of countries of focus are analysed in greater depth, including the legislative frameworks at the EU level. Due to different jurisdictions, the United Kingdom will not be considered as a case study country for this paper - only Germany and Italy are considered as case study countries.

B. Methodology

This research paper focuses on a comparative based analysis of the legislative frameworks on labour mobility of countries of origin and countries of destination, Egypt and EU respectively.

The paper has utilised a mixed-methodological approach, consisting of a combination of desk review and descriptive analysis of data. While the paper followed decisions made for Research Paper 1, in terms of selecting specific case study countries on which comparative based analysis of the legislative frameworks on labour mobility would be focused, data from a combination of sources were used to examine relevant legislation and policies at the EU level, as well as in Egypt.

As elaborated in Research Paper 1, EU countries were initially ranked based on the overall size of the Egyptian migrants in the country, as well as based on a set of factors that ensure that selected countries represent a range of economies and profiles, as well as geographical orientations (United Nations Department of Economic and Social Affairs, 2017). This paper also relies on statistical data presented in Research Paper 1, whereas profiles of Egyptian migrants abroad are noted to reveal a substantial presence of irregular Egyptian migrant youth in the EU.

The selection of literature on the evaluation and comparison of legislative frameworks and institutional apparatus and integration policies was based on the selected focus countries and on the inclusion of Egyptian migrants in those economies. Literature review was undertaken from a combination of legal information, including a collection of relevant national legislation, core international treaties and agreements, as well as academic and policy-oriented literature sources.

Various databases were used to identify relevant academic literature on labour mobility of Egyptian migrants in the select study countries. Nevertheless, there is a lack of quality research for desk review responding to specific search terms employed in relation to legislative frameworks on labour mobility of Egyptian migrants in the EU, and the selected countries, more generally. Thus, this research marks a culture of Research and Development (R&D) that needs to continue to enhance the competencies of Egyptian stakeholders, including government, Civil Society Organisations (CSOs), academia and the private sector.

The selection and analysis of up-to-date key legislative frameworks and institutional apparatus on labour mobility from Egypt to the EU countries was fairly limited. Additional publications were pulled from reputable organisations related to labour mobility and migrant integration in the EU, and the selected countries. Hence, the analysis on the new developments and advancements regarding the legislative frameworks of Egypt, and the EU, on labour requires further validation referring to the application and combination of several research methods in the study of the same. Section E provides recommendations on how similar analyses could be further improved with relevant data.

Due to a limited availability of high-quality academic and policy-oriented literature, a collection of policy documents from a variety of sources were identified, including position papers relating to specific countries. Nevertheless, the majority of included references constitute literature produced and published by international organisations and governments. The additional policy oriented literature was largely identified through resources of credible institutions such as the International Labour Organisation (ILO), the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD), the World Bank, the United Nations (UN), the UN Refugee Agency (UNHCR), African Union (AU), Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa (COMESA) and others.

C. Key legislative infrastructures and institutional apparatus on labour mobility both from the perspective of country of origin and destination

Since, the late 1990s, there have been growing numbers of citizens of Egypt leaving from Egypt to Europe due to poor social, political and economic conditions in Egypt. They chose Europe due to better economic opportunities as well as social and civil rights, despite visa restrictions and strict controls of regular travel routes to Europe. The latter were overcome by using irregular migration channels.

Despite the decrease in formal employment opportunities in Europe, the interest of Egyptian migrants to work in Europe sustained, mostly due to market related challenges of unemployment and overqualification in the Egyptian labour market (De Bel-Air, Migration Profile: Egypt, 2016). Additionally, many refugees continued to utilise Egypt as a transit country in order to reach Europe. (Noureldin, 2015).

Nonetheless, limited skill transferability and de-skilling in European labour markets, which by definition is the decrease in the quality and use of the knowledge and skills of individuals because of a lack of opportunities, remains high for Egyptian migrants. Moreover, a trend of increased female migrants leaving Egypt for family reunification in EU countries, has not been translated into integration programmes for women migrants, and/or embedded in policy planning, therefore not resulting in a more gendered Egyptian legislation and policy frameworks related to migration.

In light of the revised *European Neighbourhood Policy*, in 2017, the *EU-Egypt Partnership priorities for 2017-2020* was ratified showing the increasing role that migration collaboration plays in shaping the EU-Egypt relations (The Association Council, 2017). However, there seems to be a delay in passing add-on legislative reforms, such as mobility facilitation schemes for Egyptians travelling to the EU.

Additionally, the newly released *Pact on Migration and Asylum*, by the European Commission (EC) in September 2020 aims to streamline trust between member states and to restore citizens' confidence in EU's capacity to manage migration, by building a long-term migration policy that can interpret European values into practical management (The Commission to the European Parliament, the Council, the European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions, 2020).

The purpose of this act is to improve collaboration with third countries for fast returns, more legal pathways and robust actions to fight human smugglers, thereby essentially protecting the right to seek asylum. For example the Commission plans to disclose talent partnerships with non-EU countries that will match labour and skills needs in the EU, as well as to adopt a new comprehensive *Action Plan on integration and inclusion for 2021-2024*. The latter is elaborated in the further sections of the research.

C.1 OVERVIEW OF EGYPT'S INSTITUTIONAL APPARATUS AND KEY LEGISLATIVE INFRASTRUCTURES

Egypt relies on a broad set of laws and frameworks regarding the management of labour migration into and from the country. The review and mapping of these existing laws and frameworks as part of this research paper, is conducted to assess their relevance and compatibility with market realities against at least the following four types of indicators:

- National policy priorities expressed in current national policy documents,
- Emerging trends and needs of the population and the economy of Egypt,
- Binding international obligations,
- Directions provided by regional frameworks, such as African Union (AU) and Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa (COMESA) frameworks.

C1.1 Key global, regional, sub-regional and bilateral legislative infrastructure frameworks

At global, regional, sub-regional and bilateral levels, multiple standards and frameworks are either binding or provide guidance regarding the management and governance of labour migration by Egypt. At global level, labour migration falls under at least three sets of international standards: human rights, labour rights and specific migrant rights.

The government of **Egypt has adopted its new Constitution in 2014**, reflecting its commitment to uphold the rights of its citizens harmonised with its respective international legal obligations and to continue to develop and reinforce national human rights frameworks for the protection of rights and freedoms of its citizens, as well as its national human rights institutions.

Egypt also provides regular information on domestication and enforcement through the reporting mechanisms of each of these international instruments, to so ensure that

international obligations are part of its national laws. It is worth noting that the Egyptian Constitution of 2014 has expanded the scope of protection of freedoms and rights enshrined in the *Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the two International Covenants*. For instance, article 91 forbids the extradition of political refugees (Al-Rasmīyah, 2012). In that context, Egypt has pioneered to cover protections for rights never covered by similar documents in Egypt, as part of the national political system.

Additionally, Egypt is one of the few African member states to have ratified the **International Convention on the Protection of the Rights of all Migrant Workers and Members of their Families (ICMRW) (1993)**. The ICMRW is the only UN instrument of specific relevance to migrant workers, (United Nations Human Rights, Office of the High Commissioner, n.d.), and it commits Egypt to protection of migrant workers and members of their families regardless of their migratory status. It provides comprehensive guidance regarding their fundamental human rights, rights at work, and social rights, and it addresses the needs of both national workers employed abroad and foreign workers employed in Egypt.

Other international human rights treaties and conventions ratified by Egypt (United Nations Human Rights, Office of the High Commissioner, n.d.) are of importance in terms of protecting migrants from discrimination and exploitation on grounds other than their non-national status. These international treaties and conventions are:

- Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR)
- International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR)
- International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR), ratified in 1982
- International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination (ICERD), ratified in 1967
- Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women (CEDAW), ratified in 1981
- Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities (CRPD), ratified in 2008
- International Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment (CAT), ratified in 1986
- International Convention on the Rights of the Child (CRC), ratified 1990

The Convent of Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) in particular article 12, which has binding force, states that “preventing emigration is a breach of the right to leave any country, including one’s own,” directly relates to Egypt’s border management capacities to transparently and democratically deal with the cases of irregular migration and unauthorised exits (United Nations Treaty Collection, n.d.).

Moreover, Egypt has also ratified the **1951 Geneva Refugee Convention**, but it has expressed reservations on five clauses rendering access to refugee rights ineffective in practice. The latter reservations contradict Egypt’s commitments as signatory to the *International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights*, the *International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights*, and the **UN Convention on the Rights of the Child** (UNHCR, the UN Refugee Agency, 1981).

Additionally, the main international instrument in the fight against transnational organised crime and more specifically trafficking and smuggling, ratified by Egypt, is the **United Nations Convention against Transnational Organised Crime (UNTOC)** (2000) (United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, n.d.). The Convention is supplemented by three Protocols, which target specific areas and manifestations of organised crime:

- *Protocol to Prevent, Suppress and Punish Trafficking in Persons, especially Women and Children* – the first global legally binding instrument with an agreed definition on trafficking in persons. The intent behind this definition is to facilitate convergence in national approaches regarding the establishment of domestic criminal offences that would support efficient international cooperation in investigating and prosecuting trafficking in persons cases.
- *Protocol against the Smuggling of Migrants by Land, Sea and Air* – deals with the growing problem of organised criminal groups who smuggle migrants, often at high risk to the migrants and at great profit for the offenders.
- *Protocol against the Illicit Manufacturing of and Trafficking in Firearms, their Parts and Components and Ammunition*.

The convention and protocol ratification by Egypt has allowed use of various legal tools developed by United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) to provide States and criminal justice practitioners with useful practical assistance and information, as well as domestication in national legislation by the adaption of Egypt's very own anti-human smuggling law, *Law on combating illegal Migration and Smuggling of Migrants* elaborated below.

More specifically, in 2016 Egypt assumed commitments before the United Nations General Assembly, to contribute to the improvement of the international protection system for migrants, refugees and asylum seekers. It embarked on a process of national strategy development for combating trafficking and another national strategy aimed at combating illegal migration to strengthen the relevant norms and standards under the applicable international law (United Nations, General Assembly, 2016).

In addition to the protection of migrant workers' basic human rights enshrined in UN conventions, migrant workers are also protected more specifically by **ILO fundamental, governance (priority) and technical conventions, protocols and frameworks**. While Egypt has not ratified two of the ILO's specific technical instruments on the protection of migrant workers: *Conventions Nos. 97 Employment Convention (Revised), 1949* and *No. 143 Migrant Workers (Supplementary Provisions) Convention 1975*, as well as

Protocol on Forced Labour (2014) (International Labour Organization, n.d.), following ILO instruments remain relevant at the noted levels:

- Firstly, in terms of the core and technical conventions ratified by Egypt since all instruments apply to all workers, including migrant workers;
- Secondly, in terms of ILO protocols and frameworks which also apply to all workers, including migrant workers and which include among others the *Declaration on Fundamental Rights at Work* (1998) and the *Decent Work Agenda* (2015);
- Thirdly, in terms of non-binding frameworks specific to migrant workers which may guide the policies of Egypt, in particular:
 - The 2006 Multilateral Framework on Labour Migration (International Labour Organisation (ILO), 2006)
 - The 2014 Fair Migration Agenda 2014 (Cremers, 2014)
 - The 2016 General Principles and Operational Guidelines for Fair Recruitment (International Labour Organization (ILO), 2019)
 - The 2016 General Guidelines on the Integration of Refugees and Other Displaced Persons in the Labour Market (International Labour Organization (ILO), 2016).

Regional frameworks and bilateral agreements

At **regional level**, Egypt adheres to the principles emphasised in some of the key policy documents and decisions by the African Union (AU), such as: *the 1967 African Union Protocol, the 1969 African Union Convention, the EU-African Union Joint Action Plan on Migration & Mobility (2014-2017)*, and the *EU-Horn of Africa border management programme*, known as 'the Khartoum Process' (April 2015), which guarantee refugee and migrant rights. Moreover, at the level of the **Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa** (COMESA), Egypt strives to promote the principles of the COMESA protocols, codes and frameworks, as well as various regional conventions including the *African Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights, 1981* (Institute for Global Dialogue, 2008).

Recently, in March 2020, the EU outlined a long-anticipated new Africa strategy with the aim to break the power imbalances, and strengthen EU-Africa partnership in five key areas, including migration and mobility (The European Think Tanks Group, 2020). Most independent development institutes also agreed that there is a strong need to restore governance and policy making agendas in the Africa-EU dialogue requiring a different approach than in the past, with more sensitivity and pragmatism, in order to both help build a future for the youngsters in Africa, and also to improve the EU response to migration (Abebe, 2020). The same was noted in the first EU-African SME Summit in Brussels in 2019 (EU-African SME Summit, 2019). Unfortunately, the ongoing

dialogue between EU and Africa and the discussion related to the proposal contained in this 19-page document will be postponed considering that the summit planned between AU and the EU in October 2020 will also need to be postponed for 2021, due to the global health measures taken as a result of COVID-19 pandemic (Benjamin Fox, EURACTIV, 2020). The upcoming summit aims to identify opportunities and challenges faced by both Continents and define joint strategic priorities for a stronger partnership in the years to come.

At **bilateral level**, despite delays in passing supplementary law reforms, such as asylum law in Egypt, or mobility facilitation schemes in line with the revised *European Neighbourhood Policy in 2017*, Egypt has continued its bilateral level cooperation's and signing of memorandums of understanding with countries of destination. That said, Egypt entered into several **bilateral agreements with Germany and Italy**, at times using EU funding with the aim to regularise the stay and work of Egyptians abroad.

In 2017 Egypt signed an *Agreement on Bilateral Dialogue on Migration with Germany* to intensify collaboration on migration underlining the importance of investing in professional training for young people (Germany Federal Foreign Office, 2017). Similarly in 2007, the Italian state, signed an agreement with Egypt to amongst others promote training courses and educational cooperation programmes (Cooperation agreement on readmission between the government of the Italian Republic and the government of the Arab Republic of Egypt, 2007).

National policy frameworks and legislation

Immigration to Egypt is regulated directly or indirectly through three sets of national legislation: Legislation on immigration, which regulate right of access to and residence in Egypt; Legislation on access to employment for foreign nationals; as well as Legislation on social security, namely Social security draft Bill portability and coordination clauses.

The key institutional apparatus in domestic legislation related to the emigration of both permanent and temporary Egyptians is the **Emigration and Sponsoring Egyptians Abroad Law No. 111 of 1983**. This law covers the rules and procedures to be followed before emigration, including rights of migrants and privileges afforded to migrants and returnees. Labour Emigration from Egypt is a fundamental right recognised by the Constitution of Egypt as well as the UDHR ratified by Egypt (Zohry, 2009). In addition, several pieces of national legislation protect the fundamental rights of Egyptian emigrants prior to their departure from the country (McBride, Kelly, and Lindsey Kingston, 2014).

The new law on **Combating Illegal Migration and Smuggling Migrants No. 82** was passed by the Egyptian parliament in 2016, becoming Egypt's first law addressing irregular migration toward protecting asylum seekers and migrants from criminal responsibility. Nevertheless, this law fails to protect basic refugee rights, in line with international standards, leaving refugees vulnerable. It fails to guarantee the rights to seek asylum or the refugee rights to freedom of movement, primary education, healthcare, work and access to courts, as well as fails to protect migrants against deportation to a country where they might be at risk of serious harm (Egypt National Legislative Bodies/ National Authorities, 2016). The latter is a fundamental right, also enshrined in the *UN Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees* and its 1967 protocol, where Egypt is a signatory state.

Caught in the act of migration, refugees, asylum seekers and migrants in Egypt may in some cases find themselves punished or even criminalised. Additionally, Article 8 of the new law states that anyone who provides accommodation, transportation or any services to smuggled migrants is subject to a prison sentence, without an exception for family members or humanitarian service providers. In this manner, all types of assistance provided to migrants is deemed punishable. Consequently, the Government of Egypt needs to amend the new anti-smuggling law, or issue regulations to clarify the law and ensure that refugee fundamental rights are protected. In particular it needs to clarify how migrants will be treated pending deportation, including where and how they are accommodated, and it shouldn't set time limits for administrative detentions.

Additionally, the Government of Egypt has launched a new **“National Strategy on Combating Illegal Migration”** for **2016-2026** to address irregular migration with support from the International Organisation for Migration (IOM) (International Organisation for Migration (IOM), Egypt, 2016). Both the strategy and Egypt's new law on combatting illegal migration and smuggling migrants promise a lot. Yet, the actual assessments will reveal if they can manage to do both, punish human smugglers to protect asylum seekers and migrants against abuses, as well as protect migrants' fundamental rights.

On the other hand, regarding foreign nationals' access to employment in Egypt, this is regulated under the Egypt Labour Code Order, part of Egypt's **Labour Law No. 12/2003**, hereafter referred to as the Labour Law (Government of Egypt, 2019). Its sections on the employment of Egyptians at home and abroad and the employment of foreigners set out new features of labour code, including the balance in duties and responsibilities between workers and employers, new provisions that reflect global and

local economic changes, and reflection of fundamental principles contained in international labour standards. Nevertheless, the Labour Code is silent on various key dimensions of the migration cycle such as: pre-departure training of migrant workers, role of Public Employment Services (PES), support of services throughout the direction of the contract, assistance to smuggled and trafficked migrant workers, conciliation mechanisms, financial education and remittance channels, reintegration into the Egypt labour market upon return, portability of pension and compensation rights. Moreover, the Labour Code is also silent on issues of contributions into and access to social security by migrants and portability of such contributions back into Egypt.

Nonetheless, the new labour law aims to encourage young people to work in the private sector and contribute to the country's economic development. According to the new law, women working in the private sector will for the first time, just like women working in public institutions, be granted a four month maternity leave. Additionally, daily working hours of pregnant women will be reduced by one hour from the sixth month of pregnancy (Andersen Tax & Legal, 2019). The latter is an important step towards creating a more favourable job market in Egypt, and generating new potential jobs in Egypt's private sector, thus spurring economic development locally, and lowering the number of potential illegal migration.

Egypt is also committed to progress towards achieving the **2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development** (United Nations. General Assembly, 2015) by enabling Egyptian stakeholders to enact best practices at institutional, legislative and informational level for labour migrants. Egypt's support to the 2030 Agenda for Development means that it will report the global goals and targets set out to report on progress regarding the **Sustainable Development Goals** (SDGs). Note the following relevant primary and secondary SDGs for Egypt related to labour migration (Sustainable development, 2015):

Primary SDGs

- 8. Promote sustained, inclusive and sustainable economic growth, full and productive employment and decent work for all.
- 8.7 Take immediate and effective measures to eradicate forced labour, end modern slavery and human trafficking and secure the prohibition and elimination of the worst forms of child labour, including recruitment and use of child soldiers, and by 2025 end child labour in all its forms
- 8.8 Protect labour rights and promote safe and secure working environments for all workers, including migrant workers, in particular women migrants, and those in precarious employment

Secondary SDGs	
5.	Achieve gender equality and empower all women and girls
5.2	Eliminate all forms of violence against all women and girls in the public and private spheres, including trafficking and sexual and other types of exploitation
10.	Reduce inequality within and among countries
10.7	Facilitate orderly, safe, regular and responsible migration and mobility of people, including through the implementation of planned and well-managed migration policies
10.c	By 2030, reduce to less than 3 per cent the transaction costs for migrant remittances and eliminate remittance corridors with costs higher than 5 per cent
17.	Strengthen the means of implementation and revitalise the Global Partnership for Sustainable Development
17.18	By 2020, enhance capacity-building support to developing countries, including for least developed countries and small island developing States, to increase significantly the availability of high-quality, timely and reliable data disaggregated by income, gender, age, race, ethnicity, migratory status, disability, geographic location and other characteristics relevant in national contexts

Egypt's *Sustainable Development Strategy* and *Egypt Vision 2030*, is in line with the SDGs and its national strategic plan delivers policies, programmes, and measurable indicators that are based on ten pillars and cover the SDGs generally (portal, 2020).

Egypt also supports the **Addis Ababa Action Agenda of the Third International Conference on Financing for Development (2016)**, which provides a foundation for implementing the global sustainable development agenda. This agreement was reached by the 193 UN member states attending the Conference (United Nations, General Assembly, 2015).

The Government of Egypt also participated in the consultations for the **United Nations Global Compact for Safe, Orderly and Regular Migration (GCM)** and the negotiations leading to the 2018 Intergovernmental Conference for Safe, Orderly and Regular Migration, that resulted in UN member states agreeing to adapt the GCM and bring together the range of principles, commitments and understandings among member states regarding international migration in all its dimensions.

Egypt also supports the Declaration of the **High-level Dialogue on International Migration and Development** adopted in October 2013 with the aim to identify concrete measures to strengthen coherence and cooperation in order to improve the international migration development benefits for migrants and countries alike (United Nations, General Assembly, 2013).

Additionally, as was noted, during the 2018 voluntary national review of the **high-level political forum on sustainable development**, the vision 2030 and the 2030 Agenda are implemented by engaging all stakeholders through active contribution of the private sector and the civil society in the achievement of all the goals. That said, the Government of Egypt is committed to capitalise on the synergies between the governmental, private sector and civil society efforts to achieve this ambitious agenda.

This cross-sector approach is hugely important in terms of labour mobility, as the role of civil society organisations, including that of the labour trade unions, representatives of Small Medium Enterprises (SMEs) and other companies, is crucial to making that shift from commitment to implementation in the context of labour mobility agreements of Egypt. Designing of such inclusive approaches ensures optimal engagement of stakeholders in Egypt and its communities abroad.

C1.2 Labour institutional apparatus

Labour institutional apparatus herewith denotes entities regulated by national law, which principally aim to facilitate the match between labour supply and demand. Labour institutional apparatus in Egypt consist of the following principle labour market institutions (Egyptian government portal, 2015):

i. The Ministry of Manpower and Migration (MOMM)

MOMM is the most significant Ministry responsible for developing migration policy and mobility management tools. Amongst others, the Ministry aims to facilitate the match between labour supply and demand, increase the labour force employability, and monitor the labour market demand. The Ministry has a specially designated Emigration Sector, it runs its own training centres, as well as an Employment Information Programme. The Ministry organizes a yearly census to collect information on training needs and aims to shape training policies in direct partnership with the private sector.

ii. The Supreme Council for Human Resources Development (SCHRD)

SCHRD is a high-level political body with the goal to establish national policy for planning and developing of manpower and training, as well as to consequently coordinate the training policies of all ministries. SCHRD is headed by the Minister of Manpower and Migration, while other relevant ministers are also members of the body. Their duty is to integrate national training needs in their training programmes to adapt them to labour market requirements.

iii. The Higher Committee for Migration

The Higher Committee for Migration assures policy development, consistency and coordination of all bodies involved in mobility management. The Minister of MOMM is the head of the Committee.

iv. The Information and Decision Support Centre (IDSC)

IDSC is a Government Think Tank in the Cabinet of Ministers. Its aim is to support government decision making with a particular emphasis on priority issues to foster reform efforts. It has to date had a great impact and it comprehensively supported foreign and national policies, including through various analysis for labour demand, creating the National Youth Employment Programme, and more.

v. Employment offices (as part of MOMM)

Employment offices, as part of MOMM have a network of 307 employment offices in Egypt. Offices aim to facilitate the match between labour supply and demand by gathering data on job vacancies and publicising them. Technology plays a great role in the work of these employment offices, as both jobseekers and vacancies are recorded in a computerised system, allowing employers to seek the assistance of local employment offices in finding candidates and vice versa.

As stated in the Article 16 of the *Labour Law* other types of agencies, including non-governmental organisations (NGOs), providing similar services may be established in the future: *“the concerned minister may issue a decree licensing the associations, institutions and trade union organisations – with regard to their members – to establish offices for recruiting the unemployed.”* The latter would meet the same functioning requirements as the existing governmental employment offices.

vi. The Social Fund for Development (SFD)

SFD started off in 1991 as a joint initiative of the Egyptian Government, the World Bank and United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), which translated into a semi-independent agency under the supervision of the Prime Minister office. The agency runs several employment programmes, and its main aim is to assist vulnerable groups of people for job creation and economic development.

vii. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs

The Ministry is responsible for providing assistance and services to the Egyptian citizens abroad, including emergency deportation, renewal of passports or authorisation of personal documents.

viii. The Ministry of Interior

The Ministry is responsible for facilitating administrative support to regular migration, in particular visa issuance, registration of educational certificates and issuing labour certificates for the purpose of travelling abroad, and more.

ix. The Ministry of Defense

The Ministry of Defense plays its role in environments of military service duties of Egyptians abroad.

Deriving from the new *Labour Law*, noted in Section C1.1, new labour market institutions have or will be presented in the government of Egypt. Consequently, the institutional setting introduced by the new Labour Law and elaborated below, but not yet operational, could radically improve the so far lacking coordination between institutions.

Consultative Council for Labour, is one institution which article 145 of the Labour Law describes to be comprised of technical experts and representatives of employers and workers, who would be in charge of analysing draft laws connected with labour relationships, and international labour agreements before signing them. The latter is in line with the crucial importance of implementing the institutional cross-sector approach as noted in section above, ensuring an inclusive approach, and representations from the private sector and civil society organisation throughout consultations.

Moreover, dialogue across institutions, private sector and civil society organisations constitutes a key part of the process for the international labour agreements and for their implementation. It allows Egypt to recognise the importance of representatives of non-governmental organisations (NGOs) as a central driver of development and emphasise the importance of inclusive dialogue for building environments conducive to sustainable development.

Another innovative institution noted in the Labour Law is the Training and Rehabilitation Financing Fund, whose objective it is to finance, develop and modernise training centres and programmes aimed at meeting the needs of the labour market. Thus, it focuses on the R&D which is needed to increase capabilities of participants of the labour market, as well as the Egyptian government stakeholders. Having said that, the Training and Rehabilitation Financing Fund appears to be a promising innovation, assuming that its efficiency is regarded as an absolute priority by the Egyptian Government.

Additionally, a recommended agency to the Government of Egypt, and more particularly MOMM, may be the national employment agency, to implement policies and programmes for employment, register jobseekers and vacant jobs and provide employment services, which would advance the work that is initially being undertaken by the Employment offices listed in the table on pages 19/20. The latter would have a positive impact on the Egyptian labour market.

Technology plays a great role here, whereas the digital capacities required to align with global best practices will need investing in, by allowing that such solutions come from inside and outside of the government. Moreover, paying attention to the countries of destination for migrants which this research is looking at, Germany and Italy, information communications and technology (ICT) is a relatively accessible, cheap and heavily used tool. Hence, it is important for migrants aiming to integrate in countries of destination to start making use of technology as early as possible. At the same time, Egypt must ensure that it complies with normative standards on data production, protection and management, which are approved by the European Data Protection Supervisor, so that it manages to protect various cases of potential asylum seekers, peaceful activists etc. who may be at risk of human rights abuses, or other.

C.2 OVERVIEW OF EU LEGAL MIGRATION ACQUIS AND INSTITUTIONAL APPARATUS FOR GOVERNANCE OF MIGRANT INTEGRATION

When extrapolating key EU legislative infrastructures on labour mobility, all legal provisions adopted both at the national and the Union levels comply with fundamental rights and EU principles of law as well as international human rights documents. Moreover, intra-EU mobility of third-country nationals remains a key component of the EU labour migration policy, beyond the conditions of admission.

The fundamental rights of migrants and general principles of law are enshrined at the level of the EU, the Council of Europe and the international level. International human rights documents related to EU migration and integration law include Conventions and agreements adopted in the framework of the UN, ILO and the Council of Europe. The main foundation of fundamental rights in the EU is the **Charter of Fundamental Rights** (Charter of fundamental rights of the European Union, OJ C 364/01, 2004), which has attained the same legally binding force as the founding Treaties.

In June 2016, the EC has adopted an **Action Plan on the integration of third-country nationals**. The Action Plan provides a wide-ranging framework that supports member states' efforts in the development and consolidation of their integration policies. It also defines the actual measures the Commission will implement in this regard (European Commission, 2016). Moreover, in 2016, the Council adopted **Council Conclusions on the integration of third-country nationals legally residing in the EU** (Council of the European Union, 2016).

In 2019, nearly 21 million non-EU nationals were legally resident in the EU (Source of statistics in this paragraph: Eurostat. UK figures not included). Some integration challenges with a particular focus on selected case countries for the research, Germany and Italy are: inadequate language skills, lack of formal qualifications, the need to make skills visible, preference for work, need for special counselling concepts, health problems (post-traumatic stress disorders), cultural religious aspects (various considerations of formal education), legal and institutional barriers, diaspora concentration related to location and jobs, where assimilation versus integration ought to be addressed.

Great attention needs to be paid towards various obstacles to migrant integration that ought to be overcome by the EU as well as the member states, taking into account that legal migration is a field with a jointly shared competence between the EU and its member states.

Ever since 2001, when Egypt attempted to adapt an inclusive approach to economic migration, EU legislation has opted for a segmentation approach. To date this entailed EU legal migration directives that focused on students, researchers, highly qualified migrants, seasonal workers, intra-corporate transferees, and more. As such, the mobility schemes still vary according to categories of migrants covered by EU directives and are largely left to member states' discretion, considering that volumes of admission for economic migration are determined by member states and cannot be influenced by EU legislation (European Commission, 2019).

However, ineffective promotion of some of the directives resulted in unsatisfactory results. As per the reports issued by EU in 2011, which assessed the impact of **Directive 2005/71 on attracting third-country researchers to the EU**, the EU was short of one million researchers in order to meet the Europe 2020 target of growing R&D investment to three percent of GDP. Aside from lack of directive promotion, according to the Commission, these results most likely occurred due to ineffective differentiation between permits for researchers and other types of permits for highly skilled workers.

The latter is an example of a centralised design at EU level, and de-centralised market variabilities. Hence, it is important for centralised decision making to be followed by de-centralised application in order to bring decision-making closer to where problems and individuals are.

Moreover, labour market integration programmes tend to be more effective when they take into account the characteristics of the target groups and seek to match them with labour market needs (Martin, J. P., & Grubb, D., 2001). That said, placement and training services of youth and disadvantaged groups need to be supplemented with psychological support and traineeship in labour markets, to so generate sustainable outcomes.

In accordance with the *2015 European Agenda on Migration*, below are nine directives representing the *EU acquis* on legal migration:

EU legal migration directives are listed below:

- Transposition **Family Reunification** Directive – FRD (2003/86/EC)
- Status of third-country nationals who are **Long-Term Residents** Directive – LTRD (2003/109/EC)
- Conditions of admission of third-country nationals for the purposes of **Studies, Pupil Exchange, Unremunerated Training or Voluntary Service** Directive – SD (2004/114/EC)
- Specific procedure for admitting third-country nationals for the purposes of **Scientific Research** Directive – RD (2005/71/EC)
- **EU Blue Card** Directive – BCD on the conditions of entry and residence of third-country nationals for the purposes of highly qualified employment (2009/05/EC), Commission proposal for recast in June 2016 (COM (2016) 378 final)
- **Single Permit** Directive – SPD on a single application procedure for a single permit for third-country nationals to reside and work in the territory of a member state and on a common set of rights for third-country workers legally residing in a member state (2011/98/EU)
- **Seasonal Workers** Directive – SWD on the conditions of entry and stay of third-country nationals for the purpose of employment as seasonal workers (2014/36/EU)
- **Intra-Corporate Transferees** Directive – ICDT on the conditions of entry and residence of third-country nationals in the framework of an intra-corporate transfer (2014/66/EU)
- **Students and Researchers** Directive – S&RD on the conditions of entry and residence of third-country nationals for the purpose of research, studies, training, voluntary service, pupil exchange schemes or educational projects and au pairing (recast) (EU 2016/801 – recast)

The directives in general provide uniform statuses and admission conditions and rights attached to permits, although similar statuses already existed in most member states at national level pre-adaption of the directives.

Among the main proposals of the 2005 Policy Plan on Legal Migration, **the Blue Card directive** was the first legal instrument to be adopted. Similar to **Directive 2005/71**, the Blue Card was envisioned to appeal to highly qualified migrant workers, enhance economic competitiveness and achieve the *Lisbon strategy* objectives launched in March 2000 by the EU heads of state and government.

The directive provides a fast admission procedure of 90 days, while member states remain free to limit access to their labour market envisioning boundaries on some professions, sectors or regions. For example, while Blue Card holders are constrained to the exercise of paid employment activities during the first two years, member states may grant them equal treatment to nationals for accessing of highly qualified employment (Directorate General for Migration and Home Affairs, European Commission, 2018).

As of 2018, several EU directives specify rules of entry and stay for specific groups of immigrants: seasonal workers, intra-corporate transferees (ICTs), highly skilled workers (EU Blue Card), students and researchers and family migrants. Nevertheless, assessments of the implementation of the **Researchers Directive (2011)** and the **Blue Card Directive** on highly qualified migrants (2014) show low rates of use. In that context, worldwide promotion of these ambitious schemes for migrants is much needed.

Additionally, according to the Commission's last report on the EU Blue Card Directive application, both errors in transposition and a restricted set of rights and barriers to intra-EU mobility are a noted concern. Moreover, the Commission expressed that it is likely the latter may discourage highly skilled migrants to come to the EU through such schemes (European Migration Network, Belgium, 2014). Having said that, the extensive power of discretion retained by member states undermines the potential of directives in most cases, particularly related to equal treatment with nationals, the right to change employer, and the level of rights guaranteed compared to the framework directive. So, while the establishment of a single application procedure marks an undeniable simplification, member states are still given great flexibility at different stages of the application procedure and there is little harmonisation regarding procedural guarantees. The same conclusions can be drawn in regards to the areas in which equal rights are granted, subject to potential restrictions from member states.

As per the EU legal migration acquis, the following five categories of third-country legal national migrants (aside from Asylum seekers, or refugees) can be noted (Wiesbrock, 2010):

- Family members of EU citizens who are residing in an EU member state, who have returned from an EU member state, or are exercising a cross-border economic activity, whereas EU law applies (the condition is governed by Community provisions, Directive 2004/38/EC);
- Third-country nationals enjoying a preferential treatment on the basis of specific agreements made between EU and their country of origin;

- All third country nationals legally residing in an EU member state, other than Ireland and Denmark, governed by the four EC directives on legal migration;
- Family members of EU citizens who have not made use of their free movement rights, governed entirely by the national law of the state of residence);
- Third-country nationals residing in Denmark, Ireland or the UK, governed entirely by the national law of the state of residence.

Although the EU cannot impose quotas for migrant workers, it has legislated conditions under which the admittance of migrants happens. Matters such as the number of labour migrants admitted in the EU, whether employed or self-employed, continue to be determined by member states, according to the *Treaty on the Functioning of the EU* (Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, 2012).

These directives are not specific to Egypt, but they place the overall legal framework on legal migration to the EU, while member states have discretionary powers to allow access to member state labour markets, particularly in cases of migrants benefiting from family reunification and international protection, as well as foreign students. Consequently, for the benefit of particularly the latter noted category of migrants, Egypt should consider focusing more on bilateral diplomacy, due to the noted member states discretionary powers.

Additionally, EU labour market operational reforms have amplified the demand for knowledge-intensive, high-manufacturing and new technological skilled labour (Commission Staff Working Document. Impact Assessment, 2016). Similarly, demand for highly skilled workers is growing both in high income and middle-income countries, therefore EU will compete on a global scale to attract talent (Hunt, 2010).

Economic and social benefits, such as reducing skills mismatches, addressing unemployment, and supporting growth at the EU level, are undoubtedly recognised by the *EU acquis*. These benefits derive from mobility for both member states and individuals, but barriers continue to exist, both in the *EU acquis* and in measures applied by member states.

Moreover, third-country nationals are likely to also at times be discouraged from moving for the purpose of employment due to the national measures adopted at member state level, including for example burdensome administrative requirements, lack of automatic recognition of degrees and diplomas, and rates of minimum wages required. Some NGOs have shared their concerns related to the limited EU interventions in reference to low-skilled migrants, creating a gap in national legislations, which consequently raises the number of irregular migration as well as lowers working conditions (Directorate General for Migration and Home Affairs, European Commission, 2018). For example, the *Seasonal Workers Directive* is the only directive that concerns with the admission of medium and low-skilled migrants. According to the directive, a seasonal work permit entitles its holder to stay and work in the territory of a member state for a stay exceeding 90 days, while EU visa legislation applies for shorter periods of stay. This directive intends to prevent exploitation and abuse from employers, as well as to enhance the EU's economic competitiveness, especially in sectors such as agriculture, horticulture and tourism, characterised by the strong presence of seasonal workers.

In the future, a credible legal migration and integration policy, deriving from the newly released *Pact on Migration and Asylum* by the EC in September 2020, will benefit European societies and economies. This pact acknowledges structural weaknesses in the EU's present system, and it aims to streamline trust between member states and restore citizens' confidence in EU's capacity to manage migration (The Commission to the European Parliament, the Council, the European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions, 2020). The purpose of the pact is to improve collaboration with third countries for fast returns, more legal pathways and robust actions to fight human smugglers, thereby essentially protecting the right to seek asylum.

For example, the Commission plans to encourage legal migration to the EU through a new Skills and Talent Package to be proposed in 2021, which will contain some legislative changes, including revision of the *Directive on long-term residents* to strengthen the right of long-term residents to move and work in other member states, and the revision of the *Single Permit Directive* to ensure harmonisation of admission and residence conditions for workers who are not in the 'highly-skilled' category. The latter will promote migrants' intra-EU mobility, which will in return aid meeting labour and skills scarcities within key sectors of the EU economy.

Additionally, the Commission plans to disclose talent partnerships with non-EU countries that will match labour and skills needs in the EU, as well as its plans to adopt a new comprehensive *Action Plan on integration and inclusion for 2021-2024*, to foster inclusion of migrants and broader social cohesion *in line with its priority to promote the European way of life*. Parallely, the Commission has also launched a public consultation to collect new ideas, which will enrich the Skills and Talent package noted above, related to coordinating the skills matching, attracting skills and talent, and protecting labour migrants from exploitation.

Nevertheless, considering that collaboration with non-EU countries is crucial in the successful implementation of plans elaborated above – as has been the case in the past, a lot of effort ought to be directed to such work in the future. The latter will depend on the ability to inaugurate a genuine partnership of equals in the short and long-terms with the non-EU countries, which has already been noted as part of the EU-Africa partnership proposed in March 2020, elaborated above in the C1.1 sub-section of this research paper.

Finally, although the labour markets of Egypt and EU countries, more specifically Italy and Germany, differ considerably from each other given the nature of each country's economy, there are still moderate similarities regarding the key institutional apparatus and legislative infrastructure on labour mobility. Therefore, in the following sub-sections, this paper aims to review and compare the legislation and policies related to the labour markets from the perspective of country of origin as well as countries of destination, by utilising a comparative based approach.

C2.1 Legislation, Policy and Strategy analysis related to migrant integration in Germany

Germany's aging society has been an issue for decades, translating into growing shortages both in high and medium skilled occupations, something which has been neutralised by Germany becoming a country of migration. Nonetheless, not all of Germany is content with such developments (Der Spiegel, 2018). Hence, there remains a strong need for a well-managed labour migration policy lever.

After the adoption of Directive 1999/70, most EU countries have passed specific legislation on fixed-term contracts in order to meet the requirements set in the new EU Act. In 2000, the limited skilled workforce in the information technology (IT) sector spurred a debate on the need to reform the German migration policy, namely the controlled migration, as well as Germany as an immigration country. The latter led to the adoption of the *Migration Act in 2005*. That is when the government of Germany undertook the first large-scale reform of the immigration system and established a systematic integration policy. Moreover, two integration plans have been set up to date in Germany to integrate the social inclusion of migrant populations.

The new legal migration context of the *Migration Act* was revised a few times over the years, particularly in 2007 with *the Act to Implement Migration and Asylum Directives of the EU*, the *Work Migration Control Act of 2008*, the *Second Act to Implement Migration and Asylum Directives of the EU in 2011*, and *the Act to Implement the Highly Qualified Professionals Directive of the EU in 2012*. (The Law Library of Congress, Global Legal Research Center, 2017).

In 2007, Germany's National Integration Plan had a focus on education, training, employment and cultural integration, whereas the National Action Plan on Integration of 2012 created tools to extract the results of the integration policy. The latter included general aims, timeframes, as well as indicators to verify the achievements of the set goals, such as optimising individual support provided to young migrants, improving the recognition of foreign degrees, increasing the number of migrants in the civil service of federal and state governments and delivering healthcare and care to migrants (German Federal Agency for Political Education).

Most recently, in March, 2020 Germany launched the *Skilled Immigration Act*, a new law on the immigration of skilled workers aiming to provide easier access to the German labour market for qualified workers from non-EU countries (The Federal Government, 2020). This Act was especially important considering that the German economy suffers from a lack of skilled workers, which strongly challenges its economic growth. The Act does not provide a completely new immigration system, but it revises and supplements existing regulations. The law also expands the framework under which qualified professionals from non-EU countries can come to work in Germany. For one, this law has removed the barrier that non-EU citizens can only get a job in case there is no German or EU citizen who is able to perform the job instead. Nevertheless non-EU citizens with qualifications lower than the vocational training level are excluded, unless they already have a job offer from a German employer, whose responsibility it would be to train them and bring them to par with the

relevant professional certificates. Additionally, as per the New Act, non-EU-citizens looking for a job are allowed entry into Germany only if they can speak German at B2 level of the Common European Framework of Reference for Languages, and if they can prove that they can support themselves. Parallely, for professions with a big shortage of skilled professionals, such as medical doctors, IT specialists or registered certified nurses, the bar for emigrating to Germany has also been lowered.

Nonetheless, critics have been vocal to note that the Act still leaves room for improvement, especially considering the vast challenge of lack of skilled workers that Germany faces at the moment. According to these critics, equivalence is still not certainly a given in every situation as per the new law, since the law imposes conditions like German language skills must already be acquired in the home country, and qualifications before entering the country must be equivalent to German ones, while keeping in mind that Germany's extensive dual system of vocational training is globally unique. What is more, the new skilled Act endorses an optional implementation of new centralised immigration authorities to deal with the new fast track procedures, whereas the resources of immigration authorities are especially limited at the moment (Leonie Meißner, LL.M. and Nils Neumann, K&L Gates, 2020).

Following are a broad set of laws and frameworks regarding labour migration into and from Germany:

National legislation	Detailed Description
The Skilled Immigration Act	In March, 2020, Germany adapted a new law which makes it easier for skilled workers from non-EU countries, with vocational, non-academic training to migrate to Germany for work. Some relaxations of the rules have also been provided for the previous conditions of qualified professionals with university degrees.
Foreigners Law	Requirements for entry and residence of foreign nationals in the federal territory, and requirements on asylum procedure have been inscribed in the German Immigration Act, enacted in 2005. The Act was reformed in 2007 to, among other changes, interpret eleven EU directives, fight fake and involuntary marriages, and enable the residence of entrepreneurs.
Asylum Law	In 2015, the Asylum Procedure Act, has been amended and replaced by the Asylum Act, with the aim to regulate the legal status of refugees and asylum seekers.
Integration Law	Germany's first integration legislation framework at the federal level is the Integration Act of 2016. It intends to facilitate the integration of refugees and it is therefore accompanied by the Regulation on the Integration Course which specifies the implementation of the integration system on the basis of "support and demand" approach. Moreover, the Recognition Act, which entered into force in 2012 and was amended in 2014, regulates the fast recognition of qualifications and skills of third country nationals.

National Legislation	Detailed Description
Nationality Law	The Nationality Act of 2000 maintains the attainment of German citizenship and presents the “Optionspflicht” for children born in Germany to foreign nationals. If at least one of their parents has lived legally in Germany for at least eight years and has had permanent residence at the time of the child’s birth. Nonetheless, they do have to pick between the German and the foreign citizenship by their 21st birthday.
Anti-Discrimination	The General Act on Equal Treatment of 2006 regulates the fight against discrimination in employment and civil law, by incorporating four Anti-Discrimination EU Directives into German law.

C2.2 Institutional Apparatus and Integration Programmes in Germany

The Federal Office for Migration and Refugees (BAMF) of the Ministry of Interior plays the key role in the governance of asylum, migration and integration issues in Germany, by being in charge of the asylum procedures, the promotion and harmonisation of integration measures, data collection and research. On the other hand, local actors are often responsible for implementing the measures of the office.

Additionally, the Federal Employment Agency is a self-administered public body which leads integration of people into the labour market, while the Commissioner for Migration, Refugees and Integration supports the federal government to develop its integration policy as well as to promote the coexistence of all of Germany’s residents and the integration of immigrants.

The 2005 integration plan incorporated integration courses for foreigners provided by the federal government. In 2010, Germany introduced its nation-wide Integration Programme with the aim to standardise a great number of coexisting integration measures taken by the federal, state and local governments and ensure a greater coordination between integration offers. It is a needs-based orientation programme and it includes language courses, civic education and vocational training.

Since 2006, the Federal Chancellery has been organising an *Integration Summit* on a yearly basis, (“Integrationsgipfel” in the German language) and ensuring participation of all integration stakeholders, from representatives of the federal government and media to trade unions and migrant associations. Germany’s first national integration plan was published as a result of the first held summit. In the 9th Integration Summit which took place in 2016, concrete proposals on how to make public institutions more diverse, which were made by 50 active migrant organisations were discussed.

The National Action Plan on Integration institutes a paradigm shift in integration policy. The aim of the Federal Government of Germany is to ensure sustainable structural changes in order to establish a lasting foundation for successful integration. The Plan on Integration also represents a new quality of integration policy assuming that the achievement of goals in integration policy will be verifiable on the basis of indicators in the future. Moreover, the integration monitoring established by the federal government plays a vital role to depict that Germany is making good progress in terms of integration.

The Action Plan is designed as a process that surpasses the legislative period. Hence, it is imperative for the Plan implementation to continue on this path on a systematic basis in the future, and ensure a verification of the achievement of objectives at regular intervals. Moreover, it is imperative to accompany the implementation of the targets and the verification of the accomplishments in a follow-up process that includes all partners as part of the forums for dialogue. Hence, a future task of integration policy is to realise the goal of participation on an equal basis, whereas the federal government should make its contribution in conjunction with the municipalities, associations, federations and immigrant organisations.

Having said that, the *National Action Plan on Integration* aims to reinforce social cohesiveness in Germany, keeping in mind that the civil society plays a very important role in the integration process. In Germany, many CSOs assist immigrants in all areas of life, particularly since the unprecedented arrivals of asylum seekers in 2015 and 2016. Some of these models of assistance, have been replicated in other EU countries as well. For example, the “Refugees Welcome Housing Project” is presently a cross-border platform embodied in almost half of EU member states (Refugees Welcome International, 2019). More information on the initiative may be noted in subsection D2 of the paper.

Moreover, non-profit organisations and local authorities can apply for financing through several EU funds, such as Asylum, Migration and Integration Fund (AMIF) in Germany, European Social Fund (ESF) in Germany and other EU funds for integration available in Germany. Examples of institutions and organisations implementing integration programmes in Germany are: the Goethe-Institut, the German Joint Welfare Association, the German Adult Education Association, the Federal Association of Non-Statutory Welfare, Arbeiterwohlfahrt, Caritas Germany, the Internationaler Bund, several local institutions, schools and churches.

In 2016, the *Meseberg Declaration on Integration* was adopted by the federal cabinet. It outlined the Government policy, and a draft legislation based on a 2-ways principle: offering support, training and job opportunities to foreigners but also requiring efforts in return and highlighting their duties on the basis of “support and demand” (“Fördern und Fordern” in the German language) approach. It noted that the state provides assistance but equally expects incomers to do their bit for integration (Gesley, Germany: Act to Integrate Refugees Enters Into Force, 2016).

To illustrate, while a great number of the EU member states do not enforce any integration-related conditions as a precondition to issuance of the national permanent residence permit, Germany is one of the few countries that requires the proof of civic knowledge, and a basic knowledge of the legal and social order of Germany, as conditions for the national permanent residence permit. The latter knowledge can be verified by the successful attendance of an integration course (Constant, A. F., & Rinne, U, 2013).

Below are extracts of Meseberg Declaration on Integration (Federal Government of Germany, 2016):

Meseberg Declaration on Integration (extracts)

For successful integration it is indispensable that migrants **learn German quickly**, that they are swiftly **integrated into training, tertiary studies and the job market**, that they understand and **respect the foundations on which German society** is built, and that they respect the laws of the land.

Germany is not starting from scratch in their efforts to address these issues. The principle of **providing assistance but expecting incomers to do their bit** is central to Germany's integration-policy activities. Integration involves the offer of services, but it equally entails an obligation on the part of incomers to make an effort. Integration can only work as a **two-way process**.

A guiding principle in this integration policy is **justice**, justice for those recognised as refugees here, and justice for the German people.

Acquiring a sound command of the German language and an appreciation of the values of our society are a key foundation for successful integration into society and into education, training, tertiary study and the labour market. For this reason, Germany will be **improving access to integration courses**. Incomers should learn German at as early a stage as possible.

By **allocating incomers to specific places of residence**, it will be possible to more equally distribute people entitled to protection. At the same time this should serve to foster integration, avoid segregation that could obstruct integration efforts, and avoid the emergence of social hotspots.

Germany is also creating greater legal certainty for individuals with **tolerated residence status** and companies offering training places. In future, trainees will be assured of tolerated residence status for the entire duration of their training.

Access to the labour market will be further eased. For a period of three years, the requirement to determine that no German or EU citizens are available for a vacancy before a non-EU citizen is employed is to be suspended for asylum-seekers and individuals with tolerated residence status, depending also on the rate of unemployment in the region in question and with the involvement of the individual federal states. This will make it possible for this group to work as temporary workers.

Germany has also laid down a requirement to **cooperate on integration measures**. Any individual refusing to participate in refugee integration measures or dropping out of such measures without good cause, will see their benefits under the Asylum-Seekers' Benefits Act cut.

Germany has also **modified the benefits system** under the Asylum-Seekers' Benefits Act. In future certain misconduct will result in benefits being cut. It is to become more difficult to conceal relevant assets.

In future individuals will be deemed to have a **temporary residence permit** when they are issued with the proof of arrival so as to eliminate uncertainties in practice to date. In this way Germany will ensure that asylum-seekers are given legally certain and early access to the labour market and to integration services, among other things.

Germany will **not accept attacks on women, children and other vulnerable individuals**, whether they are citizens of our country or asylum-seekers and refugees.

Asylum-seekers without good prospects of staying in Germany should also be given orientation during their stay in our country.

Increasing the percentage of employees with a **migrant background in German public authorities** remains an important concern of the German government.

The adoption of the Integration Act was a milestone that highlighted the pro-active stance of Germany to address every individual arriving in Germany. Easier access to the job and training markets for refugees was also a major step forward in economic terms. That said, the labour market programme "Refugee integration measures," part of the integration measures used federal funding to create 100,000 additional job opportunities for individuals receiving benefits under the provisions of the *Asylum-Seekers' Benefits Act*.

Despite these significant advancements, various legislative and policy gaps still need to be addressed by the German Government. Hence, building trust of immigrants and immigrant organisations is an important duty for the German Government, which leads to promotion of migrant integration. Similarly, it is very important for the Government to transparently communicate the benefits of inclusive policies to non-immigrants too, as well as to ensure there are independent institutions in place to monitor the implementation and the effects of these policies. Moreover, despite Germany's singular efforts to monitor the integration of migrants in-house, independent institutions have found that European countries overall, including Germany, are lagging behind in conducting vital impact evaluations of immigrant integration policies that would allow us to determine whether policies are cost effective for boosting outcomes (Bilgili, 2015).

For example, in federalised EU member states, like Germany, regions have their own budgets to allocate to integration activities, which ideally complement, and do not substitute national funding. Integration mainstreaming and the fragmentation of integration governance on the other hand, can make it very difficult for cities to locate and rapidly make use of the funding from either the national or regional level. Hence, it is worth noting that harmonisation of effective migration policies, as well as successful

initiatives across host countries, and even across EU countries are crucial to ensure migrant fair treatment and protection of rights related to labour mobility.

The Germany-Egypt context

Over the past three years deportations of Egyptians from EU countries have increased. For example, in Germany, an increasing number of Egyptians have been deprived of international protection (AP News, 2018).

The EU collaboration with Egypt on migration strengthened the policing capacities of Egypt, such as trainings on border management or funding for the *National Coordinating Committee for Combating and Preventing Illegal Migration* (NCCPIM) that reports directly to the Ministry of Interior.

Advancements of Egypt's border management capacities have helped legitimise the criminalisation of unauthorised exits and irregular migration (OHCHR, 2018), whereas preventing emigration is a breach of the right to leave any country, including one's own, as stipulated by article 12 of the *International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights*, which has binding force (United Nations Human Rights, 1976). Therefore, these cooperation channels must be monitored by EU and Egypt via systematic and comprehensive human rights mechanisms.

In order to intensify collaboration on migration, in 2017 Egypt signed an *Agreement on Bilateral Dialogue on Migration with Germany*. The agreement intended to support the Egyptian education sector and additional scholarships for young Egyptians to study in Germany, as well as cooperate better on return of illegal migrants, including by raising awareness of the dangers of illegal migration (Germany Federal Foreign Office, 2017).

In the meantime, the Federal Employment Agency has initiated a recognition procedure supplemented by a skills assessment tool (MYSKILLS) for all migrants, including Egyptians abroad. MYSKILLS supports integration experts of the agency to assess existing occupational knowledge in the absence of formal qualifications, to validate customer self-disclosures, to have access to informed, targeted and individual counselling and integration in qualification of work (Bertelsmann Foundation, 2018).

As presented by Managing Director for European Affairs at the German Federal Employment Agency, Dr. Wolfgang Müller in the International Conference "Future Employment: Changes, Challenges & Opportunities" in 2019 in Lithuania, Germany's commitment is to achieve the increase in the supply of skilled workers, by reducing the number of school leavers without school leaving certificates, reducing the number of drop-outs from vocational trainings and university drop-outs, increasing the labour force participation of people over 55 and women, increase the volume of full-time work, improve labour market transparency, and others (Dr. Wolfgang Müller, 2019).

Moreover, the importance of investing in professional training for young people, in the context of Egypt, was also strongly emphasised by the Foreign Minister Sigmar Gabriel in 2017 (Germany Federal Foreign Office, 2017).

Recently, in July 2020, Egypt and Germany signed a contract of €2 million for the establishment of the Egyptian-German Center for Jobs, Immigration and Reintegration, which is the first centre of its kind in Egypt (Egypt Independent, 2020). The centre aims to provide a wide-range of information about the German labour market to those who wish to migrate out of Egypt to promote safe and regular migration, rather than illegal migration, as well as provide information and guidance for economic and social integration to returnees from abroad re-integrating back into the Egyptian society.

C2.3 Legislation, Policy and Strategy analysis related to migrant integration in Italy

Immigration to Italy from the 1980s was firstly managed through administrative regulations and bureaucratic discretion, while immigration laws largely absorbed the planning of admissions of foreign workers. The first actual notion that immigrants were growing in demand to carry out low skilled jobs in the Italian labour market are underlined in the “Martelli Law” of 1990 (L 39/1990).

On the other hand, the three-year *Document of Migration Policy Planning* (“Documento Programmatico Triennale” in the Italian language) was the first policy instrument to identify main priorities and planned integration measures for the period of 1998-2000. The other *Planning Document of 2005* was also the last national strategy aimed at integrating migrants and their children.

In 2017 the Italian government adopted **the National Integration Plan for Persons Entitled to International Protection**, funded by the EU and national financial resources. The Plan set out priorities for 2017-2018, including interreligious and intercultural dialogue, language training, access to education, labour inclusion and vocational training.

At the end of 2019, the implementation of the plan was limited to pilot actions in the three regions of Italy: Piedmont, Emilia Romagna and Calabria. The implementation of the plan however took a more inclusive approach, whereas amongst the key actors responsible were local authorities and local public services, with the support of civil society organisations, as well as with the collaboration of United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR).

National Legislation	Detailed Description
Foreigners Law	The legislative decree 286/1998 adopted in 1998 and its succeeding amendments embody the main legal framework on immigration and integration. Among the main amendments introduced, the most important is law 189/2002, which employed a more restrictive approach, and significantly reformed rules related to legal and irregular migration.
Asylum Law	Asylum laws in Italy are mostly outcomes of the transposition of the EU directives on the Common European Asylum System (CEAS) and their altered versions. Therefore, asylum is not enclosed as an organic legislative framework in Italy, but it is regulated by numerous parts of legislation targeting different features, such as qualifications, status determination procedures and reception and integration services for asylum-seekers and beneficiaries of international protection.
Integration Law	Italy does not have a self-standing integration law.
Nationality Law	Law No. 91/1992 constitutes the current legislative framework on naturalisation. The Security Bill adopted in 2009 introduced restrictive rules in the area of naturalisation by marriage, with the goal of tackling ‘marriages of convenience’.
Anti-Discrimination	Anti-discrimination is not an object of organic legislation in Italy, but it is addressed by a number of legal provisions contained in several pieces of legislation. Law 205/1993 (“Legge Mancino” in the Italian language) punishes hate speech and tackles discrimination on the grounds of race, religion and nationality.

Legislative Decree 113/2018, adopted in 2018 and converted into Law 132/2018 (“Salvini Decree” in the Italian language) introduced two new elements in the cases of:

- Naturalisation based on marriage, the foreign spouse must endorse knowledge of the Italian language via the ‘Common reference framework for knowledge of languages’ at a level no lower than B1, and
- Naturalised Italian citizens who are condemned of terrorism charges and are bound to lose their Italian citizenship. Such removal of citizenship would not affect non-naturalised citizens, even if being convicted on terrorism charges.

Furthermore, the **Immigration Act of 286/1998** includes provisions related to anti-discrimination. It therefore outlines equality of treatment between nationals and foreigners in the following rights, such as access to employment, labour conditions, social assistance and security, as well as protection against discrimination as an individual.

In Italy, regional governments have the competences over integration strategies. Moreover, they enjoy full independence in policy planning and implementation, thus producing a multilevel governance framework. According to the Italian legislation as well, regions are the key actors in planning integration policies, given their legislative and regulatory competence in the areas of social policies, education, labour market, vocational training, health and housing. Similarly, the annual admission quota for third-country nationals in Italy, for the purpose of employment compensation is based on a needs assessment at the regional level.

As per the policies set by the regional governments, municipalities are accounted as the main responsible bodies in terms of identifying actual integration measures and policy implementation. Therefore, the vital responsibility of local authorities and public services at the local level, is also reflected within the framework of the *National Integration Plan for Persons Entitled to International Protection*, whereas offering of educational institutions and healthcare services are noted.

Hence, it is critical for Egypt to absorb Italy's decentralised approach in planning of integration policies, and to effectively exercise across its own services directed towards potential migrants to the EU.

In line with the comprehensive understanding of migration and the 'mobility partnerships' promoted by the EC, when establishing the annual quota for labour migration, the Italian Government reserves spaces in the quota for nationals of third countries with which it has signed agreements designed to regulate migration flows, such as readmission agreements and subsequent agreements designed to regulate entry flows and procedures for re-entry. For example, the quotas which had been enforced in 2007 prove the importance of these agreements, where nationals of countries with which Italy has signed agreements in the prior years, including Egypt are given a noteworthy share of the general quota (i.e. 8,000 Egyptians out of the 47,100 admissions assigned for non-seasonal employees) (Mantovan, 2007).

This approach seems practical since, in principle, it is a win-win for both the EU member state and the third country parties involved. Nonetheless, these policies and their outcomes have not been analysed in detail to ensure the added value they bring to the table. Inversely, restrictions are applied to those third countries which do not cooperate or participate in the fight against irregular migration.

Special provisions have been adapted and governed within the context of these agreements in various EU member states. In various such provisions, for example migrant flows for the purpose of seasonal labour, Italy is one of the more accommodating EU member countries, as it is one of the two countries that has introduced multiple-entry permits for seasonal work for up to three years, whereas other EU member countries keep to the limitation of a maximum number of months of residence per year. Additionally, while some EU member countries do not permit seasonal workers to apply in-country for another immigration category, Italy is one of the two countries that does make it possible for immigrants to switch status for certain specified categories, such as switching from 'seasonal work' to 'employment' etc.

C2.4 Institutional Apparatus and Integration Programmes in Italy

At the national level, Ministry of Interior and Ministry of Labour and Social Policies share the responsibility for the governance of integration policies. Managing integration policies and other practical activities are delegated to General Directorate of Immigration and Integration Policies of Ministry of Labour and Social Policies.

Italy is represented at the European Integration Network by its Ministry of Interior. Within the Ministry of Interior, the Department for Civil Liberties and Immigration deals with matters related to the protection of civil rights, including those related to immigration, asylum, citizenship and religion.

Additionally, representatives of the most relevant immigrant organisations and NGOs are consulted during the drafting of policies and can participate in the technical group meetings of the Coordinating and Monitoring Committee, the inter-ministerial body in charge of drafting migration policies. Nevertheless, the participation of non-governmental stakeholders in migration decision-making ultimately depends on the Government's predisposition. Ministry of Labour and Social Policies manages a national register of the organisations providing integration services.

Aside from the national level, consultative bodies have been established in most regions of Italy with the aim to bring stakeholders together and carry out public consultations. Nevertheless, participation of CSOs and experts differs significantly across regions. It is also noted that often public consultations do not involve Immigration Territorial Councils, which are consultative bodies operating at the provincial level under the responsibility of the Ministry of Interior.

Nonetheless, Italy ensures availability of national and private funds for service providers and other stakeholders to carry out initiatives and projects for a better integration of the migrant population, because NGOs are very important in migration matters in Italy. Therefore, non-profit organisations and local authorities can apply for financing through various EU funds, such as Asylum, Migration and Integration Fund (AMIF), European Social Fund (ESF) and other offered EU funds for integration.

In the Italian context, the cultural and social integration of the migrants have only recently become part of governmental discourses, and planned policy instruments. Yet, observations that may be made after investigating Italian integration policies are that integration policies may have an assimilative approach, and that there is a gap between policy and practice (Caponio, T. and G. Zincone, 2011).

A more cultural notion of integration was first presented in 2006, with the drafting of the *Charter of the Values and Citizenship and Integration* elaborated by experts in collaboration with voluntary organisations and religious and immigrant communities. The charter is connected to the *European and International Charters on human rights* and the *Italian Constitution*. It intends to present guidelines for the Ministry of the Interior and for immigrants, religious communities and Italian citizens, with the intention of spreading data related to the problems concerning immigration (Immigrazione Oggi, 2007).

Later in 2010, the *Integration Plan* (“Piano per l’integrazione nella sicurezza” in the Italian language) was presented categorising five areas where integration occurs and in which it is required to intervene, such as the educational system to help with Italian, values and civic culture; language courses for adults, with particular focus on women; the labour market, to avoid the rise of the informal economy; housing policies to avoid the formation of ethnic enclaves; access to social and health services; and to ensure that education is guaranteed for children and second generation migrants (Caneva, 2014).

Since 2012, newly arrived immigrants have been obligated to sign the *Integration Agreement* (“Patto per l’integrazione” in the Italian language) when they obtain their first residence permit. Similarly, to the model of the *German Action Plan* elaborated in section C2.1, signing of such an agreement by migrant ensures a two-way approach, whereas migrants also commit to achieving specific integration goals in a particular timeframe.

In the Italian model, achievement is determined through a credits system assessing sufficient knowledge of the Italian language (A2), constitution, civic life and institutions, entailing of a language course, civic education and vocational training. Moreover, the fulfilment of these integration goals are mandatory for the renewal of permits. However, various categories of migrants are exempted from this obligation, either by law or if their permits cannot be withdrawn, in cases of beneficiaries of international or humanitarian protection, family migrants, long term residents, relatives of EU citizens.

The Plan together with the Integration Agreement, are the main instruments adopted by the Italian government for action on integration. Nonetheless, although the Integration Agreement highlights requirements that immigrants have to fulfill in order to integrate i.e. to “assimilate,” there are no references to the protection of immigrant cultures and languages.

The Italy-Egypt context

The Italian state, signed a Cooperation agreement on readmission with Egypt in 2007 aiming to favour the match between supply and demand through the exchange of information, promote training courses and educational cooperation programmes; assign preferential quotas, especially for those who have attended training courses in Egypt; and enhance the role of immigrant communities in Italy. The agreement entered into force in 2008, and was still being applied in 2013 (Cooperation agreement on readmission between the government of the Italian Republic and the government of the Arab Republic of Egypt, 2007).

In 2019, Italy and IOM signed an agreement to implement the second phase of the development project “Initiatives for local development of Egypt through the support of Egyptians abroad,” thereby recognising the great role Egyptians abroad have in the development of their country of origin (International Organisation for Migration (IOM), 2019).

Additionally, the Integrated Migration Information System (IMIS) was a project dedicated to put implementation of a regulatory policy in practice, which ended in 2016. It was financed by the Italian government and jointly implemented by the Egyptian Emigration

Sector of the Ministry of Manpower and Emigration, as well as the IOM. The implementation timeframe was 2001 through 2005, while the second phase of the project, started its implementation in 2010, involving the same stakeholders and donor. IMIS' aim was to support the management of regular migration flows from Egypt, advance the social status of Egyptian migrants in host countries, specifically Italy, and boost the Egyptian migrant input to Egypt's development by channeling human and financial resources generated by migrants abroad. (Egyptian Ministry of Manpower and Emigration, Christine Fandrich, 2009).

This project relied heavily on modern technology, whereas a website developed on an automated matchmaking platform aimed to connect Egyptian job seekers with employers abroad. In this manner, potential Egyptian migrants were kept up to date with data about a number of destination countries, as well as an info-portal for Egyptian migrants abroad. Since its initiation, the website matchmaking platform had received 170,000 applications from potential Egyptian migrants, out of which 1,500 applicants were selected for interviews for positions of machine operators, assistant cooks, cooks, engineers, system developers and construction workers. Out of them, 200 applicants passed a practical test, while only 178 were nominated to work in Italy.

Moreover, several policy documents in Italy plan the distribution of funding or the implementation of bodies committed to integration issues, but these actions have never been implemented or have been removed after a brief period of implementation.

Considering the competence of regional governments in Italy, integration policies are implemented by regions at local level due to their autonomy to coordinate the entire local system of social services. For example, the allocation of integration funding and investments in language courses are decided by local authorities themselves. On the other hand, housing is an area in which regions devote funds for integration policies, while language courses are often implemented with the help of the European Fund, by various organisations and associations in partnership with the local authorities.

Moreover, integration policies are generally endorsed through the European Integration Fund, because the funds for social policies, including migrant integration policies, have been reduced tremendously.

Regions of Lombardy and Piedmont have implemented ventures to offer temporal accommodation to migrants, support them in finding permanent accommodation, and favour relations with Italian neighbours. Help with labour supply and demand is another example of a very practical initiative.

As a result, the tools of policy implementation in Italy are fragmented and not consistent, and they depend on the initiatives of local authorities and the active CSOs and on the private sector in specific areas of Italy. The latter translates into difficulties for potential Egyptian migrants, depending on the region of Italy where they decide to reside. Therefore, CSOs and private sector organisations are particularly active, and they have a very important role because many integration initiatives were a result of their sole efforts, thereby compensating for the lack of integration policies since the initial immigration flows. They are to date complementary to Italian institutions.

C2.5 Comparative based analysis of two legislative infrastructures to evaluate the impact evaluations on labour mobility channels and integration policies

The previous sections and sub-sections of this paper provide an overview of the existing key legislative infrastructure and institutional apparatus on labour mobility and integration policies. Consequently, this sub-section aims to provide a comparative based analysis of two legislative infrastructures, EU selected case countries, and Egypt in order to promote flexibility to the Egypt legislative infrastructure.

In general, the Egyptian labour market legislation appears as rather flexible. Despite the lack of specific mention in the new Labour Law of types of labour contracts, such as part-time work, the unlimited and free use of fixed-term contracts grants employers considerable power and autonomy in determining the size and employment modalities of their labour force at various moments, production cycles and economic circumstances.

Nevertheless, a high degree of flexibility normally requires a decent level of protection for workers whose basic rights risk otherwise to be abused. As noted in the different sections of this paper, there are some instances where the position of workers is extremely weak and unprotected in Egypt. The existence of well-functioning social dialogue and of strong workers' organisations usually helps reconcile labour market flexibility with workers' protection and employment security. Therefore, the establishment and proper functioning of social dialogue institutions can help achieve this objective.

Moreover, a poor protection system for workers can be compensated by the provision of solid technical assistance through training and employment services, as well as through various labour market measures. In that context, the efficiency and effectiveness of employment services in Egypt must be substantially upgraded so they can provide workers with quality services both when they enter the labour market for the first time and when they need to find jobs after the termination of previous employment relationships. Hence, there is a need for the government to form a comprehensive and realistic employment promotion strategy for Egypt, which would involve the relevant economic and social ministries, the social partners and important sections of the civil society.

On the other hand, the EU legal migration framework is enacted in numerous directives adapted from 2013 up to 2016. These directives regulate from 'admission and residence conditions' to 'equal treatment rights and mobility' within the EU for different groups of third-country nationals. While the directive aims are relevant to EU's needs related to legal migration, the identified gaps in the directives regarding various categories of third country nationals, are mostly covered by national legislation of singular member states. For example, all member states have schemes for the admission of low and medium skilled third-country nationals, while the latter are not covered via the EU directives (European Commission Staff Working Document, 2019).

In general the EU framework related to migration has been accompanied with limitations, such as fragmentation, inadequate coverage of EU rules, improper

application of the common rules, and more. As far as application of EU rules in practice, various levels of success and efficiency have been noted across different EU countries depending on the countries' flexibility.

Additionally, extensive research of independent institutions finds that European countries have been lagging behind in conducting vital impact evaluations of immigrant integration policies that would in return determine whether policies are cost effective for boosting outcomes. Having said that, it has been noted that collection of data at both national and EU level ought to be improved. Yet, various types of programmes that work best for immigrants and best use and develop immigrants' skills, have been noted for both selected countries for this research: Germany and Italy, range from job search personalised assistance tied with intensive coaching, general introduction programmes and language trainings to provide migrants with country-specific skills, subsidised private jobs and more.

Considering migration is highly likely to play a growingly vital role in tackling labour and skills shortages in an ageing European society, coherence and complementarity across migration legislation and policies, as well as more efficient interaction are of great importance to make the EU more competitive.

While the current EU legal migration framework has not managed to have a great effect on the overall obstacles related to migration in Europe, the benefits of having a shared EU legal framework for legal migration range from: improved legal reliability and predictability for third-country nationals, employers and administrations; improved acknowledgement of third-country nationals' rights; improved intra-EU mobility for various groups of third-country nationals, such as researchers and students and ICT; simplified administrative procedures; and harmonisation of conditions, procedures and rights across EU member states.

In the case of Germany, one of the two selected case EU countries for the research, managing immigration flows has been identified as a government top policy priority, whereas immigration and integration policies have a vital impact. On the other hand, the other selected EU member state, Italy's integration policies have been mostly focused on economic integration, whereas social and cultural policies remain marginal, and have only developed recently, but with great assistance from its CSOs.

The table opposite aims to provide a concise summary of the conclusions reached through the assessment in terms of the legal and policy apparatuses in place for the regulation of labour immigration and emigration. It also intends to compare the legislation and policies in place, including integration policies, as well as level of bilateral and multilateral agreements, and the related challenges across Egypt, EU and the EU selected member states, Germany and Italy, with a view to identifying recommendations that will follow in later sections of the research.

Comparative based analysis

Egypt

Bilateral and Multilateral agreements

Egypt has signed agreements at both the EU level, as well as with member states, Italy and Germany. Nevertheless, Egypt cannot react flexibly and maximise the returns of international migration, due to the government mostly having to resort to ad hoc migration management measures. There is a lack of mobility management tools, like migrant pre-departure training and orientations or skills training. Also, there is policy and planning deficiency on labour migration in Egypt, rather than the lack of legal basis.

European Union

European Agenda on Migration suggests a supply-driven system as an instrument to match EU labour migration policy to labour market needs. EU labour migration policy integrates measures to enable the labour market integration of all flows of migrants into the EU. This does not represent solely economic migrants in the EU labour market with a work permit, but also all third-country nationals with access.

Germany

Germany entered into several bilateral agreements with Egypt, with the objective to regularise the stay and work of Egyptians abroad. In 2017 Egypt signed an Agreement on Bilateral Dialogue on Migration with Germany to intensify collaboration on migration underlining the importance of investing in professional training for young people.

Italy

Italy entered into bilateral agreements with Egypt. In 2007, Italy signed an agreement with Egypt to, amongst others, promote training courses and educational programmes. In 2019, Italy and IOM signed an agreement to continue implementing the "Initiatives for local development of Egypt through the support of Egyptians abroad."

Integration policies

Return and reintegration of migrant workers into the Egypt labour market are migration cycle stages which are currently neglected with only a few organisations assisting returned workers, whereas financial education, investment of savings in welfare, education and training projects are not offered to ensure positive reintegration of returned migrant workers.

The selection and analysis of data on key legislative frameworks and institutional apparatus on labour mobility from Egypt to the EU region are in general limited.

EU Action Plan on the integration of third-country nationals (2016) supports member states' efforts in the development and consolidation of their integration policies.

EU legislation opted for a segmentation approach which entails EU legal migration directives. But, ineffective promotion of some of the directives resulted in unsatisfactory results.

Germany's National Action Plan on Integration in 2016 institutes a paradigm shift in integration policy.

Refugees who show the potential to integrate and have a good chance of staying permanently in Germany are provided with easier and faster access to integration classes and employment opportunities, while refugees who refuse to cooperate face a reduction in benefits.

In 2017 Italy adopted the National Integration Plan for Persons Entitled to International Protection, funded by the EU and national resources. Integration policies differ across regions in Italy.

Since 2012, newly arrived immigrants are obliged to sign the Integration Agreement when they obtain their first residence permit which are universal across Italy.

Comparative
based analysis

Egypt

European Union

Germany

Italy

Challenges in Legislation/ policies

Limited gendered context in Egyptian migration related legislation and policy.

Limited inter-ministerial coordination in policy making related to migration.

The Labour Code is silent on pre-departure and training of migrant workers, reintegration into the Egypt labour market upon return, portability of pension and compensation rights, and portability of migrants' social security contributions.

Egypt should amend the new anti-smuggling law, or issue regulations to clarify the law and ensure that refugee fundamental rights are protected.

Recruitment of Egyptian workers for employment abroad should be regulated to prevent against trafficking, smuggling, forced labour and fraudulent recruitment.

The political sensitivity of immigration policy and the independent capability of member states to decide the

volume of admissions of third-country nationals seeking work are two major constraints on policy initiatives in this field of migration.

The current situation is characterised by the absence of a single European labour market and by the limitations of European employment policy, reduced to a kind of open method of coordination.

The tools of policy implementation in Italy are fragmented and not consistent, and they depend on the initiatives of local authorities and the active CSOs and or the private sector in specific areas of Italy.

The latter translates into difficulties for potential Egyptian migrants, depending on the region of Italy where they decide to reside.

Not all of Germany is content with "Germany becoming a country of migration," but the latter is a need due to Germany's aging society.

Limited focus is put on the Government to transparently communicate the benefits of inclusive policies and legislation to non-immigrants as well.

There is a limited number of independent institutions in place to monitor the implementation and the effects of such legislation and policies.

Challenges in Integration policies

Services available to Egyptian migrant workers currently are too limited due to resource constraints and also an overemphasis on assistance to workers covered under the bilateral agreements with the EU.

Various obstacles to migrant integration, such as inadequate language skills, lack of formal qualifications, health problems, cultural religious aspects, jobs ethnicities and assimilation need to be overcome by the EU and the member states, since legal migration is a field with a jointly shared competence of the EU and its member states.

There is a gap between policy and practice.

Policy documents plan the allocation of funding for the implementation committed to integration issues, but these actions are not implemented, or after a brief period of implementation they are removed.

The labour migration system in Germany is fairly open to highly-educated immigrants with a matching job offer, but that does not apply to jobs that do not require a tertiary degree. Moreover, this system does not consider the fact that the German language is the key skill demanded by employers.

D. The impact of labour migration policies and legislation on migration flows and the labour market integration of immigrants

The findings related to the impact of EU labour migration and legislation on migratory movements are limited. Moreover, coping with international labour required by its EU labour migration has not received the deserving attention of the policy makers. Nevertheless, legal migration is a key element of international bilateral migration policy dialogues between the EU and its partner countries, undoubtedly required to counter the approaching demographic crisis in Europe (Martín, I., Di Bartolomeo, A., De Bruycker, P., Renaudiere, G., SALAMONSKA, J. J., & Venturini, A., 2015).

This section reflects on the policies of select European labour markets/EU labour migration policy and the impact migration policies have on migratory movements, by allowing a matching of skills required by European labour markets and those selected skilled via policy instruments, as well as by fighting irregular labour migration via established effective legal labour migration channels. Consequently, the section also reflects the impact on labour market integration of immigrants by understanding the potential opportunities and challenges that Egyptian migrants specifically may face in the EU, and Germany and Italy in particular.

The visa requirement for foreign travels tightened after the Egyptian revolution of 2011 (overthrow of Mubarak) in Egypt. Nevertheless, that did not in any way decrease the willingness of Egyptians to emigrate. Quite the opposite, Egyptians at the time sought various routes and ways to leave Egypt, which are followed to date, primarily to the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) region, as well as to the region of modern western states, like USA, Canada and Europe. While the initial groups were mainly characterised by temporary and circular migration, other groups were characterised by other motives that include religious and political persecution, personal and professional development and training, academic careers and other forms of labour and marriage migration. (Weißköppel, 2015).

The factors that affect mobility of Egyptians toward the EU are overqualification and absence of quality employment within Egypt. On the other hand, Egyptian mobility can also contribute to the expansion of skills and knowledge which could consequently result in contribution to Egypt's development. The latter can also establish sustainable bridges among a high skilled labour force in the EU and Egypt, so long as the EU and Egypt are committed to the full protection of the rights of migrants.

Additionally, as noted in Research Paper 1, skill transferability in European labour markets is faced with high barriers for all migrants. For Egyptian migrants as well, deskilling is very common, especially for women migrants, because when there is no or limited skill transferability, even highly skilled and educated women straightforwardly join paid care work. The latter requires special support for the labour market integration of migrants, by mapping of migrant knowledge and skills, targeted regularisation of irregular migrants and facilitating of changes in migratory status, whereas a gendered approach is employed to ensure labour market demand and incentivisation.

Hence, participation not only of governmental institutions, but also of representatives of CSOs and the private sector, which have helpful information on local conditions and needs is encouraged to achieve successful co-ordination and adaptation of legislative and policy implementation. As an example, CSOs, including trade unions, representatives of Small Business Enterprises (SMEs) may provide services that complement government services, such as vocational training, placement and special re-integration services.

D.1 DO CURRENT EU-EGYPT MIGRATION POLICIES RESPOND TO EU MARKET NEEDS?

Available evidence on the need for labour migration from third countries to the EU is reviewed in Research Paper 1 "*Understanding the labour markets of key EU destination countries*". Results indicate that international migration is set to have an important role in meeting the needs of EU labour markets. Nevertheless, it may be noted that even the newly proposed *European Agenda Migration* does not represent a comprehensive and coherent policy, filling out the gaps in the current EU labour migration policies.

The chapter of European Agenda Migration "*A new policy on legal migration*" does not encompass major novelty in regards to the current EU labour immigration rule. The proposals do not respond to the identified and projected labour needs of the EU over the medium to long-term in relation to future EU labour migration policy and its integration with labour market and employment policy.

Although, the EU Community *acquis* in the area of freedom, security and justice is significant, its measures are mostly directed towards security matters cooperation between administrations, rather than assuring and promoting the rights and interest of migrants coming to EU. (Gerard Deprez on behalf of the Committee on Civil Liberties, Justice and Home Affairs to the Council (O-0128/08), 19 November 2008).

Nonetheless, Egypt concluded Association Agreements with the EU in 2004, where migration is listed as one of the working areas. Moreover, continuous re-actualisation of EU migration policy presents a unique opportunity to open the discussion for the EU labour migration policy in the context of its current labour market gaps and forecasts. Therefore, the policy developers ought to be wary of misalignment between the demand for labour in the EU and the supply of adequately qualified workers from countries of origin, as elaborated in the Euro-Mediterranean Network for Economic studies (EMNES) Policy paper in 2019 (EMNES Policy Paper 009, 2019).

Moreover, time and monetary investments to materialise projects that foster legal migration on the large size and diverse composition of migration flows ought to be used strategically to reduce irregular crossings. The latter may be undertaken even in small scale projects, as long as they are implemented in close cooperation with the government of migration origin, and as long as existing social network, i.e. relevant diaspora, residing in the EU, are empowered to support labour migration integration. Moreover, the EU ought to attempt to in such a way contribute to enhancing the information available to would-be migrants in close cooperation with the countries of origin (Alcidi, 2019).

To translate the above to the Egypt-EU context, providing more legal labour migration pathways is considered a way forward for EU-Egypt migration policies.

In 2017, a €60 million programme under the EUTF was signed, aimed at supporting 'Egypt's migration management, addressing the root causes of irregular migration into and from the country, and supporting Egyptian communities hosting migrants (European Commission, 2018). Additionally, as part of the EU Trust Fund, a project on Labour Mobility involving Egypt is being developed, with the contribution of the German Development Agency (GIZ), as well as the IOM and the ILO. Parallely, Egyptian authorities have also been actively engaged at a technical level, including by participating in a Workshop on Labour Migration and Visa Facilitation under the Mobility Partnership Facility (European Commission & High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security, 2018).

Additionally, Europe has an enduring and important presence in Egypt in the field of Science, Technology, Research and Innovation. Over time, the collaboration between European and Egyptian scientists has been growing in the framework of bilateral or multilateral research projects. In 2005 the EC and Egypt signed a *Science and Technology Agreement* that entailed various activities of collaborative research projects, joint funding, mobility schemes and networking (EC-Egypt Science and Technology Cooperation Agreement - Roadmap, 2007-2008).

Egypt has signed similar agreements with many EU member states as well. Moreover, the EU has pushed forward its cooperation in science and technology through its *7th Framework Programme for Research and Technological Development*, covering broad areas of collaborative research in ICT, Health, Energy and Agriculture (European Commission, Research and Innovation, FP7, 2016).

In December 2013, the EU launched its Horizon 2020 programme: H2020 (2014-2020), positively proving EU's belief in research and innovation as a means of addressing the great socio-economic challenges that will be faced in the years ahead through one of the greatest and most open research programmes in the world (European Commission, Horizon 2020, 2014-2020). An essential part of this is stepping up Egypt's engagement with its international partners, to make sure that they cooperate in those areas where their impact is the greatest.

The successor of the *Horizon 2020* programme is *Horizon Europe* set to begin in 2021, with the Commission's proposal of an ambitious €100 billion research and innovation programme. The provisional agreement amongst the European Parliament and the Council of the EU was reached in March/April 2019, while the Parliament endorsed the agreement in April 2019 (European Commission, Horizon Europe, 2019-2020). It is of utmost importance for Egypt to be informed of such future plans.

Finally, the segmentation, or the category-specific approach, to legal labour migration does not respond to the needs of EU labour markets, which are subject to a process of steady and measured unification. Hence, central decision making should be adapted to decentralised integration policies and programmes applied locally to enhance current labour force in the EU, including labour market integration of non-economic migrants (family reunification beneficiaries and refugees; intra-EU mobility of third-country nationals; and targeted regularisation of irregular migrants).

The formal decentralisation of responsibilities is most commonly found in decentralised states, such as Germany and Italy, which also happen to be the selected EU member states for this research. For example, while the German federal government is overall responsible for promoting employment and has been formally responsible for integration policy since 1997, it has managed to transfer specific aspects of labour market integration to states and municipalities in Germany. Having said that, while German states are responsible for policies related to vocational education and training, German municipalities are responsible for guaranteeing access to public services, managing social security benefits (and getting jobseekers into work), and helping young people access the labour market (Bendel, 2014).

Similarly, the Italian national government establishes an integration plan that regions of the country can then build upon, setting objectives in areas like labour market integration and managing public employment services. Italian municipalities are also responsible for reception services and helping immigrants access social services, which can include language training and other employment-related measures (OECD, 2014).


D.2 LOCAL AND REGIONAL BEST PRACTICES ON LABOUR MOBILITY CHANNELS AND INTEGRATION POLICIES IN CONTEXT OF EGYPT

Integration programmes

Local and regional authorities play a crucial role in developing and implementing efficient, sustainable and replicable integration programmes. In 2019, the European Committee of the Regions (CoR) identified a various range of local and regional best practices on integration practices. Following are the best practices identified in Germany and Italy. The good practices identified in these cases have a clear local or regional dimension and are operated or co-funded by these authorities. While Germany has a greater list of best practices for migrant integration, there were limited best practices noted in Italy.

Germany

Germany has launched a great number of programmes which combine labour market and language support for various categories of migrants as can be noted in the table on pages 42/43. These programmes have been tailored to benefit migrant integration.



An example of best practices identified in Germany:

From refugee to citizen, Germany's approach to refugee integration, in Altena, Germany (OECD, 2018)

Under the theme 'From refugee to citizen', the city of Altena, Germany started implementing a best practice initiative in 2014 in the area of integration of migrants in the education system and labour market, and in political and civic local life, as well as access of migrants to health services and housing. This best practice undertook an inclusive approach to refugee integration, with civil society, rather than government administration playing the role of the main actor.

The city had supported civil society in implementing initiatives in a range of areas, including housing support, mentoring, language learning and labour market integration. The basis for the success of this initiative was precisely the community's openness to newcomers and being part of the integration process through the investment of their time and resources. For example, various activities have been realised with the support of Stellwerk, a local volunteer agency that is supported by the city council.

Similarly through language classes and improved language skills, adults were ensured better access to the labour market. Various voluntary mentors were also important contacts for access to the labour market, helping companies and refugees connect with each other. Additionally, some companies have offered vocational orientations and internships, recognising existing qualifications and teaching new knowledge. In some cases, they might have even offered permanent employment to migrants.

Such projects are not only implemented for, but also with, refugees, through their active participation and commitment to take responsibility for integration, by also giving back to the community.

Due to Altena's pioneering approach, the city was able to take in an additional 100 refugees in October 2015, whereas in 2017, the western German town of Altena was given a prize of a cash award of €10,000 for its contribution towards the integration of immigrants into German society (Deutsche Welle, 2017).

Example of Implementing Integration Programmes in Germany:

- **Which doctor speaks my language?** – Medical directory for migrants in Darmstadt-Dieburg, Germany, whereby doctors in the district who speak languages in addition to German are listed in the publication, together with their areas of specialisation and contact information.

Since 2011, this initiative supports migrants acquire good healthcare, as a joint project of the Office for Migration and Inclusion and the Office for Equal Opportunities with financial resources from the Darmstadt-Dieburg district (**Website of the Office for Migration and Inclusion, 2019**).

- **Language counselling as a part of labour market integration** – Darmstadt-Dieburg district in Germany has an essential unit of language advice within the centre of municipal jobs.

The Staff trained in German as a second language offer assistance in applying for language courses, in addition to preliminary consultation and advice on the types of courses. The language advice is directly related to the process of labour market integration and staff case management.

- **Promoting multilingualism with book chests** – Office for Migration and Inclusion of the Municipality of Darmstadt-Dieburg (Germany) put together multilingual children's books and CDs named as 'book chests,' which have been available since 2013.

Educational establishments in the district can borrow these materials for their work in looking after and educating children. Additionally, the chests include informational brochures, such as those for parents in different languages, and materials for teachers. Feedback from teaching staff has been very positive (**Office for Migration and Inclusion, 2019**).

- **Tailored integration process for migrant children and their parents in the education system** – Heilbronn city in Germany has introduced a few of the tailored integration process initiatives related to the education system.

This initiative implemented testing for newly arrived children at school to find the most appropriate type of school and maximise their educational potential; presenting parent mentors as interpreters for meetings with parents in kindergartens and schools; as well as obtaining funding from the state and the national level to achieve strategic integration goals (**Landratsamt Heilbronn, 2019**).

- **MoBio** – Digital management of integration documents and processes - Baden-Württemberg in Germany launched an online application MoBio (Mobile Biography) making it possible for newly arrived migrants in the Rhein-Neckar district to upload certificates, qualifications and other personal information, to contribute to drawing up integration plans and agreements.

The application confirms with the digital integration management regulation of the Ministry of Social Affairs and Inclusion. Currently more than 1,000 refugees registered in the system, and their uploaded files are stored centrally on a secure server of the Rhein-Neckar district authority (**Landratsamt Rhein-Neckar-Kreis-Stabsstelle Integration, 2019**).

- **Local initiatives for refugee integration** – Schneverdingen city in Germany has implemented a variety of refugee integration initiatives, such as: weekly organised ‘Welcome cafés’, one-on-one meetings between aid workers and refugees, activities such as a reading group, cooking group, bicycle workshop, group for mothers, etc.

The integration initiatives focused on the needs of people in their educational and professional lives. Daycare centre, school, vocational school and other relevant local institutions like the Federal Employment Agency were noted to also be well prepared to meet refugee needs. For the many initiatives, the municipality delivers information, supports projects with applications for funding, engages coordinators and makes material resources available. Similar material can be noted in the website of the initiative (**Fluechtlingshilfe schneverdingen (FHS), 2019**).

- **Refugee Welcomes Housing Project** – started in Germany, but has now become a cross-border platform replicated and implemented in other EU member states (**Refugees Welcome International, 2019**).

Platform’s aim is to allow refugees to live in flatshares or houses instead of camps, by housing them in private accommodation, which is advertised as an advantage for everyone by allowing refugees to live in sound accommodation, learn the language faster, and adjust to a new environment more easily. The rent is mostly financed by government, but in other cases it is sourced from micro-donations (**Zusammenleben Willkommen, 2019**).

Italy

The best conditions for social integration of migrants in Italy have been identified in regions of Friuli Venezia Giulia, Umbria and Marche, and finally in Trentino Alto Adige (Caponio, 2013). For five years Friuli Venezia Giulia has been providing funds directed towards migrants, and in 2013 public tenders were launched to finance interventions in the five areas of the Integration Agreement.

Example of Implementing Integration Programmes in Italy:

- The Umbria region has a **website dedicated to immigration (Umbria website, 2020)**, as well as Friuli Venezia Giulia (**Friuli Venezia Giulia website, 2020**). For example, each year Umbria draws up a programme to present in which areas funds will be allocated.

As specified in the Integration Agreement, school, language courses, housing, and insertion in the labour market are the chosen areas for funding with particular attention to initiatives, which support collaboration among local institutions; as well as makes citizens aware of issues related to immigration and discrimination; and privileged immigrant women.

- A successful **project on language and civic courses** in the Lombardy region (**De Marchi, C. and S. Pozzi., 2013**).

- **Project on housing for migrants** in the city of Turin (**Cattai, G. and F. Garbaccio, 2013**).

- The Ministry of Interior, the Ministry of Education and Rai Education (**Rai education, 2020**) have created a **website to teach Italian and Italian civic culture to migrants**.

The website is financed by the European Fund for the Integration of non-EU immigrants.

E. Recommendations

This research paper aims to serve as an interactive guiding document for Egyptian counterparts to design potential legislative innovation to contribute to more effective and safer migrant labour mobility channels and collaborate with EU member states on labour market integration of immigrants.

The analysis of existing policy options for widening the legal channels for access to the European labour market permits some suppositions on the right mix of policy instruments to integrate into a comprehensive labour market approach. In terms of policy instruments, an analysis of existing options suggests the recommendations in this section, their impact, and some of the illustrative actions.

RECOMMENDATIONS FOR THE GOVERNMENT OF EGYPT

Following are recommendations for the Government of Egypt to develop policies aiming to protect migrants in Egypt better, fit legal migration channels to the needs of European labour markets, and enhance bilateral agreements within European labour markets:

Recommend	Impact	Illustrative action
1. Improving migration management legislation	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Addressing the silence noted in the Egypt Labour Code on dimensions of the migration cycle such as: pre-departure training of migrant workers, support of services throughout the duration of the contract, assistance to smuggled and trafficked migrant workers, conciliation mechanisms, financial education and remittance channels, reintegration into the Egypt labour market upon return, portability of pension and compensation rights. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Increase the number of mobility management tools, like migrant pre-departure training and orientation or skills training, to address the gap in policy and planning deficiency on labour migration, rather than only the lack of legal basis. - Establish migrant chain of safety and security from departure to destination through the professionalisation and a growing number of labour attaches.

Recommend	Impact	Illustrative actions
2. Better protection of migrant workers in Egypt	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Protection and provision of support to migrant workers in Egypt through education, and training of workers and strengthened labour inspection, mediation, arbitration and reconciliation to avoid abuse related to termination of contract, non-payment of overtime, poor conditions of work. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Introduce migrant protection policies that will target integration of immigrants in diverse domains of life. - Compensate claims, access to benefits and assistance in situations of dispute. - Adapt post-deportation monitoring mechanisms to assess the situation of people deported to Egypt in the past years
3. Enhancing bilateral agreements within European labour markets through institutional capacity building	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Rise of inter-ministerial coordination in emigration related matters to ensure that the different policy plans proposed by Egyptian ministerial bodies remain coherent and achieve complementary objectives. - In order to ensure legislative harmonisation, Egypt should continue the cooperation with member states for the strengthening of the UN treaty body system, and provide adequate support for UN agencies, programmes and funds that aid the promotion of human rights. Also, Egypt needs to engage in a comprehensive revision of its position with respect to the various international and regional instruments linked to human rights. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Integrate legal labour Egyptian migration opportunities to the EU, into the EU migration agreements with third countries (such as Mobility Partnerships), as well as mechanisms to facilitate the labour and skills matching for migrant workers for EU countries. - Egypt ought to be committed to submitting its periodic national reports to treaty bodies of the treaties it is a party of and to review reservations on and the status of ratification of the various regional and international agreements. <p>(For example, Egypt is committed to support the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development by reporting targets and goals on progress vis-à-vis the SDGs.)</p>
4. Fitting legal migration channels to the needs of European labour markets	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Align the adoption of national strategies in accordance with EU migration strategies and international standards, as well as renew bilateral agreements with EU member states. - More gendered Egyptian legislation and policy frameworks with positive impact on the Egyptian labour market. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - The enduring reform of the EU Blue Card should enforce fewer costs on migrants and employers while granting more rights, particularly to intra-EU mobility, to Blue Card holders. - Offer migrants' skills acquisition through training and internships validated by EU accepted certifications.

Recommend	Impact	Illustrative actions
5. Ensure data production, protection and management	- Egypt must comply with normative standards on data production, protection and management, due to the risk that un-protected data entails for the safety of asylum seekers, and/or peaceful activists.	- Any data-sharing agreement between Europol and Egypt should be approved by the European Data Protection Overseer.

This paper acknowledges Egypt's efforts to progress towards achieving the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development by enabling Egyptian stakeholders to enact best practices at institutional, legislative and informational level for labour migrants, as well as to submit its periodic national reports to treaty bodies of various regional and international agreements. Furthermore, the government of Egypt should continue to pioneer the strengthening of the national human rights framework and the foundations for a contemporary and democratic society. In this way, Egypt will be committed to upholding the rights of its citizens in line with its respective international legal obligations and to continue to develop and strengthen its national human rights institutions and frameworks as the backbone of the protection of rights and freedoms of its citizens, as enshrined within the Constitution.

Additionally, for example the drift towards a growing number of female migrants leaving Egypt for family reunification in EU countries, has not been followed by integration programmes for women migrants. Hence, further steps needs to be taken for Egypt to develop a more gendered Egyptian legislation and policy frameworks related to migration. Similarly, Egypt should undertake strategic actions to better protect migrant workers in Egypt, and ensure it complies with the EU normative standards on data production. A national employment agency within MOMM to implement policies and programmes for employment, register jobseekers and vacant jobs, would assist and upgrade the current work that is being undertaken by the Employment offices, as part of the Egyptian institutions.

It is also crucial for Egypt to align the adoption of national strategies in line with EU migration strategies and international standards, as well as renew bilateral agreements with EU member states, due to the great power of discretion that EU member states have over EU central policies.

Moreover, as noted in the recommended actions above, by using the virtue of being a founder of and an active player in a number of key regional and political organisations, Egypt can lead the way to development of enhanced regional cooperation in the area of protection of all human rights and fundamental freedoms, including through the Human Rights Council.

Egypt can also do so through the implementation of the African Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights, the African Charter on the Rights and Welfare of the Child and the African Peer Review Mechanism; as well as engage in the consideration of the protocols relating to the rights of women and to the African Court of Justice and Human Rights. Furthermore, in order to enhance human rights and fundamental freedoms in the continent, Egypt ought to encourage more cooperation and political dialogue in the field of human rights.

RECOMMENDATIONS FOR ALL STAKEHOLDERS INVOLVED, INCLUDING INTERGOVERNMENTAL ORGANISATIONS (IGOs)

Following are recommendations regarding the cooperation between EU member states (Germany and Italy in this case) and the Government of Egypt, to develop policies that optimise the Egyptian labour force present in the EU, as well as extend the pool of potential Egyptian labour migrants in the EU. The recommendations are relevant for all stakeholders, including IGOs, as their implementation can be expected after a great set of efforts to be employed by all parties.

Recommend	Impact	Illustrative actions
6. Optimising the Egyptian labour force presence in the EU	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - The recognition and certification of qualifications and skills attained in Egypt by Egyptians needs to be made easier, thus envisioning the progress of the EU-wide recognition system. - Enable the intra-EU mobility of Egyptians legally working in EU member states. - Incentivise the targeted regularisation of irregular migrants for whom there is labour market demand. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Support the labour market integration of migrants by firstly mapping their knowledge, skills and facilitating changes in migratory status to therefore understand Egypt's employment priorities. - National Integration Plan for Persons Entitled to International Protection, including interreligious and intercultural dialogue, language training, access to education, labour inclusion and vocational training.
7. Extending the pool of potential labour migrants for employers	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Enhance the appeal of the EU destination. - Address the limited skill transferability of Egyptian migrants and their de-skilling in European labour markets by expanding services to migrants in the form of assistance with access to EU labour markets and migrants' skills development. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Facilitate smooth integration of Egyptian migrant professionals with the required skills via an EU Traineeship Programme for them. - Provide opportunities for Egyptian migrants (foreign students) graduating in EU education institutions, to access EU labour markets.

Recommend	Impact	Illustrative actions
8. Ensuring an institutional cross-sector approach in the context of both EU and Egypt	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Develop inclusive approaches that ensure optimal engagement of stakeholders in Egypt and its communities abroad. - Explore the role of private placement agencies in international labour migration matching to be regulated via the development of a system of certified international recruitment agencies. 	Engage in dialogue with immigrant communities and NGOs to create common principles and improve the system of monitoring integration. Such data may be combined with polling and other tools for measuring the integration climate
9. Defusing misrepresentations of migrants in political discourse and public opinion	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Labour migration policies ought to be more transparent regarding the admission criteria harmonised with labour market needs. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Undertake a communication strategy on Egyptian migration at EU level to be employed and promoted through and with migrants on the realities of migration.

Labour market integration of immigrants is one of the key policy areas in many EU countries, which focus on migration. Effective integration of immigrants in the labour market is a vital factor of their individual level structural integration in the host countries, considering that it has been widely concluded that having a job and earnings that reflect one's skills positively contributes to the individuals' well-being, as well as positively influencing their social integration.

As part of the selected countries for this research, Germany and Italy, labour migration policies at both the EU central level, as well as at the EU member state level ought to be more transparent regarding the admission criteria harmonised with labour market needs.

On another note, any monitoring and evaluation of cooperation between the EU at the central level, or the EU individual member states, such as Germany and Italy, with Egypt in the field of migration and asylum should be based, amongst others, on the consultation of relevant European and Egyptian independent civil society organisations. Social partners and social dialogue mechanisms are a necessary component of any labour migration initiative, considering that they both define a labour migration policy responding to the actual needs of the labour market.

Having said that, initiatives aimed at affiliating different stakeholders in society, such as the Integration Summits organised in Germany in July 2006 and July 2007, are undoubtedly a step in the right direction. They have involved the participation of various stakeholders, including civil society, immigrants groups and community and government representatives, to so help the Governments to develop wide-ranging policy for immigrants and their families.

In that context, building of immigrant trust and the trust of immigrant organisations is an important duty of both the country of origin and the host country, because the latter leads to promotion of migrant integration. Similarly, it is very important for the Governments to transparently communicate the benefits of inclusive policies to non-immigrants too, as well as to ensure there are independent institutions in place to monitor the implementation and the effects of these policies.

RECOMMENDATIONS FOR COORDINATION OF EGYPTIAN MIGRANTS FROM THE PERSPECTIVE OF EU MEMBER STATES, GERMANY AND ITALY:

Following are recommendations regarding the partnerships between Egypt and EU migration member states (Germany and Italy, in this case). Furthermore, this analysis is enriched by best practices on labour mobility channels and integration policy, and it provides recommendations regarding policy contributions to facilitating effective and safer labour mobility, as well as successful integration programmes in host countries.

Recommend	Impact	Illustrative actions
10. Improving labour matching within and outside the EU	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Facilitate international labour matching for Egyptian migrants and operationalise the principle of EU preference in order to guarantee a better matching of labour migration policy outcomes to the actual needs of EU labour markets. - Offer current EU and member states (Italy and Germany) job intermediation tools, such as public employment matching services to Egyptian migrants. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Extend the European Job Mobility Portal, EURES, and others, to Egyptian migrants, in particular neighbourhood countries in the framework of Mobility Partnerships. - Extend employment matching services through partnerships with public employment services in Egypt. Aligning their digital capacities with global best practices for technology plays a great role here.
11. Addressing migrant integration challenges	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Through involvement of all relevant stakeholders, and efforts concentrated on a public debate on immigration which is factual and balanced. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Have placement and training services of youth and disadvantaged groups, to be supplemented with psychological support and traineeship in labour markets, to so generate sustainable outcomes.

Recommend	Impact	Illustrative actions
12. Addressing the extensive power of discretion retained by EU member states	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - The mobility schemes still vary according to categories of migrants covered by EU directives and are largely left to member states' discretion, considering that volumes of admission for economic migration are determined by member states and cannot be influenced by EU legislation. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Have centralised decision making be followed by de-centralised application in order to bring decision-making closer to where problems and individuals are. - Focus on bilateral agreements with EU member states to make use of market variabilities in Egypt's favour.
13. Comprehensive promotion of EU legal migration directives	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Cases of ineffective promotion of some of the EU directives has resulted in unsatisfactory results. The EU was short of one million researchers to meet the Europe 2020 target of growing R&D investment to 3% of GDP. - Ineffective differentiation between permits for researchers and other types of permits for highly skilled workers. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Promote EU directives that focus on students, researchers, seasonal workers, highly qualified migrants, intra-corporate transferees, etc. - Replicate/adapt the EU Blue Card Directive as an instrument for low-skilled migrants too (Currently, <i>Seasonal Workers Directive</i> concerns with the admission of medium and low-skilled migrants).
14. Create a "clearing house" of informational sources and data coordination for Egyptian stakeholders	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - More research is needed particularly on Labour Market Integration of non-economic migrants, patterns of intra-EU mobility of third-country nationals residing in the EU legally, on tools to improve matching of the profile of labour migrants to the needs of the EU labour markets. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - The current Commission Annual Report on Immigration and Asylum could be altered into a self-sufficient review tool for EU-wide migration policy. - Collect exact and decentralised migration statistics at the EU level, especially related to Egyptian migrant youth and their employment in the focus countries.

As noted in this research before, EU legislation has opted for a segmentation approach, but the extensive power of discretion retained by member states undermines the potential of directives in most cases, such as the *EU Blue Card Directive* application, which may discourage highly skilled migrants to come to the EU through such schemes. That is considering that member states have discretionary powers to allow access to member state labour markets, particularly in cases of migrants benefiting from family reunification and international protection, as well as foreign students. So, although the established single application procedure marks an irrefutable simplification,

member states are given great flexibility at various stages of the application procedure and there is little harmonisation regarding procedural guarantees. In many occasions, the flexibility of member states has also made the procedures more burdensome on immigrants.

Hence, Egypt should consider focusing more on bilateral diplomacy, due to the noted member states discretionary powers. It should focus on renewing its agreements with EU member states designed to regulate migration flows, such as readmission agreements etc. For example, Italy's decentralised approach in planning of integration policies is crucial for Egypt to absorb and effectively employ across its own services directed towards potential migrants to the EU.

Some immigrant integration challenges that have been noted throughout the analysis of this research, especially in the case of selected EU member states, Germany and Italy, are: inadequate language skills, lack of formal qualifications, the need to make skills visible, preference for work, need for special counselling concepts, health problems (post-traumatic stress disorders), cultural religious aspects (various considerations of formal education), legal and institutional barriers, diaspora concentration related to location and jobs, whereas assimilation versus integration ought to be addressed. Additionally, the assessments of the implementation of the *Researchers Directive (2011)* and the *Blue Card Directive on highly qualified migrants (2014)* show low rates of use. In that context, Egypt may initiate its own small promotion of these ambitious schemes for potential Egyptian migrants solely.

Inversely, after extensive research few types of programmes that work best for immigrants, and best use, develop and activate 'immigrants' skills, can be recommended in both case countries for this research: Germany and Italy. They range from job search individualised assistance coupled with intensive coaching, general introduction programmes and language trainings to provide immigrants with country-specific skills, subsidised private jobs and more. Moreover strong coordination between central employment agencies and immigrants' municipalities result to higher success rates of finding employment for immigrants. Having said that, in Egypt's case, the role of private placement agencies in international labour migration matching can be enhanced and regulated via the development of a system of certified international recruitment agencies.

The impact on labour mobility channels and integration policies of economic and non-economic migrants may be assumed to be fairly restricted. Though obtainable information does not allow an elaborate analysis of such impact evaluation, the latter may be inferred taking into consideration the low usage of EU labour policy tools and insufficient promotion of the existence of rules and potential directives, as is noted in section C of this paper. Additionally, an EU-wide Labour Market Information System and an EU labour market requires a forecasting system integrating migration flows of non-economic migrants. While both are the basis of any effective, evidence-based labour migration policy at the EU level, the former's role can be to facilitate international labour matching for third-country nationals and to operationalise the principle of EU preference, as well as to ensure a better matching of labour migration policy outcomes to the actual needs of EU labour markets.

Therefore, more research is needed, particularly on Labour market integration of non-economic migrants, patterns of intra-EU mobility of third-country nationals residing in the EU legally, on tools to improve matching of the profile of labour migrants to the needs of the EU labour markets, and the actual implementation and working of labour market tests in different EU member states. Hence, Egypt may consider to adapt the current Commission Annual Report on Immigration and Asylum into a self-sufficient review tool for EU-wide migration policy. The latter assessment should also be presented to the EU member states and EU national human rights mechanisms.

Finally, Government of Egypt also needs to address existing data gaps related to Egyptian migrant youth and their employment in the focus countries. It ought to be guided by further analyses and nuanced information to support the development of skill-sensitive, bilateral labour migration agreements or programmes between Egypt and Germany, Italy for Egyptian youth to be best matched with quality labour opportunities in these countries. In order to achieve the latter, Egypt needs to ensure the coherence and complementarity of policies across sectors. Moreover, Egypt needs to ensure the cross-sectoral complementarity of policies across countries, which is even more difficult.

F. Conclusions

One of the main objectives of the *EU legal migration acquis* was to benefit from establishing of a level field in the EU by approximating and harmonising national legislation of member states regarding admission criteria and conditions of entry and residence, which would in turn bring EU economic benefits and create a more attractive destination for migration. Nevertheless, as per the research undertaken for this paper, it can be noted that substantial disparities endure in relation to rules concerning admission procedures across the directives, therefore resulting in different standards across EU countries.

Additionally, little interaction is noted between *Employment* and *Legal migration policies*. Despite promoting labour mobility in fields with persistent vacancies and skills mismatches, the new policies for jobs, growth and investment make no reference to the need of a comprehensive economic migration strategy and its beneficial impact on EU competitiveness. Moreover, although Europe would without a doubt benefit greatly economically from greater intra-EU mobility, more legislative harmonisation is needed in order for it to be more attractive and competitive.

It is also highly important for future research to focus on analysing socioeconomic and environmental factors which may affect the relevance of the Egypt legislation in place, as well as of EU legal migration acquis. Additionally, more research and better production of data are crucial in any effective evidence-based labour migration policy at both the Egypt and the EU level. Hence, this paper aims to serve as an interactive guiding document for Egyptian counterparts, as well as IGOs assisting in the field of labour market integration and mobility channels, to develop potential legislative innovation that will contribute to more effective and safer migrant labour mobility channels.

It is indeed accurate that Europe's policy towards Egypt focuses strongly on the arrival of irregular migrants on its territory, which can take precedence over other issues. Nevertheless, there is lack of clarity for both migrant workers' and employers' obligations and entitlements due to limitations in Egypt's national legislative and regulatory frameworks on labour mobility, resulting in uncertainties regarding social protection provisions, insurance and residence/work permits.

Young Egyptian workers in Europe are especially at risk of lowered employment standards and potential informal labour arrangements, due to lack of diplomas and formal certifications that would give them access to jobs, and/or possessing certifications from country of origin

which may not be recognised in a host country new labour market. Moreover, as noted in the research, the barriers to skill transferability in European labour markets remains high. Migrant men, and especially women, are prone to undergo a process of deskilling, as a consequence of their migrant status. The latter provides an area for further research to serve as a vital basis for consideration both in migration studies and in labour economics. Moreover, there is also scope for important research with regards to families that have migrated together and the impact barriers to labour mobility channels have on them.

Additionally, Egypt needs to adapt the inclusive approach of involving CSOs, including labour trade unions, representatives of SMEs and other companies, in the context of labour mobility agreements of Egypt. The latter is crucial for Egypt to make that shift from commitment to implementation. Egyptian public information and communication strategy on the realities of migration and the need for a comprehensive labour migration policy at EU level should also be an integral part of any debates with migrants in this field, especially given the public discourse on immigration.

In Italy, integration policies have been implemented at local level, whereas regions have the independence to coordinate the entire local system of social services and decide how to allocate integration funding. Often, local authorities have invested in language courses, in funds for integration policies in housing and in the area of work, whereas NGOs have played a great role compensating for the lack of integration policies in the past, and complementing or substituting Italian institutions to date. Recently, newly arrived immigrants in Italy have been obligated to sign the Integration Agreement when they obtain their first residence permit. Similarly, in Germany, the model of the German Action Plan ensures a two-way approach, whereas migrants commit to achieving specific integration goals in a particular timeframe.

In collaboration with countries of origin, such as Egypt, both Germany and Italy need to also further engage in dialogue with immigrant communities and NGOs to create common principles and improve the system of monitoring integration. Such data may be combined with polling and other tools of measuring the integration climate. Similarly, labour migration policies ought to be more transparent regarding the admission criteria harmonised with labour market needs.

Having said that, there is a lack of quality research answering the precise search terms selected in relation to legislative frameworks on labour mobility of Egyptian migrants in the EU, and the case study EU countries of Germany and Italy, more generally. Hence, this research marks a culture of R&D that needs to continue to enhance the competencies of Egyptian stakeholders, including government, CSOs, academia, the private sector and IGOs.

Finally, host countries in collaboration with Egypt need to ensure that labour migration policies are framed to foster innovation, boost investment and create jobs even during the times of recession. Such labour migration effective policies should allow for migrants to shift to more permanent migration status, and host countries should communicate the latter in a timely and public way to all constituents to ensure that such reforms are not met with intolerance.

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A ROADMAP TO IMPROVE INTEGRATION POLICIES AND
OUTCOMES FOR EGYPTIAN IMMIGRANTS

RESEARCH PAPER 5

Exploring the Global Links between Indicators of Integration Policies and Outcomes

Research on the Means to Improve
Human Mobility Channels

Prepared by
Thomas Huddleston



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Executive Summary

METHODOLOGY

This research report reviews the existing integration policies worldwide and their potential impacts on harnessing the potential for all migrants to contribute their skills to the labour market and daily life of their destination country. The key deliverable of this report is the production of an overview of the data linking integration policies to the outcomes and beneficiaries that each policy aims to address.

Given the broad geographical and thematic scope of the links between policies and outcomes, the most appropriate methodology for this report is secondary meta-data collection and analysis of the trends and effectiveness of integration policies. The author had access to the latest labour migration and integration policy indicators for all destination countries covered by comparable indexes. To provide this overview of data linking integration policies to outcomes, the author conducted a full interdisciplinary literature review of all multivariate or multilevel analyses over the past decade that studied these links. These studies mostly measure integration policies by using the Migrant Integration Policy Index (MIPEX), which are the most comprehensive, reliable and widely cited indicators of integration policies. These studies measure outcomes in terms of labour migration and labour market participation, participation in most other areas of life as well as public attitudes. A specific analysis of integration indicators for immigrants from Egypt is not possible, due to the data limitations and sample sizes of the available international datasets. However, the report was able to identify any findings specifically related to outcomes for immigrants from the MENA region or Muslim family backgrounds. In the end, this global literature review identified 128 robust studies that analysed 414 links between a wide variety of integration policies and outcomes. The report is structured in separate sections for each area of policy covered by the comprehensive MIPEX index and by the corresponding studies linking policies and outcomes.

The report's findings on the links between integration policies and outcomes are generally applicable to developed democracies, as international multivariate studies are limited in geographical scope to Europe (mostly Western Europe) and, occasionally, OECD countries. The report's conclusions highlight the main results on the links between integration policies and outcomes. This review gives indications of the potential effectiveness and gaps for integration policies facing Egyptian immigrants around the world. Based on these findings, the report's conclusions propose recommendations for Egyptian policymakers and stakeholders to promote the interests of Egyptian immigrants in their main destination countries.

NATIONAL APPROACHES TO INTEGRATION

Overall, a country's approach to integration policy is strongly related to public and immigrants' attitudes and identities as well as to immigrants' well-being, political participation and several other outcomes. Looking at the major destination countries for Egyptian immigrants, integration policies overall are fully inclusive and developed in only a few countries, such as Australia and Canada. Integration policies overall are only slightly inclusive, with a few areas of weakness, in countries like France, Germany, Italy, the Netherlands and the UK. Policies are restricted and under-developed in countries like Kuwait, Israel, Oman, Saudi Arabia, Turkey and the United Arab Emirates.

LABOUR MARKET PARTICIPATION

Despite the limited and mixed results from the previously mentioned studies, a combination of various targeted policies may improve immigrants' investment in their skills, employment quality and long-term labour market mobility in the destination country. Labour market mobility policies also seem positively related to public perceptions of competition and economic threat.

Among the top destinations for Egyptian immigrants included in MIPEX, labour market mobility policies are the most developed in Austria, Canada, Germany, Italy, the Netherlands and the US. These policies are slightly less strong in Australia, France, Greece and the UK. They were the least developed in Cyprus and Turkey. Labour immigration programmes in the Gulf countries and Southeast Asia place significantly more family restrictions than programmes in Latin America, Europe and North America. Restrictions are greatest for low and medium-skilled 'temporary' worker programmes. MIPEX 2015 observed that labour market mobility policies are usually the best developed area of a country's integration policies. These policies are also one of the few areas of integration policy where international reform trends are consistently strong and positive.

FAMILY REUNIFICATION

Family reunification policies may be important to secure the family life, settlement and well-being of the limited number of Egyptian immigrants who live separated from their spouse, children and other direct dependents. Looking at the major destination countries for Egyptian immigrants, the right to family reunification is relatively secure in countries like Australia, Canada, Italy and the US, more insecure in countries like Austria, Cyprus, France, Turkey and the UK and highly restricted in countries like Kuwait, Israel, Oman, Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates.

MIGRANT EDUCATION

Inclusive education and integration policies can facilitate a stronger sense of belonging and more equitable academic progress for youth of various ethnic backgrounds. Looking at major destination countries for Egyptian immigrants, migrant education policies are well developed in countries like Australia, Canada and the UK, partially developed in countries like France, Germany, Italy and the Netherlands and under-developed in countries like Kuwait and Turkey. Education is identified by MIPEx 2015 as one of the greatest weaknesses in the integration policies of most countries, as education systems are very slow to adapt their policies to the specific needs of immigrant pupils.

MIGRANT HEALTH

Inclusive migrant health and integration policies are fundamental to secure basic health protections and inclusion for immigrants regardless of legal status. Integration policies seem related to various subjective and objective measures of health: self-reported health, the deleterious health effects of discrimination, chronic and longstanding illness including diabetes, elderly migrants' frailty and mortality rates. Among the top destinations for Egyptian immigrants included in MIPEx, migrant health policies are the most developed in Australia, Austria, Italy, the UK and the US. Policies were the least developed in Cyprus, Greece and Turkey. Generally, migrant health policies are most developed in countries with inclusive integration policies overall and least developed in countries with restrictive policies.

PERMANENT RESIDENCE

Permanent residence policies may influence immigrants' settlement and mobility decisions as well as their security of residence and employment. Looking at the major destination countries for Egyptian immigrants, permanent residence rights are relatively secure in countries like Canada, Germany and Italy. These policies are more insecure in countries like Australia, France, the UK and the US. They are highly insecure in countries like Cyprus, Turkey, Israel and Kuwait. Looking to indexes with a broader geographic scope, labour immigration programmes in the Gulf countries and Southeast Asia place significantly more restrictions on the long-term rights of migrant workers than programmes in Latin America, Europe and North America. The greatest restrictions emerge in terms of residence rights (access to permanent residence or citizenship) and in terms of social rights, especially unemployment benefits, retirement benefits and access to public education. These restrictions are greatest for low and medium-skilled 'temporary' worker programmes.

POLITICAL PARTICIPATION

Political participation policies seem to have consistently positive effects on the levels of immigrants' participation in the public life of their destination country in terms of voting in elections, other forms of conventional and unconventional participation. Increased participation is associated with a greater sense of political engagement and trust in the destination country. Inclusive policies also help to close the gap between immigrants and non-immigrants in terms of their satisfaction with life and in terms of their demands on politicians in their destination country.

Political participation is a slight area of weakness for integration policy in most countries. Looking at the major destinations for Egyptian immigrants, political participation policies are most inclusive in Australia, Germany and Nordic countries. These policies are more limited in Canada, France, Italy, the Netherlands, Oman, the United Arab Emirates and the UK. They are highly restricted in Greece, Israel, Kuwait, Saudi Arabia and Turkey. Political rights generally do not vary between immigration categories or skill-levels. These policies in this area are very slow to change over time.

NATURALISATION

Naturalisation policies emerge as one of the strongest determining factors behind naturalisation rates for first generation immigrants. The policies with the greatest effects on naturalisation seem to be the dual nationality policies of the origin and destination country, birthright citizenship for the second and third generation and the restrictiveness of the legal and procedural requirements. Facilitating naturalisation policies is strongly and positively linked to the development of a common sense of belonging, identity, trust and openness between immigrants and the general public. Naturalisation policies also seem to impact immigrants' 'citizenship premium' in terms of the boost to their employment, language learning and civic participation.

Given the importance of naturalisation policies for citizenship and belonging and their potential for employment and mobility, Egyptian immigrants could benefit from naturalisation reforms in their destination countries. For example, Egyptian immigrants still face restrictions to dual nationality in a few major destination countries (e.g. Kuwait, UAE, Germany, Austria and Netherlands). For most Egyptian immigrants, the greatest obstacle to naturalisation is the very long residence duration requirement in the largest destination countries for Egyptian immigrants: UAE (30 years), Bahrain (25), Qatar (25), Kuwait (20), Oman (20) and Lebanon (ordinary naturalisation restricted).

ANTI-DISCRIMINATION

Anti-discrimination policies can have a long-term impact on changing public attitudes, awareness, trust and reporting on discrimination. In countries with stronger policies, people are more likely to be aware of discrimination as a problem and know their rights. Greater knowledge of rights is associated over time with higher reporting of witnessing discrimination and lower levels of identification as discriminated minority groups. The potential reason for this change in reporting and identification over time could be immigrants' growing levels of trust under these supportive conditions. Stronger policies appear associated with greater levels of immigrant trust in the police and legal system and a more shared sense of social trust and satisfaction with democracy.

Introduction

Egyptian immigrants are working around the world in the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) region, Europe and the traditional English-speaking destination countries. The UN's 2019 estimations suggest that most are concentrated in MENA countries like Kuwait, Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates. Sizeable communities exist across the MENA region and in Australia, Austria, Canada, France, Germany, Greece, Italy, the Netherlands, the United Kingdom and the United States. While their specific profile and needs differ country-by-country, the most common experience of Egyptian immigrants are as migrant workers in younger working-age cohorts. They need to secure stable employment at the appropriate salary and qualification level. For this, they may need to invest in their professional and language skills and qualifications. They need full healthcare coverage and protection from discrimination. Over time, they will need to secure their family life and their future plans. They will want to participate fully in life, both in their destination country and back in Egypt. In all these ways, Egyptians abroad differ little from other immigrants, who have a wide diversity of reasons for migration and experiences of discrimination and integration.

Responding to immigrants and society's needs is the main aim of integration policies. The official government definitions of integration in most destination countries are related to the idea of a 'two-way' process of mutual accommodation by all immigrants and non-immigrants. Integration policies mainly regulate this process in two ways. Firstly, government policies regulate the extent to which immigrants and non-immigrants are granted equal rights and responsibilities. Secondly, government policies regulate the extent to which targeted policies and services invest in securing equal opportunities and outcomes for immigrants, as a disadvantaged or discriminated group. These definitions also present integration as a multi-dimensional policy and process involving most areas of public life: employment, education, health, family life, political participation, immigration and residence policies, and so on. Non-discrimination is usually presented as the main way for non-immigrants to contribute to this 'two-way' process. While the integration process is also seen as 'local' and local authorities are accorded a specific role, most policies in these areas of life are either regulated or strongly influenced by national policies and the central government.

This research report reviews the existing integration policies worldwide and their potential impacts on harnessing the potential for all migrants to contribute their skills to the labour market and daily life of their destination country. The key deliverable of this report is the production of an overview of the data linking integration policies to the outcomes and beneficiaries that each policy aims to address.

Given the broad geographical and thematic scope of the links between policies and outcomes, the most appropriate methodology for this report is secondary meta-data collection and analysis of the trends and effectiveness of integration policies. The author had access to the latest labour migration and integration policy indicators for all destination countries covered by comparable indexes. To provide this overview of data linking integration policies to outcomes, the author conducted a full interdisciplinary literature review of all multivariate or multilevel analyses over the past decade that studied these links. These studies mostly measure integration policies by using the Migrant Integration Policy Index (MIPEX), which are the most comprehensive, reliable and widely cited indicators of integration policies. This review therefore focused on MIPEX studies for the sake of comparability. These studies measure outcomes in terms of labour migration and labour market participation, participation in most other areas of life as well as public attitudes. A specific analysis of integration indicators for immigrants from Egypt is not possible, due to the data limitations and sample sizes of the available international datasets. However, the report was able to identify any findings specifically related to outcomes for immigrants from the MENA region or Muslim family backgrounds. In the end, this global literature review identified 128 robust studies that analysed 414 links between a wide variety of integration policies and outcomes. The 128 studies are too numerous for this report's list of references, but all can be publicly accessed via Google Scholar by typing in the study's publication year, the author's last name and MIPEX or 'Migrant Integration Policy Index.' The list of references in this report refers to the key international resources and overviews of integration policies that can be used by Egyptian stakeholders to develop country-specific strategies.

The report is structured in separate sections for each area of policy covered by the comprehensive MIPEX index and by the corresponding studies linking policies and outcomes. The report is divided into nine sections: overall integration policies (i.e. a country's general approach to equal rights and opportunities for immigrants), targeted labour market mobility policies, family reunification policies, targeted education policies for migrant children, targeted migrant health policies, political participation policies, permanent residence policies, access to nationality policies and anti-discrimination policies. Each section analyses the main findings, similarities and differences between these studies of integration policies and outcomes. Within each section, the first sub-section examines the links between that specific integration policy (i.e. migrant health policies) and the specific outcomes and beneficiaries that policy aims to address (i.e. migrant health outcomes). This section also considers more general studies linking overall integration policies (i.e. the overall MIPEX score) with outcomes in that specific area (i.e. migrant health outcomes). The second sub-section looks more broadly at the links identified between the specific integration policy (i.e. migrant health policies) and integration outcomes in other areas (employment, education, public opinion, etc.) The multidimensionality of integration can lead policies in one area to affect outcomes in several other areas. The third and final sub-section reviews that the specific integration policies facing

Egyptian immigrants around the world. Using MIPEX and comparable indexes, this section captures the international range of policies, reform trends, standards for best practice and key international resources where available. This third sub-section provides a gap analysis relative to the context for Egyptian immigrants abroad, which Egyptian stakeholders can use as a roadmap to inform their work to advocate for stronger integration policies in the main destination countries.

The report's findings on the links between integration policies and outcomes are generally applicable to developed democracies, as international multivariate studies are limited in geographical scope to Europe (mostly Western Europe) and, occasionally, OECD countries. The report's conclusions highlight the main results on the links between integration policies and outcomes. This review gives indications of the potential effectiveness and gaps for integration policies facing Egyptian immigrants around the world. Based on these findings, the report's conclusions propose recommendations for Egyptian policymakers and stakeholders to promote the interests of Egyptian immigrants in their main destination countries.

1. Trends on integration policies

1.1 LINK BETWEEN OVERALL INTEGRATION POLICIES AND OUTCOMES

A country's overall approach to integration policy is strongly associated with public attitudes towards immigrants, based on 23 MIPEX studies of over 800,000 people across Europe. The relationship is strongest with the level of anti-immigrant attitudes and perceived threats from immigrants. Countries with more inclusive integration policies, as measured by MIPEX, enjoy higher levels of public support for immigrants (Just and Anderson 2014 and Karpiński and Wysieńska-Di Carlo 2018) and for inclusive policies (Brady and Finnigan 2014, Schroyens et al. 2015, Heizmann 2016, Heizmann and Ziller 2020). They also experience lower levels of anti-immigrant attitudes (Hooghe and Vroome 2015, Bello 2016, Visintin et al. 2018, Kim and Byun 2019), anti-Muslim attitudes (Kaya 2015 and Schlueter et al. 2020) and perceptions of immigrant threats (Schlueter et al. 2013 and Callens and Meuleman 2017), particularly in terms of economic threats (Heizmann 2015, Hooghe and Vroome 2015 and Callens and Meuleman 2017). Inclusive integration policies also seem related to higher levels of public social trust (Reeskens 2010 and Zimdars and Tampubolon 2012). Policies and public opinion are likely to continuously influence each other as a virtuous or vicious circle (Callens and Meuleman 2017). As summarised by Callens 2015, the virtuous circle is where inclusive integration policies relate to positive public opinion on immigrants, which in turn can reduce the level of perceived threat and anti-immigrant attitudes. In contrast, the vicious circle is where exclusionary policies reinforce perceptions of threat. One longitudinal study (Schlueter et al. 2013) suggests that policies may have a greater impact on public opinion than vice-versa. Further research is necessary to investigate the dynamics between integration policies and public opinion.

The strong link between integration policies and public attitudes towards immigrants does not mean that these policies reflect all aspects of public opinion. For example, integration policies do not seem to affect the public's perceptions of immigrants as cultural threats (Callens and Meuleman 2017). Studies disagree about whether integration policies are related to the level of voting for far-right or populist parties (for example, Kauff et al. 2013, Werts et al. 2013 and Podobnik et al. 2019). Similarly, integration policies are not necessarily positively related to the public's level of satisfaction or trust with society, democracy, institutions or government (McLaren 2010, Hooghe and Vroome 2015 and Pennings 2017). These levels often differ little between countries with inclusive vs. restrictive integration policies. Public dissatisfaction is usually related to broader

trends of political polarisation in the developed world and many topics remain up for debate in a diverse democracy.

The positive dynamic between integration policies and public opinion directly shapes immigrants' opportunities for integration. 'Contact theory' – the idea that positive attitudes increase contacts and positive experiences for immigrants and the public – appear to play out in practice (Green et al. 2020). Strong integration policies are associated not only with more positive attitudes towards immigrants, but also with more frequent and more positive everyday contacts between immigrants and the public. Integration policies provide greater opportunities for interaction to develop skills and networks as well as a more positive narrative for immigrants and the public to develop a common sense of belonging. As a result, the positive impacts of inclusive integration policies can be measured in terms of both 'subjective' and 'objective' outcomes for immigrants and the public.

In terms of 'subjective' outcomes, a more common sense of belonging and identity emerges in countries with overall inclusive integration policies. Supportive policies and attitudes seem to bring together the identities of immigrants and non-immigrants. Under inclusive policies, immigrants and non-immigrants generally tend to develop more common and more inclusive ideas about national identity (Jugert et al. 2018, Visintin et al. 2018 and Igarashi 2019) and patriotism (Ariely 2018). More broadly, comparative studies from Europe find that a supportive context is a major factor that helps to close gaps in life satisfaction for long-settled immigrants from non-European and developing countries (Hadjar and Backes 2013, Hendriks and Bartram 2016, Kogan et al. 2018, Heizmann and Böhnke 2019). Immigrants' greater sense of well-being under inclusive integration policies also extends to their health outcomes. A country's overall integration policy appear to have major effects on immigrants' health in terms of both 'subjective' and 'objective' health outcomes. Eleven MIPEX studies investigate the links between overall integration policies and migrant health, which are fully reviewed in this related section in this report. Although positive relationships do not emerge with all aspects of identity, trust and well-being, policies emerge as a potentially major factor shaping the overall process of identity formation and trust between immigrants and non-immigrants.


In terms of 'objective' outcomes, a country's overall approach to integration predicts several key steps in the integration process. The effects of these policies are often most obvious for immigrants from non-European countries and discriminated groups, including those from North Africa and Muslim family backgrounds. Granting equal rights and opportunities to immigrants helps to close the gaps in their political participation, interest and trust (Ruedin 2013, Helbling et al. 2015, Welge 2015 and Thorkelson 2016). Results are more mixed and complex for the links with employment and educational outcomes. An earlier review of studies (see MIPEX 2015 and Bilgili et al. 2015) suggested that inclusive policies help immigrants in practice to reunite their families, get basic training, become permanent residents, voters and citizens and use their rights as victims of discrimination. This updated review of MIPEX studies explores all these relationships between overall integration policies and outcomes, with detailed results in each thematic section of this report.

1.2 OVERALL INTEGRATION POLICIES FACING EGYPTIAN IMMIGRANTS AROUND THE WORLD

Summarising these general findings, a country's approach to integration policy is strongly related to public and immigrants' attitudes and identities as well as to immigrants' well-being, political participation and several other outcomes. Comparable data on integration policies are mostly available for developed countries via MIPEX (2015) and ICRI (2008), which are presented in Figure 1. The two indexes slightly differ in their thematic coverage of integration policies. In order to enhance comparability of the two indexes, an adapted score was calculated for each index, based on a simple average restricted to the policies measured by both indexes: family reunification, education, political participation, access to nationality and anti-discrimination policies. These individual integration policies will be compared in each thematic section of this report. These adapted MIPEX and ICRI scores for overall integration policies are presented in Figure 2. This figure also includes a slightly different index (Ruhs 2009), which focuses only on the rights of migrant workers. Looking at the major destination countries for Egyptian immigrants, integration policies overall are fully inclusive and developed in only a few countries, such as Australia and Canada. Integration policies overall are only slightly inclusive, with a few areas of weakness, in countries like France, Germany, Italy, the Netherlands and the UK. Policies are highly restricted and under-developed in countries like Kuwait, Israel, Oman, Saudi Arabia, Turkey and the United Arab Emirates.

According to the latest MIPEX 2015, the international trends are ambivalent towards the granting of equal rights and opportunities to immigrants. On the one hand, immigrants generally face greater obstacles in emerging destination countries with small numbers of immigrants and high levels of anti-immigrant sentiment. On the other hand, immigrants usually benefit from more equal rights and opportunities in wealthier, older and larger countries of immigration, for example in Western Europe and the English-speaking world. Internationally, the greatest areas of strength are that migrant workers, reunited families and permanent residents enjoy basic security, rights and protection from discrimination. In contrast, the greatest obstacles are for foreign citizens to become citizens or politically active and for mainstream services to guarantee equal access and opportunities for immigrants (targeted employment, education and health support). The international trends and situation for Egyptian immigrants are analysed in each of the thematic sections of this report.

Figure 1: Inclusiveness of overall integration policies in selected destination countries



Note: Authors own compilation of MIPEX indicators (2015 in green) and ICRI (2008 in blue). Country names coded to ISO 3166-1 alpha-2 code.

Figure 2: Adapted indexes of overall integration policies (adapted MIPEX, ICRI and Ruhs Index)

Note: Authors own compilation and adaptation of MIPEX indicators (2015 in green), ICRI (2008 in blue) and Ruhs (2009 in purple). MIPEX and ICRI scores are adapted simple average of their common policy dimensions: family reunification, education, political participation, access to nationality and anti-discrimination policies. The Ruhs score reflects the original overall index score. Country names coded to ISO 3166-1 alpha-2 code.

2. Labour market mobility policies

2.1 LINK BETWEEN LABOUR MARKET POLICIES AND OUTCOMES

With the limited available evidence, labour market integration seems to be primarily explained by countries' general economic migration policies and context, rather than by their targeted integration policies. Given the importance of labour market integration in governments' integration agendas, it is surprising that these policies and outcomes are investigated in only nine specific MIPEX studies and three more general MIPEX studies over the past decade. Most of these studies do not control for migrants' reason for migration and the economic situation at and since their arrival. Nor do most try to match the different types of targeted policies with their specific beneficiaries and outcomes. More robust impact evaluations have concluded that immigrants benefit significantly from programmes providing early work experience, country-specific vocational training, start-up funds for entrepreneurs and job search (see Butschek and Walter 2014, Bilgili 2015 and Liebig and Huddleston 2015). Therefore, more targeted research is needed before any robust conclusions can be drawn from these studies on the effectiveness of labour market mobility policies. In addition to these 12 studies, several dozen more MIPEX studies have investigated the link between employment outcomes and integration policies other than labour market mobility. Of the 70 links studied, 28 positive links emerge with most integration policies measured by MIPEX, particularly access to nationality and anti-discrimination, which will be presented in later sections.

Looking only at studies comparing labour market policies and outcomes, these policies do not seem particularly relevant for access to employment- i.e. whether immigrants and their descendants are working or looking for a job. These policies, as measured by MIPEX, are not related to their overall participation (Bredtmann and Otten 2015, Kesler 2016 and Cebolla-Boado and Finotelli 2015), unemployment (Bergh 2014, Cebolla-Boado and Finotelli 2015 and Lancee 2016) or employment rates (Bisin et al. 2011 and Kislev 2017). A few studies do observe effects worthy of further investigation. For example, targeted policies have a significant effect on access to work permits (Migali and Natale 2017) and a small effect on the participation rates for non-EU immigrants (Kesler 2017). These policies also seem to boost the employment rates for discriminated groups like non-EU immigrants with strong ethnic identities (Bisin et al. 2011). This study finds that stronger targeted policies decrease the employment penalties that they experience in European labour markets.

More encouraging results emerge about the potential benefits of targeted integration policies for the long-term outcomes of employed immigrants. Low-educated immigrant

workers are more likely to experience in-work poverty, without a sufficient or secure income to meet their needs, while highly-educated immigrant workers are more likely to experience over-qualification and brain waste, working in jobs far below their education level from their origin country (Liebig and Huddleston 2015). Specific policies have small positive effects on their exposure to overqualification (Aleksynska and Tritah 2013 and Prokic-Breuer and McManus 2016), job relocation opportunities (Nowotny 2011 and Guzi et al. 2015) and occupational status (Platt et al. ongoing), although differences sometimes emerge for men and women (Palencia-Esteban 2019). One explanation for these weak and mixed results so far could be that targeted policies may be too new, small-scale, or generic to reach beneficiaries and affect aggregate outcomes at country level (see Bilgili et al. 2015). Another possible interpretation is that these policies aim less at immigrants' immediate labour market participation and more at improving their country-specific skills and qualifications. According to this logic, these policies encourage immigrants to make investments in their long-term skills, even if participation in these programmes temporarily depresses their participation in the labour market. These policies might also be designed to be responsive to the needs of at-risk groups. In that case, policies would be stronger in countries with mostly low-educated non-economic immigrants in need of support and weaker in countries with mostly high-skilled migrant workers. If this logic holds, then studies simply comparing policies to labour market outcomes may lead to misleading results known as 'reverse causality.' In other words, the absence of a systematically positive relationship between policies and outcomes across all countries may not be interpreted as the ineffectiveness of policies, but rather as the responsiveness and uptake of these policies to specific national contexts.

This logic of policy responsiveness bears out in a few specific MIPEx studies where the relationship between policies and employment outcomes were, surprisingly, negative. This means that policies are better developed where immigrants' labour market situation is weaker, while policies are under-developed where immigrants are in a stronger position on the labour market. Aleksynska and Tritah 2013 find that targeted support is negatively linked to immigrants' levels of overqualification, meaning that countries offering significant support tend to have more immigrants working below their qualifications. This finding could indicate that policies are responsive to overqualification and, even, employing overqualification as a short-term strategy by placing immigrants in entry-level jobs combined with on-the-job language and vocational training. Similar negative relationships emerge between policies and immigrants' relative income levels (Kislev 2017), unemployment (Cebolla-Boado and Finotelli 2015) and skill levels (Levels et al. 2017). Kislev 2017 interprets negative relationships like these as a positive indicator of immigrants' participation in targeted policies; immigrants' labour market participation would be delayed while they participate in adult education measures. Indeed, Zwysen and Demireva 2020 find that strong labour market mobility policies are associated with higher levels of participation in language courses and further education for non-EU family migrants, refugees and migrant workers arriving without job offers. This study suggests that stronger policies are associated with higher levels of investment in immigrants' skills and qualifications, with diffuse effects that are hard to capture in standard measures of labour market integration. Further research is required into the role of these policies in responding to labour market needs and supporting this long-term investment for different categories of non-EU immigrants.

2.2 LINK BETWEEN LABOUR MARKET POLICIES AND OTHER INTEGRATION OUTCOMES

Studies are limited and their results are mixed about the links between policies and other integration outcomes. Only 13 MIPEX studies have considered the possible effects of labour market mobility policies on areas outside employment.

Labour market mobility policies seem positively related to public attitudes and to immigrants' attitudes. In terms of public attitudes, two studies (Careja and Andreß 2013 and Callens and Meuleman 2017) conclude that these policies influence to what extent the public sees immigrants as an economic threat or as an opportunity. More inclusive policies do not lead to greater perceptions of competition and economic threat, but rather to lower perceptions of economic threat and greater perceptions of immigrants' positive contributions. Callens and Meuleman 2017 calculate that an increase of 10 points on the MIPEX scale for labour market mobility policies would improve public attitudes about the economic role of immigrants by an average of six percentage points. The links with public opinion require further investigation, as perceptions of economic threat are just one aspect of public opinion. These policies appear unrelated for perceptions of cultural threat (Callens and Meuleman 2017) and negative for overall social trust (Zimdars and Tampubolon 2012).

In terms of immigrants' attitudes, labour market mobility policies may improve immigrants' general perceptions, without noticeable effects on specific integration outcomes, according to the preliminary studies to date. Stronger policies may be associated with greater levels of life satisfaction (de Freitas et al. 2018), greater interest in the country as a destination (Beine et al. 2019) and lower levels of discrimination-related depression (de Freitas et al. 2018). Any direct link between these policies and discrimination levels seems weak (André and Dronkers 2016). Beyond this, no clear links emerge from the few MIPEX studies comparing labour market mobility policies to outcomes on migrant education (Fossati 2010 and 2011 and Schlicht-Schmälzle and Möller 2012) or health (Malmusi et al. 2015, Bakhtiari et al. 2018 and De Freitas et al. 2018). Future studies should match different labour market mobility policies to their specific beneficiaries and to the related long-term integration outcomes that the policy aims to address.


2.3 LABOUR MARKET POLICIES FACING EGYPTIAN IMMIGRANTS AROUND THE WORLD

Despite the limited and mixed results from the previously mentioned studies, a combination of various targeted policies may improve immigrants' investment in their skills, employment quality and long-term labour market mobility in the destination country. MIPEX 2015 is the only international source with comparative indicators on migrant labour market mobility policies (see Figure 3). Further comparative information is available through the IOM (Migration Governance Index), OECD (International Migration Outlooks and targeted publications) and European Commission (European Website on Integration and European Migration Network).

Among the top destinations for Egyptian immigrants included in MIPEX, labour market mobility policies are the most developed in Austria, Canada, Germany, Italy, the Netherlands and the US. These policies are slightly less strong in Australia, France, Greece and the UK. They were the least developed in Cyprus and Turkey. In general, they are strongest in traditional destination countries and Western Europe and weakest in newer destination countries in Central and Southeastern Europe. MIPEX 2015 observed that labour market mobility policies are usually the best developed area of a country's integration policies. On average across the MIPEX countries, family and long-term residents can immediately access the private labour market, public employment services and training. The main area of weakness is the development of targeted support measures to recognise newcomers' skills or foreign qualifications and to orient them to appropriate jobs and services. Labour market mobility policies are one of the few areas of integration policy where international reform trends are consistently strong and positive. The majority of MIPEX countries made improvements to these policies between 2010 and 2015. Newer destination countries tend to focus on legislative reforms of work migration channels and rights, while more established destinations go further by piloting and expanding targeted support measures. Summarising policies from different countries, MIPEX 2015 sets the following standard for best practice on labour market mobility:

"A migrant with the right to work and live in the country has the same chances as everyone else in the labour market. From day one in the country, she and her family members can start applying for any job in the private or public sector. She gets her qualifications from abroad recognised. She can then improve her skills through training and study grants. The state encourages her by targeting her specific needs – for example, she can take language courses focused on her profession. Job mentors and trained staff help her assess skills and use public employment services. Once employed, she has the same rights as all workers in the country."

Figure 3: Inclusiveness of labour market mobility policies in selected destination countries



Note: Authors own compilation of MIPEX indicators (2015 in green).

3. Family reunification policies

3.1 LINK BETWEEN FAMILY REUNIFICATION POLICIES AND OUTCOMES

Family reunification policies and their impacts on integration have been rarely investigated through robust multivariate analysis. Family reunification can be seen as both migration and integration. While these policies provide a migration channel for dependent family members, these policies also function as integration policies as they regulate the right to family life for the sponsor and the socio-economic rights and support for dependent adults and children. Despite the potential importance of family reunification policies for integration, only 20 studies have investigated the link between these policies, as measured by MIPEX, and integration outcomes. Of these 20 studies, only three specifically focus on family reunification policies as a distinct policy area and measure family-specific outcomes and hypotheses. The other 17 studies include family reunification policies as one integration policy among all others, with little-to-no methodological attention to the specific objectives, beneficiaries and outcomes of family reunification (see Bilgili et al. 2015). Given that these studies do not properly match family reunification policies to the specific integration outcomes that they aim to address, the methodological weaknesses of these few studies limit the applicability and significance of many of their findings. Future opportunities for analysis are emerging, as international surveys are increasingly including the variable “reason for migration”, including family reasons. These surveys can then be used for dedicated analysis of the integration process of family migrants in comparison to other categories of migrants with the same individual and origin characteristics.

The three specific studies on family reunification policies (Sumino 2014, Migali and Natale 2017 and Sand and Gruber 2018) suggest that policies may significantly affect immigrants’ right to family life and the well-being of the different members of the family. Given the under-investment in robust research linking family reunification policies and outcomes, the conclusions from these three specific studies are tentative but useful for debate on the role of family reunification policies in the long-term integration process.

Firstly, the main purpose of these policies is to regulate the reunification of sponsors with their family members. Indeed, policies seem to have a significant and positive effect on the number of family reunifications, as Migali and Natale 2017 have shown across Europe based on the number of first permits given for family reasons. Non-EU families are more likely to reunite in countries with inclusive policies, while non-EU family reunifications are rarer in countries with restrictive policies. These findings by Migali and Natale 2017 echo the broader findings by Beverelli 2020 that family reunification policies are one of the few integration policies that may impact on non-EU bilateral migration flows. Interestingly, family reunification policies may not constitute the so-called “pull factor” often assumed in political debates, as Beine et al. 2019 do not find that these policies affect the overall attractiveness of the country to other potential migrants living in their country of origin. Instead, this increase in family mobility may serve as an indicator of family’s aspirations for long-term settlement and local integration. In countries facilitating family reunification, immigrants are less likely to live in segregated neighbourhoods (Ambinakudige and Lichter 2019) and more likely to remain settled in their area rather than move to new regions or countries due to job shortages (Guzi et al. 2015).

A second study on family reunification policies (Sand and Gruber 2018) focuses on reducing the gap in well-being between immigrants and non-immigrants, specifically among the elderly (ages 50-85). The few other MIPEX studies including family reunification suggest these policies do not have widespread effects on all immigrants’ overall levels of life satisfaction (De Freitas et al. 2018) and health (Bakhtiari et al. 2018). Nor would one empirically expect such a population-wide effect, given that the majority of immigrants are young, often single people, who were not family migrants or ever separated from their spouse or children (OECD 2017b). Rather, as immigrants age into more fragile stages of their lives, the long-term benefits of family reunification may become more evident. The well-designed study of ageing by Sand and Gruber 2018 observe that, in countries with restrictive family reunification policies, immigrant elderly experience much lower levels of well-being than non-immigrant elderly. Whereas in countries facilitating family reunification, the immigrant elderly experience levels of well-being that are similar to non-immigrant elderly, even after controlling for the key individual-level factors that normally determine well-being. This level of well-being may be related to the psychological security of family life and long-term settlement, as highlighted above.

3.2 LINK BETWEEN FAMILY REUNIFICATION POLICIES AND OTHER INTEGRATION OUTCOMES

This subjective feeling of well-being may stem from the concrete benefits of family reunification for the socio-economic integration of family members. The OECD has started to investigate the effects of rapid family reunification; a younger age of migration, longer residence duration and wider family and social networks in the country significantly improve immigrants' socio-economic outcomes (OECD 2012, 2017a and 2019). Looking across Europe, Bisin et al. 2011 find that facilitating family reunification is generally associated with positive employment outcomes for most non-EU immigrants, although the effects may be negative for immigrants with strong ethnic identities, which can limit their social networks. Facilitating family reunification may also provide immigrant women with the resources and networks they need to get out of gender segregated occupations into the mainstream labour market (Palencia-Esteban 2019). Direct links between family reunification policies and education outcomes are often hard to identify in individual studies (Fossati 2010, Fossati 2011, Schlicht-Schmälzle and Möller 2012). A wider meta-analysis suggests that countries facilitating family reunification may see overall benefits in terms of not only immigrant children's academic performance, but also their socialisation and behaviour at school (Dimitrova et al. 2016). Turning from children to adults, a new study by Zwysen and Demireva 2020 find slightly negative relationships between family reunification policies and the uptake of further education for all categories of non-EU immigrants. Reviewing this limited literature on family reunification policies and outcomes, further research is needed on the differential socio-economic impacts for male and female sponsors, spouses and children from different migrant groups and reasons for migration.

The third specific study on family reunification questions whether these policies have wider effects on public opinion and immigrants' sense of belonging. Sumino 2014 presents family reunification rights as a form of multiculturalism that diminishes public support for state policies, although his results are statistically weak. Interestingly, the few other scholars investigating the link between family reunion and public opinion have uncovered some initially positive relationships. Zimdars and Tampubolon 2012 observe that family reunification and integration policies are all positively associated with high levels of trust in society. Faoro 2016 finds that inclusive family reunification policies are the most important integration policy for building trust in the country's public institutions, both among immigrants and their second-generation children. The study speculates that inclusive family policies make the second generation feel that their family is treated equally and fairly. Similarly, André and Dronkers 2016 suggest that these policies may also have some limited effect on whether immigrants and their children identify as a discriminated group in society, although a study by De Freitas et al. 2018 does not find an effect. Looking beyond general levels of trust, more focused studies could look at the effects of policies on family migrants in terms of their trust, social identity and political participation.

3.3 FAMILY REUNIFICATION POLICIES FACING EGYPTIAN IMMIGRANTS AROUND THE WORLD

Family reunification policies may be important to secure the family life, settlement and well-being of the limited number of Egyptian immigrants who live separated from their spouse, children and other direct dependents. Comparable data on these policies are mostly available from democracies in the developed world via MIPEX (2015) and ICRI (2008), which are presented in Figure 4. A slightly different index (Ruhs 2009) focused only on the rights of migrant workers. This migrant workers' index (see results in Ruhs 2011) found that labour immigration programmes in the Gulf countries and Southeast Asia place significantly more family restrictions than programmes in Latin America, Europe and North America. Restrictions are greatest for low and medium-skilled 'temporary' worker programmes. Looking at the major destination countries for Egyptian immigrants, the right to family reunification is relatively secure in countries like Australia, Canada, Italy and the US, more insecure in countries like Austria, Cyprus, France, Turkey and the UK and highly restricted in countries like Kuwait, Israel, Oman, Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates.

All three of these indexes agree on the common basic elements of a family reunification policy. Legislation may define family reunification as a right or only a discretionary decision by authorities. The eligibility of sponsors is usually defined in terms of the eligible categories of temporary residents and any residence duration requirements. The eligibility of family members can be restricted to only spouses and minor children or enlarged to include all direct dependents including a partner, adult children, dependent parents or grandparents. Reunited family members are generally granted the same type of residence permit as their sponsor, with the same residence duration, right to work and social benefits. Going further, MIPEX sets the following standard for best practice on family reunification:

"Families who are successfully reunited together have the socio-cultural stability to fully participate in society. In Europe, a non-EU family has the same rights and responsibilities as an EU family moving from one country to another. Upon arrival, any legal resident has the right to live with her spouse/partner, dependent children, and dependent parents and grandparents. They have the right to reunite in the country if they have a basic legal income and meet the legal requirements. Authorities have no reason to reject her application if it's not fraudulent and poses no security threat. The procedure is free and short. The state promotes the family's integration by facilitating autonomous residence and guaranteeing equal access as their sponsor to schools, jobs and social programmes."

In practice, these policies differ widely across the developed world. MIPEX 2015 and OECD 2017b provide comparative overviews of these policies. Both studies note that policies are most inclusive for spouses and minor children of citizens, long-term residents and highly skilled migrants, but highly restricted for temporary and low-skilled migrants.

According to the OECD 2019, the requirements for family reunification are becoming more restrictive across the developed world, although little evidence exists of a positive effect of these restrictions on integration outcomes such as employment. Almost all OECD countries impose an income requirement, while requirements are imposed on housing in 25, on residence duration in 14 and on pre-departure language skills in 5.

Figure 4: *Inclusiveness of family reunification policies in selected destination countries*



Note: Author's own compilation of MIPEx indicators (2015 in green), ICRI (2008 in blue including IL and GH) and Ruhs (2009 in purple including TW). Country names coded to ISO 3166-1 alpha-2 code.

4. Migrant education policies

4.1 LINK BETWEEN MIGRANT EDUCATION POLICIES AND OUTCOMES

Migrant education policies may not impact the educational outcomes of all children. Over the past decade, 12 MIPEx studies have been published on the links between educational outcomes and education or integration policies. Overall, migrant education and integration policies do not seem to have systematic effects on the academic outcomes of all first and second generation pupils (Fossati 2010 and 2011, Dronkers and de Heus 2012, Cebolla-Boado and Finotelli 2015, Dimitrova et al. 2016, van de Werfhorst and Heath 2019, Arikan et al. 2020, Gonneke et al. 2020). However, five specific MIPEx studies have investigated further by matching migrant education policies to the beneficiaries and outcomes targeted by these policies. These results on migrant education policies have been replicated in a few broader MIPEx studies of the links between education outcomes and integration policies overall.

Inclusive education and integration policies can facilitate a stronger sense of belonging and more equitable academic progress for youth of various ethnic backgrounds. Ham et al. 2017 finds that several migrant education policies seem to improve migrant pupils' psychological sense of belonging at school. The importance of policy for pupils' sense of belonging is supported by Veerman 2015's finding that more diverse schools are not more likely to experience higher classroom disruptions under conditions of inclusive integration policies. Turning to attainment, Ham et al. 2020 finds that guaranteeing equal rights can have broad impacts on educational attainment. Van de Werfhorst and Heath 2019 use the best available national surveys to identify positive effects of inclusive integration policies on the academic attainment of second generation youth of various backgrounds.¹ Arikan et al. 2020 focuses on the same migrant group – Turkish youth – across Europe and finds that comparing migrant education policies help to explain the amount of progress in math achievement from the first to the second generation. Van de Werfhorst and Heath 2019 also find that inclusive integration policies offer more equitable chances for youth of various ethnic backgrounds to access academic over vocational forms of upper secondary education. Kislev 2016 observes

1. Van de Werfhorst and Heath 2019 suggest that the education situation of first-generation youth may be strongly influenced by the restrictiveness of migration channels. For example, Schlicht-Schmälzle and Möller 2012 find a negative relationship between family reunification policies and math academic achievement among immigrant youth due to selection effects.

similar positive relationships between various policies and immigrants' chances to attain tertiary education, although results vary for different migrant groups. These positive relationships suggest that targeted policies can have various positive effects on specific children in need who are eligible to benefit.

4.2 LINK BETWEEN MIGRANT EDUCATION POLICIES AND OTHER INTEGRATION OUTCOMES

Ten additional studies have identified significant relationships between education policies and other integration outcomes. Echoing Ham et al. 2017's findings on immigrant youth's sense of belonging at school, Choi and Cha 2019 conclude that inclusive education policies contribute to a more common sense of patriotic pride among all youth – first generation, second generation and non-immigrants. To a lesser extent, inclusive education policies may partly contribute to a common sense of trust in institutions by both the first and second generation (Faoro 2016). Moving from more 'subjective' to 'objective' integration outcomes, Kislev 2017 suggests that positive relationships exist between inclusive education policies and the labour market integration of the first generation. Similarly, education policies may, to some extent, contribute to the settlement of immigrant communities; Bilateral migration aspirations (Beine et al. 2019) and flows (Beverelli 2020) appear higher for countries with inclusive education policies, while onward migration for job opportunities seem to be lower (Guzi et al. 2015). Interestingly, inclusive education policies do not, at first glance, seem related to the level of neighbourhood segregation of immigrants in the country (Ambinakudige and Lichter 2019).

Future studies could also better match outcomes to the specific beneficiaries of these policies. Most of these 10 studies consider education as one of many integration areas and thus use more 'generic' measurements of the immigrant target group. As such, De Freitas et al. 2018's meta-analysis of the limited existing literature was not able to identify a systematic link between education policies and general levels of discrimination among immigrants. Significant findings do not emerge from the one study comparing education policies and health outcomes (Bakhtiari et al. 2018), while studies of political participation have only looked indirectly at migrant education policies (Faoro 2016 and Schnyder 2019).

4.3 MIGRANT EDUCATION POLICIES FACING EGYPTIAN IMMIGRANTS AROUND THE WORLD


Migrant education policies may be important for the educational pathways and inclusion of first and second generation youth from Egyptian families. Comparable data on these policies are mostly available from democracies in the developed world via MIPEX (2015) and ICRI (2008), which are presented in Figure 5. Looking at major destination countries for Egyptian immigrants, migrant education policies are well developed in countries like Australia, Canada and the UK, partially developed in countries like France, Germany, Italy and the Netherlands and under-developed in countries like Kuwait and Turkey. MIPEX observes that education policies are generally more targeted in countries with large numbers of immigrant pupils. Overall, education is identified by MIPEX 2015 as one of the greatest weaknesses in the integration policies of most countries, as education systems are very slow to adapt their policies to the specific needs of immigrant pupils.

The two indexes (MIPEX and ICRI) identify several elements of migrant education policies. MIPEX breaks these policies down into four dimensions– access, targeting needs, new opportunities and intercultural education – with several indicators measuring each dimension. ‘Access’ examines whether all children, with or without a legal status, are allowed in law and encouraged in policy to access all levels of education. MIPEX 2015 identifies wide variation in access to vocational and higher education for undocumented youth and little targeted support to help all pupils access these levels. ‘Targeting needs’ measures to what extent migrant children, parents, and their teachers are entitled to have their specific needs addressed in school, for example through additional financial, training, language and technical support. MIPEX 2015 finds that schools have wide discretion and few resources to address these specific needs. ‘New opportunities’ considers to what extent school practices incorporate immigrant students, parents, languages and cultures. The ICRI Indicators on education fall under this MIPEX dimension by measuring support for religious minority schools and teachers and minority language and cultural teaching. MIPEX 2015 suggests that issues of immigrant languages and cultures are more often addressed than issues of school segregation or diversity in the teaching profession. Lastly, ‘intercultural education’ includes various policies and measures to help pupils and teachers to appreciate and learn about cultural diversity. In terms of international trends, MIPEX 2015 notes that cultural diversity is often simply a cross-curricular priority, a subject for voluntary

teacher trainings and a government budget line for ad hoc projects. As a summary of all these targeted policies, MIPEX sets the following standard for best practice on migrant education:

“Any child living in the country can go from kindergarten to university and achieve the best she can. She benefits from the same general measures as classmates with the same socio-economic background. If she has different needs because of her or her families’ immigration experience, she benefits from additional support. Her teachers are trained to recognise those needs and set equally high expectations for her. She is entitled to extra courses and teaching to catch up and master their language. Her parents play an active role in her education because the school specifically involves them at every step of the way. She and her parents also bring new opportunities to her school. All students can enrol in classes about her families’ language and culture. Her school uses an intercultural approach in its curriculum, textbooks, schedule and hiring practices. She, along with all students and staff, learn how to live and learn in a diverse society.”

Figure 5: Inclusiveness of migrant education policies in selected destination countries



Note: Authors own compilation of MIPEX indicators (2015 in green) and ICRI (2008 in blue including KW). Country names coded to ISO 3166-1 alpha-2 code.

5. Migrant health policies

5.1 LINK BETWEEN MIGRANT HEALTH POLICIES AND OUTCOMES

Migrant health policies are now emerging as an area of integration research, with potentially positive results between policies and outcomes. Migrant health policies were measured internationally for the first time in 2015. Since then, only three have been published on the potential effects of migrant health policies (Bakhtiari et al. 2018, Walkden et al. 2018 and Sorbye et al. 2019). Bakhtiari et al. 2018 and Walkden et al. 2018 find a strong positive link between migrant health policies, as measured by MIPEX, and two subjective measures of migrant health: self-reported poor mental or physical health (Bakhtiari et al. 2018) and elderly migrants' self-reported frailty (Walkden et al. 2018). These two studies suggest that migrant health policies may be most effective in reducing the social exclusion of particularly vulnerable migrant groups. However, health policies on their own might not be sufficient to guarantee equitable health outcomes and full inclusion (Bakhtiari et al. 2018). For example, Sorbye et al. 2019 observes that migrant health policies do not seem to improve the generally lower birthweight of babies born to migrant mothers. De Freitas et al. 2018's meta-analysis of the limited available literature was not able to identify a systematic link between health policies and immigrants' experiences of discrimination.


These initial results on migrant health policies are confirmed by 11 general MIPEX studies of the links between integration policies and migrant health. 13 of the 16 links investigated in these studies were significant and positive. Integration policies seem related to various subjective and objective measures of health: poor self-reported health (Malmusi 2015, Reus-Pons et al. 2015, Giannoni et al. 2016 and Juarez et al. 2019), the deleterious health effects of discrimination (Borrell et al. 2015), chronic and longstanding illness (Giannoni et al. 2016) including diabetes (Reus-Pons et al. 2015), elderly migrants' frailty (Walkden et al. 2018) and mortality rates (Juarez et al. 2019). Available studies are more mixed on the link between policies and migrants' depression levels (positive in Ikram 2016 and Malmusi et al. 2017 and Andreatou 2019 but none Levecque and Van Rossem 2015 and Reus-Pons et al. 2015). The conclusions of these studies have been compiled and tested in a meta-analysis (Juarez et al. 2019) in *The Lancet*, one of the world's most prestigious medical journals.

This emerging literature suggests that migrants' health is affected by a country's overall integration policies. These policies determine migrants' access to all the rights, support and opportunities that can benefit their physical and mental well-being. Most of these studies measure integration policies in terms of the differences between full inclusion (i.e. equal rights and targeted support), assimilation (i.e. equal rights without targeted support) and exclusion (i.e. limited rights or support). Generally, health outcomes appear to be most favourable under policies of inclusion and least favourable under exclusion. A country's overall approach seems more determinate than any specific area of integration policy. For example, no specific health link seems to exist with country's education and labour market mobility policies (Malmusi et al. 2015 and Bakhtiari et al. 2018). The latter study identifies a negative relationship between health and family reunification policies, given that dependents, particularly adult children or elderly parents, are often only eligible for reunification based on their poor health. The two studies do find that anti-discrimination policies are one area of integration with consistently positive links to health in terms of poor self-reported health, depression and activity limitations. These findings on anti-discrimination are compelling and worthy of further research, given that these policies aim to guarantee equal access to all services, raise public awareness and provide a sense of security to discriminated groups.

5.2 MIGRANT HEALTH POLICIES FACING EGYPTIAN IMMIGRANTS AROUND THE WORLD


Inclusive migrant health and integration policies are fundamental to secure basic health protections and inclusion for immigrants regardless of legal status. While health has been internationally recognised as a basic human right, access to healthcare is regulated through migrant health policies, usually at the national level. MIPEX 2015 is the only international source with comparative indicators on migrant health policies, covering most of the developed democracies in the OECD (see Figure 6). Among the top destinations for Egyptian immigrants included in MIPEX, migrant health policies are the most developed in Australia, Austria, Italy, the UK and the US. Policies were the least developed in Cyprus, Greece and Turkey. Generally, migrant health policies are most developed in countries with inclusive integration policies overall and least developed in countries with restrictive policies. A core set of MIPEX indicators, including on migrant health policies, was updated in 2019 in 33 countries (see Figure 7). Only 12 countries grant unconditional access to healthcare. In 17 out of the 33 countries, access to healthcare for non-EU immigrants is further undermined by administrative obstacles, such as documentation and discretion. Targeted health promotional measures are also relatively limited for most immigrants. Only 14 out of the 33 countries provided health education materials to all categories of non-EU immigrants. Similarly, free interpreters are only available in 14 out of the 33 countries. Worryingly, these four core building blocks – entitlements, administrative procedures, health education and interpreters – are absent in 11 out of the 33 countries. These migrant health policies are further detailed on the MIPEX website and comparative report (Ingleby et al. 2019).

Figure 6: *Inclusiveness of migrant health policies in selected destination countries*



Note: Authors own compilation of MIPEx indicators (2015 in green)

Figure 7: *Core policies on migrant inclusion in the health system*



Source: CrossMigration/Migration Policy Group, 2019

6. Permanent residence policies

6.1 LINK BETWEEN PERMANENT RESIDENCE POLICIES AND OUTCOMES

Similar to family reunification, permanent residence policies remain an unexplored area of integration. Very few studies have seriously examined the potential impact of permanent residence policies on immigrants' security of residence, employment or other integration outcomes. 17 of the 20 recent MIPEX studies of permanent residence policies do not consider permanent residence as a distinct policy area with its own hypotheses or measurements of outcomes. Instead, the 17 studies include permanent residence as only one of many areas that they try to match to integration outcomes. This lack of rigour partly may explain the lack of success at identifying significant links between permanent residence policies and outcomes. These studies find only eight positive relationships between permanent residence policies and integration outcomes, three negative relationships and 15 non-significant relationships. This limited study of permanent residence policies is likely to persist as permanent residents remain hard to identify in survey data.

The three specific MIPEX studies on permanent residence policies (Dewaard 2013, Corrigan 2015 and Heising et al. 2018) point to the potentially significant role of these policies in the integration process. Three of the four links examined emerge as significant. Permanent residence policies may influence immigrants' settlement and mobility decisions as well as their security of residence and employment. Restrictive policies can have a 'selection effect' by pushing immigrants with precarious statuses to pursue return or onward migration strategies. For example, Heising et al. 2018's analysis of immigrants' relative retirement income may indicate that restrictive policies exclude financially insecure immigrant households. Whereas inclusive policies may secure a longer residence duration for a larger share of the immigrant population. Dewaard 2013's EU-wide estimations find a positive link between permanent residence policies and immigrants' expected residence duration in their country of residence. In other words, immigrants tend to stay longer in countries with more inclusive permanent residence policies (48 years on average) than in countries with more restrictive policies (40 years on average). Facilitating permanent residence or naturalisation can also boost immigrants' long-term labour market integration in terms of their occupational mobility from more temporary and precarious to more permanent and secure positions (Corrigan 2015). The fact that positive links emerge for occupational mobility (Corrigan 2015) rather than employment rates (Bisin et al. 2011)

may indicate these policies have more long-term than short-term labour market effects. Notwithstanding these interesting initial results, the small number and sample sizes of these three studies caution against over-interpretation and call for replication through wider research.

6.2 LINK BETWEEN PERMANENT RESIDENCE POLICIES AND OTHER INTEGRATION OUTCOMES

Further positive relationships suggest that permanent residence policies may improve immigrants' aspirations towards long-term settlement. While permanent residence policies do not increase migration flows with the destination country (Beverelli 2020), permanent residence policies, among other policies, may improve the attractiveness of the destination country in immigrants' countries of origin (Beine et al. 2019). Similarly, Guzi et al. 2015 finds that permanent residence policies, among others, may encourage immigrants to settle, rather than move elsewhere for job opportunities.

The remaining evidence is mixed and inconclusive about the links between permanent residence policies and integration outcomes. Fossati 2010 and 2011 finds no potential effects on the education outcomes of immigrant children, while the results are positive for Schlicht-Schmälzle and Möller 2012 and Dimitrova et al. 2016 in terms of math achievement and anti-social behaviour. A positive relationship emerges with levels of social trust (Zimdars and Tampubolon 2012 and Faoro 2016), but not with satisfaction with the quality of life (De Freitas et al. 2018) or of democracy in the country (Faoro 2016). Studies of discrimination and mental health also provide a mixed bag of results: positive (De Freitas et al. 2018), non-significant (André and Dronkers 2016, Bakhtiari et al. 2018 and De Freitas et al. 2018) and even negative (Malmusi et al. 2015). Further research is required to substantiate any of these claims. Future multivariate analysis of permanent residence policies should focus on different immigrant cohorts and these policies' potential long-term progress over time.

6.3 PERMANENT RESIDENCE POLICIES FACING EGYPTIAN IMMIGRANTS AROUND THE WORLD

Permanent residence policies may be important for the long-term security of residence and employment of Egyptian immigrants. Comparable data on these policies are available from democracies in the developed world via MIPEX (2015) and ICRI (2008), which are presented in Figure 8. Looking at the major destination countries for Egyptian immigrants, permanent residence rights are relatively secure in countries like Canada, Germany and Italy. These policies are more insecure in countries like Australia, France, the UK and the US. They are highly insecure in countries like Cyprus, Turkey, Israel and Kuwait. Looking to indexes with a broader geographic scope, a slightly different index (Ruhs 2009) focused only on the rights of migrant workers on employment-based schemes. This migrant workers' index (see results in Ruhs 2011 and Figure 9) found that labour immigration programmes in the Gulf countries and


Southeast Asia place significantly more restrictions on the long-term rights of migrant workers than programmes in Latin America, Europe and North America. Ruhs 2011 identified the greatest restrictions in terms of residence rights (access to permanent residence or citizenship) and in terms of social rights, especially unemployment benefits, retirement benefits and access to public education. These restrictions are greatest for low and medium-skilled 'temporary' worker programmes.

All three of these indexes agree on the common basic elements of a permanent residence policy. Nearly all categories of temporary residents should have the chance to apply for a permanent or long-term residence permit after approximately five years of residence in the destination country. The duration of this new permit may be permanent (unlimited in time) or long-term (i.e. 5-10 years' validity and renewable). After acquisition of this permit, permanent or long-term residents usually enjoy greater protections against expulsion and full and equal access to the destination country's labour market and social rights. MIPEX sets the following standard for best practice on permanent residence policies:

"Soon after arrival, any temporary resident has the right to settle permanently in the country if she secures a basic legal income, obey the law and, if necessary, improved her language skills through free courses and study materials. For an applicant, the procedure is short and nearly free, with full rights to appeal. If accepted, she is secure in her status as a permanent resident and treated equally as nationals, with the same rights and responsibilities in most areas of life."


Among national permanent residence systems, MIPEX identified Italy, Portugal and Spain as examples of good practice of new destination countries that facilitate the path for their large number of newcomers. Immigrants in these three countries can secure their situation and will not remain in permanently temporary conditions. Access to permanent residence does not appear to be a particular problem for specific nationality, gender or age groups, since permanent residents generally reflect the country's overall immigrant population, and the uptake of long-term residence is relatively high (MIPEX 2015).

Figure 8: Inclusiveness of permanent residence policies in selected destination countries



Note: Authors own compilation of MIPEX indicators (2015 in green) and ICRI (2008 in blue including GH, KW, SG). Country names coded to ISO 3166-1 alpha-2 code.

Figure 9: *Restrictions on migrant rights by geographic region (Ruhs 2009)*



Note: All programmes (N=104), 2009. The migrant rights scores range from 0 (most restrictive) to 1 (least restrictive)

7. Political participation policies

7.1 LINK BETWEEN POLITICAL PARTICIPATION POLICIES AND OUTCOMES

Political participation policies seem to have consistently positive effects on the levels of immigrants' participation in the public life of their destination country. The link between integration policies and immigrant political participation has become a major area of study of integration. Five specific MIPEX studies investigated these links among 23,000 immigrants all across Europe. Their findings are largely confirmed by nine additional general MIPEX studies surveying 30,000 mostly in Western Europe. Inclusive integration policies are positively related to the various steps in the process of political participation for immigrants and the second generation. Thorkelson 2016's general study also finds that one point increase on the overall MIPEX scale is associated with a 40% higher odds of voting in destination country elections, a 30% higher odds of other forms of conventional participation and a 60% higher odds of unconventional participation. Aleksynska 2011's specific study of political participation policies finds that these particular policies are related to higher levels of conventional and unconventional political participation among immigrants from developed countries, newcomers (≤ 20 years' residence) and Muslim immigrants.

Increased participation is also associated with a greater sense of political engagement and trust in the destination country. Helbling et al. 2015 finds that inclusive integration policies help to close the gap between immigrants and non-immigrants in terms not only of their electoral and non-electoral participation, but also their levels of political interest, trust and efficacy. Welge 2015 confirms more inclusive political participation policies provide immigrants with a similar sense of political efficacy – i.e. that change is possible and that their voice can be heard. Whether or not these policies have major effects on the demographic and substantive representation of immigrants in politics is unclear; results are sometimes weak or mixed, depending on the country's overall political system (Ruedin 2013, Sanhueza Petrarca 2015, Schnyder 2015 and 2019).

Mixed results have also emerged about the effects on integration policies on political transnationalism, which may raise concerns from an origin country's perspective. The effects of integration policies on immigrants' likelihood to participate in the origin country may be non-existent (Voicu and Comsa 2014 and Ahmadov and Sasse 2016) or even negative (Chaudhary 2018). More research is required to draw any definitive conclusions about the potential effects of destination country policies on origin country political participation.

7.2 LINK BETWEEN POLITICAL PARTICIPATION POLICIES AND OTHER INTEGRATION OUTCOMES

Twenty other MIPEX studies investigate the links between political participation policies and various integration outcomes. Political participation policies are less related to migration issues than to broader issues of integration and democracy. For example, these policies have little-to-no relationship with migration flows or aspirations (Guzi et al. 2015, Ambinakudige and Lichter 2019, Beine et al. 2019 and Beverelli 2020).

Instead, policies promoting immigrant political participation may be part of the functioning of highly developed democracies that aim to secure fairness and trust for all residents. Within the European Union, the development of these policies appears to be particularly important for non-EU citizens as opposed to mobile EU citizens, who enjoy greater rights and resources when moving between EU countries (Welge 2015). Inclusive policies help to close the gap between immigrants and non-immigrants, both in terms of their overall satisfaction with life and in terms of their demands on politicians in their destination country (Welge 2015, Faoro 2016 and Just 2017). While immigrants will continue to experience discrimination, health and other life problems, regardless of the policy in place (see André and Dronkers 2016, Malmusi et al. 2015, Bakhtiari et al. 2018, De Freitas et al. 2018), these policies may help immigrants and their allies to defend their common interests. General MIPEX studies have uncovered strong and positive relationships between political participation policies and certain integration outcomes in education (Fossati 2010, Fossati 2011, Schlicht-Schmälzle and Möller 2012), employment (Bisin et al. 2011) and health (Bakhtiari et al. 2018). On the one hand, granting equal political rights to immigrants helps to reinforce an inclusive political culture, as politicians are forced to be responsive to the needs of all residents – both immigrants and other vulnerable groups in society. For example, Vernby 2013 finds that the expansion of noncitizen voting rights in Sweden helped to explain the expansion of equitable social spending to all disenfranchised local areas, including those with large immigrant populations. Inclusive political participation policies appear to be associated with higher levels of trust in society (Zimdars and Tampubolon 2012, Justwan 2015 and McLaren 2017), lower levels of anti-immigrant prejudice (Callens and Meuleman 2017) and a greater sense of civic rather than ethnic national identity (Sarrasin et al. 2019). On the other hand, granting equal political rights to immigrants may also contribute to the wider polarisation of politics in developed democracies and the mobilisation of far-right parties, leading to greater contestation over national identity (Sarrasin et al. 2019). As a result, immigrants have more opportunities and more allies to defend their common interests in our increasingly divisive democracies.

7.3 POLITICAL PARTICIPATION POLICIES FACING EGYPTIAN IMMIGRANTS AROUND THE WORLD


Political participation policies seem most relevant for the democratic participation of those non-EU immigrants who are long-settled in the world's democracies. The MIPEX 2015 study concludes that political participation is a slight area of weakness for integration policy, as foreign residents in most countries have few opportunities to

inform and improve the policies that affect them daily. Comparable data on these policies are mostly available for developed countries via MIPEX 2015, ICRI 2008 and Ruhs 2011, which are presented in Figure 10. Looking at the major destination countries for Egyptian immigrants, political participation policies are most inclusive in Australia, Germany and Nordic countries. These policies are more limited in Canada, France, Italy, the Netherlands, Oman, the United Arab Emirates and the UK. They are highly restricted in Greece, Israel, Kuwait, Saudi Arabia and Turkey. Political rights generally do not vary between immigration categories or skill-levels (Ruhs 2011). MIPEX concludes that policies in this area are very slow to change over time.

Political participation policies involve a range of targeted rights, opportunities and support for foreign residents. One of the most reliable indicators of political participation policies is voting rights for foreign residents. The first overview of the global right to vote for immigrants (Pedroza 2019, not accessible by the author) identified 94 countries extending some form of voting rights to immigrants. 55% of these countries have sizeable foreign populations. The most comprehensive overview available to the public covers 53 countries in Europe and the Americas (Arrighi and Bauböck 2017). However, the global list of countries extending voting rights for foreign residents does not include any of the top 20 destination countries for Egyptian immigrants. The one exception is the UK where Egyptian immigrants cannot enjoy the voting rights which are only open to citizens of Commonwealth countries. On average, the voting rights extended to foreign residents are limited to the local right to vote (and not the right to stand as a local candidate). Only four countries worldwide extend the national right to vote to foreign residents: Chile, Malawi, New Zealand and Uruguay. The MIPEX 2015 study observes that voting rights are generally secure but hard to obtain, with ongoing debates for decades (see Figure 11 that highlights ongoing debates in Canada, France, Luxembourg and US).

In addition to voting rights, the three main indexes identify other common basic elements of political participation policies. Voting rights are the least common policy extended to foreign residents compared to other types of policies. The most common policy is the extension of equal civic rights, such as the right to join or form trade unions and associations. The right to join political parties is sometimes restricted in newer countries of destination. Beyond civic and political rights, national and local consultative bodies have been created across a wide range of countries, but usually on an ad hoc basis. The MIPEX 2015 study finds that these bodies tend to be weak, government-led and too poorly funded to engage immigrants. Despite their weaknesses, these existing consultative bodies around the world represent opportunities for organisations of Egyptian immigrants to defend their interests. Reviewing all these policies, MIPEX 2015 sets the following standard for best practice on political participation:

“When states open political opportunities, all residents can participate in democratic life. A newcomer enjoys the same civil liberties as national citizens. After a limited number of years of legal residence, she can stand in local elections and vote in local, regional and even national elections. She can be elected and even lead a strong and independent immigrant consultative body in her community, region, or for the whole country. The state informs her of her political rights and supports the emergence of immigrant civil society.”

Figure 10: *Inclusiveness of political participation policies in selected destination countries*

Note: Authors own compilation of MIPEx indicators (2015 in green), ICRI (2008 in blue including KW) and Ruhs (2009 in purple). Country names coded to ISO 3166-1 alpha-2 code.

DEBATES ON DENIZEN ENFRANCHISEMENT OVER TIME



8. Naturalisation policies

8.1 LINK BETWEEN NATURALISATION POLICIES AND OUTCOMES

Naturalisation policies have consistently strong and positive effects on immigrants' chances to acquire the nationality of the destination country, based on six MIPEX studies surveying 30,000 immigrants in Western Europe. Traditionally, citizenship has been one of the best-studied areas of integration policy. From this research, naturalisation policies emerge as one of the strongest determining factors behind naturalisation rates for first generation immigrants, both from developing countries (Dronkers and Vink 2012, Vink et al. 2013, Hoxhaj et al. 2019, Huddleston and Falcke 2020) as well as from other EU countries (Alarian 2017). For immigrants from developing countries, a one-percentage-point increase on the MIPEX 100-point scale for 'Access to Nationality' policies should translate to an increase in naturalisation rates by around 2.3-2.4 percent (Vink et al. 2013 and Huddleston and Falcke 2020) and up to 3.5% for those with 5-20 years of residence (Dronkers and Vink 2012). The policies with the greatest effects on naturalisation seem to be the dual nationality policies of the origin and destination country (Reichel 2011, Vink et al. 2013, Stadlmair 2017, Huddleston and Falcke 2020), birthright citizenship for the second and third generation (Stadlmair 2017) and the restrictiveness of the legal and procedural requirements (Stadlmair 2017, Huddleston 2020).

8.2 LINK BETWEEN NATURALISATION POLICIES AND OTHER INTEGRATION OUTCOMES

Results are mixed from the 30 other MIPEX studies comparing naturalisation policies with other integration outcomes. Naturalisation policies do not seem directly related to immigrants' experiences of discrimination (André and Dronkers 2016 and De Freitas et al. 2018) or health outcomes (Malmusi et al. 2015 and Bakhtiari et al. 2018). Nor do naturalisation policies for first generation adults seem related to the educational outcomes of their children, although one of the four available studies (Fossati 2010) does find a negligible effect.

In terms of subjective integration, facilitating naturalisation policies is strongly and positively linked to the development of a common sense of belonging and trust between immigrants and the general public. 19 relationships between attitudes and naturalisation policies have been investigated in 12 MIPEx studies; 14 of these 17 relationships are positive and 10 were strongly significant. Facilitating naturalisation policies are associated with higher levels of social trust in the country (Zimdars and Tampubolon 2012, Faoro 2016 and McLaren 2017), more inclusive national identities (Ariely 2012 and Sarrasin et al. 2019) and lower levels of anti-immigrant and anti-Muslim sentiments (Ariely 2012, Kaya 2017). Facilitating naturalisation may also have a small effect on boosting immigrants' civic participation (slightly positive in Hunger 2018 but no relationship in Aleksynska 2011).

Naturalisation policies also seem to impact immigrants' 'citizenship premium' in terms of the boost to their integration outcomes post-naturalisation. Employment outcomes have been the main focus of national and international studies of naturalisation, which regularly find that naturalised immigrants benefit from higher employment rates (Liebig and Von Haaren 2011). Researchers investigating the citizenship premium has started to consider whether policies facilitating naturalisation also make it easier for immigrants to find employment. Bisin et al. 2011 found that naturalisation policies had no effect on the size of this citizenship premium, which means that naturalisation boosts employment rates, regardless of the policy in place. Two later studies (Prokic-Breuer et al. 2012 and Hoxhaj et al. 2019) reveal a significant positive relationship between naturalisation policies and employment rates for immigrants from developing countries, especially for women (Hoxhaj et al. 2019). This citizenship premium may extend from levels of employment to levels of language fluency. Language acquisition seems positively related to facilitated naturalisation policies for all immigrant groups, except for refugees, who tend to benefit from policy exemptions due to their specific vulnerabilities (Zwysen and Demireva 2020).

Despite this initial boost, naturalisation policies may not necessarily help employed immigrants to further improve their job quality and economic mobility. The evidence is mixed from the four available studies. Facilitating naturalisation or permanent residence may unlock immigrants' occupational mobility (Corrigan 2015). Naturalisation may also have positive effects to get immigrant women out of gender-segregated occupations (Palencia-Esteban 2019). But for immigrant men, facilitating naturalisation may have no or, even negative, effects on their occupational mobility (Hoxhaj et al. 2019). One potential explanation for this from Guzi et al. 2015 is that facilitating naturalisation encourages immigrants, especially male heads of households, to settle in their chosen destination and thus decreases their geographical mobility and their willingness to move to other regions or countries in pursuit of greater job opportunities.

Similarly, naturalisation policies may facilitate immigrants' mobility in diverse ways. This link between nationality acquisition and mobility is an emerging topic with limited research to date. Ambinakudige and Lichter 2019's findings suggest that facilitating naturalisation may help naturalised immigrants to improve their housing situation and move out of segregated neighbourhoods. Facilitating naturalisation may also facilitate circularity by increasing the aspirations or ability of immigrants and their families to move between their country of residence and origin (Beine et al. 2019 and Beverelli 2020).

8.3 NATURALISATION POLICIES FACING EGYPTIAN IMMIGRANTS AROUND THE WORLD

MIPEX observes that nationality acquisition policies remain a major area of weakness for most destination countries. The highly discretionary and costly path to citizenship often discourages rather than encourages immigrants to apply and succeed as new citizens. A few countries have not caught up with international reform trends on dual nationality and birthright entitlements for children. MIPEX set the following standard for best practice based on existing national policies:

“All settled residents who see their future in the country get full support to become citizens and equally participate in public life. All citizens can be dual nationals. A child born in the country to immigrant parents becomes a citizen at birth (jus soli) like all other children. Someone born abroad has become attached to the country after living there for 5 years. She is entitled to the nationality when she meets the legal conditions, such as having no recent criminal record. The requirement to pass the basic language test and a citizenship course encourages her to succeed through free, flexible and professional courses and tests. As a new citizen, she has the same citizenship protections as her fellow nationals.”

Given the importance of naturalisation policies for citizenship and belonging and their potential for employment and mobility, Egyptian immigrants could benefit from naturalisation reforms in their destination countries, particularly reforms of dual nationality and residence requirements. Indicators of naturalisation policies demonstrate a wide range of policies around the world (see Figure 12).

These indicators of naturalisation policies are aggregations of several key policy elements.

8.3.1 Dual Nationality


Dual nationality seems to function as a precondition in immigrants' decision-making on naturalisation. Whether or not dual nationality is allowed strongly determines immigrants' interest to acquire the nationality of their destination country (see Huddleston and Falcke 2019 and Huddleston 2020). The acceptance of dual nationality is a major policy trend in destination and origin countries, although major variations persist in the diffusion of this norm across world regions (Vink et al. 2019). The availability of dual nationality is monitored by Maastricht University's MACIMIDE Global Expatriate Dual Citizenship dataset (see Figure 13). For example, Egyptian immigrants still face restrictions in a few major destination countries (e.g. Kuwait, UAE, Germany, Austria and the Netherlands).

8.3.2 Residence Requirements


For most Egyptian immigrants, the greatest obstacle to naturalisation is the very long residence duration requirement in the largest destination countries for Egyptian immigrants. In Europe, the European Convention on Nationality (1997) of the Council of Europe has limited the maximum residence duration requirement to 10 years. The majority of destination countries around the world, including Egypt and Saudi Arabia, are in line with this 10-year maximum (see Figure 14). This maximum is exceeded in half of the countries in Africa and Asia, including the major destination countries for Egyptian immigrants (see Figure 15): UAE (30 years), Bahrain (25), Qatar (25), Kuwait (20), Oman (20) and Lebanon (ordinary naturalisation not allowed). The very long residence requirements in these Arabic-speaking countries effectively bar most Egyptian immigrants who reside there and would otherwise be able to meet the language, work and good character requirements.

8.3.3 Birthright Citizenship

For children born abroad to Egyptian immigrants, birthright citizenship is fully available in the Americas, restricted in Western Europe and unavailable in most other countries around the world. These policies are monitored by the Global Birthright Indicators of the Global Citizenship Observatory (GLOBALCIT) of the European University Institute (see Figure 16).

Figure 12: *Inclusiveness of naturalisation policies in selected destination countries*

Note: Authors own compilation of MIPEx indicators (2015 in green) and ICRI (2008 in blue including SG, IL and KW). Country names coded to ISO 3166-1 alpha-2 code.

Figure 13: Dual nationality policies (2016)

Source: IOM GMDAC 2019 using GLOBALCIT 2017

Figure 14: *Ordinary naturalisation requirements around the world*


	World	Africa	Americas	Asia/ Oceania	Europe
RESIDENCE REQUIREMENT					
After 5 or fewer years	48%	36%	66%	51%	45%
After 6 to 9 years	18%	13%	29%	2%	33%
After 10 to 12 years	22%	38%	3%	18%	21%
After 15 years / no or discriminatory provision	12%	13%	3%	29%	0%
Dual citizenship for immigrants	64%	70%	71%	62%	52%
Economic Requirement	53%	43%	37%	67%	64%
SPOUSAL TRANSFER					
Yes	60%	57%	69%	31%	88%
No special provision	13%	0%	17%	27%	12%
Discriminatory provision	27%	43%	14%	42%	0%
Fast track for cultural affinity	23%	13%	14%	18%	48%
Number of countries	175	53	35	45	42

Figure 15: Ordinary naturalisation in selected major Egyptian destination countries

Bahrain	BAH 6(1a)	Naturalisation (discretionary)	Person has been resident in Bahrain for at least 25 years. <i>Other conditions:</i> speak Arabic, have good character, and own real estate.
Kuwait	KUW 4(1)	Naturalisation (discretionary)	Person has lived in Kuwait for a minimum of 20 years. <i>Other conditions:</i> fluent in Arabic, has an income, good character, holds a qualification needed in a country (such as a degree for a profession), and is Muslim.
Lebanon	No provision	Not allowed	Not allowed
Oman	OMA 15	Naturalisation (discretionary)	Person has been resident in Oman for at least 20 years. <i>Other conditions:</i> can read and write Arabic, has an income, good character and of physical health, written consent to renounce citizenship of another country.
Qatar	QAT 2(1)	Naturalisation (discretionary)	Person has been resident in the country for at least 25 years. <i>Other conditions:</i> proficient in Arabic, has an income, good character and has physical health.
Saudi Arabia	SAU 9	Naturalisation (discretionary)	Person has had a permanent resident permit (kiqama) inside the kingdom for 5 years continuously as a minimum. <i>Other conditions:</i> is above legal age, no mental illness, good behaviour, no criminal record of more than 6 months imprisonment, legal income. The decision is made based on an additional list of requirements by a Committee of the Executive Regulation of the Saudi Citizenship System as featured in the citizenship law. Under article 20 of the citizenship law, the residency period will be reset if the applicant after filing his application left the kingdom for more than 12 months using his existing passport, or if before filing his application they left the kingdom for more than 6 months.
United Arab Emirates	UAE 8	Naturalisation (discretionary)	Person has been resident in the UAE for at least 30 years. <i>Other conditions:</i> proficient in Arabic, has an income and good character.

GLOBALCIT (2017). Global Database on Modes of Acquisition of Citizenship, version 1.0. San Domenico di Fiesole: Global Citizenship Observatory / Robert Schuman Centre for Advanced Studies / European University Institute. Available at: <http://globalcit.eu/acquisition-citizenship/>

Figure 16: *Global birthright indicators (2016)*



GLOBALCIT (2019). Global Birthright Indicators. San Domenico di Fiesole: European University Institute.

Note: These indicators are part of <http://globalcit.eu>. They measure the inclusiveness of birthright citizenship provisions across 177 countries.

9. Anti-discrimination policies

9.1 LINK BETWEEN ANTI-DISCRIMINATION POLICIES AND OUTCOMES

The relationship between anti-discrimination policies and the process of discrimination is still relatively new and limited to only 11 MIPEX studies. No systematic link emerges between the overall strength of anti-discrimination policies, as measured by MIPEX, and the level of discrimination towards immigrants (Ziller 2014, André and Dronkers 2016, Callens and Meuleman 2017, Kislev 2018, Kislev 2019). Some positive, but limited, effects are observed for specific policies, such as clear definitions in law, enforcement mechanisms and, to some extent, equality policies and bodies (Kislev 2018 and 2019). Kislev finds that these positive benefits are most apparent for long-settled first- and second-generation, especially those from the Middle East and North Africa (MENA).

Anti-discrimination practitioners will not be surprised by the finding that laws and policies may not directly affect the perceived level of discrimination in society. Discrimination is a reality in all societies, regardless of public attitudes and the policies in place. Anti-discrimination policies are not able or intended to eliminate discrimination, despite the sometimes-lofty rhetoric to the contrary. As with other crimes and areas of the law, anti-discrimination policies secure greater public awareness of discrimination and greater access to justice for potential victims.

Rather than a simple straightforward link between policies and discrimination, the work of Conrad Ziller illustrates the long-term process that changing policies can have on changing public attitudes, awareness, trust and reporting on discrimination. People in countries with stronger anti-discrimination policies are more likely to be aware of discrimination as a problem and know their rights (Ziller 2014). In contrast, people in countries with weaker policies are less likely to know their rights or agree that discrimination is a problem in society. The difference in knowledge of rights between the countries with the lowest- and highest-scoring policies is 11 percentage points. While people experience discrimination in all types of countries and ethnic minorities are likely to identify as discriminated groups, greater knowledge of rights is associated over time with higher reporting of witnessing discrimination and lower levels of identification as discriminated minority groups.

The potential reason for this change in reporting and identification over time could be immigrants' growing levels of trust under these supportive conditions. Under strong policies, immigrants who experience discrimination no longer seem to feel the same loss of trust in public institutions that other immigrants do in countries with weak policies (Ziller and Helbling 2019). This increase in immigrant trust does not necessarily extend to all types of institutions (Ziller 2019 and Ziller and Helbling 2019). Stronger policies appear associated with greater levels of immigrant trust in the police and legal system (Röder and Mühlau 2012) and a more shared sense of social trust (Zimdars and Tampubolon 2012 and Ziller 2017) and satisfaction with democracy (Ziller and Helbling 2019). Erisen 2017 even finds that stronger policies increase immigrants' likelihood to identify as Europeans and as national citizens of the country. This increase in trust is often most apparent among the second generation, who were fully socialised to the country's policies and norms (Faoro 2016).

9.2 LINK BETWEEN ANTI-DISCRIMINATION POLICIES AND OTHER INTEGRATION OUTCOMES

This stronger sense of social trust and belonging may explain why anti-discrimination policies are linked with positive health outcomes for immigrants. De Freitas et al. 2018's meta-analysis suggests that strong anti-discrimination policies decrease the likelihood that a person who experiences discrimination will fall into depression. In contrast, immigrants are at greater risk of depression in countries with weak policies (Malmusi et al. 2015). They are also more likely to experience poor health and report health limitations that impact their daily life (Bakhtiari et al. 2018).

The impact of anti-discrimination policies is harder to observe in other areas of integration. Most of the 23 MIPEX studies available are not the best for studying this relationship as they only consider anti-discrimination policies as one integration policy among many, without a specific methodology targeting discriminated groups. Looking at the different areas of integration, the latest available discrimination study (EU MIDIS II, FRA 2017) finds that respondents of North African background in Western Europe experienced discrimination in the past year in public or private services (21%), looking for work (15%), at work (14%) and least likely in housing (9%) and health (3%). Reviewing the policy research in these areas, no study has focused on access to services. When looking for work, anti-discrimination policies have unclear effects on activity rates (Kesler 2016 and Kislev 2017) and no effects on overall unemployment or employment rates for all immigrants (Bisin et al. 2011, Lessard-Phillips et al. 2012, Patacchini et al. 2015, Kislev 2017, Kislev 2019). Yet studies focusing on specific policies and discriminated groups may show better results. Patacchini et al. 2015 demonstrate that employment rates for self-identified Muslim men and women can be related to strong enforcement mechanisms and equality policies. At work, anti-discrimination policies seem to have clearer positive effects for working immigrants. Effects have been recorded in terms of immigrants' income (Kislev 2019), occupational status (Platt et al. ongoing), qualifications

for their job (Aleksynska and Tritah 2013) and ability to relocate for job opportunities (Guzi et al. 2015) or other purposes (Beverelli 2020). One example of these effects at work: the likelihood that immigrants are overqualified for their job is 42% lower when comparing the European countries with the strongest and weakest policies. Again, all these effects seem to differ for different types of policies (Kislev 2019) and for different groups and genders (Patacchini et al. 2015, Palencia-Esteban 2019, Platt et al. ongoing). Beyond employment, other areas do not reveal overall effects for all immigrants, based on the four general MIPEX studies on education (Fossati 2010, Fossati 2011, Schlicht-Schmälzle and Möller 2012, Dimitrova et al. 2016), three on political participation (Aleksynska 2011, Raschke and Westle 2018 and Schnyder 2019) and one study on housing segregation (Ambinakudige and Lichter 2019).

9.3 ANTI-DISCRIMINATION POLICIES FACING EGYPTIAN IMMIGRANTS AROUND THE WORLD

Strong anti-discrimination policies, especially enforcement mechanisms and equality policies, seem essential for securing the rights and trust of Egyptian immigrant men and women who are potential victims of ethnic, religious or nationality discrimination. The EU-MIDIS II (FRA 2017) survey in the EU illustrates how discrimination acts as a regular obstacle for a sizeable share of North African immigrants. MIPEX studies confirm that anti-discrimination policies may be particularly useful for the first and second generation from the MENA region, particularly of Muslim family background. Comparable data on these policies are mostly available for developed countries via MIPEX (2015) and ICRI (2008), which are presented in Figure 17. Looking at the major destination countries for Egyptian immigrants, anti-discrimination policies are strongest in countries like Canada, the UK and the US. These policies are only partially developed in countries like Austria, Germany, Greece, Israel and Italy. They are weak in countries like Israel, Kuwait, Switzerland and Turkey. Victims are best supported in traditional English-speaking destinations and a few Western European countries with longstanding legislation, such as Belgium, France, the Netherlands, Sweden and the UK.


The two indexes identify core elements of anti-discrimination policy. Explicit legislation and specific enforcement procedures must exist in criminal and civil law and conform to international standards, such as the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination. This set of legislation and procedures must explicitly apply beyond racial discrimination to ethnic, religious and nationality discrimination in all areas of life. Independent equality bodies must be able to assist, advise and represent potential victims, also in accordance with the international 'Paris Principles' for National Human Rights Institutions (NHRIs).

The major gaps identified by MIPEX 2015 are, on the one hand, the relative newness and public ignorance of this legislation, jurisprudence and support bodies and, on the other hand, the weakness of the existing equality bodies and policies. Limited state commitments and resources for equality bodies and policies mean that most victims

are too poorly informed or supported to even report their complaint, which represents the first step in the long path to justice. More in-depth country-by-country information is available through the UN reporting mechanisms (under ICERD, the Paris Principles and the UN Human Rights Committee). In Europe, more detailed information on law and practice is available through the European Equality Law Network and the Council of Europe's European Commission against Racism and Intolerance (ECRI). Summarising policies found around the world, MIPEX sets the following standard for best practice on anti-discrimination policies:

"All residents, whatever their background, can fight discrimination and benefit from equal opportunities. Anyone in the country can bring forward a case against all forms of discrimination, as well as racial profiling and incitements to hatred. These are illegal in all areas of public life – from employment to education, public space, housing and social protection. A victim is empowered to seek justice because laws are well enforced and used. Independent equality bodies and NGOs help her throughout the proceedings. Courts use wide-ranging sanctions to prevent, discourage and correct discrimination, while the state adopts positive duties and actions."

Figure 17: Inclusiveness of anti-discrimination policies in selected destination countries



Note: Authors own compilation of MIPEX indicators (2015 in green and ICRI (2008 in blue). Country names coded to ISO 3166-1 alpha-2 code.

Conclusions

The links between integration policies and outcomes worldwide are starting to emerge from the growing international literature, with at least 128 robust multivariate studies over the past decade. This literature review focused on analysis of the Migrant Integration Policy Index, as the most comprehensive, reliable and cited index of integration policy indicators. The report reveals where research gaps still exist and illustrates why and how studies should better match different policies to the specific beneficiaries and outcomes that each policy aims to address. These methodological deficiencies explain many of the research gaps in specific policy areas, such as labour market mobility, education, family reunification and permanent residence. As most integration policy and outcome indicators focus on the situation for all immigrants, these conclusions are generally applicable to the situation in developed countries for the first and second generation from non-European countries. Summarising the recurring trends from all these studies, this report provides preliminary conclusions as to the potential effects of integration policies and outcomes. The report also highlighted any research results that were specific to the situation of immigrants from the MENA region or Muslim family backgrounds.

Key findings were identified for each area of integration policy:

- A country's overall approach to integration policy is strongly associated with public and immigrants' attitudes and identities as well as to immigrants' well-being, political participation and several other socio-economic outcomes.
- A combination of labour market mobility policies may help Egyptian migrant workers to invest in their skills, employment quality and long-term careers.
- Family reunification policies may be critical to secure the family life and well-being of the limited number of Egyptian immigrants separated from dependent family members.
- Migrant education policies may be important for the educational pathways and inclusion of first and second generation youth from Egyptian families.
- Inclusive migrant health and integration policies are fundamental to secure basic health protections and inclusion for all Egyptian immigrants, regardless of legal status.
- Permanent residence policies can shape the long-term security of residence and employment for Egyptian immigrants.
- Political participation policies seem most relevant for the democratic participation of Egyptian immigrants who are long-settled in the world's democracies.

- Naturalisation policies are the major determinant of access to nationality for first generation Egyptian immigrants and may boost their belonging, employment and settlement.
- Strong anti-discrimination policies, especially enforcement mechanisms and equality policies, seem essential for securing the rights and trust of Egyptian men and women who are potential victims of ethnic, religious and nationality discrimination.

The integration policies facing Egyptian immigrants around the world were summarised based on the available comparable policy indexes. These indexes are uneven in their thematic coverage of integration policy areas and limited in their geographical coverage to the world's developed democracies. Currently, comparable integration policy indicators are missing for many of the main destination countries for Egyptian immigrants, particularly in the MENA region. These gaps in the global state-of-the-art on integration policy indicators is one reason why initial drafts of the UN Global Compact on Migration promoted participation of all states in the Migrant Integration Policy Index, as a means to identify challenges and best practices. Drawing on the available data and international policy trends, the report proposes the following recommendations for Egyptian policymakers and stakeholders to promote the interests of Egyptians abroad and contribute to the development of integration policies in their main destination countries:

- Encourage the development of an overall integration strategy and action plan in each major destination country for Egyptian immigrants;
- Facilitate bilateral or multilateral exchange of good practice and models for policy development with major destination countries in the MENA region;
- Advocate for more accessible enforcement mechanisms, more ambitious equality policies and better resourced equality bodies to assist victims of racial, ethnic, religious and nationality discrimination;
- Ensure full inclusion of all Egyptian immigrants, with or without legal status, into the health system of their destination country and facilitate targeted information about healthcare access and critical health information;
- Advocate for greater support for self-organisations of immigrants from Egypt and the MENA region to promote greater civic participation at destination, origin and international level;
- Advocate for greater funding and access for qualification recognition procedures, professional training, higher education and long-term language courses for migrant workers;
- Gather and report on difficulties of Egyptians abroad to obtain permits for work, family reunification and permanent residence in specific destination countries and advocate for related changes in their national laws and procedures;
- Encourage intercultural education, multilingualism and inclusive education models to be promoted through international institutions and exchanges;
- Discuss models within the MENA region for facilitated modes for nationality acquisition, to facilitate the dual nationality and residence requirements for Arabic-speaking immigrants who meet all other naturalisation requirements.

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RESEARCH PAPER 6 ONLINE SURVEY

Egyptians in Europe

Prepared by **Prof. Liam Kennedy**




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October 2020

To supplement the research conducted to prepare Research Paper 6 (RP6) an online survey was created to obtain fresh knowledge about the opportunities and challenges facing Egyptians seeking employment in Europe and on the expatriate experience more broadly.¹ The survey focused on Egyptian emigrants between the ages of 18 to 40 years old living in Italy, Germany, the United Kingdom and Ireland. It was carried out via Facebook from January to June 2020 and received 781 responses.

It is important to note that the survey responses were generated via social media and not via Egyptian organisations and service providers – only 3.72% of those surveyed are members of an Egyptian organisation or network. In this regard, the survey represents original primary information about the demographics and perspectives of Egyptian emigres in Europe. As detailed in RP6, the Egyptian emigrant community in Europe is not a homogenous entity and is segmented and fragmented in ways that can challenge state/diaspora engagements as well as tools of academic analysis. The challenge is significant for empirical research, as the researchers discovered in setting out to source and engage subjects who are dispersed socially, geographically and virtually, with few communal or connective elements. The use of an online survey underscores the importance of social media to Egyptian emigrants' communications and maintenance of community.

Country of residence



There is some regional skewing with the majority of respondents (86.58%) based in Italy, though we take this to simply reflect the demographics of Egyptian populations in Europe.



1. The survey was begun due to the challenges of interviewing Egyptian migrants in significant numbers, especially as the Covid-19 pandemic restricted fieldwork.

METHODOLOGY



We designed and distributed an online survey via Qualtrics of 28 questions designed to capture information on demographics, organisations and networks, views on Egypt and sense of identity. In order to target 18-40 year old Egyptian emigrants through social media, the research team created an educational Facebook page titled “Egyptians in Europe Survey.” Through this page, posts were made to gain the interest of Egyptian emigrants with a link to our survey. The specific demographic of respondents that we chose to engage were people aged between 18 and 40, live in Italy, Germany, the UK or Ireland. Engagements from using boosts on the Facebook posts resulted in an increase of several hundred respondents to the survey. The survey received 781 responses in total. It has been analysed using statistical software once data collection was completed in June 2020.

DEMOGRAPHICS

All respondents were between 18 and 40, as stipulated by the survey criteria, of which over 40% were aged between 18-24. Almost three quarters were male.




Half were married and over 70% of spouses are from Egypt.




Asked, what is the highest level of education, over a third indicated they hold a first degree.

Highest level of education



As noted in RP6, Egyptians in Europe often have primary identifiers other than national origin, including religion, the nationality of the country of residence, and Arabic.


How do you primarily identify?



MIGRATION


The survey sought responses on the emigrants' reasons for migrating to Europe, with economic opportunity clearly the most significant pull factor, nearly 40%, followed by family reunification, almost 20%. The push factor with the highest percentage, just over 10%, was the political environment in Egypt.

Reasons for emigration to Europe




Asked about those who helped during the migration process, over 60% were close family or other relatives, reflecting the importance of familial ties in migrant networking. The emigrants received several forms of assistance, with help with obtaining a resident visa or permit the most common, over 28%.

Sources of help during the migration process




Forms of assistance




EMPLOYMENT

Over 50% of the survey respondents were employed or self-employed, just over 20% were students.

Employment status




Fellow Egyptian migrants are an important source of job information, almost 40%, reflecting the significant role of bonding social capital in co-national networks.




ENGAGEMENT WITH EGYPT

The survey contained several questions focused on emigrants' interactions with Egypt, via travel, media and investment.


Over three quarters visit Egypt at least once a year, with meeting family and friends being the main purpose of visits.




The vast majority of emigrants stay informed about Egypt, doing so through several media formats. For social media communications with co-nationals, Facebook is by far the most popular platform.



Asked about sending remittances to Egypt, 60% of survey respondents stated they do so, with just over 30% doing so regularly. The numbers investing in Egypt are smaller yet significant, with over 21% doing so.




Almost two thirds of the emigrant respondents to the survey signified they would return to Egypt to live. The main obstacles to return are economic, with over 58% citing poor economic conditions and job opportunities in Egypt.




EGYPTIANS IN EUROPE

As remarked upon in the Research Report, Egyptian emigrants by and large have no interest in established Egyptian organisations in Europe. Their views on community leadership and representation are mixed, with just under 50% perceiving it as efficient.



While rates of language intercourse and fluency suggest integrative engagement with host communities, there is evidence of disengagement, with 22% conversing mostly with fellow Egyptians and almost 9% not speaking the host language.



The closing question of the survey asked “What advice do you give Egyptians looking for work in Europe?” This was not posed in a statistical form but as an open question inviting statements. Here is a sampling of the statements:

Do a lot of research and ask a lot of people if they know any places so you can go and leave your CV.

*Get a good education – be flexible but choose your battles.
Make yourself employable. Work on your education and skills. It does pay off.*

Work hard on your CV before coming. Keep to your goal and do not deviate due to the negatives of Western society.

Be regular in your work, do nothing contrary and follow the laws.

I advise him to learn and master a craft well, and from now on he must learn the language of the country he wants to migrate to at a high level.

Europe is not a paradise or an ideal place to live.

Master the language of the country you want to go to and master the craft.

Master the language of the country in which you will reside.

If you have work, do not go.

Look and do not despair, as there are many job opportunities in the country.

Stay away from the forbidden, drugs and bad employers.

Build your future in Egypt better

Learn and integrate quickly, forget Egypt, forget social and cultural customs and traditions, but do not forget about religion, Muslim or Christian.

Fluency in the language, mastery of a specific craft, simplicity of speaking and accommodating all human beings and opinions.

Master the language and obtain an Italian license.

Fluency in the language of the country is essential to facilitate obtaining a job.

Sincerity at work and love for the work you do.

Diligence and honesty.

Investing in Egypt is much better than working outside the country, and success in your country is better than abroad.

Commitment to work, dates and work efficiency.

Serious research and education of host country laws.

Coping in Egypt with the poor economic situation and few jobs may be better than Europe.

Obtain all papers including the Italian license and obtain work experience courses.

To whoever wants to travel to any European country first, you must master the language of the country you intend to travel to. Try not to put all your trust in a friend because he will often mislead you. Try to ask a lot. Do not ask one person, but ask more.

To learn the language well so that they can learn about the culture and integrate into the new society.

I advise them to mix with the people of the country and stay away from Arab foreigners.

First, you must learn the main language of the country in which you reside for ease of communication.

Learning the Italian language is very important and indispensable because it helps in opening job opportunities, does not allow in any way for an employer to take advantage of you and does not give you full wages or try not to appoint you formally to guarantee your rights from taxes and social insurance.

Learn craftsmanship and patience for work and racism.

Formal or government education and training while learning different languages.

They must learn a good specialty before coming to Europe, and if they can learn at least the Italian language and read about the Italian culture.

Do your best to leave Egypt and reach Europe. Staying in Egypt is a waste of life and age.

Do not accept illegal work or accept a lower salary than it deserves. Raise your head, so no one has any favour over you.

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RESEARCH ON THE MEANS TO IMPROVE HUMAN MOBILITY CHANNELS

RESEARCH PAPER 7

Circular Migration and Development of Skills

Prepared by **Dr. Katrin Marchand**



UCD CLINTON
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October 2020

ABSTRACT: This paper evaluates the impact of existing circular migration schemes on the development of migrants' skills. To the extent possible, it differentiates between "spontaneous" circular migration activities and managed or regulated circular migration schemes, focusing on the latter while referencing the relevance of the former. The paper examines how and with what efficacy the schemes facilitate migrant labour mobility and aid in the development of particular skills. It considers how they negotiate the interests of governments and societies of origin and destination and migrants themselves. As much as possible, particular attention is paid to circular migration in the Egyptian context. The paper is informed by desk review of data and literature on circular migration.

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Abbreviations and Acronyms

CES	Conference of European Statisticians
EMN	European Migration Network
EU	European Union
GCIM	Global Commission on International Migration
GCM	Global Compact for Safe, Orderly and Regular Migration
GIZ	German Development Cooperation
IOM	International Organization for Migration
MPI	Migration Policy Institute
UN	United Nations
UNECE	United Nations Economic Commission for Europe

Executive Summary

The objective of this research paper is to provide an overview of circular migration in the context of Egypt and wider discussions around its measurement and (potential) impacts. For this purpose, the paper presents an overview of the current state of the art on defining and, to some extent, measuring circular migration, circular migration in the Egyptian context, the development implications of circular international movements and managing circular migration. Specific attention is paid to the “triple-win” concept, i.e. countries of origin and destination as well as the migrants benefitting from the movements, and to the role of skills and skill development in (circular) migration as well as the portability of skills across borders, especially in contexts where labour markets in countries of destination and countries of origin share few similar characteristics. The research paper is intended for different stakeholders, including policy makers in national governments, programme managers in international organisations or technical development cooperation agencies and researchers interested in circular migration, focusing on movements between Egypt and the EU.

This summary describes the main findings related to the measurement, trends and potential impacts of circular migration. It also investigates existing policy options for circular migration around the world and highlights several key gaps in the understanding of circular migration in the Egyptian context, especially when it comes to movements between Egypt and the EU.

DEFINING AND MEASURING CIRCULAR MIGRATION

Circular migration is a phenomenon that has been gaining attention among academics, policy makers and practitioners for several years. Yet, there is to-date no international definition of what circular migration actually is. Several different definitions are used by different organisations. The general consensus is that the term circular migration describes repeated movements between country of origin and country/ies of destination. What is clear is that circular migration is different from the concepts of permanent and temporary migration. It has a dynamic that those two terms do not contain as they refer to linear movements. It is therefore useful to think about the different components that make up the concept of circular migration. These are the repetition of movement, the directionality of movements, the time dimension, the purpose of migration and the legal nature of migration. Considering all of these points, the challenge when it comes to circular migration lies in how to capture all of this in one definition and how it can be measured. Practically, a recommendation by the United Nations Economic Commission for Europe is to make a distinction between a conceptual and statistical definition respectively as this allows us to know what it is that needs to be measured and how to measure it. The conceptual definition is very much in line with

those cited above and states that circular migration is “a repetition of legal migration by the same person between two or more countries” (UNECE, 2016, p. 18). When it comes to the statistical definition, a general and an extended (indicated in [brackets]) version are presented, which differ in the duration of stay they consider:

“A circular migrant is a person who has crossed the national borders of the reporting country at least 3 times over a 10-year period, each time with duration of stay (abroad or in the country) of at least 12 months [/of at least 90 days]” (UNECE, 2016, p. 20).

Even with this definition proposal in place, the measurement of circular migration remains a challenge. While many countries collect and report data on migration to and from their territory through administrative sources, such data rarely allows to identify circular movements as each movement is reported as a new incidence and it is not possible to track people over time. While surveys would allow to get a clearer understanding of circular movements, this requires including questions about entire migration histories of migrants. In practice, this is rarely done. And even in panel studies, such people are often those that drop out between rounds when they move temporarily and are then not traced again in the case that they move back. In order to capture the global scale of circular migration, data would need to capture information on migrants across space and time.

CIRCULAR MIGRATION IN THE EGYPTIAN CONTEXT

In the Egyptian context, no established definition of circular migration exists. In practice it may, however, play a role in alleviating pressures from the domestic labour market and resources caused by population growth in the country. The main legal framework guiding migration of Egyptians is the *Emigration and Sponsoring Egyptians Abroad Law No. 111 of 1983*. Among other things, this Law outlines the rules and procedures for Egyptian emigrants and contains a clear distinction between permanent and temporary emigration, but does not refer to circular migration. The factors that determine the migrant status to be temporary or permanent are the duration of stay abroad and in the home country. When reflecting on circular migration then, the Law allows for flexibility in returning to the homeland while maintaining the migrant status and employment abroad only to some extent. The duration of time abroad and in Egypt are recorded and the emigration status is lost if the person returns to Egypt and lives there for twelve months or longer in the case of permanent migration. For temporary migrants the status is already lost when they return to Egypt for six months. It is also important to mention that the Law grants migrants the right to retain their Egyptian nationality along with the nationality of their country of destination and other rights such as the exemption from all taxes and fees on the returns of investments by Egyptian migrants in one of the banks operating in Egypt. Such policies are generally beneficial when it comes to circular migrants.

When it comes to measuring circular migration, especially between Egypt and the EU, there is currently no data that allows to do so. The best option is therefore to look at migration trends more generally to see if there is information that allows inferences about circular migration of Egyptians. For instance, Saudi Arabia only provides temporary status based on the 'Kafala' system. Hence, emigration flows from Egypt towards the Arab Gulf, main destinations of Egyptian migrants, are generally classified as temporary, while emigration flows towards Europe and North American countries are classified as permanent. Evidence on circular migration between Egypt and the EU, on the other hand, is completely lacking. No true circular migration scheme exists and while spontaneous circular migration could potentially include a variety of migratory flows, no data exists.

THE DEVELOPMENT IMPLICATIONS OF CIRCULAR MIGRATION

The interest in circular migration has grown in particular because policy makers and practitioners have recognised the potential that lies in such movements. In this context, the triple win scenario proposes that the country of origin, the country of destination as well as the migrants themselves all benefit. This notion is largely conceptual at this stage as empirical evidence that is specific to circular migration does not exist.

The country of origin can benefit from circular migration in multiple ways. The main channels for such benefits are remittances and (temporary) return. While abroad, migrants may accumulate financial and human capital, which might in turn have benefits for the country of origin. It is important to caution against high expectations in terms of origin country development put on circular migration. A prerequisite for positive implications is a favourable environment, referring to factors such as the investment climate, administrative procedures, infrastructure as well as low levels of corruption and conversely trust of migrants.

When it comes to the country of destination, the most direct benefit is the fact that circular labour migration allows addressing labour demands. In times of ageing societies and structural labour market shortages, such options are becoming more attractive for many countries and offer the opportunity to secure a supply of workers with different skills levels, without committing to permanent migration and integration of these migrants. This ignores the reality that migrants, which were intended to engage in circular movements, do then settle permanently. Furthermore, it remains to be seen whether temporary, even if repeated, migration facilitated by circular migration policies and programmes is a sustainable solution to addressing employers', often structural, needs.

Finally, migrants themselves are also perceived to benefit from circular migration. Regular migration channels provide new opportunities for migration in a safer manner and reduce costs and risks for migrants. Furthermore, migrants may want to migrate only for a limited time to reach a savings goal or acquire skills that will enable them to improve their situation

in the country of origin upon return. In an ideal scenario, circular migrants are able to optimise their situation with every move that they make. This means that they improve skills, income, savings and assets, which in turn increases their socio-economic status, while decreasing their costs by building country-specific human capital and social networks. Practically, such behaviour is largely possible for EU nationals in the EU context, but much more difficult when it comes to third country nationals, such as Egyptians, where regular migration opportunities remain highly selective.

It should also be noted that some existing evidence largely contests the triple-win approach to circular migration as such. This is because the way that such approaches have been used by several countries in the Global North seems to focus on the securitisation of migration rather than the development implications. In addition, states face having to balance meeting labour market demands and overcoming fears regarding immigration in the general public. This generally has implications for the rights given to migrants arriving through these channels in order to keep the political and social costs low. This has implications for the way that circular migration can contribute to development in practice and how development-relevant aspects are taken into account when designing circular migration schemes.

THE ROLE OF SKILLS

Skill development and acquisition as well as education more generally are important at different stages of a migration trajectory. When returns to education differ between countries, this might be reason for people with specific skills to migrate to benefit from these higher returns. Educational and work background along with the transferability of these skills as well as the willingness to gain further knowledge and qualifications, determine the economic success of immigrants to a large extent. Many employers in destination countries have little interest to invest in the skills development of temporary workers, including circular ones. In this context, evidence exists that migrants often take jobs that require skills below the level that they have attained. Human capital generally does not transfer perfectly across borders caused by factors such as a lack of language skills or challenges with recognition of skills and experience or knowledge of the necessary procedure. Work experience in the destination country enables migrants to move into better positions over time, while prior work experience in the origin country may intensify the mismatch. In this context, evidence from Egypt shows that youth intending to migrate do not look for work opportunities according to their skill profile but are rather willing to take any job accessible to them. Even those that have specific skill sets and specialisation search for employment in unskilled sectors in countries of destination rather than in their respective field. Therefore, the likelihood of being in a situation of educational mismatch is high, but this is in those cases, at least to some extent, a calculated risk.

MANAGING CIRCULAR MIGRATION

Trying to manage circular migration is not an easy task and it might even be said that trying to manage it will by default turn circular migration into temporary programmes of migration. Additionally, labour migration policies and programmes have been used to fight irregular migration by some destination countries. Such motivations are likely not in line with priorities of the Egyptian and other origin country governments, who would be interested in options for circular migration for their nationals for other reasons and likely have more focus on the development implications. In line with such critical stances, a review of existing circular migration schemes highlights that there are few and that even those that do exist could also be seen as temporary rather than circular labour migration schemes.

The few schemes that have been identified, none that include Egypt, highlight a pattern in terms of what countries of destination have been using circular migration schemes for. It is largely in seasonal work, to a large extent in the agricultural sector, or to address specific demands in the labour market, largely in low skilled occupations. Another observation relates to the fact that most of the cited schemes that allow for circular migration usually give migrants the option to apply for a new visa once they return home, rather than providing a set-up that allows truly flexible movements between country of origin and destination. Evaluations of these schemes are lacking, which further limits the understanding regarding effective ways of facilitating circular migration and the realities of the triple-win scenario.

CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

Circular migration is a topic that has been widely discussed in the past two decades in both academic and policy circles. Yet, the review conducted for this paper shows that knowledge and practices are still in relatively early stages. In the context of Egypt, it can be assumed that much of the labour migration to the Gulf countries undertaken by large numbers of Egyptian nationals is circular in nature, while there is no reliable evidence on the nature of migration between Egypt and the EU available at this stage. No policies or programmes facilitating circular migration along this corridor could be identified.

In order to increase the understanding and work towards facilitating circular migration, several recommendations can be made. In the specific context of circular movements between Egypt and the EU, as well as more generally, more data needs to be collected and analysed to understand the role of these movements in migration patterns and trends. Exploring existing data and seeing whether there is information that already exists that would allow to produce an analysis of circular migration in the Egyptian context is a first step in this direction. Depending on the outcomes of such an assessment and to really understand the patterns and dynamics of circular migration in the Egyptian context, a survey might then be more useful. A module in a household survey could be a source to further the understanding of circular migration as could a more targeted demographic survey, which focuses exclusively on capturing individuals' migration history.

In order to facilitate circular migration, it is important to find a way to combine interests of different stakeholders. As such, designing effective policies and programmes for circular migration is an extremely challenging task. So far, few countries have piloted projects to do so and systematic evaluation of such initiatives are lacking. Without such evidence, including longer term perspectives, it will be difficult to develop policies and programmes further and to design them in a way that they indeed create a triple win situation for all involved stakeholders.

I. Introduction

Egypt has a long tradition of labour migration and has seen both temporary and permanent movements of nationals to a variety of destination countries. At the global level, evidence suggests that a large share of movements across international borders are in fact people returning to their country of origin, whether that be the country of birth or citizenship (Azose & Raftery, 2010; OECD, 2008). What is not clear is to what extent people returning “home” is the end of a migration trajectory. Evidence shows that in many cases migrants are involved in circular movements, where they move between their country of origin and one or more destination countries repeatedly (Zimmermann, 2014). It is likely that this is also the case in the Egyptian context.

Circular migration has always naturally happened in unmanaged, spontaneous ways. In relatively recent years, there has, however, been an increase in attention to the term circular migration¹ among policy makers and practitioners in the area of migration. The new awareness has resulted in countries trying to manage circular migration. In 2005, the first-ever global panel addressing international migration, the Global Commission on International Migration (GCIM), published its final report in which it “concludes that the old paradigm of permanent migrant settlement is progressively giving way to temporary and circular migration” (GCIM, 2005, p. 31). This is based on the observation that millions of people around the world move within as well as across regions for short-term employment to then return to the country of origin. They may do so once or repeatedly, which is when the movements take on a circular nature (GCIM, 2005).

It is in the same report that the GCIM calls for actions by countries of destination to promote circular migration. They also clarify that to achieve this, mechanisms and channels are needed that allow and facilitate the movement of mobile migrants to move between countries relatively easily (GCIM, 2005). Almost fifteen years later, similar notions are expressed in the Global Compact for Safe, Orderly and Regular Migration (GCM), which was adopted by the majority of United Nations (UN) Member States in December 2018 (IOM, 2020). Within Objective 5, the GCM calls to

“[d]evelop flexible, rights-based and gender-responsive labour mobility schemes for migrants, in accordance with local and national labour market needs and skills

1. It is important to note that in this paper, circular migration is distinguished from other types of migration, particularly temporary or seasonal migration. Circular migration implies repetitive or repeat migration which is not necessarily temporary or seasonal. The definition will be discussed extensively in Section III, but this is important to understand from the beginning.

supply at all skills levels, including temporary, seasonal, circular and fasttrack programmes in areas of labour shortages, by providing flexible, convertible and non-discriminatory visa and permit options, such as for permanent and temporary work, multiple-entry study, business, visit, investment and entrepreneurship”
(United Nations General Assembly, 2018, p. 13).

In particular, the GCM calls for the engagement in bilateral partnerships and programmes to facilitate mobility and circulation of migrants as well as skills development. To achieve this, channels such as student and professional exchange programmes are suggested as well as scholarships and trainee- or apprenticeships. The important part of such programmes is the option that participants can look for jobs or start a business after completion (GCIM, 2005). This is very much in contrast to many of the existing temporary labour migration schemes, which require migrants to return to the country of origin upon end of a work contract that was facilitated under the programme.

In practice, there are different ways in which governments can facilitate, or at least not stop, circular migration. They can facilitate such movements through managed or regulated circular migration schemes. It is, however, also the case that many migrants engage in circular movements naturally when this is possible. This is what is often referred to as spontaneous circular migration. Migration policies can limit such natural decisions of migrants when they do not allow migrants to move freely. Restrictive migration policies can have adverse effects such as the diversion of migration to irregular channels, migration becoming more permanent and involving families moving rather than individual mobile migrants. This might lead to welfare losses in both countries of origin and destination. It is when free labour mobility is possible that circular migration occurs and has potential to contribute to development. According to the triple-win concept, countries of origin, countries of destination and the migrants themselves all benefit from circular migration in different ways (Zimmermann, 2014).

It is a matter of fact, that at present few practical examples of truly circular migration schemes exist at the global level. In order to understand why this may be the case, this paper will cover different topics before coming to the discussion of circular migration schemes as such. The next section will discuss the methodology used to compile the information presented in this paper. Section III will then deal with the current state of the art on defining and, to some extent, measuring circular migration. Section IV looks at circular migration in the Egyptian context both in terms of definition as well as migration trends over time. The following section will then discuss the development implications of circular international movements and in doing so elaborate on the triple-win concept already mentioned above. More specific attention within this section will then be placed on the role of skills and skill development in (circular) migration as well as the portability of skills across borders, especially in contexts where labour markets in countries of destination and countries of origin share few similar characteristics. It is in Section VI that the existing circular migration schemes as well as any evidence on them will be presented. Section VII concludes with recommendations for future research as well as implications for policy and practice when it comes to circular migration focusing on movements between Egypt and the EU.

II. Methodology

The discussions of circular migration, specifically in the context of Egypt, in this paper are based on a review of existing literature. Both academic literature as well as grey literature was included to ensure coverage of different approaches to the topic. In the search for literature, the focus was two-fold. Firstly, literature specifically on circular migration was identified to cover several issues. This includes the matters of defining and measuring circular migration (see Section III) as well as the theoretical perspectives on the potentials of circular migration (see Section V).

A second round of searches was then conducted to identify existing circular migration schemes. For this part, schemes in which Egypt is or has been involved were initially the focus. However, only a small number of labour migration schemes could be identified, especially when looking for ones facilitating circular migration. As a consequence, the search was broadened. This serves the purpose of providing an overview of situations in which circular migration schemes have been used by governments to understand contexts where this has been found useful.

Thirdly, the specific aspect of skills development needed further attention as it was not a strong theme that emerged in the first two rounds of literature review. It was therefore decided to not limit the literature search on this aspect to its relationship with circular migration specifically. Instead, the scope here was widened to labour migration more generally. This allows to get an overview of the relationship between movements for the purpose of work and the development of skills of migrants.

In turn, it is likely that the more general findings are then also applicable to circular migration movements, at least to a large extent.

In addition to the review of literature, data was also consulted to try to see if data contains evidence on circular migration movements between Egypt and the European Union (EU) Member States. For this purpose, data from the Eurostat database was downloaded and analysed to look at the different types of labour migration from Egypt to Europe, which may be of circular nature, specifically when it comes to seasonal work. However, it turned out that existing data does not allow to do so as discussed in more detail in Section IV.B.

It is important to mention that this methodology as well as the state of the literature and data on circular migration results in several limitations. While circular migration is by no means a new phenomenon, it is extremely difficult to measure. This has led to a situation where its potential consequences and the movements as such have largely been overlooked in research on labour migration. Data limitations have led to limited empirical research, while there is literature that is more descriptive in nature. This is important to note as it limits the possibilities to develop strong recommendations regarding circular migration between Egypt and the EU based on the present review. It is therefore important to seek additional information and research on circular migration trends, policies and programmes. A first step in this regard would be to gain a better understanding of the trends of circular migration in this context. While no programmes facilitating circular movements specifically could be identified at this stage, it is possible that there is spontaneous circular migration already happening. Surveys or interviews with migrants could shed light on such trends and provide insights for further research in this area.

III. Defining and Measuring Circular Migration

Circular migration is a phenomenon that has been gaining attention among academics, policy makers and practitioners for several years. Yet, there is to-date no international definition of what circular migration actually is. This is in contrast to other kinds of migration which have been clearly defined within the system of the United Nations. The United Nations Recommendations on Statistics of International Migration (1998) contain definitions on, for example, long-term and short-term migrants as well as return migrants. While these are very relevant in discussions on circular migration, they do not provide a clear understanding of what makes circular migration a concept that deserves specific attention.

In February 2013, the Bureau of the Conference of European Statisticians (CES) of the United Nations Economic Commission for Europe (UNECE) established a taskforce to address this lack of an international definition. The Task Force on Measuring Circular Migration is also tasked with clarifying the concept in a way that it becomes possible to measure circular migration in a fashion that it becomes comparable across countries. In October 2016, the Task Force presented a report on *“Defining and Measuring Circular Migration”* in which the current state of the knowledge on defining and measuring circular migration and the proposals for definition and measurement are presented (UNECE, 2016).

Prior to this report and still today, several different definitions were used by different organisations. The general consensus was that the term circular migration describes repeated movements between country of origin and country/ies of destination (UNECE, 2016). At least, this is the underlying information in definitions developed by institutions such as the International Organization for Migration (IOM), the European Migration Network (EMN) or the Migration Policy Institute (MPI). IOM defines circular migration as “[a] form of migration in which people repeatedly move back and forth between two or more countries” (International Organization for Migration, 2019, p. 27). EMN as “a repetition of legal migrations by the same person between two or more countries” (European Migration Network, 2011, p. 14) and the MPI as “the temporary or permanent return of migrants to their countries of origin” (Agunias & Newland, 2007, p. 1). Many other definitions exist and are used by different authors as elaborately discussed by UNECE (2016).

What these definitions show is that circular migration is different from the concepts of permanent and temporary migration. It has a dynamic that those two terms do not contain as they refer to linear movements. Yet, both of these more static concepts are closely linked to different types of circular migration (UNECE, 2016). To further explain this, Argunias and Newland (2007) put forward a typology of circular migration as shown in Table 1. In their typology, any movement that includes crossing an international border at least twice is therefore considered circular migration. This remains a rather broad and inclusive conceptualisation, which would, for example, also classify all seasonal migration to be a specific form of circular migration.

Table 1: *Typology of Circular Migration*

	Permanent Return	Temporary Return
Permanent Migrants	Migrants who reside abroad for an extended period of time and then return to their country of origin for good.	Migrants who reside abroad for an extended period of time and return to their country of origin for temporary stays.
Temporary Migrants	Migrants who reside abroad for a short period of time and then return to their country of origin for good.	Migrants who reside abroad for a short period of time and return to their country of origin for temporary stays.

Source: Developed by the authors based on Agunias and Newland (2007).

It is therefore useful to think about the different components that make up the concept of circular migration. Firstly, there is the **repetition of movement**. Circular migration can only occur when a person moves more than once and completes a full migration loop each time. Migration loops describe movements across international borders that start and end in the same country, the country of origin. A basic migration loop consists of the movement from country A to country B and back to country A. The move to country A is then return migration. In other words, more than one migration loop must be completed in order to consider the movements to be circular migration, for example two moves back and forth between country A and B. However, circular migration does not have to take place between the same countries, so it could also be a move to country C after returning to country A for the first time and then back to country A again after spending some time in country C (UNECE, 2016).

A second dimension of circular migration is the **directionality** of movements. This relates to the definition of a country of origin, which is in most cases the country of birth or citizenship. However, this is not a necessary condition to defining circular migration. In principle, circular migration can also take place between two or more countries of residence that are neither the country of birth or citizenship (UNECE, 2016).

Thirdly, the dimension of **time** is also important to consider when discussing circular migration. More specifically, time is important to consider in two ways. Firstly, it is important in light of the duration of stay in each of the countries a migrant resides in when moving circularly. In simple definitions this does not matter, but becomes especially important when it comes to measuring circular migration (UNECE, 2016). In general, any stay in a different country is not considered to be international migration when it is for a duration shorter than 90 days according to the United Nations definitions (United Nations Department of Economic and Social Affairs, Statistics Division, 1998). In other words, visits to the home country for vacation, family visits or other short trips should generally not be considered to be a part of circular migration. Time is secondly important when it comes to determining the period over which cross-border movements should be counted to determine circularity (UNECE, 2016).

Next, the **purpose of migration** is also important to consider. This is particularly important when it comes to policy making on circular migration as depending on the reason for moving between countries, different visa and migration policies likely play a role. While not easy to measure, understanding the nature of circular movements can be beneficial as it might make a difference whether the movements are motivated by work, education or other reasons (UNECE, 2016).

Closely related, there is also the **legal nature of migration** which is important to consider. International definitions of migration generally do not limit the phenomenon to regular movements as this would ignore a large share of migration happening in the world. In the case of circular migration this would also exclude a large portion of the movements that were introduced before as spontaneous circular movements rather than managed ones (UNECE, 2016).

Considering all of these points, the challenge when it comes to circular migration lies in how to capture all of this in one definition and how it can be measured. In their report, UNECE (2016) they goes a step further than the existing definitions and provide proposals for a conceptual and statistical definition respectively. This is important because when it comes to measuring circular migration, it is important to a) know it is that needs to be measured and b) how to measure it. The conceptual definition is very much in line with those cited above and states that circular migration is “a repetition of legal migration by the same person between two or more countries” (UNECE, 2016, p. 18). When it comes to the statistical definition, they provide a general and an extended version. The general one reads as follows:

“A circular migrant is a person who has crossed the national borders of the reporting country at least 3 times over a 10-year period, each time with duration of stay (abroad or in the country of at least 12 months” (UNECE, 2016, p. 20).

This definition focuses on rather long periods of stay, which is why it is complemented by the extended definitions, which also considers short-term migration:

“A circular migrant is a person who has crossed the national borders of the reporting country at least 3 times over a 10-year period, each time with duration of stay (abroad or in the country) of at least 90 days” (UNECE, 2016, p. 20).

This definition becomes much broader but still excludes, for example, one-time seasonal migration or seasonal workers that only go abroad for two months every year. Yet, in practice, many seasonal movements remain circular in nature and when examples of circular migration schemes are presented later in this paper (Section VI.) this will become clear as many of the practical examples can actually be found in the form of seasonal worker schemes. As such, a clear distinction between circular and seasonal migration is difficult to make in practice.

Also, at this stage these remain proposals and the measurement of circular migration a challenge in many contexts (UNECE, 2016). While many countries collect and report data on migration to and from their territory through administrative sources, such data does rarely allow to identify circular movements as each movement is reported as a new incidence and it is not possible to track people over time. While surveys would allow to get a clearer understanding of circular movements, this requires including questions about entire migration histories of migrants. In practice, this is rarely done. And even in panel studies, such people are often those that drop out between rounds when they move temporarily and are then not traced again in the case that they move back. In order to capture the global scale of circular migration, data would need to capture information on migrants across space and time (Zimmermann, 2014).

At this point, this has not been done and no comprehensive overview of circular migration at the global level exists. And as stated, even in terms of definitions there is no general international agreement at this stage. For the purpose of this paper, it is therefore important to look more specifically at circular migration in the context of Egypt to understand how circular migration may fit into the overall migration trends in the country and to what extent it is possible to measure it.

IV. Circular Migration in Egypt

IV.A DEFINING CIRCULAR MIGRATION IN THE EGYPTIAN CONTEXT

No established definition of circular migration as such exists in the context of Egypt. However, existing reviews identify that migration is used by the Egyptian government, at least to some extent, to alleviate pressures from the domestic labour market and resources caused by population growth in the country (Badawy, 2008; Jureidini, 2010). In this context, circular migration may potentially play an important role, when also considering its development implications (see Section V). It is, therefore, important to take a look at the existing legal and policy framework to get a sense how circular movements may fit in.

The main legal framework guiding migration of Egyptians is the *Emigration and Sponsoring Egyptians Abroad Law No. 111 of 1983*. Among other things, this law outlines the rules and procedures for Egyptian emigrants and contains a clear distinction between permanent and temporary emigration (Jureidini, 2010). As circular migration is considered to be a phenomenon in which a person rotates between the country of origin and the country/ies of destination, it is important to look at these definitions by the government to see how they relate to the concept of circular migration. According to Article 8 of the Emigration Law:

“[a] permanent migrant is the Egyptian who stays abroad permanently, by obtaining the nationality of a foreign country, or a permanent residence permit to stay in this country; or who stays abroad for at least ten years, or obtains an emigration permit from one of the countries of emigration specified by a resolution of the Minister concerned with Emigration Affairs” (Badawy, 2008, p. 4).

When it comes to temporary migration, Article 13 of the Law states that:

“[a] temporary Egyptian migrant is the Egyptian citizen, who is not a student, or seconded employee, who settles and sets up his main activity abroad, and has a job

to make his living, providing that he has stayed abroad for one year and has not taken the permanent emigration procedures stated herein, or that he has taken the said procedures and returned to his homeland before fulfilling any of the conditions stated in article (8) herein. The period of one year referred to in the above-mentioned paragraph is to be considered a continuous year even if it is interrupted by intervals not more than thirty days. This provision shall not prejudice the extension of sponsorship duty to all Egyptians abroad” (Badawy, 2008, p. 4).

That means that the factors that determine the migrant status to be temporary or permanent are the duration of stay abroad and in the home country. When reflecting on circular migration then, the Law allows for flexibility in returning to the homeland while maintaining the migrant status and employment abroad only to some extent. The duration of time abroad and in Egypt are recorded and the emigration status is lost if the person returns to Egypt and lives there for twelve months or longer in the case of permanent migration. For temporary migrants the status is already lost when they return to Egypt for six months (Badawy, 2008). Considering the proposed definitions by UNECE (2016) (see Section III), this would limit possibilities for circular migration in the general sense and allow it in the extended sense.

In practice, the temporary or permanent status is also determined by the country of destination and the respective policies and opportunities there. For instance, Saudi Arabia only provides temporary status based on the ‘Kafala’ system. Hence, emigration flows from Egypt towards the Arab Gulf are generally classified as temporary, while emigration flows towards Europe and North American countries are classified as permanent (Ghoneim, 2010; Nassar, 2008). This calls for a further analysis of the main emigration trends in Egypt in the light of circular migration in the following section.

IV.B (CIRCULAR) MIGRATION TRENDS IN EGYPT

Looking at Egyptian migration patterns allows to further develop the understanding of the role of circular migration. However, when it comes to measuring circular migration, especially between Egypt and the EU, there is currently no data that allows to do so. Reviewing data provided by Eurostat, the European Statistical Office, does not allow to capture repeated movements and neither does publicly available data from national statistical offices. The complexity of obtaining such data is clearly expressed in the UNECE (2016) report. In the report, examples of how existing data can be used to measure circular migration are provided. One of the practical examples provided in this context is Italy, the main country of destination of Egyptians in the EU. Generally, immigration and emigration in Italy does not contain information on the (intended) duration of the stay or any information on prior movements. To get such information, the Italian statisticians linked data from the population register and the migration flow data. Unfortunately, Egypt is not one of the countries of origin that was included in this exercise (UNECE, 2016).

The best option is therefore to look at migration trends more generally to see if there is information that allows inferences about circular migration of Egyptians. Emigration trends from Egypt have undergone a drastic change over time, which in turn also has had impacts on circular migration of Egyptians. The period between the 1950s and the mid-1960s witnessed very restrictive emigration policies. It was not until 1964 that an institute was established to assist certain emigration cases. That year the Committee for Manpower was established and consequently authorised to issue “a few thousand permits per year” (Ghoneim, 2010, p. 13). Under Nasser’s regime (1956 to 1970), migration policies witnessed a drastic reform, and, in most cases, these were politically driven. As a tool of soft-power, migration policies shifted from restricting emigration in the light of avoiding brain drain to encouraging migration especially during the period of Pan-Arabism (Tsourapas, 2020).

During Sadat’s era from 1970 to 1981, emigration was declared a right for Egyptian nationals under Article 52 of the 1971 Constitution. From the standpoint of circular migration, it was the first step towards promoting such movements as nationals have the right to emigrate and return home. In addition, “Law 73/1971 allowed public-sector employees to return to their jobs after an absence of one year, subsequently extended to two years together with the removal of other legal impediments. Following the open door policy adopted in 1974, all restrictions on labour migration were lifted (Ghoneim, 2010 p. 13)”. As such, this period witnessed the expansion of migratory rights and the Egyptian government established institutions to manage migration flows and maintain links with Egyptians abroad. For instance, the Ministry of State for Emigration Affairs was established after the Presidential Decree 574/1981.

As previously said, migration in Egypt is currently governed by law and distinguishes between permanent and temporary migration. The law also grants migrants the right to retain their Egyptian nationality along with the nationality of their country of destination. Moreover, Chapter 4 of the Emigration Law addresses migrants’ rights. For instance, Article 15 grants the exemption from all taxes and fees on the returns of investments by Egyptian migrants in one of the banks operating in Egypt (Ghoneim, 2010). All of these are policies that are generally beneficial when it comes to circular migrants (Zimmermann, 2014).


In 1996, there was a shift in duties and responsibilities in Egypt regarding labour migration. The Ministry of Manpower and Emigration replaced the Ministry of State for Emigration Affairs and took over their duties regarding labour migration. The Ministry of Manpower and Emigration established a Higher Committee for Migration where several activities for potential migrants were initiated. The Higher Committee for Migration was, for example, given the responsibility for preparing potential migrants for their migration journey, as well as maintaining ties between Egyptian migrants and their homeland. However, according to Ghoneim (2010) the committee rarely meets which limits the effectiveness of their activities.

Coming back to specific evidence on circular migration in the Egyptian context, it is important to take a closer look at data on the main emigration trends. As already briefly mentioned in the previous section, there are different permanent and temporary trends that characterise Egyptian emigration. While the majority of Egyptian migrants reside in the MENA region, there is also a significant population of Egyptian migrants in Europe and North America. As explained in earlier papers of this research paper series (see especially Research Paper 1), clear destination hubs have emerged across Europe's different subregions.

Data by the Population Division of the United Nations Department of Economic and Social Affairs (2019) provides one of the most contemporary assessments of global migrant stocks in countries of residence by country of origin.² The data shown in Figure 1 shows the important role of the Gulf countries as destination countries for Egyptian migrants. Furthermore, the data shows that overall Egyptian emigration increased between 2010 and 2019, but that there were no significant changes in the destination countries. The role of the migration of Egyptian workers to other Arab countries is significant. Egypt is one of the main providers of migrant workers in many of the countries and migration is generally indeed temporary. The lack of opportunities for permanent migration to the Gulf countries has led to a situation where Egyptians tend to stay for several years, but circular migration movements between Egypt and the main countries of destination are also rather common (Tsourapas, 2020). In this context, Nassar (2008) concludes that “most of the Egyptian is temporary migration and part of temporary is likely to be circular” (Nassar, 2008, p. 2).

Even less evidence exists on circular migration between Egypt and the EU. At present, no true circular migration scheme exists (see Section VI). In terms of spontaneous circular migration, this could potentially include a variety of migratory flows. For instance, Egyptian students that study abroad as well as Egyptian nationals who independently find a job, either after their studies abroad or from Egypt, could engage in spontaneous circular migration. These kinds of individuals have the opportunity to engage in circular movements, however, no data can be identified in this regard to investigate in how far they actually do.

2. Depending on the destination country the country of origin is defined either by country of birth or citizenship.

Figure 1: *Egyptian Migrants by Main Countries of Destination*³

Source: Department of Economic and Social Affairs, United Nations Population Division (2019).

NOTES: Please note that estimates on migrant stock are based on the country of birth in the United States, Italy, the United Kingdom and Germany and on citizenship in Saudi Arabia, United Arab Emirates, Kuwait, Qatar and Jordan.

It is also important to briefly note that, due to its geographical location, Egypt is considered to be a sending, receiving and transit country. After the 2011 uprising, irregular migratory routes became popular and attracted mixed migratory flows.⁴ While regulations and laws around regular migration have developed over the years, irregular migration was not governed or controlled until the issuance of Law 82 in 2016. This was the first law to criminalise irregular migration in Egypt and it came into place after a boat which departed from Egypt capsized, killing approximately 500 passengers. While it is perceived as a positive first step towards combatting irregular migration, it has been criticised for providing measures ensuring the protection against non-refoulement for asylum seekers and refugees as such failing to ensure important rights for refugees (Human Rights Watch, 2016). However, irregular migration is also a strategy chosen by unemployed Egyptian youth. High unemployment rates and a lack

3. The United Kingdom and Germany are not among the main destination countries overall, but the main destination countries in Europe besides Italy.

4 These include asylum seekers, refugees, labour migrants and Egyptian Nationals.


of good work opportunities in Arab countries, has driven many to migrate to Europe irregularly. Such flows include both low skilled and qualified workers. Social networks as well as proximity are the main factors determining destination within Europe, with the main countries being Italy, Malta, Cyprus and France (Badawy, 2008; Völkel, 2016). However, no reliable information on the nature of these movements in terms of duration and circularity is available. It is unlikely, however, that these migrants would engage in circular movements considering the dangers involved in irregular migration and the risks of leaving once and not being able to enter again. It is much more likely that these movements are motivated by work opportunities and, as such, the young migrants return home once they have reached a savings goal or face hardships that make staying impossible.

V. The Development Implications of Circular Migration

V.A THE TRIPLE-WIN SCENARIO: BENEFITS AND CHALLENGES

The interest in circular migration has grown in particular because policy makers have recognised the potential that lies in such movements. In this context, the triple win scenario proposes that the country of origin, the country of destination as well as the migrants themselves all benefit. This scenario has become somewhat of a mantra which frames discussions around policy options especially when it comes to migration from the Global South to the Global North (see Section VI for more on this). It is important to note, however, that these notions are largely conceptual at this stage and that little practical experiences and empirical evidence exist that are specific to circular migration (Constant et al., 2013). At the same time, in many ways circular migration is maybe not so different from temporary migration and a lot of the implications are similar.

Figure 2 provides a summary overview of the main benefits often cited for the different parties. These will then be discussed below the figure in more detail. At the same time, it also should not be ignored that circular migration, like migration in general, may also have negative, or at least not the overly ambitious positive, effects on the involved parties. The more critical views will also be discussed for the three different sets of stakeholders in turn.

Figure 2: *The Triple-Win Concept: Main Potential Benefits*

Source: Author's own compilation based on the literature review presented in this section.

Country of Origin

The country of origin can benefit from circular migration in multiple ways. As in the migration and development nexus more generally, the main channels for such benefits are remittances and (temporary) return (Agunias & Newland, 2007; IOM, 2010). While abroad, migrants may accumulate different types of capital, which might in turn have benefits for the country of origin when they return. Firstly, they may acquire new human capital, in the form of qualifications and skills, which they then bring to the country of origin (Agunias & Newland, 2007). The link between migration and skills as well as the portability of skills will be discussed further in the following two sections. Secondly, they may also acquire financial capital. Yet, in many cases, especially low skilled, migrants end up being able to save little, possibly even driving them to stay longer than originally intended to meet a savings goal (Castles & Ozkul, 2014). See more on this also below in the discussion of the benefits for migrants themselves.

In general, the expectations in terms of origin country development put on circular migration are often aimed too high. As de Haas (2010) puts it, expecting circular migrants to automatically drive development in their country of origin reflects “the naivety of recent views celebrating migration as self-help development “from below”” (de Haas, 2010, p. 227). He goes on to explain that these are ideological expectations that do not reflect the reality of existing structural constraints (de Haas, 2010). What should not be overlooked is the fact that states play a vital role in facilitating developmental impacts of migration. They need to create an environment that is

favourable for this to happen. This includes things such as the investment climate, administrative procedures, infrastructure as well as low levels of corruption and conversely trust of migrants (Castles & Delgado Wise, 2008).

In this context, it is also important to remember that migration is selective. In other words, migrants are generally not a random sub-group of the population at origin, but differ in terms of characteristics such as qualifications from non-migrants (Borjas, 1987). Furthermore, characteristics of migrants may determine where they move. Lower skilled migrants can often find work in countries relatively close by, while those with specific skill sets might have to look further away for a job that matches their skills and preferences (de Haas et al., 2020). This also matters in terms of development implications. Who migrates, as well as who returns, may have diverse social and economic effects. So, in the end the actual benefits of circular migration always depend on the context in which the migration takes place.

There is also in most cases a relationship between emigration and labour markets in countries of origin, including effects on unemployment. What this relationship looks like largely again depends on the composition of the migration flows. Depending on who leaves and who stays, it might either create a gap in the labour force or it might alleviate pressure. If migrants were unemployed before their migration this is also likely to have different effects than if people that leave were employed until the moment they leave (David & Marouani, 2016).

Country of Destination

When it comes to the country of destination, the most direct benefit is the fact that circular labour migration allows addressing labour demands. This might be either gaps, where not enough labour is available within the country to meet the demand, or a mismatch, where not enough labour with the right set of skills is available. Addressing such demands with circular migration is possible when migration policies provide ways to do so. This is then usually done in a way that links the option to migrate to the availability of work in the country (Constant et al., 2013). In times of ageing societies and structural labour market shortages, such options are becoming more attractive for many countries and offer the opportunity to secure a supply of workers with different skills levels, without committing to permanent migration and integration of these migrants (Agunias & Newland, 2007). Often migrants are also willing to work for lower wages than citizens, while policies may not allow them to switch jobs (Castles & Ozkul, 2014).

This is at the same time one of the main risks for countries of destination. There is the possibility that migrants, which were intended to engage in circular movements, do then settle permanently. This could be done by overstaying their visa or, where this is an option, changing their status. This is often explicitly not the aim of circular and temporary policies and programmes. Many governments use these kinds of policies specifically to avoid the permanent settlement and to stress the temporary element of the migration, which is a way of making migration a more attractive option to filling labour market demands among the general public (Hugo, 2009; Zimmermann, 2014).

Yet, evidence also shows that, in particular highly skilled, migrants generally have a preference for long-term residence and care about options for family reunification when selecting their country of destination. This is independent of whether they aim to stay in the country indefinitely (Castles & Ozkul, 2014). Other authors argue that circular migration matches the plans of migrants well as most only intend to move abroad for a period of time anyway (Agunias & Newland, 2007).

Furthermore, it is far from certain that the temporary, even if repeated, kind of migration facilitated by circular migration policies and programmes is a sustainable solution to addressing employers' needs. When demands are structural, and therefore long-term, circular migration only works when labour migrants are rotated in their moves between country of origin and country of destination. This is often not the preference for employers as it disrupts workflows and requires additional resources. A good example for this is the care sector, which is one facing significant challenges in many countries. In the contact with patients and especially elderly people, consistency in staff is important and employers generally avoid staff turnovers when possible (Castles & Ozkul, 2014).

In general, labour migrants fill specific market needs in the destination country and, through their participation in the labour market, contribute to local economic development. There is evidence that integration is an important process for such contributions to happen. Temporary and circular migrants with uncertainty about the period they will spend in the country are less inclined to invest in language learning and other integration measures. As a result their chances to develop careers and receive higher wages are smaller and the risk of marginalisation higher. This, in turn, limits their productivity and contributions to economic growth (Anderson & Huang, 2019). In some cases, they may even be excluded from integration efforts, which puts these individuals in a vulnerable position, when trying to find housing and arriving in everyday life in a new environment (Castles & Ozkul, 2014). This leads us to looking at the benefits of circular migration for the migrants themselves.

Migrants

It is generally perceived that the migrants themselves also benefit from circular migration. First and foremost, when countries open channels for circular migration and develop programmes that facilitate such movements, this provides new opportunities for migration in a safer manner through regularised channels (Agunias & Newland, 2007). This reduces costs and risks for migrants and is surely a benefit then. Furthermore, many authors argue that many migrants want to migrate only for a limited time to reach a savings goal or acquire skills that will enable them to improve their situation in the country of origin upon return. Yet, such an assumption is not without caveats. In many cases initial migration plans change once migrants are in the country of destination and get involved in social relationships (Castles & Ozkul, 2014).

In an ideal scenario, circular migrants are able to optimise their situation with every move that they make. This means that they improve skills, income, savings and assets, which in turn increases their socio-economic status. At the same time, their costs for finding work, moving and being away from family and friends may decrease and the social capital increase as they build networks also in the country of destination. In theory, this gives them a comparative advantage over temporary migrants, who do not have the opportunity to maximise benefits, as well as non-migrants (Constant & Zimmermann, 2011). However, in order for this to be a reality, the legal framework must make it possible for the circular migrants to make the decisions that indeed allow them to optimise their situation. In the context of the EU, this is largely possible for EU nationals, but much more difficult when it comes to third country nationals, such as Egyptians.

Countries of destination are selective with regard to what kind of migrants they open up such regular migration channels for. Usually, this is for people with very specific skill sets, which are in high demand on the labour market. This generally puts the lower skilled migrants in a position where they still have to use irregular ways of migrating and engaging in informal employment when they have a savings goal, they want to meet by migrating. So in reality, it is the highly skilled that are more likely to benefit from circular migration policies and programmes. Yet, these are also the migrants for which opportunities for permanent residence already more readily exist. Lower skilled migrants may still engage in circular migration, but when they do so this is often through irregular channels (Castles & Ozkul, 2014).

When considering the impacts of migration on the migrants themselves, wages are also one of the key factors. Literature on this largely has focused on the wage gap between immigrants and natives. Several studies have investigated the wage gap between natives and migrants and the impact of immigration on wages of natives. In the light of development impacts of migration, the latter is less relevant, while it is interesting to take a closer look at how migrants fare compared to natives as this may have consequences on the benefits of labour migration for the migrants themselves. Borjas (1999) finds that existing skill differences between natives and immigrants explain the initial differences in wages and that when these skill differentials diminish over time, migrant wages eventually rise to the level of natives. Similar findings come out of other research in, for example, the United States (Carliner, 1980; Chiswick, 1978), Canada (Baker & Benjamin, 1994), Germany (Dustmann, 1993) or Australia (Beggs & Chapman, 1991), while it cannot be confirmed in the case of Sweden (Hammarstedt, 2003). Dustmann (1993) specifically proposes that the optimal investment into country specific human capital should be lower in cases of temporary migration than for permanent migration.

Yet, even if migrants do not catch up with the natives, the income they earn in the country of destination may still be significantly higher than what they earned at home; that is, if they were employed before migration in the first place. As such, the income migrants earn is one of the most direct effects of labour migration on the migrants themselves. And in turn potentially on their families in the country of origin in cases where they sent a part of their income home as remittances.

Looking at the connections between migration and employment, it is also interesting to consider the impacts of a migration experience on labour market status upon return to the country of origin. There are a number of papers looking at different related aspects in different contexts. For example, a past migration experience increases chances of being employed in Uganda (Thomas, 2008), increases the probability of upward occupational mobility in Albania (Carletto & Kilic, 2011) and Egypt (El-Mallakh & Wahba, 2016) and leads to relatively higher earnings compared to non-migrants in, for example, Ireland (Barrett & Goggin, 2010), Egypt (Wahba, 2015) and several West African countries (De Vreyer et al., 2010). However, many of these effects cannot be generalised and the migrants for which such trends are found have specific characteristics. For example, in the analysis of De Vereyer et al. (2010), they only find a substantial wage premium for migrants returning from an OECD country, but not for those who moved elsewhere. Similarly, Thomas (2008) only finds a significantly higher likelihood of being employed among migrants with tertiary education levels, but not those returning migrants with secondary schooling or below. Further research also highlights that it makes a difference whether returning was a choice or whether it was forced. Forced returnees are more likely to face challenges in terms of labour market reintegration, as well as socio-cultural integration more generally, in the Maghreb countries (David, 2018).

General Criticism

It should also be noted that some existing evidence largely contests the triple-win approach to circular migration as such. This is because the way that such approaches have been used by several countries in the Global North seems to focus on the securitisation of migration rather than the development implications (Cassarino, 2013). In addition, as discussed above, states face having to balance meeting labour market demands and overcoming fears regarding immigration in the general public. This generally has implications for the rights given to migrants arriving through these channels in order to keep the political and social costs low (Castles & Ozkul, 2014). This has implications for the way that circular migration can contribute to development in practice and how development-relevant aspects are taken into account when designing circular migration schemes. This issue will therefore be further discussed in Section VI.

V.B (CIRCULAR) MIGRATION AND SKILLS

Skill development and acquisition as well as education more generally are important at different stages of a migration trajectory (Dustmann & Glitz, 2011). It is also important to consider the ways in which migration can further develop skills and grant people access to new qualifications. In this context, human capital theory provides a good basis for understanding education and migration as an investment (Becker, 2009; Massey et al., 1993; Sjaastad, 1962). Looking at the different stages of the migration journey at which education and skill acquisition may be important, at least four different points can be identified. Firstly, when returns to education differ between countries, this might be reason for people with specific skills to migrate to benefit from these higher returns (Dustmann & Glitz, 2011). Secondly, in many cases regular migration

channels are more readily available to those with specific skills in demand in destination country labour markets (Czaika & Parsons, 2017). Thirdly, educational and work background along with the transferability of these skills as well as the willingness to gain further knowledge and qualifications, determine the economic success of immigrants to a large extent. Finally, the acquisition of new skills and knowledge in the country of origin might be the main motivating factor for moving to a different country (Dustmann & Glitz, 2011). It should, however, also be kept in mind that such newly obtained qualifications and knowledge are not necessarily beneficial for migrants. It is possible that the value of the new skills is actually not as high as anticipated when they return to the country of origin. This relates to the portability of skills, which will be discussed in the following section.

Evidence does highlight that many employers in destination countries have little interest to invest in the skills development of temporary workers, including circular ones. Especially when it comes to low skilled workers, employers see migrants as cheap labour, so investing in training would only increase costs for them. And even when willing to do so generally, the fact that the migrant will leave after some time is a further disincentive to invest in the development of their skills (Castles & Ozkul, 2014).

However, there are also migration programmes that aim specifically at the development of skills. Germany, for example, has offered schemes for care workers from several countries such as the Philippines, Tunisia and Serbia, as well as engineers from Tunisia. In such programmes the participants receive specific training in these sectors. It is also ensured that such programmes are only established with partner countries where there is an oversupply of workers in the targeted sectors. In this way, the German Development Cooperation (GIZ) ensures to facilitate the triple win scenario, which is at the centre of their work on labour migration (GIZ, 2019). However, these are not circular migration schemes as the aim is to have these workers contribute to filling the structural labour market gaps in the German labour market in these specific sectors. While there is no requirement to stay, there is also no component of facilitating circular movements.

When discussing migration and skills, one term that immediately comes to mind is the term “brain drain”, which came to prominence in the 1960s and 1970s to refer to a situation of emigration of a large share of the highly skilled population of a country. “Brain drain” expresses an anxiety that developing countries lose scholars and professionals to more developed countries, leading to a lack of public services and research, as well as tax revenues, in origin countries (Bhagwati & Hamada, 1974; Grubel & Scott, 1966). The early literature on this topic largely focused on the negative effects of such a pattern for the country of origin in terms of implications for development. Later research approaches the topic much more nuanced and acknowledges the complex relationship between highly skilled migration, productivity and equality (Mountford, 1997). Other research still finds negative effects of highly skilled migration in particular in the medical field (Bhargava, 2008; Chauvet et al., 2013).

A move in the academic literature from emphasis on “brain drain” to “brain gain” or “brain circulation” occurred in the early 2000s. “Brain gain” counters the “brain drain” narrative, highlighting that the emigration of skilled migrants can lead to increased human capital accumulation in countries of origin, particularly through increasing the rate of return on education (Borjas, 1987; Stark et al., 1998), and the return of skilled migrants who were trained abroad (Meyer et al., 1997, 2001). The return of skilled migrants is also termed “brain circulation”, which describes the flows of the embodied skills and information as bidirectional rather than unidirectional (Johnson & Regets, 1998).

The literature on “brain gain” and “brain circulation” has examined the enhancement of human capital accumulation in countries of origin and destination due to migration, of which knowledge transfer in the countries of origin is a central mechanism. Le (2008) examined the effect of domestic research R&D, international R&D spill overs and human capital accumulation on total factor productivity in 19 OECD countries and found strong evidence that labour migration plays an important role as a conduit of technological transmission. This has major benefits for both the countries of origin and destination, and developed countries can significantly contribute to global development through investment in R&D (Le, 2008). It has been argued that Indian and Chinese engineers working in Silicon Valley since the 1980s have been instrumental in fostering information technology industries in their countries of origin through technical knowledge transfers, promoting entrepreneurship and maintaining links with companies in the U.S. (AnnaLee, 2005; Wadhwa et al., 2011). A study of Chinese scientists finds that domestically trained scientists largely benefit from working with Chinese nationals who live overseas (Fangmeng, 2016).

Overall, the effects of skilled migration on countries of origin are not easily predicted and highly depend on the respective context. Important factors to consider are the duration of migration as well as the labour market structure. If migration is permanent, the risk of “brain drain” is larger than in temporary migration. At the same time, when unemployment rates are high, migration provides a way to relieve that situation (David & Marouani, 2016).

There is also evidence on the topics related to qualifications and knowledge specifically in the context of Egypt, where there is no strong evidence that “brain drain” is a concern. Wahba (2014) reports that the temporary nature of the majority of migration prevents this from happening. That is even though migrants are on average higher educated than non-migrants. A point of concern in this regard might be the public investment in education in Egypt. If migrants educated in the country then leave, this could indeed be an indication of a brain drain. Yet, since the incidence of unemployment among educated people is quite high, this migration rather takes pressure off the labour market (Wahba, 2014).

V.C PORTABILITY OF SKILLS

The focus in the literature when it comes to immigrants and skills is the educational mismatch of many immigrants in the labour markets of the destination country. This means that migrants take jobs that require skills below the level that they have attained (Piracha & Vadean, 2013). Chiswick (1978) finds that migrants positively self-select and are, on average, higher educated than natives. Yet, they often work in jobs that are below their education level and that is the case for migrants significantly more often than for natives. One reason for this phenomenon is that human capital does not transfer perfectly across borders. Factors such as a lack of language skills or challenges with recognition of skills and experience or knowledge of the necessary procedure can be problematic. Work experience in the destination country enables migrants to move into better positions over time, while prior work experience in the origin country may intensify the mismatch (Chiswick & Miller, 2009; Piracha & Vadean, 2013).

The share of immigrants that are in such a mismatched situation differs across countries and the mismatch as such is, in fact, not easy to measure. Often it is less likely to be the case for migrants from countries where the same language is spoken, or which share other similarities such as quality and structure of the educational system or labour market. In other words, cultural and language proximity often decrease the likelihood of an educational mismatch for migrants (Piracha & Vadean, 2013; Sanromá et al., 2015).

In this context, evidence from Egypt shows that youth intending to migrate do not look for work opportunities according to their skill profile but are rather willing to take any job accessible to them. Even those that have specific skill sets and specialisation search for employment in unskilled sectors in countries of destination rather than in their respective field (Elbadawy, 2011). Therefore, the likelihood of being in a situation of educational mismatch is high, but this is in those cases, at least to some extent, a calculated risk.

A World Bank report on return migration from Europe to overall four countries – Egypt along with Albania, Moldova and Tunisia – also identifies a significant mismatch between the skills migrants possess and the jobs they end up doing while abroad, especially in the case of people who migrate to the EU. Among the other varied findings of their study, Sabadie et al. (2010) report that the migrants returning to the countries do have the potential to contribute to development. Yet, there are no structures in place in the countries of origin that would facilitate this, therefore limiting development impacts of labour migration (Sabadie et al., 2010). Without such structures, a triple-win outcome is unlikely to happen.

There is also some evidence regarding the portability of skills in the country of origin upon return. Often skills and experiences from destination countries are not easily transferable to the country of origin as labour markets may differ in terms of structure and skills needed. Arwolo (2000), for example, finds that return migrants face challenges in terms of labour market reintegration in Namibia due to a mismatch of skills acquired abroad and those needed on the domestic labour market. This poses significant

challenges to their reintegration (Arowolo, 2000). A study by David and Nordman (2017) finds a mismatch of return migrants' education and labour markets in both Egypt and Tunisia, with it seemingly being a more significant issue in the latter. By comparing non-migrants with return migrants, they find that the migration experience is associated with a higher probability of being overeducated. They consider those to be overeducated that have an education level higher than the average level within their occupation plus a standard deviation. They do not distinguish between different kinds of destination countries in this analysis, but state that there are generally different patterns between the two countries, where migration from Egypt is more commonly to Gulf countries and of temporary nature, while Tunisian migrants work abroad for longer periods of time and more likely to go to European countries (David & Nordman, 2017). This might imply that movements to Europe lead to more problems in terms of overeducation upon return than migration from Egypt to the Gulf countries. There is, however, evidence that temporary migrants to the Gulf region also face similar challenges. Sadik (2019) reports this specifically for the case of return from Saudi Arabia. Return migration from there has increased due to bad working conditions and a lack of protection of migrant workers' rights. Upon arrival in Egypt, these returnees have a hard time finding a job and the ones that do resort to occupations in construction or as taxi/uber drivers (Sadik, 2019).

VI. Managing Circular Migration

When it comes to circular migration schemes, there is a risk of labelling temporary migration schemes as such to make them sound more attractive in times where policy makers rave about the potential development implications of circular migration and face anti-immigration sentiments among the general public as discussed in Section V.A. However, real circular migration schemes should enable the migrants to choose freely when and for how long they move between the country of origin and destination(s). And many of the programmes that are labelled circular, in fact, only seem to rebrand “guest worker” policies that were used by several countries in the past to fill demands on the labour market, particularly in low skilled occupations (Castles, 2006; Castles & Ozkul, 2014).

In the middle of the 1970s, the majority of Western European countries abandoned the guest worker programmes, which were installed after World War II. At that time, the demand for labour in the region was high as the industry-based economies were recovering and growing at a fast pace. Germany was among the countries that implemented such a scheme and the state tried to regulate it strictly as the aim was to disincentivise migrants to stay, but rather switch out the labour regularly through rotating them. To achieve this, their rights were restricted, and family reunion not made easy. As Castles (2006) states “Germany, like other Western European states, was trying to *import labour but not people*” (Castles, 2006, p. 742).

In this context, Skeldon (2012) has also warned that trying to manage circular migration is not an easy task. He goes further than that in the following statement: “...in the context of international migration it is argued that, while temporary migration can be managed, it is a contradiction in terms to speak of managing circular migration, as the very fact of managing the process will turn circular migration into temporary programmes of migration” (Skeldon, 2012, p. 53). While this may be a strong statement, a review of existing schemes highlights that indeed there are few and that even those that do exist could also be seen as temporary rather than circular labour migration schemes.

A second major criticism of managing circular migration is based on the use of such policies and programmes to fight against irregular migration already mentioned above at the end of Section V.A. This refers to the fact that countries of destination are opening temporary regular migration channels as a way to curb irregular migration. It is more than likely that with such motivations for the establishment of circular and temporary migration schemes, this does not match the priorities of the Egyptian and other origin country governments, who would be interested in options for circular migration for their nationals for other reasons and likely have more focus on the development implications (Ghoneim, 2010).

In this context, Cassarino (2013) talks about “securitised temporariness” that lies behind policy making regarding migration at the level of the EU and individual countries. He further argues that it is, in fact, rather unclear what policy and programming tools countries want to use to facilitate circular migration. The risk is that bilateral cooperation to establish circular migration schemes might put in place policies that constrain or restrict channels to certain types of migrants and hinder natural circular flows to some extent. This might mean that “in practice, the bilateral cooperation might promote the selective temporariness of labour mobility more than its fluid circulation (Cassarino, 2013, p. 23).

Practically, few existing labour migration schemes can be described as truly circular at this stage. It is important to mention here that there is a much wider variety of labour migration schemes, mostly facilitating temporary migration. Some of these that are relevant in the Egyptian context have been discussed in Research Paper 3 of this series. Here the focus is specifically on programmes for circular migration of which a small number have been piloted at this stage. A few countries have piloted projects and an overview of these is provided in Table 2.

There is no claim here that this is a complete list, but even these examples show a specific pattern in terms of what countries of destination have been using circular migration schemes for. It is largely in seasonal work, to a large extent in the agricultural sector. This is the case in the examples from Canada, New Zealand and Spain. In other examples, specific demands in the labour market are addressed, largely in low skilled occupations. Another observation relates to the fact that most of the cited schemes that allow for circular migration usually give migrants the option to apply for a new visa once they return home, rather than providing a set-up that allows truly flexible movements between country of origin and destination.

A main challenge is that it seems that in almost all cases no evaluations of the (pilot) programmes exist or are accessible. An exception is the Blue Bird Circular Migration Pilot Project carried out by the Netherlands. The evaluation identified both contextual and programme design factors as being problematic for achieving the goals of the pilot. Based on the research several recommendations for future similar projects were developed. Depending on the specific goals, objectives and needs, elements may need to be targeted specifically, but some basic criteria that will enable a project to have a higher likelihood of success can be identified as the following: a willing political environment; a capable implementer; a certain degree of flexibility, clear goals and objectives and a clear focus on these, an expert advisory board and clear criteria with regard to practicalities in implementation (Siegel & van der Vorst, 2012).

Coming back to the specific context of this paper, no actual circular migration scheme could be identified in which Egypt is involved. The Egyptian government has signed bilateral agreements with some countries such as Libya, Sudan, Qatar and Jordan “that regulate the right of entry, movement, ownership, and work” (Ghoneim, 2010, p. 20). Evidence suggests that the four freedom agreement signed with Sudan has promoted circular migration from Sudan to Egypt. The bilateral agreement with Sudan is the only agreement which directly relates to the migration of both Egyptians and Sudanese to the respective countries. The latter is perhaps due to the fact that the Sudanese migrants represent one of the largest foreign populations in Egypt. However, according to Ghoneim’s 2010 study, the Sudanese are allowed to own buildings and land in Egypt but not vice versa. The agreements with the other countries do not necessarily focus on the promotion of labour migration, for instance the agreement with Jordan focused on managing migration flows from Egypt to Jordan. It emphasises on the Egyptian government’s role to raise awareness of the condition of work and living in Jordan and that labour migrants must hold a valid work permit issued by the Jordanian authorities. Between 1974 and 1993 Egypt signed eleven labour migration agreements but this number has decreased afterwards (Ghoneim, 2010). Information on these agreements is not easy to find and more details on their role in facilitating circular migration is therefore not known.

When it comes to migration from Egypt to the EU, the main country of destination is Italy. Migration, both regular and irregular, has a long tradition and in the mid-2000s it became apparent that there was a necessity for better management of these flows. This included both stopping irregular migration that was happening at the time and establishing regular migration channels for Egyptian nationals. This has led to several initiatives, among which a bilateral labour migration agreement which was signed in November 2005. As discussed in Research Paper 3, this agreement and the resulting cooperation on migration cooperation has been credited as a model for labour migration facilitation across the EU. Yet, circular migration was not a specific aim of this cooperation (Roman, 2008).

Table 2: *Examples of Circular Migration Schemes*⁵

Programme	Country	Partner Country/ies	Type of Migration	Description
Seasonal Agricultural Workers Programme	Canada	Mexico and several Caribbean countries	Seasonal agricultural work	This programme allows migrant workers from Mexico and selected Caribbean countries to work temporary in the agricultural sector. The first temporary workers came in under SWAP in 1966. An employer must offer a minimum of 240 hours of work within a period of six weeks or less, for a maximum duration of eight months. Both employers and foreign workers have to sign a contract which outlines their rights, obligations and duration of employment. The workers' performance is evaluated by the employer and when a foreign worker receives approval his name will be added to a list that allows return under the same scheme, often to the same employer. Practically, return rates are very high as well as repeat participation of migrants and employers (Newland et al., 2008; Siegel & van der Vorst, 2012).
Temporary Foreign Worker Programme	Canada	n/a	Occupations that require lower levels of formal training	This is Canada's programme for hiring foreign workers in occupations that require lower levels of formal training. Initially, after 24 months of employment, temporary foreign workers were to return to their country of permanent residence for at least four months before applying for another work permit (that means 24 months in, four months out). The requirement to return home has since been rescinded and the programme is as such not necessarily circular anymore (Refugees and Citizenship Canada Immigration, 2014).
Bilateral Seasonal Migration Programme	France	Morocco, Poland and Tunisia	Seasonal work	The seasonal foreign worker programme facilitates circular migration of people from countries with which France has concluded a bilateral agreement for this purpose. The programme provides employers with regulations and guidelines on their obligations and ensures the protection of migrant workers' rights.
Bilateral Agreement	France	Mauritius	Diverse occupations	The two countries signed a bilateral agreement on 23rd September 2008 in Paris under which Mauritian workers will be allowed to go and work in France for a specific period. The purpose is that they gain experience and save money before returning to Mauritius to find employment in new sectors of the economy or set up their own business. There are several different categories of migration within this agreement and in some there is a possibility to extend the visa and therefore complete two migration trajectories. This applies to young professionals as well as works in specific sectors (GFMD, 2014; Nayeck, 2009).

⁵ The table contains an overview of different initiatives aimed at facilitating circular migration used by different countries. The author does not claim that this list is comprehensive, but it covers those examples most widely cited in the existing literature on circular migration.

Programme	Country	Partner Country/ies	Type of Migration	Description
Blue Birds Pilot	The Netherlands	Indonesia, South Africa	Shortage sectors (agribusiness, chemistry, engineering, finance, hospitality (including restaurants), industry, IT, logistics, technical, telecommunication and wellness)	The “Blue Birds” Circular Migration Pilot took place between December 2011 and February 2012. An evaluation found several factors that prevented the successful implementation of the pilot including the assignment framework, the quality of the implementation process and the timing as the pilot was carried out when the economic crisis came and there was a change of government (Siegel & van der Vorst, 2012).
Recognised Seasonal Employer Scheme	New Zealand	Fiji, Kiribati, Nauru, Papua New Guinea, Samoa, Solomon Islands, Tonga, Tuvalu, Vanuatu	Horticulture and viticulture industries	This is a managed circular migration initiative that is designed to provide benefits to employers in New Zealand's horticulture and viticulture industries. They can employ workers from Pacific states, where employment opportunities are limited (Bedford et al., n.d.; New Zealand Immigration, 2020).
Temporary and Circular Labour Migration Project (TCLM)	Spain	Colombia	Seasonal agricultural work	The project started in December 2006 and finished in December 2008. Participants received assistance to go to Spain to work in seasonal agriculture for a maximum time of nine months. When their visa expired, they had to return to Colombia. As long as they successfully complied with all conditions set by the programme, they were eligible to go to Spain again in the following year. The programme was suspended due to the economic crisis that hit Spain in 2008 (Hooper, 2019; Rinke, 2012).

Source: Compiled by the author based on the sources cited for each scheme.

VII. Conclusions

Circular migration is a topic that has been widely discussed in the past two decades in both academic and policy circles. Yet, the review conducted for this paper shows that knowledge and practices are still in relatively early stages. In the context of Egypt, it can be assumed that much of the labour migration to the Gulf countries undertaken by large numbers of Egyptian nationals is circular in nature. While no structured evidence exists, anecdotal evidence suggests that this is the case. When it comes to circular migration between Egypt and the European Union, on the other hand, there is actually no reliable evidence available at this stage. While there is data on the stocks of Egyptians in the different Member States as well as annual immigration flows, including for seasonal work, data on circular migration could not be identified. This is due to the fact that the existing data does not allow to analyse whether those coming and going are the same or different people. It was also not possible to identify a reliable data source based on survey data, that would allow to provide an overview of existing circular migration patterns between Egypt and the EU.

Another major challenge becomes apparent when reviewing existing policies and programmes that would facilitate circular migration between Egypt and the EU. No such initiatives could be identified. While there are some options for temporary migration (see Research Paper 3 for an overview of these), none of these are practically facilitating circular movements. In the light of the labour market pressures in Egypt and irregular migration trends, there may be room to change this by engaging in dialogue about potentials for regular migration channels that facilitate circular movements between Egypt and the EU. Yet, designing such programmes is not easy and some authors even argue impossible.

This brings us to a more general challenge that was observed in the review of existing literature and evidence on circular migration that was conducted for this paper. It can be said that there is to a large extent a disconnect between theory and practice when it comes to circular migration. This applies both to the implications that such movements have for countries of origin and destination and the migrants themselves as well as policy making on circular migration. In the migration policy and governance sphere, circular migration has become somewhat of a new mantra. The theoretical implications for development of countries of origin, labour markets in the country of destination and benefits for the migrants themselves seem to be significant as expressed in the triple-win concept. Yet, empirical evidence questions such optimistic outlooks and highlights the challenges faced by temporary migrants, which largely also apply to circular migrants then.

When it comes to policies and programmes on circular migration, there is a risk that countries of destination use such tools to rebrand guest worker and other temporary migration schemes. Governments and employers recognise the value of migration to address labour shortages in the domestic labour market. At the same time, in many countries there is a general resentment of immigration and policies are rather selective in who is admitted for permanent residence. This runs the risk of ignoring that migrants are people and, as such, the social side of migration. In this context Wickramasekara (2011) states that this “reflect[s] the desire on the part of destination countries to bring in ‘labour’ but not ‘people’” (Wickramasekara, 2011, p. 1).

In such cases, temporary and circular migration schemes are often used for low skilled occupations. In addition, there is a sense that countries are using such schemes as tools in the fight against irregular migration. Managing circular migration risks the promotion of selective temporariness of labour mobility rather than fluid circular movements. It is, on the other hand, a fact that when migration is largely unregulated, people move between countries naturally and spontaneously.

VIII. Recommendations

Based on what has been presented above, several recommendations regarding furthering the understanding of circular migration in practice can be made. In the specific context of circular movements between Egypt and the EU as well as more generally, more data needs to be collected and analysed to understand the role of these movements in overall global migration patterns and trends. Data on migration ideally would provide ways to identify circular migrants. This can be achieved through administrative data registering changes of residence. A first recommendation, would therefore lie in exploring existing data and seeing whether there is information that already exists that would allow to produce an analysis of circular migration in the Egyptian context. However, even if data exists, it should be noted that this kind of data tends to be incomplete as migrants do not always register and deregister every time they move. Border control data is another possible source, though this often is limited in terms of the details it contains in terms of reasons for leaving the country. Yet, it is strongly recommended to exploit data that is already being collected as a first step.

Depending on the outcomes of such an assessment and to really understand the patterns and dynamics of circular migration in the Egyptian context, a survey might then be more useful. As proposed by UNECE (2016), a module in a household survey could be a source to further the understanding of circular migration. This can be relatively easy when an ad-hoc module is integrated in a survey that is being carried out anyway, such as Labour Force Surveys. However, surveys also come with limitations as it is often challenging for respondents to recall events in the past. UNECE recommends that this kind of module is done in countries of destination, asking about entries into the country. However, it seems that asking about prior and current experiences of household members in the country of origin, would also allow insights into patterns and dynamics of circular migration movements. Another option is a more targeted demographic survey, which focuses exclusively on capturing individuals' migration history, asking about details of different movements such as reasons for moving, activities while abroad and other factors, which in turn might be able to capture the implications for development of the movements. For this, topics such as remittances, skills and transnational activities can be covered in a survey that, in combination with existing evidence, would allow inferences regarding potential developmental impacts.

In order to facilitate circular migration, it is important to find a way to combine interests of different stakeholders. Evidence shows that the EU and individual Member States seem to engage in temporary and circular migration schemes in their fight against irregular movements. In the light of the call for more regular channels to facilitate safe migration, this is a strategy that makes sense to some extent. It, however, often ignores the interests of countries of origin, the migrants themselves and in some cases even the country of destination. The latter is the case when labour market demands by the scheme are structural and employers therefore would prefer migrants to come permanently to address these shortages. When it comes to the migrants, evidence has shown that temporary migration is not necessarily the preference for all migrants. There are indeed many migrants who only want to move abroad temporarily, in many cases to reach a specific goal. However, in a number of cases these plans change. Others have no clear strategy but opt for countries where they have the chance for permanent stay when they have a choice to make.

This means that designing effective policies and programmes for circular migration is an extremely challenging task. So far, few countries have piloted projects to do so and even fewer have aimed at understanding what works in this context and what does not. What is lacking at this stage are systematic evaluation of such initiatives. Without such evidence it will be difficult to develop policies and programmes further and to design them in a way that they indeed create a triple win situation for all involved stakeholders.

To this end, future projects should include research components on both process and especially impact but are necessary to understand how different initiatives and their components work or do not work. For this, it would be especially important to track the effects over time and follow migrants through multiple cycles, including return to the country of origin to see to what extent, for example, gained skills are utilised. Ultimately, comprehensive evaluations should cover the different dimensions of the triple win scenario, which is so widely promoted by many policy actors. Only by fully understanding the actual effects on countries of origin, countries of destination and the migrants, will it be possible to develop circular migration schemes in a way that they indeed benefit all involved parties.

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